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BYZANTIUM AND THE WEST

PERCEPTION AND REALITY (11TH–15TH C.)

Edited by

Nikolaos G. Chrissis, Athina Kolia-Dermitzaki and Angeliki Papageorgiou

ROUTLEDGE

Byzantium and the West

The interaction between Byzantium and the Latin West was intimately connected to practically all the major events and developments which shaped the medieval world in the High and Late Middle Ages – for example, the rise of the 'papal monarchy', the launch of the crusades, the expansion of international and long-distance commerce, or the flowering of the Renaissance. This volume explores not only the actual avenues of interaction between the two sides (trade, political and diplomatic contacts, ecclesiastical dialogue, intellectual exchange, armed conflict), but also the image each side had of the other and the way perceptions evolved over this long period in the context of their manifold contact.

Twenty-one stimulating papers offer new insights and original research on numerous aspects of this relationship, pooling the expertise of an international group of scholars working on both sides of the Byzantine-Western 'divide', on topics as diverse as identity formation, ideology, court ritual, literary history, military technology and the economy, among others. The particular contribution of the research presented here is the exploration of how cross-cultural relations were shaped by the interplay of the thought-world of the various historical agents and the material circumstances which circumscribed their actions.

The volume is primarily aimed at scholars and students interested in the history of Byzantium, the Mediterranean world, and, more widely, intercultural contacts in the Middle Ages.

Nikolaos G. Chrissis is Assistant Professor of Medieval European History at the Democritus University of Thrace and Associate Lecturer at the Hellenic Open University, Greece. He has also taught at the Universities of London, UK, Birmingham, UK, and Crete, Greece. In 2012–2015, he was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens.

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Byzantium and the West

Perception and Reality (11th–15th c.)

Edited by Nikolaos G. Chrissis, Athina Kolia-Dermitzaki, and Angeliki Papageorgiou

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Abbreviations

BMGS *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*
BZ *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*
CFHB Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae
CSHB Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae
DOP *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*
JÖB *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik*
MGH Monumenta Germaniae Historica
MM F. Miklosich & I. Müller (eds.), *Acta et Diplomata Graeca Medii Aevi Sacra et Profana*, 6 vols, Vienna: C. Gerold, 1860–1890; repr. Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1968
MPG J.-P. Migne (ed.), *Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Graeca*, 161 vols., Paris: Migne, 1857–1866
MPL J.-P. Migne (ed.), *Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Latina*, 221 vols., Paris: Migne, 1844–1865
ODB *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, ed. A. P. Kazhdan, A.-M. Talbot, A. Cutler, T. E. Gregory & N. Ševčenko, 3 vols., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991
PLP *Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palaiologenzeit,* ed. E. Trapp et al., 16 vols., Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1976–1996 [re-issued in CD-ROM in 2001]
REB *Revue des Études Byzantines*
ZRVI *Zbornik Radova Vizantoloskog Instituta* (= Recueil des Travaux de l'Institut d'Études Byzantines, Belgrade)

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Introduction

Nikolaos G. Chrissis, Athina Kolia-Dermitzaki and Angeliki Papageorgiou

The present volume is based primarily on the papers delivered at the homonymous conference held at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens in September 2014. In addition to the original speakers, however, we have also secured the participation of a number of other well-known scholars in the field who were unable to attend the conference, namely, Michel Balard (Paris), Jean-Claude Cheynet (Paris), Catherine Holmes (Oxford), Anthony Kaldellis (Columbus, OH), and Sophia Mergiali-Sahas (Athens). Thus, we believe we have further strengthened the breadth and the international dimension of the research presented here. Unfortunately, health problems prevented Professor Bernard Hamilton, one of the participants in the conference, from contributing to the volume as well. Dr. Marina Koumanoudi, for all her willingness and efforts, was also unable to submit a revised version of her original conference presentation to the volume due to numerous other pressing obligations. The editors wish to thank them both for their valuable participation in the original event.

The interaction between Byzantium and the Latin West was intimately connected to practically all the major events and developments which shaped the medieval world in the High and Late Middle Ages: the rise of the 'papal monarchy', the launch of the crusades, the expansion of international and long-distance commerce, and the flowering of the Renaissance, to name some of the most important ones. The aim of the volume is to explore not only the actual avenues of interaction between the two sides (trade, political and diplomatic contacts, ecclesiastical dialogue, intellectual exchange, armed conflict), but also the perceptions which formed the mental and ideological background within which this manifold contact took place.

The chapters presented here offer new insights and original research on numerous aspects of this relationship, pooling together the expertise of scholars working on both sides of the Byzantine-Western 'divide', on topics as diverse as identity formation, court ritual, ecclesiology, literary history, military technology and the economy, among others. The contact between the Greek and Latin worlds is explored in a variety of contexts and settings: not only in Constantinople and the other Byzantine territories before and after 1204, but also in the multi-cultural court of 12th-century Palermo, the Italian maritime republics, the Hungarian kingdom, the crusader states of Outremer, and the Latin-held territories of

mainland and insular Greece. There is also variation in scope, approach, and subject-matter. Some chapters explore particular themes or offer broad vistas in the *longue durée*, while others focus on turning points or key sources which illustrate the meeting of the two worlds.[1] The particular contribution of the volume as a whole is to shed light on how cross-cultural interaction was shaped at the intersection of the thought-world of the historical agents and the material circumstances which circumscribed their actions.

Byzantine-Western relations constitute a topic of great importance and of vast scope, and there have been numerous publications that deal with one or more aspects of the contact between the two worlds of Medieval Europe. Even if we limit ourselves to a few of the most recent or best-known publications within this theme we can name here, for example: the pioneering studies by D.J. Geanakoplos on the 'sibling' cultures of Byzantium and the Latin West; the proceedings of the eighteenth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies (published in 1988) or the seminal collection edited by Arbel, Hamilton and Jacoby (1989), both of which contain many articles still considered as classics in the field; Krinje Ciggaar's monograph on Western visitors to Constantinople; as well as a growing number of collected volumes of exceptional quality arising from stimulating conferences held as far afield as Nicosia (Cyprus), Greifswald (Germany), Oxford (UK), and Princeton (USA) within the last decade.[2]

This research is indicative of the abiding importance of the subject-matter, and evidence that the present volume is part of an ongoing academic debate with a broad and established audience. Nevertheless, we believe that we have avoided extensive overlap with previous publications, as the chapters included here re-evaluate old questions with new approaches and sources, or cover previously unexplored topics under the general headline of 'Byzantine-Western interaction'. In fact, the particular emphasis on the interplay of perception and reality in Byzantine-Latin contacts is unique to this volume.

Structure of the volume

The contributions are arranged in rough chronological order, while also forming thematic clusters. The volume opens with three chapters which set the scene of East-West contacts: the one by Anthony Kaldellis revisits a landmark event at the beginning of the period under examination, namely the so-called Schism of 1054, offering a radical reassessment of the role of Patriarch Keroularios; the other two chapters explore the broader theme of Italian presence in the Eastern Mediterranean throughout our period, focusing, in turn, on population movements (Michel Balard) and on the relations between Genoa and Byzantium (Sandra Origone).

This opening section is followed by seven chapters that deal with Byzantine-Latin interaction in the late 11th and 12th century, primarily in the context of the crusading movement. Athina Kolia-Dermitzaki explores the ideological aspects of the meeting between the Byzantines and the crusaders, while Jean-Claude Cheynet looks into the political motivations and practical considerations for both sides.

Jonathan Phillips then examines how the empire, its capital, and its people were portrayed in crusader accounts from the First to the Third Crusade. Turning to the opposite side, Angeliki Papageorgiou analyses the image of Western peoples in the Byzantine court during the reign of John II Komnenos (1118–1143). Elizabeth Jeffreys takes the same theme further, focusing particularly on the corpus of the elusive but prolific poet who flourished under John's heir, Manuel Komnenos, and is conventionally known as Manganeios Prodromos. These two chapters on the Komnenian court are followed by Catherine Holmes' timely reminder that there were Byzantine perspectives which differed from the Constantinopolitan one, in her re-evaluation of local factors in Eustathios' narration of the Norman conquest of Thessalonica in 1185. Michael Angold's examination of how the Byzantines reacted to another, near-contemporary conquest, this time of Latin Jerusalem by the army of Saladin in 1187, rounds off this section on Byzantine-Western interaction in the period of the early crusades.

The following section of the volume offers a change of focus in terms of both geography and chronology, and deals with cases that stand very much at the margins of the 'Western' and the 'Byzantine' worlds. The six chapters here challenge the simple Latin–Greek binary opposition and demonstrate the multilateral character of cross-cultural interactions in the Mediterranean, the Balkans, and the Holy Land. Eleni Tounta provides an insightful analysis of the intercultural mixture of Greek and Latin elements in the poetry of Admiral Eugenius of Sicily, while Alicia Simpson turns her attention to the kingdom of Hungary, another liminal political entity at the margins of the Latin world but with close and abiding ties with Byzantium as this chapter amply shows. The contribution by Nikoletta Giantsi focuses on the provisions of the Third Lateran Council (1179) on leprosy, bringing out connections between papal policy, Byzantine interventionism, and the circumstances in the crusader kingdom of Jerusalem under Baldwin IV (1174–1185). Moving past the watershed of the Latin conquest of Constantinople in 1204, the next two chapters juxtapose the perceptions of Greek or Latin 'otherness' and the reality of the manifold symbiosis between the two sides in Romania. First, Ilias Giarenis explores contacts with, and perceptions of, the West in the Byzantine successor state of Nicaea. Then, Maria Dourou-Eliopoulou turns to interactions in the Latin-held territories of Romania as presented in contemporary narrative and documentary sources. Finally, the contribution by Nickiphoros Tsougarakis takes us once more to the Holy Land with a fascinating discussion of the portrayal of Greek rite and Greek clergy in late medieval pilgrim accounts, and the wider context which explains the noticeable hardening of attitudes in the 15th century.

The last section of the volume brings together five chapters on the various functions of the Latins in Late Byzantium; different contexts are explored, including identity discourses, diplomacy, administration, the economy, and the military. Starting with the Byzantines' view of the Latins, Theodora Papadopoulou provides an overview of how Western peoples were represented in Byzantine literature before and after 1204, while Nikolaos Chrissis takes up the question

of how the image of the West can provide insights into the transformations of Byzantine identity in the last centuries of the empire. Sophia Mergiali-Sahas follows up with the examination of key questions regarding the presence and role of Westerners in the restored Byzantine empire of Michael VIII Palaiologos (1261–1282). Triantafylitsa Maniati-Kokkini sheds light on the place of Latins in Late Byzantine socio-economic reality through an examination of the relevant terminology used in the sources. The volume closes with a comparative examination by Christos Makrypoulias regarding the evolution of military technology in Byzantium and the Latin West, discussing mutual influences and challenging various modern assumptions on the topic.

Thus, the collection covers a broad array of subjects, spread throughout the period from the 11th to the 15th century, and examining different settings for Byzantine-Western interaction, while at the same time maintaining a unity of focus around the theme of perception and reality. Besides the chronological-thematic organisation of the contributions set out above, there are also numerous other points of intersection between the chapters which lend themselves to comparative research, and which the interested reader can pick up in order to explore continuities and changes over time.

Acknowledgements

This volume is based on the conference 'Byzantium and the West: Perception and Reality, 12th–15th c.'/«Βυζάντιο και Δύση: Αντιλήψεις και Πραγματικότητα, 12^{ος}–15^{ος} αι.», held at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens on 5–6 September 2014. The conference was organised in the context of a postdoctoral research project carried out by Dr. Nikolaos G. Chrissis and supervised by Prof. Athina Kolia-Dermitzaki. The project and (in part) the conference were jointly funded by the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Greek state.[3]

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Finally, the editors would like to thank all the colleagues, from Greece and abroad, who accepted our invitation to participate in the conference and/or contribute to the volume. We would also like to thank Dr. Marilia Lykaki and Dr. Nausika Vassilopoulou who assisted in the efficient and smooth running of the conference.

Notes

1 We should note here that the decision was made for the programming of the conference, and consequently for the volume as well, not to include discussions on art, archaeology, and material culture. We fully acknowledge that those are exceptionally important fields for the study of intercultural contacts, but we felt they would not be adequately served as a mere side note to a primarily literary-historical collection because they merit dedicated extensive discussion in their own right.

2 D.J. Geanakoplos, *Interaction of the 'Sibling' Byzantine and Western Cultures in the Middle Ages and Italian Renaissance (330–1600)* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); J.D. Howard-Johnston (ed.), *Byzantium and the West, c.850–c.1200: Proceedings of the XVIII Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies* (Amsterdam: A.M. Hakkert, 1988) [= *Byzantinische Forschungen* 13]; B. Arbel, B. Hamilton and D. Jacoby (eds.), *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean World after 1204* (London: F. Cass, 1989) [= *Mediterranean Historical Review*, 4.1]; K.N. Ciggaar, *Western Travellers to Constantinople: The West and Byzantium, 962–1204. Cultural and Political Relations* (Leiden: Brill, 1996); M. Hinterberger and C. Schabel (eds.), *Greek, Latins and Intellectual History, 1204–1500* (Leuven: Peeters, 2011); M. Altripp (ed.), *Byzanz in Europa: Europas östliches Erbe* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012); J. Harris, C. Holmes and E. Russell (eds.), *Byzantines, Latins and Turks in the Eastern Mediterranean World after 1150* (Oxford: OUP, 2012); M.S. Brownlee and D.H. Gondicas (eds.), *Renaissance Encounters: Greek East and Latin West* (Leiden: Brill, 2013). For an extensive list of works dealing with aspects of Byzantine-Western relations, see also the online searchable database created by A. Kolia-Dermitzaki, Tr. Maniati-Kokkini, and M. Dourou-Eliopoulou (Faculty of History and Archaeology, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens), based on the research programme 'Byzantine and Western World: Juxtapositions and Interactions, 11th–15th c.' (available at byzantio-dysi.arch.uoa.gr).

3 The research project 'Worlds Apart? Identity and Otherness in Late Byzantine Perceptions of the West' (SH6–1345) was implemented within the framework of the Action 'Supporting Postdoctoral Researchers' of the Operational Program 'Education and Lifelong Learning' (Action's Beneficiary: General Secretariat for Research and Technology) and was co-financed by the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Greek State.

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Part I

Setting the Scene

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1 Keroularios in 1054

Nonconfrontational to the papal legates and loyal to the emperor

Anthony Kaldellis

The present chapter offers a radical reinterpretation of the events associated with the Schism of the Churches that took place in Constantinople in the summer of 1054.[1] It focuses not on the liturgical, ecclesiastical, and theological issues but on the stance and politics of the patriarch of Constantinople Michael I Keroularios (1043–1058) and argues specifically, in contrast to the reconstructions of events found in almost all modern discussions, that Keroularios did not engage or seek out confrontation with the papal legates; in fact, that he deliberately avoided doing so even when provoked; that Keroularios was likely obeying imperial directives the entire time; that he never challenged or confronted the emperor Constantine IX Monomachos (1042–1055) or sought to undermine his foreign policy regarding Italy; and that the mutual excommunications did not, as far as we know, affect the emperor's relations with the papacy regarding the Norman problem there, nor were the excommunications understood by any of the parties as having affected those relations. The issue at hand, then, is not whether Keroularios held liturgical, ecclesiastical, and theological views that were at odds with those of the reformist papacy. It is probable that he did, and so, I suspect, did most Byzantine prelates. In later Byzantine tradition, Keroularios was credited with formulating a series of objections to the beliefs and practices of the Latin Church (though the textual traditions are tangled and, in my view, surely postdate the events of the summer of 1054 [Kolbaba, 2000]). Nor is the issue here the modern debate over the definition of Schism and the attempt to ascertain whether the two Churches came to be in a state of Schism before, during, after, or long after the events of 1054. Rather, *the issue is whether Keroularios engaged in confrontation with representatives of the Church of Rome over those issues and whether his actions in 1054 clashed with any aspect of the emperor Monomachos' policies.* My answer to both of these questions is no.

The reconstruction offered here, based on a fresh reading of the primary sources, stands in contrast to all scholarly discussions of the events known to me. The standard narrative can be illustrated from a sampling of general surveys. First, the emperor Monomachos is seen as an 'ineffective' and 'weak emperor no longer capable of controlling the course of events', while Keroularios was 'the most strong-willed and ambitious prelate of Byzantine history', he had a 'restless

and bellicose nature … [with] a ruthlessness which did not hesitate to go to any lengths' (Ostrogorsky, 1969, 336). Keroularios behaved so poorly toward the legates that he exacerbated whatever prior tensions may have existed with Rome. It was he who 'broke off discussions with the Roman delegation' (Gallagher, 2008, 595). Then, 'exasperated by the patriarch's intransigence, the papal legates excommunicated him. While the emperor tried to calm the dispute, demonstrations in the capital supported the patriarch, who excommunicated the legates. [This] ruined the emperor's alliance with the papacy' (Treadgold, 1997, 596). Those riots were orchestrated by Keroularios: 'He fomented an anti-Latin riot which destroyed the emperor's efforts to build an alliance between Byzantium and the papacy' (Holmes, 2008, 272).[2] The counter-excommunication of the legates was also his doing, as he 'managed to persuade the vacillating emperor to change his policy and fall into line. With the consent of the emperor, he summoned a synod which returned blow for blow by excommunicating the Roman legates' (Ostrogorsky, 1969, 337). The emperor is sometimes cut out of the narrative, leaving the patriarch as the sole agent on the Byzantine side: 'Keroularios together with his synod retaliated by excommunicating the papal legate' (Gallagher, 2008, 595; cf. Smith, 1978, 103: 'the emperor was unable to withstand the patriarch's reciprocal excommunication of those who scorned the sanctity of Orthodox tradition'). The anti-Norman alliance with the papacy was now dead (Louth, 2007, 310). 'It was a triumph for the patriarch, a setback for the emperor, whose Italian policy was now in ruins, and a humiliation for the papal legates' (Angold, 1997, 52).

A substantial portion of this narrative, I will argue, is fiction, and the rest is a distorted twisting of the facts which ensures that Keroularios is blamed. Let us then go back to the sources and see if we can ascertain exactly what it was that Keroularios actually did. Even if not all readers are persuaded to accept the full conclusions reached here, the analysis should expose the tenuous documentary foundations of the traditional narrative.

No contemporary narrative recounts those events in detail. Instead, the story has come down to us as an ecclesiastical version of *Les liaisons dangereuses*, a scandalous epistolary narrative in which authors were misattributed and signals crossed even as events played out. A recapitulation of the sequence will allow nonspecialists to follow the trail. In 1053, Leon, archbishop of Ohrid, sent a brief letter to John, bishop of Trani in southern Italy, raising certain ecclesiastical issues, especially the use of leavened versus unleavened bread (*azyma*) in the eucharist. The Byzantine Church used leavened bread, whereas the Latins (and Armenians) used unleavened, and Leon argued against the *azyma* (in Will, *Acta*, 56–60). This letter came to the attention of the papal court, especially cardinal Humbert, who was outraged by it and made a rough translation (Will, *Acta*, 61–64). By this point, Keroularios had (mistakenly) been added as the co-author of Leon's letter. This addition may have been made by Humbert himself, by Argyros (a Byzantine governor in southern Italy but of local origin Smith, 1978, 124–125)), or someone else, and it may have been made by mistake, or in the sincere belief (whether correct or not) that Keroularios held the same views as Leon or had authorized him to dispatch the letter, or it may have been done maliciously, to implicate Keroularios

in an emerging controversy and embarrass him. Be that as it may, Humbert hereafter treated Keroularios as the (evil) instigator of the controversy.

Yet Keroularios was not behind Leon's letter to John (Michel, 1924–1930, 2:282–289; Smith, 1978, 53–54, 85, 106–108). He may have agreed – and likely did agree – with its position (had he known it), but what is at issue here is how Keroularios acted as the head of the imperial Church. When he soon afterward entered the story (see below), he immediately tried to create a constructive relationship in order to promote imperial interests, not instigate or inflame a conflict. In fact, it is not certain that Leon of Ohrid himself meant to instigate one. We do not know how 'explosive' the *azyma* issue was perceived to be in the relationship between the Churches – except by Humbert, of course, who was incensed (the thesis of Smith, 1978). Later, Catholic advocates and polemicists naturally perpetuated the (co)attribution of Leon's letter to Keroularios. But it has also crept into the mainstream, riding on the premise that Keroularios was a combative polemicist, 'equally to blame'. So, even in the *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium,* we read that Leon was Keroularios' 'spokesman'.[3] It is important to stress that there is no proof of that. Leon was the autocephalous archbishop of Ohrid (i.e., Bulgaria), a most sensitive post in the Byzantine imperial Church, and had held it for thirty years, far longer than Keroularios had been patriarch. He had a mind of his own and could send letters of his own (for Leon, see Tăpkova-Zaimova 2011, 229–230).

Pope Leo, through Humbert, next wrote a long polemical response to Leon 'and Keroularios' (Will, *Acta*, 65–85; for Pope Leo, see Bischoff and Tock, 2008). Before that could be sent, however, the pope received two letters from Constantinople, one from the Emperor Monomachos urging the continuation of the anti-Norman alliance, something that Leo himself desperately wanted; and one from Keroularios, which was irenic, did not raise controversial issues, and also urged the anti-Norman alliance. We do not have these letters, but we know them from Leo's responses to them and from later back-references. Keroularios' tone must have confused the papal court, but only because of their prior misattribution of Leon of Ohrid's letter to him. In reality, the patriarch was doing in this instance what he would do throughout this entire story, namely whatever the emperor told him to do in pursuance of imperial policy. Keroularios later referred to this letter (his first to Leo) as being extremely humble and solicitous, and no doubt it was that.[4] There is no reason whatsoever to think that Keroularios sent this letter reluctantly or against his wishes, or that he had to be persuaded by someone else to send it on the *a priori* assumption that he was not the type to do any emperor's bidding (Runciman, 1955, 43). This is just the bias against Keroularios churning up fictions to explain facts that cut against the standard modern narrative.

Pope Leo wrote two letters in response, the first to the emperor in favour of the alliance, praising Monomachos but condemning Keroularios on the *azyma* and other issues (Will, *Acta*, 85–89). Leo also wrote a hostile letter to Keroularios, calling him out on a number of points, including on his title ('Ecumenical Patriarch', which the Church of Rome had never accepted since its appearance in late antiquity) (Will, *Acta*, 89–92; see Demacopoulos, 2013). The pope's letters

were to be delivered by his legates, Humbert, Petrus, the bishop of Amalfi, and Frederick, the papal chancellor and architect of Leo's anti-Norman strategy. And here we come to the events in Constantinople.

Despite the importance of the events of 1054 and the frequency with which they are retold in modern studies, we have only three sources for what happened in Constantinople, and they are not ideal. The first is Humbert's brief *Commemoratio*, which he wrote after his return to preface the *Excommunicatio* of Keroularios and his *sectatores* (Will, *Acta*, 150–152). As historians have realized, Humbert's account is extremely biased and must be treated with caution. But what it does *not* say is sometimes more revealing for our purpose. The second is the edict of counter-excommunication issued by the Byzantine Synod convened by Monomachos and Keroularios after the legates' departure (Will, *Acta*, 155–188). This source contains a narrative that explains why the counter-excommunication was necessary at all. In addition to the usual doctrinal polemics, this is a fussy bureaucratic document, concerned with explaining procedural steps and justifying its existence. In my reading, it reflects Keroularios and the other bishops' anxiety to appear to have done everything by the book, in full compliance with imperial instructions. And third, we have Keroularios' first letter to Petros of Antioch, which conveys the patriarch's side of the story and advances his feud with Argyros (Will, *Acta*, 172–184). Let us look again at all the events which these sources record because that has not yet been done outside of a framework which assumes that Keroularios had an agenda and was behind everything.

These sources record few specific events that took place in 1054 before the legates' dramatic excommunication of Keroularios, in fact only three. When we look at them closely, the narrative of a 'confrontation' between the legates and Keroularios evaporates. But first, we have to remember that the legates' primary business was presumably to work out the terms of an alliance with the emperor for dealing with the Normans. They would have spent most of their time in the palace or in discussion with Monomachos' minister, at this time one John the *logothetes* (Skylitzes, *Synopsis*, 477; Psellos, *Chronographia* 6.177–181; idem, *Orationes funebres* 2.9). But we hear almost nothing about that. The legates were also going to investigate or resolve the religious controversies that had arisen in the meantime, in the letter of Leon of Ohrid misattributed to Keroularios (Humbert, *Commemoratio*, in Will, *Acta*, 153).

The legates arrived on Constantinople around the end of April. The three known events are the following. First, the legates visited the emperor. Nothing is known about those discussions. Second, they visited Keroularios (these two visits are known from his *Letter I to Petros of Antioch*, in Will, *Acta*, 177). Keroularios later claimed that they came with arrogance, did not address him properly – presumably this means they did not address him as Ecumenical Patriarch, or even as Patriarch at all, but probably as 'archbishop', the title used in Pope Leo's letter to Keroularios – and then there was a dispute about the order of seating arrangements (reminding us of Liudprand's complaint about his visit to the court of Nikephoros II Phokas a century earlier: Liudprand, *Relatio*, par. 19). The problem was inevitable, as Byzantine ranking protocols did not make provision for Western ranks and

titles, certainly not the exalted status which the legates arrogated to themselves as the representatives of a pope who claimed to preside over the entire Christian world. Apparently, the legates did not debate any matter with Keroularios other than the seating arrangements. They gave him the pope's letter (possibly both versions) and left. It is possibly from these letters that Keroularios would have first learned that issues of religious import were now encroaching on what for the court were discussions of military-political issues. Keroularios found that the seals on the letters had previously been opened and he suspected that the contents of the letter had been tampered with by Argyros. It is not surprising that he was confused and suspected foul play, because, to his knowledge, he had sent only a cordial letter to Pope Leo, nothing that merited the attack that he now read once he had it translated. 'Even after the legates arrived in Constantinople, Keroularios was apparently unaware of having done anything intentionally to disrupt relations with Rome' (Smith, 1978, 85–86).

The following cannot be stressed enough: *This was the only meeting that ever took place between Keroularios and the legates*, and *the meeting did not involve any altercation between them on liturgical or theological matters.* The legates delivered their charge and left. They made no attempt to resolve the misunderstanding that had been created by the misattribution of the letter of Leon of Ohrid. They did not inquire after Keroularios' position on the issues in question. Keroularios did nothing Schism-related at this meeting, and it was the only one he would have with the legates.

The third event (or set of events) that we know took place before the legates excommunicated Keroularios involved not Keroularios, but Niketas Stethatos, a learned monk at the Stoudios monastery. We know of it only from Humbert's *Commemoratio*. At an unknown time, Stethatos had written a treatise critiquing some positions and practices of the Latins, including the *azyma* and clerical celibacy. When it now came into Humbert's hands, he was incensed and wrote a polemical refutation. The legates also pressured the emperor (*insistentes*) to bring Stethatos to account and, indeed, on 24 June Monomachos forced Stethatos to recant in the Stoudios monastery, repudiate his own writings in the emperor's presence, and reject anyone who denied papal supremacy. After that, upon the legates' *suggestio*, the emperor required that the writings be burned in the presence of all. It is not clear whether all these actions constituted one event in the Stoudios monastery in the presence of both the emperor and the legates, though that seems to be the implication. On the following day, Niketas came out to the palace of Pege where the legates were staying and made up with them. The emperor also commanded that the legates' responses to all the 'Greek slanders' and especially to the letter of Leon of Ohrid be translated into Greek and kept on file in Constantinople (Humbert, *Commemoratio*, in Will, *Acta*, 151).

What conclusions can we draw from this episode? The legates seem to have had frequent access to the emperor, probably because they were discussing the political situation in Italy with him. Moreover, by disciplining Stethatos in such a spectacular way, the emperor gave the legates the impression that he was willing to impose their views upon his own subjects – and many later Byzantine emperors

would try to give this same impression to the Church of Rome. But likely unknown to the legates, Monomachos had a personal motive in this case too: Stethatos had, in the past, criticized the emperor's 'affair' with his mistress Maria Skleraina (Skylitzes, *Synopsis*, 434). This was a matter of life and death, not a trivial grievance. Monomachos had come to the throne when the people of Constantinople had overthrown and blinded Michael V in 1042 because he had tried to set aside the Macedonian heiress Zoe and, in 1044, Monomachos himself had almost been torn apart by a crowd who believed that he too was going to replace Zoe with his mistress (Skylitzes, *Synopsis*, 434). As for Stethatos' treatises, it is not clear if they were written in response to the legates' presence; it is possible they were already circulating. There is no evidence of 'debates' taking place with the legates from which the treatises might have emerged (yet debates are mentioned in – for example – Hussey, 1986, 133; Kolbaba, 2011, 39). The last thing the emperor wanted were ecclesiastical debates. These 'debates' are the fictions of modern historians who accept the framework of ecclesiastical confrontation at the highest levels. In other words, Stethatos was not necessarily a provocateur laying down a challenge before the legates. Rather, it seems that he was now called to account for prior writings that happened to be circulating. Finally – and this is the key point – there is no reason to think that Keroularios was 'behind' Stethatos in this matter. That assumption is often made because of the interpretive framework which presupposes that Keroularios was the evil mastermind behind all Orthodox actions or reactions, whether those of Leon of Ohrid or Stethatos (Michel, 1924–1930, 2:307; Kolbaba, 2011, 39; cf. Smith, 1978, 157: Keroularios 'naturally designated the Studite monk to answer their objections'). But there is no proof for that at all, and not even Humbert alleges it. Nor did Stethatos 'support' Keroularios in his dispute with the legates (Angold, 1995, 28) because the patriarch had not publicly taken a position or entered into any dispute with them in which he required support.

Moreover, while we know extremely little about Keroularios' patriarchate other than its very end (see below), the one thing that we know about its politics was that Keroularios was at odds with … the Stoudios monastery (for what follows, see Angold, 1995, 28, citing the sources). Apparently, he had refused to commemorate St Theodore the Stoudite and had clashed with the monastery over the liturgical belts that its deacons wore. Interestingly, when the abbot complained to the emperor (Monomachos) about the commemoration, the emperor forced Keroularios to include Theorodos' name. This again reveals the balance of power: Keroularios followed imperial orders in this matter just as in the entire 1054 affair, as we will see. And it indicates that Stoudios would be the last place Keroularios would turn for help. It is sometimes assumed that Keroularios and Stoudios had made up because in 1052 the remains of St Symeon the New Theologian, whose cause was championed by Niketas Stethatos, were returned to Constantinople (Stethatos, *The Life of Saint Symeon* 129, 312–313). But there is no evidence of Keroularios' involvement. Stethatos says only that the saint's remains were returned. It is modern historians who have spun a narrative of patriarchal endorsement out of this bare reference. Moreover, Stethatos, like Leon of Ohrid, was his own man, not a stooge of Keroularios.

The next thing that we know happened in Constantinople that summer was the dramatic excommunication of Keroularios by the legates, on 16 July. In sum, there is no proof for any 'confrontation' between him and the legates, no ongoing debate or dispute or anything of the sort. Quite the contrary, it was the patriarch's silence that seems to have frustrated Humbert. In the *Commemoratio* he claims that the patriarch 'avoided' them (in Will, *Acta*, 151; also in the *Excommunicatio*, Ibid, 154); therefore, according to his lights, they had to take action. In other words, *Keroularios had done nothing whatsoever*. The question is how we interpret this nothing. The 'bad Keroularios' school of interpretation uses expressions such as 'refused to see them', but *refused* is a loaded word, for there is no evidence that they requested to see him after their initial awkward meeting. Another way to put it is that Keroularios 'thought that if he refused to become involved with the legates the whole affair would simply pass' (Smith, 1978, 160), which takes something away from the narrative of 'confrontation'. A different way to put it would turn the entire narrative on its head: Keroularios 'was systematically ignored [by the legates;… their] conduct presupposed that he was expected to be the defendant on a grave charge and the legates were both prosecutors and judges' (Chadwick, 2003, 210).

The excommunication itself provides the best proof that Keroularios had furnished no grounds for confrontation. For an excommunication has to take aim at specific declarations or actions but, in the body of the text, the legates can pin nothing specific on Keroularios apart from the issues that had been raised in the letter of Leon of Ohrid along with some stock distinctions between the Eastern and Western Churches, some rumors about how the patriarch created eunuchs and made them bishops, and the like. The legates had no document to cite in which Keroularios had gone on the record expressing any view whatsoever, nor could they claim that he had expressed any particular views orally to them. In short, there were no 'confrontations' in 1054. The legates had no more to go on in July than they had when they had left Italy, no legal handle by which to hold Keroularios. I suspect that during their stay in Constantinople they had come to understand that Keroularios probably agreed with the main points outlined in Leon of Ohrid's letter, as did many or most Byzantines,[5] but that the patriarch was keeping a low profile to avoid confrontation. But what made them think that they could get away with storming into Hagia Sophia and excommunicating the emperor's own patriarch?

The legates had built a strong relationship with the emperor, and there is no reason to think that the discussions over the anti-Norman alliance were going badly. The excommunication was laid down on the altar of Hagia Sophia on 16 July. Two days later, according to Humbert's account, they went again to the emperor who gave them presents for St Peter's, the kiss of peace, and permission to depart (Will, *Acta*, 152). We do not know what agreement the legates had made with him, but the mission seems to have succeeded. Yet just as they were about to leave, they decided to excommunicate Keroularios even though he had done nothing during their entire stay. How should we understand this turn of events?

There is no way to avoid speculation at this point. The mystery of the legates' action has been explained in the past by inventing a fictitious character, the intransigent, arrogant, theocrat Keroularios who is familiar from so much scholarship and the polemics of Psellos (see below). Yet, that monster has been invented to fill a gap in the causal chain that leads to the excommunication. I present a different scenario which fits the documented behavior of all parties involved. The legates were papal reformers, not merely political diplomats. Early on during their stay in Constantinople, the court – likely emperor and patriarch alike – realized, even if only through the papal letters, that the legates, if they suspected that anyone in Constantinople deviated from the position of Rome, were likely to insist on a full definition and clarification of all relevant doctrinal, liturgical, and ecclesiastical issues; and, moreover, that they would also insist that the position of Rome (e.g., on papal supremacy) be publicly upheld by all authorities in Constantinople and that all contrary views be repudiated and burned.[6] That is the position that Humbert takes in all his writings about the events, and it is exactly what the legates demanded in the case of Stethatos. But the emperor and patriarch knew for their part that the people and the clergy of Constantinople would likely never accept the legates' position; moreover, they themselves did not agree with that position to begin with, but they wanted the alliance. Therefore, they decided it would be best if Keroularios stayed out of it altogether, or the emperor ordered Keroularios to keep quiet; it does not matter. Stethatos (conveniently a personal enemy of both Monomachos and Keroularios) was tarred and feathered for the legates' satisfaction, and all was done to give the impression that there was no major rupture between Rome and Constantinople on the issues that mattered to the reformers. Keroularios accordingly kept quiet. Far from the traditional image of the man, this was a calculated withdrawal to avoid a dispute.

But the plan did not work because the legates were not satisfied that all was well. Humbert makes no secret of what he wanted: a full repudiation of the errors expressed in the letter of Leon of Ohrid, which he thought came also from Keroularios. By this point, the original misunderstanding was probably a mute issue, as the legates had come to the position that the patriarch's views on the key issues were no different from Leon's. Without such a repudiation and recantation, the legates could not be certain that the Church of Constantinople did not harbour strong elements of resistance to papal supremacy, the emperor's assurances notwithstanding. The legates were explicit about this in the text of the excommunication itself: one of their purposes in coming to Constantinople was to ascertain whether the rumours they had heard about heterodox beliefs having nestled there were true. But after a few months, realizing that the patriarch could not be baited, they decided, two days before they were about to leave, to excommunicate him because of what they *suspected* were his views, based on the letter of Leon of Ohrid and other rumours they had heard. The fact that they went to receive the emperor's farewell gifts indicates that Monomachos had successfully persuaded them that he was on their side: the legates believed that the emperor supported not only the alliance but papal supremacy, and that is the impression which they took to Italy with them. The excommunication and Humbert's *Commemoratio*

praised the emperor, the people of Constantinople, and the clergy – it was only Keroularios and his *sectatores* whom they targeted.

This interpretation of events explains the sequel better than the narrative which postulates conflict between Keroularios and Monomachos. A subdeacon on duty that day in Hagia Sophia begged the legates to take the document back, but they refused and dropped it on the ground. It changed hands many times before it reached the patriarch, who 'accepted it so that its blasphemies would not be publicized' (Synodal Edict in Will, *Acta*, 161). He had the excommunication translated and informed the emperor; by this point, it was the day after the legates had departed. The patriarch requested that the legates answer to the Holy Synod (Humbert, *Commemoratio*, in Will, *Acta*, 152A.21–24; and implicit in the Synodal Edict, idem, 165). Monomachos ascertained that the translation was accurate and that the legates were unwilling to appear before Keroularios and the Synod to explain their momentous and offensive act. The emperor informed the patriarch and Synod of these findings; he also thought that the excommunication had to be answered and sent detailed instructions to Keroularios and the Synod as to how this should be done. The instructions are quoted in full in the Synodal edict (Will, *Acta*, 166–167) because, in this delicate matter, the patriarch and Synod were careful to show that they had followed them to the letter. Those instructions were that the blame was to be laid on certain interpreters and on Argyros. The Synodal edict ratified the emperor's findings.

Historians often assume that it was Keroularios who somehow forced the emperor to condemn Argyros, imposing his personal vendettas upon imperial policy. But this is a conspiracy theory lacking evidentiary basis. It assumes that Keroularios somehow dictated the emperor's instructions and verdict against Argyros in advance, and then made a show of obeying them. The Synod claims to be following imperial instructions, so the burden of proof is on the conspiracy theorists to prove that Keroularios had somehow twisted the emperor's arm in advance. In reality, the emperor had his own reasons to distrust Argyros, who was not as 'indispensable' to imperial policy in Italy as many historians think. Argyros was the son of a former rebel (Melo) who had introduced the Normans to southern Italian affairs. Argyros had even led a Norman attack on imperial territories in 1042 before switching sides, and he had then proven ineffective at stopping the Normans and had been recalled to Constantinople in 1045 or 1046. He had been sent back to Italy in 1051, though was still not raking up successes (for his career, see Lambakis, 2008, 432–449). Argyros is hardly mentioned in Byzantine sources, but William of Apulia, the historian of the Normans, says that Argyros irrevocably lost Monomachos' favour in 1053, after the battle of Civitate (when the Normans defeated the army of Pope Leo, whom Argyros had failed to support).[7] Whatever the truth of this, it shows that the emperor may well have had his own reasons for putting Argyros in his place (just as he had independent reasons for suppressing Stethatos); we do not, therefore, need to suspect a conspiracy by Keroularios. Moreover, we do not know that Argyros was *not* involved in the scandal with the legates. Someone, after all, had led them to believe that Keroularios held objectionable, anti-reformist views. This is probably why the

interpreters were blamed too. By blaming them and Argyros, the emperor could conveniently condemn what the legates had done without breaking off relations with the pope, who is explicitly dissociated from the condemnation at the very start of the Synodal counter-excommunication (in Will, *Acta*, 160; for the role of false translations and interpreters in the whole story, see Gastgeber 2014).

At this point in the story all modern reconstructions confidently report two facts: first, that riots broke out in Constantinople, instigated by Keroularios to force the emperor into allowing the condemnation of the legates; and, second, that this ruined the emperor's foreign policy for Italy. For example, we are told that: 'faced with a popular uprising if he pursued a course of conciliation with Rome, the emperor… had to abandon his projected Italian military alliance against the Normans and capitulate to his intransigent patriarch' (Smith, 1978, 38). Or, 'it took only a week for Keroularios to bring the emperor and the synod over to his side' (Kolbaba, 2010, 118). It is time for both beliefs to be scrutinized anew because neither holds up.

Our sole evidence for the alleged riots is a brief reference by Humbert in his *Commemoratio*, and it must be emphasized that this, by extension, is *our only piece of evidence for a rupture between the patriarch and the emperor*. Humbert, we must recall, was eager to maintain that the pious and wise emperor was really on the legates' side, both because that served Humbert's rhetorical agenda and also because it was probably the impression that Monomachos himself had given him throughout. Therefore, any apparent changes in the emperor's stance – such as authorizing the counter-excommunication or arresting anyone associated with the legates such as the interpreters – had to be attributed to Keroularios' malign influence and pressure. Humbert claims that the emperor protected the legates from Keroularios and refused his request for an inquiry. Keroularios, seeing that he was not getting his way, stirred up a mob against the emperor (*concitavit imperatori vulgi seditionem maximam*). In order to quiet this down, the emperor handed the interpreters over to the patriarch. But later the emperor learned that Keroularios had tricked him by twisting the translation of the excommunication. The idea is that Monomachos would naturally have agreed with the true position of the legates had it only been presented to him accurately. Monomachos then showed the accurate translation to the citizens, and the implication is that even the people of Constantinople agreed with the contents of the excommunication of Keroularios when they were shown an accurate copy. Thus, the *Commemoratio* concludes, the emperor (and people) were now at odds with the patriarch and expelled his friends and relatives from the palace (Will, *Acta*, 152).

This story, especially the riot, has been taken at face value. The riot has even entered the canonical list of rebellions and seditions against the emperors of this period – based solely on this passage (Cheynet, 1996, 64). Yet there are reasons to be skeptical. It is not so much fictional as distorted to promote a specific interpretation, namely that the emperor and even the people of Constantinople were fully on the legates' side and that anything which seemed to undercut the legates' success was due to Keroularios' evil influence. But Humbert was not in Constantinople when those alleged riots took place. Moreover, he is wrong about

Keroularios' allegedly deliberate mistranslation of the Latin excommunication, in a way that we can actually confirm: the Synod quotes the Greek translation of the original excommunication, and it is quite accurate. This must have been the version that Keroularios sent to the emperor on the day after the legates departed. Thus, we know there was no trickery there. Also, it was not Keroularios' relatives who were expelled from the palace, but those of Argyros, as the emperor states explicitly (Will, *Acta*, 167). What Humbert could not accept, or did not want to be known, was that the emperor could disagree with the views in the legates' excommunication of Keroularios so long as they were accurately presented to him. In reality, the emperor was appalled by them, calling them 'shameless' (Will, *Acta*, 166). Humbert was being disingenuous (or deluded) when he suggested that the people of the capital would also accept the contents of his excommunication of Keroularios if only they were presented with an accurate translation of it. But Humbert was not lying in all this, because the emperor had probably given the legates the strong impression that he supported papal claims, especially when he forced Stethatos to recant and apologize.

The *seditio* mentioned by Humbert could have been anything. Some people may indeed have protested the legates' behavior that day at Hagia Sophia, or the excommunication of their patriarch, but we should not interpret this as a political attack on the emperor by Keroularios. No such riot or attack is mentioned in the Byzantine sources, which, for the 11th century, are attuned to popular riots (Kaldellis, 2013). Granted, the final years of Monomachos are not covered well in the narrative sources, but when Keroularios was deposed in 1058 by Isaakios I Komnenos (1057–1059), Psellos wrote a long invective attack against Keroularios, who was his personal enemy, listing all of the patriarch's past infractions against imperial authority (Psellos, *Orationes forenses* 1; for Psellos and Keroularios, see Kaldellis & Polemis, 2015). Yet he does not say anything there about an attack against Monomachos, even though it would greatly help his argument that Keroularios was arrogant and usurped imperial prerogatives. 'The Byzantine histories do not present Keroularios' behavior in that affair [1054] as an anticipation of his later autocratic actions' (Smith, 1978, 103–104). A complementary argument from silence can be drawn from Psellos' eulogy of Keroularios, delivered a few years afterwards in the presence of the emperor Constantine X Doukas (1059–1067) and his empress Eudokia, who was Keroularios' niece. In that eulogy, Psellos does not shy away from mentioning confrontations between Keroularios and various emperors, including Theodora (1055–1056), Michael VI (1056–1057), and Isaakios Komnenos, nor does he hide the fact that Keroularios, before his ordination, had been implicated in a plot against Michael IV (1034–1041) and was exiled. But he says nothing about a clash between him and Monomachos, and he had no reason in this speech to make Monomachos appear to be a strong and unchallenged emperor (Psellos, *Orationes funebres*, 1).

In sum, there was no 'triumph of Keroularios over Monomachos' (Smith, 1978, 103–104). In fact, there was no rupture between them for the entire duration of Monomachos' reign.

What then of the anti-Norman alliance? The problem is that we have no evidence for what the legates and the emperor agreed regarding this matter. It is therefore impossible to know how the excommunications affected the political negotiations because we know nothing about them, other than their (certain) existence. However, we have some indications. When the legates left, after the scene at Hagia Sophia, they were on perfectly good terms with the emperor and presumably believed that he supported (or would have supported) what they had done (we do not know whether the emperor at the time of their departure knew about the scene at Hagia Sophia, as the excommunication had not been translated yet). Moreover, even after returning to Italy Humbert continued to maintain that the emperor, people, and clergy of Constantinople were pious and were on his side, and he goes out of his way to praise them in the excommunication itself and the *Commemoratio* (see esp. Will, *Acta*, 153). For him, Keroularios was the bad apple and, presumably, the emperor would deal with him soon enough. Humbert was trying to attack the patriarch but without spoiling the alliance. The emperor, for his part, allowed the legates to leave without answering for their deeds before the Synod, which would indeed have ruined everything by exposing the fiction of ecclesiastical unity that he had constructed during the legates' stay. He did so because, like most emperors, he wanted the alliance more than to sort through religious disagreements. And, finally, the patriarch and the Synod carefully avoided attacking the pope in their own counter-excommunication. In other words, even after all the acrimony, everyone was keeping the option of an alliance open.

We cannot follow the immediate sequel because Pope Leo had died in the meantime and an alliance could not be concluded without papal authority. Leo's successor would not come to Italy for another year and meanwhile Monomachos died in early 1055. These were the vagaries of medieval diplomacy. But did the excommunications hamper the diplomacy? The best indication that they did not is the fact that subsequent popes made moves to renew the alliance before they had to swallow the bitter pill of a Norman alliance in 1059. Specifically, in 1057–1058, *and while Keroularios was still patriarch*, Pope Stephen IX sent envoys to Constantinople to renew the anti-Norman alliance. Now, Stephen IX was none other than Frederick of Lorraine, one of the three legates who had been there in person, in Hagia Sophia on that day in July 1054. That the alliance did not fall into place was again due to reasons other than the Schism (Stephen died and his legates returned) (Runciman, 1955, 56–57; Cheynet, 2007, 304–305, for Victor II). There is, then, no proof that Keroularios' actions hampered the negotiations; moreover, there is no evidence to substantiate most of Keroularios' actions, as they are alleged by modern historians.

A reading of the sources that are not shaped in advance by a bias against Keroularios, leads to the following conclusions. Keroularios did not behave in a confrontational way at any point while there was a papal legation in his city; he actually tried to minimize potential confrontation. Keroularios and the emperor were not at odds, but likely collaborating closely, and Keroularios did not

undermine the emperor's diplomatic initiatives. The whole narrative of 1054 has to be rewritten.

There are still some loose ends to tie up.

The present argument does not change our understanding of Keroularios' position on the liturgical, ecclesiastical, and theological issues that underlay the Schism: like Leon of Ohrid, Niketas Stethatos, and most Byzantines, he disagreed with the Latins on the *azyma*, papal supremacy, the *filioque*, clerical celibacy, and so on. The question here is whether he acted on these beliefs in a confrontational way. The answer is that he did not, at least not in his letter to the pope or while the legates were in Constantinople. Nevertheless, there are other ways in which he may have enacted anti-Latin policies. Humbert complains that Keroularios had shut down Latin-rite churches in the city, but these complaints are vague, second-hand (or worse), and obviously polemical, so that there is an ongoing debate about whether we can accept their historicity and how to understand them (Smith, 1978, 119–121; Kolbaba, 2005, and 2011; Ryder, 2011). Moreover, Keroularios himself says, in a letter to Petros of Antioch, that he had refused communion on multiple occasions to Argyros, back when the latter was in Constantinople, over precisely the kinds of issues that Pope Leo had raised in his letter to Keroularios, such as the *azyma* (Will, *Acta*, 177). The circumstances and nature of those events are unclear. If Argyros believed in *azyma*, why was he seeking out Orthodox communion with leavened bread? Keroularios also says that Argyros held beliefs that denigrated Constantinopolitan custom, and so their confrontation may have been over that. But all this evidence is not enough to conclude that Keroularios was waging an 'anti-azymite campaign' (Ryder, 2011, 34). Still, we should not cast Keroularios as an irenic figure either; precisely in 1054, he was subjecting the philosopher Psellos to a Synodal inquiry over his teaching, which would result in his flight from the capital and involuntary tonsure.

Other patriarchs before and after Keroularios, including Constantine Leichoudes (1059–1063) and John Xiphilinos (1063–1075), hauled Jacobite and Armenian bishops to Constantinople, forced them to 'debate' similar issues and exiled them (Hussey, 1986, 138–139; Benner, 1989). Yet those patriarchs are regarded as learned humanists and were likely following imperial directives anyway. The issue before us is not whether Keroularios was capable of being confrontational. It is rather about his role in the events of 1054 and his relationship with Monomachos. My thesis is that when the emperor had to deal with the Western envoys, the patriarch fell in line and stayed quiet until he and the entire Eastern Church were served with a provocation that neither Keroularios nor Monomachos could ignore.

Keroularios has had a bad press, but it is important to identify its two sources. The first is Humbert, who presented Keroularios as a master-heretic at odds with the emperor. This picture, however, is problematic. Humbert needed to rhetorically separate Keroularios from the emperor and the rest of Byzantine society in order to claim that they were really on the side of the reformers. The second

hostile source is Psellos, who presents Keroularios as arrogant and ambitious, but this polemic has nothing to do with the Schism of 1054. It stems, rather, from Psellos' own persecution by Keroularios later in 1054 (for unrelated reasons having to do with Psellos' teachings) and from the events of 1058, when Isaakios I Komnenos deposed Keroularios for unrelated (also largely unknown) reasons (Dagron, 2003, 235–247; Cheynet, 1995). It is only when we combine these two unrelated sources, dealing with unrelated events, that we get the mostly fictional narrative of 1054 served up in most scholarship. Apart from the rhetorical and self-interested polemics of Psellos and Humbert, there are no solid reasons to believe that Keroularios opposed any emperor in a dramatic fashion.

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Notes

1 The literature on '1054' is enormous, and some of it is cited in this chapter. My view of Keroularios is different from that found in the most recent general survey: Bayer, 2002. A 'standard' account of Keroularios' life is Tinnefeld, 1989.
2 Cf. Angold, 1997, 51–52: 'He fomented a riot and the emperor was forced to climb down.' Likewise, Cameron, 2006, 43: Keroularios 'was able to force the emperor to climb down.'
3 *ODB*, 1215; cf. Michel, 1924–1930, 2:300; Runciman, 1955, 41: 'he induced Leo… to write a letter to John'; Hussey, 1986, 132: Keroularios 'no doubt stirred up' Leon to send it.
4 Keroularios, *Letter I to Petros of Antioch*, in Will, *Acta*, 174–175; Keroularios supported imperial policy, and did not use ecclesiastical issues to block it: Smith, 1978, 159; Kolbaba, 2010, 128 n. 23.
5 Some believed that those differences were nonessential and could be accommodated, but that view lost out in both the short and the long run and was likely already in the minority: Petros of Antioch in Chadwick, 2003, 213–216.
6 For the rise of the reformist papacy, see the surveys in Morris, 1989; Papadakis, 1994.
7 William of Apulia, *Le geste de Robert Guiscard* 2.275–283: '*Iam Constantinus amare desinit Argiroum, nec, ut ante solebat haberi, est iam consilii comes intimus imperialis. exilium passus, longo post tempore vitam degit in aerumnis*…'

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2 Colonisation and population movements in the Mediterranean in the Middle Ages*

Michel Balard

Are there medieval antecedents to modern colonisation? This question has been raised many times by the historians of our time. But it is important to be unambiguous about the meaning given to the word ‘colonisation’. As Paul Leroy-Beaulieu wrote at the end of the 19th century (Leroy-Beaulieu, 1874), an empire created by colonial expansion can be roughly characterised by the following three elements: *political domination* of the colonising power over a conceded or conquered territory, upon which a system of subjection is imposed for the benefit of a Western metropolis; *economic domination* through which the land is often taken away from those who exploited or owned it before, and the production is geared towards the interests of the colonising power; *cultural domination* through which the colonisers impose their civilisation, language, and sometimes religion. Obviously, all these forms of domination imply a transfer of population from the metropolis towards its overseas territories, a constant flux of emigrants who, upon becoming settlers, will constitute the base on which the exploitation of colonised lands rests.

If we exclude short-lived expansions, such as that of Amalfi, a city which was brought under the control of the Normans from the second half of the 11th century and then lost all its brightness in the Mediterranean, or that of Pisa, which was stopped by the terrible defeat of its fleet at the battle of Meloria (1284) against the Genoese, it was mostly two Italian maritime republics, namely Venice and Genoa, which played a colonising role, whereas the Catalan expansion was mostly economic – apart from the ephemeral duchy of Athens.

The Italian colonisation in the Eastern Mediterranean

Let us recapitulate the stages of the overseas expansion. Both cities took part in it very early: Venice towards the Byzantine empire, to which it was bound by a common past and common interests; Genoa towards Fatimid Egypt in the last decades of the 10th century (Braunstein & Delort, 1971, 31–49; Kedar, 1983, 19–30). As early as the 950s, as noted by the ambassador of Otto I, Liutprand of Cremona

* Translated from French by Nikolaos G. Chrissis.

(Liutprand of Cremona, *The Embassy,* 203), the Venetians had settled on the banks of the Golden Horn in Constantinople, in all likelihood in the area of Perama, which was formally granted to them by the chrysobull of 1082. There, during the 12th century, they developed a trading outpost which attracted the most illustrious businessmen from Venice (Romano Mairano, the Stagnario) (Pozza & Ravegnani, *I trattati*; Thiriet, 1959; Borsari, 1988). However, it was the First Crusade which led to the first permanent settlements of Western merchants in the coastal cities of Syria-Palestine. The help provided by the Italian republics for the conquest, and then the naval defence, of the Latin states came in exchange for the concession by the Frankish princes of vast areas in the conquered cities, where the Venetians, the Genoese, the Pisans and the Provençals were granted commercial, jurisdictional and administrative privileges – to such an extent that they largely escaped the authority of local sovereigns (Favreau-Lilie, 1989; Jacoby, 1997, 156–166; Balard, 2002).

These early forms of colonisation developed further in the 13th century. The capture of Constantinople and the partition of the Byzantine empire (*Partitio Romanie*) after the Fourth Crusade brought under Venice's control the island of Crete, the outposts of Coron and Modon in southern Peloponnese, and indirectly, through various Venetian nobles, a large part of the Aegean islands, in particular the duchy of Naxos. Evicted from its possessions in Acre during the war of Saint Sabas, Genoa took its revenge by helping Michael VIII Palaiologos to reconquer the capital of the empire, Constantinople. Genoa received in grant the area of Galata (Pera), on the other side of the Golden Horn, while it expanded its trade to the Black Sea, where new outposts were created in the last decades of the 13th century: Caffa on the Crimean coast, Tana at the edge of the modern-day Sea of Azov, Trebizond in the empire of the Grand Komnenoi, Vicina at the Danube delta (Balard, 1978, 1:127–175; Karpov, 1986). Furthermore, the Genoese and the Venetians obtained from the Lusignan kings important land concessions in the main cities of Cyprus: Famagusta, Paphos and Limassol (Bliznjuk, 1991–1992; Balard, 1995).

In the course of the 14th century, the two Italian maritime republics consolidated their possessions. Venice extended its influence over the Ionian islands (Corfu), Nauplio, Negroponte and Thessalonica, becoming the dominant power in the whole western part of the Aegean Sea, while Genoa came to dominate its eastern part after the conquest of Chios (1346) and the capture of Mytilene by the Gattilusi (1355). The control of the Pontic trade was the objective of three colonial wars between the two cities. After these conflicts, the Genoese reinforced their supremacy at the mouth of the Danube and on the Crimean coast (Genoese Gazaria), while in Tana and Trebizond both communities were obliged to coexist. The loss of the Frankish states of Syria-Palestine in 1291 forced the survivors to find refuge in Cyprus, where Genoa established its power over Famagusta after an expedition led against the Lusignans (1373). The Venetians had to content themselves with only a few possessions around Paphos.

The Ottoman conquests in Anatolia and in the Balkans considerably reduced Italian possessions in the 15th century. Constantinople was captured by Mehmet II

in 1453 and the Genoese colony of Pera was forced to submit, without disappearing altogether. In the Black Sea, all the Italian outposts fell into the hands of the Ottomans between 1453 and 1482; the same happened in the Peloponnese. Thus, at the end of the 15th century, Genoa retained only the island of Chios until 1566, on the condition of paying tribute to the Ottomans, and Venice only had control over the island of Cyprus, which it had gained after the forced abdication of Queen Catherine Cornaro, and kept until 1571. The two colonial empires, the Genoese and the Venetian one, disappeared in the 16th century, annihilated by the Ottoman power (Heyd, 1967*,* 2:255–552).

Population movements

An overseas expansion that lasted over three centuries implies numerous population movements. How could mother-cities with no more than 100,000 inhabitants before the Black Death of 1348 contribute, in a more or less continuous way, to populating these numerous colonies in the East? Because of a lack of figures in the contemporary sources, it is quite difficult to know the number of those who settled overseas, either in the wake of the crusades themselves or in the Western outposts in the East.

The calculations made by the crusade historian Jonathan Riley-Smith reveal that, out of 791 crusaders identified by their name, only 104 settled in the Holy Land (barely 13%), and that, out of the 697 settler names known before 1131, only 122 had taken the cross between 1097 and 1102 (around 17%) (Riley-Smith, 1997). These figures confirm that the majority of the crusaders who took part in the capture of Jerusalem quickly returned home, considering their vow to be fulfilled. They also confirm that Latins came to settle in the Holy Land after the first phase of the conquest. How many could they be towards the middle of the 12th century, at the highest point of the Frankish states' expansion? A minority among the Muslims, the Jews and the Eastern Christians, which Joshua Prawer tentatively estimated at around 100,000 Westerners, mostly composed of Franks, Italians, Germans, and Iberians. Those would be split among five cities of about 10,000 Latins each, a dozen others of about 3,000, and a score of townlets of about 500. To those 'urban dwellers', one should add a few hundreds of Westerners who had settled in the rural villages which have been unearthed by recent excavations (Ellenblum, 1998). This maximum population of Westerners must have been reduced correspondingly to the reduction of the territory occupied by the Franks. But it is hard to venture an estimate regarding the number of those who stayed in Syria-Palestine until 1291.

Do we have a better-grounded estimate regarding the number of Italians who emigrated to the overseas outposts? After the Fourth Crusade, which led to the acquisition of the island of Crete, the Venetian government strived to implement a systematic settlement policy. With the *Concessio Cretae* of 1211, it granted full ownership of the island to 180 settlers, except for the city of Candia and the territory around it (Maltezou, 1994). New groups of settlers were sent in 1222, 1233 and 1252 but they remained insufficient, as it is estimated that at the beginning

of the 14th century there were only 587 lots given to settlers (Gallina, 1984; Gallina, 1989). It is reasonable to consider that only a few thousands of Venetians and northern and central Italians had settled in Crete by then: they were a very small minority, but they had political power and military force, compared to the majority of the Greek population.

In Upper Romania, Sergei Karpov's estimates, based on notarial deeds drafted in Tana, reveal that, in the years 1359–1360, out of a total number of 541, 194 people were permanent inhabitants of the Venetian colony, which was distinct from both the Genoese outpost and the indigenous city, Azaq [Azov]. About a hundred declared themselves *habitatores Tane*. Fifty years later, between 1407 and 1417, while the outpost had just been rebuilt after the destruction brought about by Tamerlane and the pillaging carried out by the Tatars, the number of permanent residents was 218, out of a total of 482 identified. Bearing in mind that this outpost was very far from the metropolis and was barely restored after being devastated, this number is considerable, given that the notary only dealt with family heads and ignored wives and children (many of the migrants from the West had a concubine when they settled in the eastern colonies of Genoa or Venice, or could also call their family to join them, if they settled for a long time). In these figures, those with Italian origins are the great majority, being about 80% of the settlers; this percentage is quite comparable to the one which emerges from the analysis of the ethnic composition of the Genoese outposts (Karpov, 2005).

The relative abundance of Genoese documents drawn up overseas – notarial deeds and financial records – gives us access to more precise data. If we take only the case of the registers of Gabriele di Predono, a notary working in Pera (Bratianu, *Actes*), he registered 637 people for the year 1281, i.e. nearly 300 with a Genoese patronymic and 174 called by the name of their hometown or village in Liguria (Balard, 1978, 1:235–248). For sure, not all of them were permanent residents; among them, many were only transient. But is it likely that within a few months all the Western inhabitants reported to the notary? Women, the largest group 'forgotten by History', do not appear, nor do children. So, it is not daring to venture an estimate of about two or three thousand Westerners, which is all the more remarkable as immigration to Pera started only in 1267, just fourteen years before the date of our deeds.

Resident in Caffa on the coast of Crimea in 1289–1290, the Genoese notary Lamberto di Sambuceto provides us with a sample of nearly 1,600 names, both Westerners and Easterners, the latter being a small minority (Balard, 1973). Nearly 720 individuals had a Genoese patronymic, with a strong representation of the aristocracy by birth and by wealth, and 428 were identified by the name of a Ligurian village or town. Here again, an estimate of three to four thousand Westerners seems reasonable, since several other Genoese notaries also worked in Caffa at the same time, but their deeds have not survived. In both outposts, one should add several hundreds of northern Italians (from Lombardy, Piedmont, Emilia and the Veneto) and a few tens of central and southern Italians, of Corsicans and of Catalans. Both in Pera and in Caffa, the first colonisation at the end of the 13th century shows that immigration had a national dimension: nearly 80% of the

Westerners counted were Genoese or Ligurians who had come via Genoa. The overseas immigration extended the movement of *inurbamento*, through which Italian cities grew at the expense of their *contado*, but it was still unstable and limited, made up of a society of young men, without many family ties.

In the course of the 14th century, a Genoese colonial society was progressively implanted overseas. The 1386 Caffa financial register mentions 1,516 names, including 1,025 Westerners, 85% of whom were Genoese and Ligurians. The great family clans (*alberghi*) are well represented and the lure of the overseas has spread throughout Liguria, both sea and mountains. As early as 1340, the traveller Ibn Battuta, passing by Caffa, noted the great size of the city which he said was inhabited by Christians, mostly Genoese. At the beginning of the 15th century, the German traveller Johann Schiltberger counted 6,000 houses within the first enclosure, 11,000 houses *extra muros*, and 4,000 houses in the suburbs. This is obviously an exaggeration, but it emphasises how large the population was, and how active the Genoese outpost was – two characteristics that were particularly striking for a lowly Germanic knight (Balard & Veinstein, 1981, 82–83). An evaluation based on the customs on the sale of slaves would suggest that the population of Caffa was around 20,000 in 1386, but this number is certainly much too low, since slaves served mostly Westerners and to a much lesser degree the members of the various indigenous communities (Balard & Veinstein, 1981, 83).

The quantitative data changes in the 15th century, especially after 1453, when the traffic between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea was at the mercy of the Ottomans. The Genoese elite became reluctant to go and make a fortune on shores which they deemed dangerous and which had become much less attractive for tradesmen. The Genoese authorities struggled to find volunteers to fill in the administrative positions of the Eastern outposts. However, two testimonies, that of Giustiniani of Chios and that of the Florentine Benedetto Dei, provide an estimate of 8,000 houses and a population of 70,000 in Caffa in the years preceding the outpost's fall (1475). Equally exaggerated are the numbers given by the Genoese notary Antonio di Torriglia, who wrote in 1467 that only 4,000 men were left. With reference to the context in which Caffa found itself after 1453, we can accept an estimate somewhere in the middle: a population that did not exceed 10,000 people in the last years of the Genoese domination, with less than 2,000 Westerners according to Malowist (1947), and still a large and unstable mix as regards the Easterners, with two groups dominating, the Armenians and the Greeks, ahead of the Tatars.

The last territory whose population can be estimated with some accuracy is the island of Chios. The deeds that were drafted there by the Genoese notaries between 1394 and 1408 enable us to count 406 Genoese and Ligurians, including the Giustiniani, members of the Mahona. In 1395 the podestà Niccolò Fatinanti sent a report to the doge. He mentioned 2,142 Greek family heads and about 400 family heads of Western origin, so around 2,000 people. Examining in parallel the data from the notarial deeds and the podestà's official report leads to a fairly convincing conclusion: there were about 2,000 Westerners living in

Chios at the end of the 14th century, making up a fifth of the local Greek population (Argenti, 1958, 1:146–149).

The data presented above enable us to put into perspective the importance of Western immigration to the East. Wherever one looks, the Latins were always a small minority. But, at least in the Genoese and Venetian outposts, they constituted a community united by their geographical origins – few Genoese in the Venetian colonies, few Venetians in the Genoese colonies – by their economic interests geared towards commercial activity, and also by the very process of taking roots together: this eventually led to a widening of the gap between these settlers and their metropolis, as shown by the revolt of Saint Titus in Crete (1363) or the refusal by the inhabitants of Chios to accept the authority of the French governor of Genoa, Marshall Boucicaut. The Latins who settled overseas were thus few and accepted or were submitted to a process of progressive orientalisation.

The modalities of emigration

The Western emigration overseas happened according to various modalities: through the initiative of individuals looking for fortune or adventure; with businessmen hiring a labour force intended for the settlement or the exploitation of overseas territories; or through migration flows organised by the authorities of the metropolis.

Personal emigration leaves few traces in the sources, except when notarial deeds survive, proving that individuals asked relatives who stayed behind to take care of their affairs. The conduct of commercial activities seemed to predispose shipping agents of the great merchants to settle in the colonies of the East: of Genoese or Venetian origin, but also some who came from the *contado* (Liguria and the Veneto) and who, after staying in the host metropolis for a shorter or longer period of time, decided to depart overseas. Examining the patronymics collected in the deeds drafted in the East has enabled us to underline that there were numerous and important emigration hubs, especially in Liguria, where the main townlets of the *Riviere*, but also the villages of the Apennines, contributed to the migration flows, through the departure of young males, who sought to escape hunger and destitution, an all too frequent fate in the barren lands of inner Liguria (Balard, 1978, 1, 229–254). To these migrants seeking a better fate, one should add the seamen who took part in a voyage to Romania or the Holy Land and left off at various stopovers on the way in order to escape an exceedingly hard form of work. Thus, the great Genoese and Venetian outposts in the East were a permanent pool of naval labour force, expatriated for shorter or longer periods of time (Balard, 1981; Pistarino, 1981; Hocquet, 2006, 240–241).

Collective hiring could also be organised by warriors seeking to settle in the East or by great merchants who had commercial outposts overseas. The first category obviously includes the followers of all the military leaders who established themselves in the Holy Land or in the Aegean world. The Embriaci, who took part in the First Crusade, and were subsequently granted Gibelet, took with them relatives, friends and ‘faithful’ in order to occupy the city that the Commune had given

them (Cardini, 1994; Airaldi, 2006, 115–139). At the end of the 13th century, when Manuel and Benedetto Zaccaria occupied Phocaea, they made contracts with some people of modest social status in Genoa regarding the exploitation of the alum mines which made them wealthy. Similarly, their taking possession of Chios in 1304 came with hiring a Latin workforce, coming from Liguria, possibly to ensure the production of mastic or, more certainly, to defend the island and its accesses. The notarial deeds which have survived evoke the harsh living conditions for these employees of the Zaccarias, nearly twenty-five of whom died in this Aegean world, where they were hoping to find a better fate through their employment (Balletto, 2005).

Another example of collective emigration concerns the participants in the Genoese expedition of 1346 which captured Chios and Phocaea. The ship-owners, under the command of Simone Vignoso, made a contract with the impecunious Commune of Genoa, and were granted the right to exercise over their conquests a *dominium utile et directum*, i.e. the ownership and the right to exploit Chios and Phocaea, for at least as long as the Commune of Genoa proved incapable of reimbursing the cost of the expedition. These various families of ship-owners constituted the Mahona of Chios and established themselves on the island. Their members abandoned their own patronymic for that of the Giustiniani and shared the spoils of their conquests in proportion to their initial capital (*luoghi*). One of the first tasks of Simone Vignoso, the leader of the expedition, was to make provision for the island to be populated by Latins. In the treaty which he imposed on the Greek nobility on 12 September 1346, the Genoese admiral demanded that he be immediately granted two hundred houses in the *castrum* of Chios, to be later occupied by Genoese and Latin settlers, and that within eight months, if necessary, other Greek houses of the *castrum* become available for sale to Latins at a price set by arbitration. In order to attract men, the crews from the twenty-nine galleys of the expedition were encouraged to settle on the island. Ligurian immigrants were also invited and were given the goods which were confiscated from the plotters who took part in the foiled plot of 1347: *chisilimae* (escheated) houses, vineyards, gardens and orchards were given or rented out for a low price to Latins who committed to coming with their family to live in the *castrum* and reside there several months a year. This was not an agricultural colonisation, since the immigrants, who were partly listed in the contemporary notarial deeds, were all craftsmen and merchants. They were expected to take part in defending the island, to pay to the Mahona the property tax corresponding to the land they were given – which, thanks to the cultivation work by *paroikoi*, constituted a safe and regular source of income for the new settlers (Argenti, 1958, 1:569–579). This situation led to an influx of Genoese to the island of Homer, but also to a progressive detachment of the people of the Mahona from their former metropolis (Argenti, 1958, 1; Balard, 1978, 1:376–386).

On the Venetian side, recent studies have outlined the lineages established in Romania after the Latin conquest of the Byzantine empire in 1204 (Saint-Guillain, 2003, 2:672–739). The seigniorial families of the Archipelago, among which two great lineages stand out – the Sanudo and the Ghisi of Tinos, who

came with the Fourth Crusade – became overseas Venetians, whose existence, motivations and scope of activities were located mostly in Greece. They attracted some families of a lesser rank, often from the Po Plain, such as the Gozzadini of Bologna, the Sommaripa of Verona, the Crispo, the Da Corogna, some of whom would be given high political offices in Latin Romania. To those, one should add the feudatories, the agents and officers of those great lineages, governors, *baillis*, lieutenants, ducal vicars, castellans, chancellors of the duchy, notaries, a whole set of Cycladic notables, who had preserved no ties of political dependence with the Commune of Venice, but considered themselves 'Latins of Romania', while maintaining private ties with the members of their lineage who had stayed behind in the City of the Doges.

The two maritime republics also strived to stimulate the emigration of their citizens and to facilitate their installation in the overseas territories. After the death in 1312 of Toqta Khan, whose armies had destroyed their outpost of Caffa, the Genoese were granted by his successor, Özbek, the right to rebuild the city. On 18 March 1316, the *Officium Gazarie* (a council of eight sages, created in 1313) took a series of measures to this effect. The *ordo de Caffa* included provisions to repopulate, improve and fortify the Genoese colony, in particular an extremely detailed town planning (Sauli, col. 377–382). It ordered the consul to regain all the lands and sell them by auction – with a certain number of plots being taken away from this lot and reserved for utilities or religious institutions. It made it compulsory for Genoese settlers who had bought land to have a house built there by the end of the year 1320. A previous decree which has not survived gave them only eighteen months to complete the building of a house, but many complained that they could not procure on time neither the materials nor the master craftsmen needed. The *Officium Gazarie* extended the given deadline in order to facilitate the immigration of Genoese citizens, encouraging them to settle down right in the heart of the city (Balard, 1978, 1:202–204). In the other Pontic outposts, the establishment of an embryonic administration and of a small permanent garrison are indications of the Commune's desire to facilitate the development of a Latin settlement.

The same concerns motivated the Venetian authorities, particularly in Crete, but also in Messenia, where they strived to affirm the pre-eminence of the Commune by populating the territories systematically with their fellow citizens. The deliberations of the Senate and of the colonial councils reveal how fearful the authorities were of workforce shortages. They strived to prevent the *paroikoi*, who cultivated the lands of the Commune or of the feudatories, from fleeing, and to import men, if too many had left. Demographic concerns were thus essential both in Crete and in Messenia, especially in the 14th century. Bringing in labourers was made indispensable on account of a variety of factors, such as: the Turkish raids and the depredations of pirates, ill-contained despite the vigorous Venetian defence; the excessive taxes, which drove away many *paroikoi* and even small owners; the natural disasters such as the earthquake of 1303, which caused nearly 4,000 casualties in Candia, and finally the 'mortalities', such as the famous Black Death which devastated Negroponte, the Venetian Messenia and Crete to a lesser degree.

This policy of populating these territories was implemented as soon as the Venetians managed to rid themselves of the Genoese who, assisted by the Count of Malta, Enrico Pescatore and by Alamanno da Costa, had tried to prevent Venice from occupying the island. As early as 1211, the document known under the name of *Concessio Crete* organised a military colonisation of Crete, which was split like Venice into six *sestieri*. Each one of them was composed of 33 and 1/3 units of land, called *cavallerie* or *miliciae*. Out of the 200 *cavallerie* the whole island comprised, 132 were granted to knights (*milites*); the remaining 68 were divided into six fractions, i.e. a total of 408, called *serventarie* (sergeantries) and reserved for foot soldiers. The new settlers, who were granted those lots, were above all soldiers, whose mission was to occupy the island and quell any Greek resistance. They could only hand over their *feudum* to other Venetians, but with the assent of the duke of Crete, and were obliged to reside in the city of Candia. The income of a *cavalleria* must be enough to bear the cost of three horses, one armour and weapons, as well as the equipment of two squires. That of a sergeantry must provide for the needs of a foot soldier. The 1211 document ends with a list of knights – 94 of them, all of Venetian origin – and sergeants – 26 of them, of humble, though not necessarily Venetian, origin. The difference between the number of these 120 first settlers and the projected number of 540 immigrants could lead us to think that the duke of Crete had the power to hire mercenaries from northern Italy, especially amongst those who had been used in the fight against the Genoese. In 1222, the Senate deemed it necessary to create 60 new *miliciae* around the city of Rethimno, but allowed the new owners of these lots to own both *cavallerie* and *serventarie* and thus to take a more active part in the defence of the island, with the obligation for each new settler to reside there for two years. Thirty years later, the Senate created 90 *miliciae* around Chania, and increased the duties of their owners, while a Venetian army, independent from the military forces of the settlers, was already in place (McKee, 2000, 32–38). In the 14th century, the heavy demands imposed by the mother-city led a number of feudatories to join the resistance of the *archontes* and the Greek people and to participate in the revolt of Saint Titus against Venice in 1363. After a fierce military repression, the Senate strived to repopulate the island: in 1368, it authorised the duke of Crete to declare all those who would come and settle in Candia and the surrounding area, Venetian citizens; in 1383 it exempted from all burdens the immigrants who would accept settling in Chania, and re-settled in Crete and Euboea nearly 4,000 inhabitants of Tenedos, expelled from their island after the treaty of Torino signed with Genoa (Thiriet, 1959, 263–264).

Such a policy to populate these territories was not without its problems. Indeed, the Commune of Venice was concerned above all about repopulating the areas which it held around Candia; it let the feudatories fight over a scarce workforce and make provisions by themselves for the exploitation of their domains. Despite all efforts, the efficiency of the measures to repopulate the island was limited. The authorities of Candia strived to control the population closely by monitoring slave escapes and authorising departures from the island. The Venetian councils – the Senate and the *Quarantia* – regularly set out who could be considered a citizen of

the Commune, and thus benefit from the right of citizenship, which granted the largest commercial privileges (Cessi & Sambin, *Le deliberazioni*, 1:207, n° 354). In the last thirty years of the 14th century, the issue of repopulating Romania became a true *leitmotiv* in the decisions of the Senate.

These concerns were shared by the Genoese authorities, who were eager to avoid the effects of the demographic crisis of the 14th century. They parsimoniously facilitated access to Genoese citizenship, by creating two categories in Cyprus: the white Genoese and the black Genoese. In the treaty signed in 1365 by the Commune of Genoa with King Peter I of Cyprus, it was made clear that in Cyprus were recognised as Genoese citizens not only the inhabitants of Genoa and its region but also those who came from the territories falling under the authority of the Ligurian metropolis, the slaves and servants of the Genoese, as well as their freedmen. The very wide definition of the status of the Genoese fell within the remit of the podestà, who was encouraged to consider as Genoese some Syrians or Jews under the Commune's protection (Mas Latrie, 1852–1861, 2:258; Jacoby, 1977). Several of them can be seen in 1447 taking the oath of fidelity of the inhabitants of Famagusta to the procurators of the Bank of Saint George, during the transfer of sovereignty over Famagusta, which the Commune had granted to the Bank (Polonio, 1966, 231). As regards the Black Genoese, in all likelihood they were freed slaves who belonged to the domains of the Lusignans and had found refuge under the Genoese authorities.

These conditions for citizenship were insufficient when we consider the seriousness of the demographic problems experienced by the Genoese colony in Famagusta. The latter underwent depopulation and became less and less able to resist external threats, whether they came from the Catalans, the Mamluks, or the royal troops of Cyprus. The fiscal pressures, the embezzlement of civil servants and the sluggishness of economic activity drove away the native population. The Genoese authorities complained about it and recommended that the guards of the gates of Limassol and of the sea should closely control all exits. They also took positive measures: they granted permits and encouraged foreigners to come and live in Famagusta. In 1448 they even decided to carry out a census of the decaying houses and to give them, in exchange for a commitment to repair them, to those who would come and settle in the city (Vitale, 1935, 415). It is impossible to measure the impact of such decisions.

Whether one considers the Genoese outposts or the Venetian overseas territories, the questions on demography and the issues regarding identity can be raised in a similar way. For three centuries, the Italian colonies in the East were populated, governed and maintained thanks to the contribution of a 'national' immigration (Genoese in Genoese outposts, Venetian in Venetian ones), made up of young men who settled overseas. But this contribution was always insufficient for the exploitation and the defence of the colonies. The Genoese and Venetian authorities thus strived to enforce a policy of populating the territories and controlling the population in order to avoid the demographic decline entailed by piracy, raids, famines and plague-related 'mortalities'. The success of such a policy, which was certainly enforced more rigidly in Venice than in Genoa,

remained limited. This failure certainly explains why, right in the heart of the 15th century, the two maritime republics could only put up weak resistance to the Ottoman expansion, as they did not manage to rally under their authority the vital forces of the subjected populations. For three centuries, they had confronted, without being able to solve them fully, the same problems that colonisation in the 19th and 20th centuries experienced when it came to populating a colony: emigration of their fellow citizens, resistance of the native peoples, fruitless efforts to control the colonised populations. In this sense, it can be argued that there are indeed medieval antecedents to modern colonisation.

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3 Genoa and Byzantium

Aspects of a long relationship

Sandra Origone

In this chapter, we will examine how Byzantine awareness of the Western world progressively evolved, taking the First Crusade as the starting point of a long process. There have been several recent scholarly examinations of this subject, especially as regards the impact of crusaders as a whole. Some substantial relevant works are included in collected volumes prepared on the occasion of the nine-hundredth anniversary of the First Crusade (or, more precisely, of the appearance of crusading armies outside Nicaea) and of the eight-hundredth anniversary of the Fourth Crusade (e.g. Balard, 1996; Laiou & Mottahedeh, 2001; Laiou, 2005; Ortalli, Ravegnani & Schreiner, 2006). A particular purpose of the present study is to consider the Byzantine attitude towards the mercantile element. A crucial aspect of this discussion is how the Byzantines saw the Italian merchants (Genoese, Venetians, Pisans, Amalfitans) by comparison to the Frankish crusaders. We will evaluate, for example, how expressions of hostility initially directed towards the crusaders were subsequently extended to the mercantile element. The Genoese presence – which in the early days of Byzantine-Western relations seemed to be less relevant than that of Amalfitans, Pisans and Venetians – is a very good example of a gradual development until the Genoese became some of the most visible players in the interaction between Byzantium and the West.

We will first look at how the various groups of Westerners were presented in the most important Byzantine sources from the First Crusade onwards, and examine the terminology (such as 'Logobardoi', 'Latinoi', 'Italoi', etc.) that these authors used. Then we will turn more specifically to the relations and attitudes between the Byzantines and the Italian merchants. We will discuss a number of key topics, such as the danger of the Italians in the eyes of the Byzantines, the Italian infiltration in the empire, the status of Italian citizens residing in Byzantium, the competition between the maritime republics, the importance of cultural and political differences between the two sides; we will show how these themes were reflected in contemporary Byzantine and Western sources.

A premise: the impact of the crusades

The Byzantines at the time had to face the mass movement of populations from the West towards the Empire. In particular Anna Komnene describes as barbarians

(*ὁπόσον γένος βαρβάρων*) the populations living on the other side of the Adriatic as far as the Pillars of Hercules and 'who moved all together against Asia, marching from the one end of Europe to the other' (Komnene, *Alexiade*, 2:20.5–10). Their compact and aggressive arrival on the scene helped form the notion of the 'Latin people' and of the West as a unified entity in the eyes of the Byzantine authors from Anna Komnene onwards, who were nonetheless aware of the multiplicity of peoples covered by the term *Latinoi* (Kazhdan, 2001, 86). Speaking about people coming from the mercantile towns, however, Anna uses strictly their particular names (*Amalphenoi, Benetikoi, Genousioi, Pissaioi* and *Pissaikos stolos, naus*).[1] Nevertheless, on the occasion of the return of Dyrrachion to Emperor Alexios in 1085, the Amalfitans and the Venetians are presented as Latin people who demonstrated the greed which characterized the Latins as a whole (Komnene, *Alexiade*, 2:5.4–6). Anna's writing can serve as a starting point for further historians. Nonetheless, each of them has a different perspective depending on their contemporary context and circumstances.

John Kinnamos is another important author as regards his view of the Western world. Like Anna he uses the generic term *Latinos* and the adjective *Latinikos,* for example when he speaks of the Latin races (*λατινικὰ γένη*) (Kinnamos, *Epitome*, 199.17), and he describes as barbarians the crusaders following Conrad III in his expedition through the Balkans, when the Byzantine ambassadors met their chiefs (*ἐπὶ τοὺς τῶν βαρβάρων ἡγεμόνας ἦλθον*) (Kinnamos, *Epitome*, 67.19). But what makes this particular historian special is his interest in the Italian context. He refers to the Normans as *Siculi* and, consequently, to Roger II as tyrant of Sicily (Kinnamos, *Epitome*, 67.15, 98.15–16; for the Norman rulers as tyrants and hypothetical recognition of the Norman rule in Byzantine historiography, see Kolia-Dermitzaki, 2008, 36–37). Moreover, he uses the term *Italos* for people as well for individuals from Southern Italy, such as Alexander, Count of Gravina (Kinnamos, *Epitome*, 67.13–14). When he focuses on Northern Italy and its population he shows a preference for specific and ancient ethnonyms, indicating that he is inspired by the situation of Late Antiquity; *Liguria* was the name used at that time for the region *Transpadana* as suggested by Jordanes and by Prokopios (even if confusedly) in his *Bellum Gothicum* (Iordanes, *Getica*, 114; Procopius, *Opera Omnia*, 2:76, 185, 247, 262). Consequently, Kinnamos uses Ligurian/Liguria, as a synonym for Lombard/Lombardy, the northern region of Italy where the Longobards had come to settle, from the hinterland to the coast. In another passage, Kinnamos speaks about the Venetian attack on the Lombards' houses in Constantinople. This well-known episode of hostility, which occurred in 1171, involved the Genoese traders' community. For the purpose of this study, it is noteworthy that Kinnamos hints at the Genoese and their presence in Constantinople by using the term Lombards. The historian, however, speaks much more of the Venetians, describing them in a well-known passage of his work as pernicious, parasitic, ignoble people and even discrediting their reliability and nautical expertise (Kinnamos, *Epitome,* 280.24–25, 282.8–13).

A specific vision of the Western world is to be found in Archbishop Eustathios' writing on the Norman capture of Thessalonica. He too makes very frequent use of

the generic ethnonym *Latinos,* occasionally the adjective *Latinikos*[2] and once the expression *Latine ge* (*Λατίνη γῆ*) (Eustathios of Thessalonica, *Espugnazione,* 64.13), especially to indicate Southern Italy, whence had come the Normans to invade the Illyrian lands. Like Kinnamos, he describes the Normans as Sicilians on the basis of where they came from (they are *Sikeloi*, their army *Sikelikos stratos*, and William II is described as either king or tyrant of Sicily) (Eustathios of Thessalonica, *Espugnazione,* 34.33, 58.3, 21, 26, 60.5, 62.10, 13, 22, 26, 31, 64.9, 70.3, 84.11, 88.6, 100.32) or else generically as Latins, but he never refers to them as Franks, the term Anna Komnene used for them. In Anna's terminology, as shown by Alexander Kazhdan, the Franks 'have no connection with the land called Frankia' and 'where they are identifiable are predominantly Normans' (Kazhdan, 2001, 90). The reason for the difference in the terminology used by these authors is the chronology of their works: Anna speaks about the relations between the empire and the Normans during Emperor Alexios' life (d.1118), while Kinnamos and Eustathios, speaking about the following events, were well aware that the Normans ruled the kingdom of Sicily, and therefore they called them *Sikeloi*.

I think we can safely say that Archbishop Eustathios' work is crucial in helping us understand the attitude of the Byzantines towards the Western world. We find therein the by now common acceptance of the term *Latinoi* to indicate the totality of the Western peoples involved in Byzantine affairs, regardless of their ethnicity and whether they were crusaders or Italian merchants. In relation to the subjects he discusses, he uses the term *Latinos/Latinikos* to describe various categories of people: first the Latin (mostly Norman) aggressors;[3] then the Westerners, mainly Italians, living in Constantinople who were victims of Andronikos I's massacre in 1182 (Eustathios of Thessalonica, *Espugnazione,* 32.35, 34.11, 15, 21, 31, 36.4); on another occasion, two Provencal knights in the service of William II in Thessalonica (Eustathios of Thessalonica, *Espugnazione,* 70.2); and, lastly, some individuals, not further specified, who befriended the besieged and gave them detailed information about the Norman army and navy during the siege of the town, thanks in part to the discussions on religion they had had with them (Eustathios of Thessalonica, *Espugnazione,* 86.30–33, 92.7,15, 150.8–9). I would underline that Eustathios contributed to a definition of the characteristics of the Latins as barbarous. In fact, he frequently uses the term *barbaros*[4] for the Normans who assaulted his city, and *barbarikos*[5] for their habits as they distinguished themselves – following the author's report of the events in Thessalonica – for their cruelty, greed, treachery, bloodthirstiness and sacrilege. These are all characteristics traditionally attributed to 'barbarians' in Byzantine literature but, in particular, the belligerency and the lack of mildness and civility are the primary traits ascribed to 'barbarians' by the authors of the Late Antiquity, and thereafter ascribed by the Byzantines to all peoples, Latins included, who were not Greek (Hunger, 1987, 31–7).

Attributing the barbarian connotation to the Latin groups present in his work, Niketas Choniates, to recall again the felicitous words used by Alexander Kazhdan, molded the stereotype of the Latins on the stereotype of the barbarians. Niketas Choniates depicts the Latins as supercilious, boastful, arrogant and stupid, and he says that between the Greeks and the Latins 'lies an open gap'.

His stereotypical image of the Latin coincides with that of barbarians, who were cruel, arrogant, greedy, unstable and foulmouthed. Kazdhan noted however that Choniates does not attribute to 'the Latins' deficiencies such as noisiness and lack of culture which he ascribes to other 'barbarians' such as the Vlachs and the Hungarians (noisiness), Andronikos' I friends who did neither speak nor understand Greek (boorishness and rudeness), or the conquerors of Constantinople in 1204 (lack of culture).[6] Admittedly, they were Latin, but in these circumstances Choniates avoids mentioning them as Latins, revealing how cautious he was in identifying as 'Latin' people who had barbaric customs (as Kazhdan has noted too).

Starting with Choniates, however, the characteristics of barbarian people, hitherto concentrating on the feudal and military group, were also applied to the Italian mercantile element. In fact, in the course of the Fourth Crusade, the two categories were indeed in close contact. The author, writing about the efforts of the Latins to suppress the rebellions which had arisen against them in the towns of Thrace, refers to the raids of the Venetians along the Greek coasts and considers their piratical activity unbecoming for Christians. Nevertheless, he was especially distressed by the cruelty of the Latin army led by Henry of Hainaut. After their vain attempt to conquer Adrianople, the Latins asked for reinforcements from Constantinople and turned to Didymoteichon. The soldiers in Constantinople were unwilling to leave and help the army. They were, however, compelled to obey under the threat of excommunication by the papal legate and the Latin patriarch of Constantinople, the Venetian Thomas Morosini. We can reasonably presume that these troops included some Venetians. During the siege of Didymoteichon, a storm destroyed the Latin camp. Niketas comments on these events and emphasizes the point that some Latins, who were wise and not wholly bloodthirsty, suggested retreating while the others wanted to remain.[7] He does not elaborate further, but it may be that he is alluding to the presence among the Latins of milder elements, such as the Venetians might appear to him, alongside the more ferocious professional warriors. We have to consider that the term *Latinos* the author mostly uses to designate the mass of the crusaders is generic, in so far as it denotes the totality of Westerners without making any distinction and for the most part particular peoples/groups are not identifiable. Fortunately, this is not the case with the Normans of Sicily. There is no doubt that on the occasion of the events related to the conquest of Thessalonica, Choniates at times uses Latin for Sicilian (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:317.16, 360.48, 365.56, 379.91). In Choniates' text, there are also other particularities. As is the case with the term *Frankos* in Anna Komnene (Kazhdan, 2001, 90), *Italos* in Choniates is synonymous with *Latinos* (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:109.87–8, 631.5, 633.60, 641.42) and denotes a generic Western origin (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:74.54). It is used for sundry Italians, such as Renier of Montferrat, who actually belonged to an Italian feudal family (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:230.95), and for individuals such as Baldwin III, king of Jerusalem who, whilst coming from a Latin environment, were not Italian (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:141.93); the term is also used for the Normans (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:317.11, 319.58, 321.5, 334.92, 356.24, 610.13), for the Latins who

lived in Antioch (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:39.45, 109.66, 87) and for the German crusaders (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:67.36, 68.72, 71.62). The Byzantines perceived the differences between themselves and the Latins first and foremost (Kazhdan, 2001, 88–9; for self-awareness, bias and reciprocal knowledge between Greek and Latin, see Hunger, 1987, 34–46). However, Choniates' opinion is neither univocal nor totally negative: in particular, he appreciates not only the good Venetian who helped him and his family flee from the crusaders in 1204, but also Aldebrandino, Pisan governor of the city of Attaleia, Italian in origin but who grew up in a Greek environment (Choniates, *Historia,*1: 588.13–31, 639.73–640.12).

The process which led to greater familiarity between Westerners and Greeks during the period of the Nicaean empire can be read in George Akropolites' *History*. This was a time when, for better or worse, the Latins were heavily involved in Byzantine affairs. In view of the circumstances and the terrible situation the Greeks found themselves in, we may speculate that, purely to be cautious, the author does not refer to the Latins directly as barbarians, even if one cannot but note that he does use the term for the Bulgarians, described in similar terms to the Latins on account of their enduring hatred of the Greeks and their lack of perseverance in warfare (Akropolites, *Opera*, 1: pars. 58, 73; for Bulgarians, see Akropolites, *The History*, 90–92). The author was familiar with the various groups of Latins who occupied the territories of Byzantium after the Fourth Crusade and aware that they consisted of different peoples: Franks in the Peloponnese, Venetians and Lombards in Euripos, Italians in Macedonia (Akropolites, *Opera*, 1:21.10, 62,15–16). In the capital itself, there was the feudal element who lived alongside the Venetian merchants; the city was divided between them although they were all considered jointly as Latins (Akropolites, *Opera*, 1:13.5,8, 183.8–17). In Nicaea, there were other Latins, presumably Genoese with other Italians, who had entered Theodore Laskaris' service. George Akropolites' historical writing represents a progression as regards the Byzantine awareness of the Latins, who had by this stage made deep inroads in Byzantine territory and also affected Byzantine politics. The Latin presence in Romania was highly composite, in that it contained mercantile and military elements, enemies and allies of the Greeks, and, on the occasion of the battle of Antioch-on-the-Maeander in 1211, even soldiers who fought on the Byzantine side and who were appreciated for their prowess and noble souls (Akropolites, *Opera*, 1:16.6–9, 12–18).

In short, on the basis of the historians we have considered above, we can see that, until the first half of the 13th century, the Byzantines kept using the notion of 'Latin' for all Westerners they met in a political and military context (and while Western presence in the empire's territories grew), even though they were well aware that they consisted of many different peoples.

The danger from Italian cities as perceived in 12th-century Byzantium

We will now focus on the perception of the danger constituted by the Westerners settled in Byzantine territory and on the changing attitudes in Byzantium towards

the Italian merchants, starting from the 12th century until the coming to the throne of Michael VIII Palaiologos when the Genoese assumed a dominant position in Byzantium.

The facts we are referring to are generally well known, but we should briefly remember that at that time, the frequent contacts taught both sides to understand each other, to seek each other out, as well as to repel each other. Particularly in 1104, Emperor Alexios Komnenos wrote to Venice, Genoa and Pisa asking for their support against the Norman Bohemond (Komnene, *Alexiade*, 3:54.1–6). Indeed, from the end of the 11th century, that was the case: the complex political circumstances made unavoidable a progressively greater Latin involvement. Except for a few passing thoughts on the excessively generous policies of the *basileus* towards the Latins, something which at that time was even hinted at by Anna Komnene,[8] the perception of the danger, or rather of the irreparable error committed in underestimating the Latin populations, became a certainty only with Niketas Choniates' description of Manuel's policies at the time of his strife with Frederick Barbarossa. Choniates says that the *basileus*, comparing the threats to the empire from East and West, thought of keeping off the eastern barbarians through money payment and war. He feared much more the growing power of the Western peoples, especially if they all allied together against the empire. He actually had concluded pacts under oath with Venice, Genoa, Ancona and the other maritime peoples, which granted them privileges and allowed them to settle in the capital (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:199.59–62). The Byzantines sought a military alliance with the Italian cities and attempted to take advantage of the conflicts between the cities and the higher powers, such as the king of Sicily and the Western Emperor, even instructing the cities on how to resist Barbarossa's threats. As implied by Choniates the emperor feared above all the Latin kings, and especially the Western Emperor (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:199.62–200.69). In reality, he did not fully appreciate the strength that the mercantile cities had themselves and he thought it would be easy to obtain their friendship. However, his efforts were in vain – indeed; in that period, the Westerners became even more arrogant. In fact, Choniates, focusing on the Venetians and the events of 1171, describes them as enriched men, indifferent to the orders and threats of the *basileus.* He also says that, after the Byzantines welcomed them in order to obtain their help, they moved to Constantinople in swarms and tribes and changed their home with Constantinople (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:171.45–54; see also Kinnamos, who has a similar opinion about the Venetian: Kinnamos, *Epitome,* 281.20–282.8).

In reality, we do not know whether Niketas' opinion was influenced by the increasing dismay at the wrongs perpetrated by the Latins over this period and, therefore, whether his view of them depended on what happened in 1204 or had already been shaped before that time. We would ask if episodes like the Venetian outrage toward the emperor on Cyprus in 1147 and their offences in 1171, as well as the conquest of Thessalonica by the Normans in 1185 (when various Italians, in particular from Genova, Pisa, Tuscany, Lombardy and even Longobards from southern Italy, were among those urging William II to attack), had led the Byzantine dignitary to embrace anti-Latin opinion before the crusaders' assault

against Constantinople. This negative opinion was held by Constantinople's population, but, apart from the parenthesis of Andronikos I, was contradicted by official policy decisions aiming to avoid the worst if they were to irritate the Latin 'guests'. The behavior of the crusaders, however, definitively influenced the historian's opinion (On the consequences of the crusade on the opinion of Byzantine bureaucrats and members of the church see Gounaridis, 2006, 81–95) and everything took a desperate turn for the worse with the events of 1204. Faced with the horrors of the sacking and the sacrilegious acts carried out in the churches, Niketas inveighs against the Latins whom he calls 'forerunners of the Antichrist' (*tou Antichristou prodromoi*). His criticism does not deal with doctrinal matters. It is based on the evidence of Latin impious behavior: although they took the cross, they proved themselves worse than the Muslims, who were more respectful and moderate towards the Latins when they captured Jerusalem; in fact, in Niketas' text the term *allopistoi* ('infidels') is used for the Latins, purportedly from the point of view of the Muslims who conquered Jerusalem, but we could argue that the author wanted to at least imply that for the Byzantines too, the Latins were (or acted like) 'infidels' (Choniates, *Historia,* 1:573.7, 576.92; see Asdracha,1983, 34). Elsewhere in the same chapter of the *Chronike Diegesis* the author is more explicit about their impious attitude and he accuses them of having transgressed against their Christian heritage and of having destroyed the meaning of the cross with the cross they bore upon their shoulders (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:575.61, 576.79–80; see Maltezou 2005, 152–153).

Genoese, Pisans, Venetians and Byzantium in the 12th century: encounters and conflicts

Diplomatic relations in the 12th century between Byzantium and the Italian cities are well documented. Original Byzantine chancery documents have reached us through Genoa (nine documents) and Pisa (two documents) (Dölger and Wirth, *Regesten*, 2: nos. 1582, 1606, 1607, 1609, 1610, 1612, 1616, 1649, 1651, 1660, 1661a), whereas none have come to us through Venice, though we do have Latin copies (Pozza and Ravegnani, 1993, 11–12). In the letters and privileges destined for Italian cities the terms *doulos*, *douleia*, *pistis*, *pistos* or *pistotatos* (MM, 3: nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 9) referred to people and governors, implying that the emperor assumed he had extended a kind of formal power over them. Every city had made specific demands from the empire, which granted appropriate favors on the basis of these demands and the negotiating leverage of the parties involved. The documentary information runs in parallel with the chronicles and often blends in with them. The example of the Venetian *bourgesioi* in the empire, whom we know about thanks to Kinnamos, is significant (Kinnamos, *Epitome*, 282.5–7). Through documentary sources we know the famous Pisan Signoretto (Müller, *Documenti*, no. 10) and a Venetian *burgensis,* Giovanni Christofolo who lived in Constantinople before 1197 (Borsari, 1988, 50). Scholars have discussed the problem of the actual status of the *bourgesioi* (for discussion about the subject of the status of *bourgesioi*, see Penna, 2012, 200–203), but sources do not help us in clarifying it. Nicetas Choniates says nothing about the *status* of those

Pisans who had chosen Constantinople as their permanent residence (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:552.83–84). We know little about the *marinarii Pisani burgenses Constantinopoli* mentioned in the instructions to the Genoese ambassador Grimaldo in 1174 (Bertolotto and Sanguineti, *Nuova serie di documenti*, no. 5). They attacked a Genoese ship in the port of *Pasechia* with other Pisans, who were not *burgenses.* However, we can deduce nothing about their particular *status* in Constantinople which differentiated them from their fellow citizens. There is no mention of particular Genoese as *burgenses* in Constantinople, but we do know that a number of them were the emperor's *lizioi* while others sought to enter imperial service and to become *homo imperatoris* (For instance, see Chiaudano and Moresco, *Giovanni Scriba*, 1: no. 97). This bond with the *basileus* was personal and was founded on loyalty; it did not refer to a specific category of person but was rather an individual arrangement (On *lizioi* see Magdalino, 1993, 106–107, 223–226). In all likelihood, Manuel wanted to incorporate Pisans and Venetians who lived in Constantinople as quasi-citizens, whereas for the Genoese he preferred to focus on controlling specific individuals, making them his friends through the grant of honors and benefits – as, for example, in the case of Baldovino Guercio who was a *lizios* of the emperor while he also received a land benefit.[9] Moreover, the Genoese threat to the empire did not appear to be political or institutional but rather, according to complaints made in letters from Byzantium to the Genoese government, took the form of pirates attacking the Greek inhabitants of the islands and along the coasts. The most famous Genoese pirates of the 12th century were Guglielmo Grasso and Kafuris. As Angeliki Laiou has pointed out, the former caused both economic and political harm to the empire (Laiou, 2001, 158–160). Niketas Choniates shows an interest in the latter who was defeated by the emperor thanks to his Calabrian ally Giovanni Stirione and the Pisan fleet following him. The historian, however, is unsparing in speaking insultingly of the Genoese pirates, referring to them as 'garbage' and 'abortion of mankind' on the occasion of their attack on Crete in 1206 (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:639.89–95). On the contrary, he does not inveigh against Pisan pirates, probably considering that a Pisan fleet had helped the emperor in capturing the Genoese pirate Kafuris in 1196–early 1197, and some Pisans participated in defending the city against the crusaders in 1203.[10]

On the opposite side, if we read the Pisan, Genoese and Venetian sources of the 12th century, we can see that each of them attributed a number of totally different meanings to their contacts with Byzantium. We know well enough that the Venetians looked on their past through the perspective of their autonomy and refused to see themselves as being subject to Byzantium, as Constantine VII considered them in his treatise *De administrando imperio* (Schreiner, 2013, 25). However, from the end of the 10th century onwards they received privileges from the emperors who, in exchange for the help they were given, had to turn a blind eye to various hostile episodes. Nevertheless, in every Italian city any relationship with the empire was seen as a benefit and a source of prestige, whether doing military service for the *basileus*, like the Genoese and Pisan *lizioi,* or having a Greek presence, like in Pisa with Eudoxia*,* niece of the *basileus,* and wife of a high-ranking citizen named Guelfo, son of Hormanno, son of Paganello da Porcari (Maragone, *Annales*, 68).

Relations between Manuel and the Pisans had nonetheless eroded over time and the image of Byzantium had faded. However, at the end of the 12th century, there was a new situation for the Pisans. It is noteworthy that Alexios III had in his employ the *lizios kavallarios* Pipino Pisano (MM, 3: no. 6) and appreciated the Pisans so much as to make the Venetians angry (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:537–538). Genoa, on the other hand, by 1155 at any rate, was maintaining relations with the *basileus* that on the whole may be considered – apart from the slaughter of the Latins in 1182 – as pretty much continuous. In particular, the Genoese had appreciated Manuel's policy toward them. The mourning for the death of the emperor appears heartfelt, and the precise date is recorded (the 23rd of September, Saint Thecla's Day), while people are shown mourning in a sketch in the *Codex Parisiensis* of the Genoese Annals (held by the Bibliothèque nationale de France). The annalist Ottobono Scriba also specifies that the sad news was brought from Pera on a ship loaded with grain – in effect an allusion to the benefits gained in the long years of friendly Byzantine-Genoese relations (Belgrano and Sant'Angelo, *Annali genovesi,* 2:14–15). And this was all-important for the Genoese. In Genoese relations with the empire, however, we can find no demonstration of feeling similar to the Amalfitans' friendship towards the Greeks, which Choniates himself underlines, noting that they had been nourished according to the Byzantine customs (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:552.82–83). There is also nothing in Genoa which resembles that particular climate in which operated those described by W. Berschin as 'the three bright stars': i.e. firstly *Burgundione da Pisa* and later the brothers *Ugo Eteriano* and *Leone Tusco*, when Pisan translation activity shifted completely from Arabic to Greek (Berschin, 1989, 285–292). These contacts favored a particular perception of the Byzantine world at every level, as demonstrated by the Pisan coinage from the beginning of the 13th century, which has the image of the Virgin and the inscription in Greek letters *meter theou* ('mother of God'), evocative albeit comprehensible to few in the Tuscan city (Weyl Carr, 2004, 277–292; Bacci, 2007, 63–78).

The strife for the dominion of the sea after 1261

For the Genoese in particular, everything changed in 1261 with the Treaty of Nymphaion, associated with the famous *pallium* donated by Michael VIII to Genoa's Cathedral. I am not going to talk about this subject, which has been discussed recently by Cecily Hilsdale and by Ioli Kalavrezou.[11] Since much has been written on the events of 1261 let us rather ask ourselves for what reasons the Genoese, initially categorized as 'people of the sea with experience of the market and as allies, good in navigation, experts in naval warfare and land defense', became for the Byzantines the worst of enemies, 'pitiless and insolent people, murderers and ingrates' (Schreiner, 2013, 72). I will not be considering here the evolution of the political relationship, but I will pick up certain themes of interest in the context of this paper.

Let us start with George of Cyprus' praise of the sea (George of Cyprus, *Ἐγκώμιον εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν*, 433–444), probably a literary work composed for his teaching activities (Conticello, 2012, 9). The scholar's rhetoric emphasizes the

advantages, thanks to the maritime connections, of the universal availability of the goods of other countries and being able to obtain common products at reduced prices. He also emphasizes an awareness of the economic issues, which he says count for little for those who have a cult of knowledge and have loftier thoughts than those of the majority of men. His words, however, show that on account of the Italians' presence, the economic issues at that moment in time had apparently become of greater significance.

In all probability, the Byzantines were coming to appreciate the value of how much they had conceded to the Genoese and, indeed, the emperor had tried to postpone the execution of the treaty with them. After having promised them a quarter in Constantinople he decided to move them outside the city settling them firstly in Herakleia and then in Pera, and called the Venetians back into the empire in 1277, thereby provoking the former's violent reaction until 1278 (Pachymeres, *Relations Historiques*, 2:534–543; cf. Origone, 2004, 619–631). The consequences were not slow in making themselves felt and were enduring: war between the Italians, attacks on imperial dominions and increasingly impudent behavior towards the emperor himself, efforts to dominate the entire seaboard and strengthen their settlements, without restriction or subject to any pact (Pachymeres, *Relations Historiques*, 3:262–267). In 1349, the Genoese destroyed the fleet Emperor Kantakouzenos had set up aiming at enforcing the new customs regulations and, after the battle at Bosporus in 1352, the Byzantine detached themselves from their allies, i.e. the Venetians and the Catalans (Balard, 1978, 1:78–83). Disdain toward the Genoese is a constant theme in the writings of contemporary Byzantine historians. Particularly Nikephoros Gregoras, underlining Genoese increasing arrogance, criticizes or points out their ambition to become lords of the sea, from Tana and the Meotide (the Sea of Azov) to Cadiz and the Pillars of Hercules, and rejoices in their defeat off the coasts of Sardinia (Gregoras, *Byzantina Historia*, Bk 28, pars. 22–28. The Genoese fleet was defeated at Porto Conte near Alghero on August 27th 1353).

Genoese and Greek experiences in the 14th century

It is nonetheless undeniable that the widespread presence of the Italians in the empire tended to encourage, if not an understanding, at least mutual familiarity. The two worlds ultimately had a reasonably realistic perception of each other, even if, as Peter Schreiner has shown, the Genoese system of government was interpreted in an anachronistic way, akin to the democracy of ancient Athens (Schreiner, 2013, 63–79). It must also be said, as highlighted by Angeliki Laiou, that being up to date on what was happening in Genoa, as well as in Italy and the rest of Europe in general, was increasingly becoming the norm for Byzantine authors (Laiou, 1995, 59–98).

Regarding the possible influences of the Latin model on the reality of Byzantium, a topic much discussed is the revolt in Thessalonica. Indeed, if we can find no relevant Genoese presence in 14th-century Thessalonica, there is, however, something to be said about the social basis of the Zealot movement

revolt. During the succession struggles between John V Palaiologos and John VI Cantacuzenos there was a new upheaval in Thessalonica. Elements of the dynatoi who dominated the city attempted to deliver it to Kantakouzenos in 1342. John Barker, in his account of these events, remarks that a faction of the demos, whose main strength was the organization of sailors and dockworkers in the harbor, called themselves Zealots and stirred up the populace. The Zealot regime lasted about seven or eight years. Scholars have demonstrated that the struggles in Thessalonica had more complex implications than a solely social upheaval (See the discussion of this subject in Barker, 2003, 5–33). Nevertheless, at that time the sailors were heavily involved in this movement. We can assume that some of them probably had sailed together with Westerners. The crews of Genoese navies in particular were mixed: Latin and Greek seamen sailed on the same galleys, shared the same harsh living conditions and could inspire and influence each other (Balard, 1981, 511–534). In 1339, a dangerous sailors' revolt occurred in Liguria; it was in Savona, a maritime city forming part of the Genoese dominion, from where they enlisted most of their crews. The chronicler George Stella shows us the background to this revolt, speaking of a Genoese fleet in the service of the king of France sailing to Flanders under the command of Admiral Aitonus Doria: owing to a riot by the crew of this fleet who were demanding to be paid their wages, sixteen sailors were captured while the others managed to reach Genoa. The sailors from Savona were especially furious, and when they reached home they rebelled against the nobles who in most cases were ship-owners. It is significant that this revolt which was fired up by *marinarii cum quibusdam aliis artificis idiotis* started from here in 1339 and spread to Genoa and the surrounding area just a little before the victory of the populares and the election of Simon Boccanegra as doge.[12]

Concluding our discussion on this point, we recall that the scholars have underlined that there is no evidence to postulate any direct connection between the political situation in 14th-century Thessalonica and Genova, and in particular neither Gregoras nor Kantakouzenos draws any comparison between Genoese events and the Thessalonian ones (in particular, see Ševčenko, 1981, 603–617; Browning, 1995, 91–104; Barker, 2003, 33). What we may assert is only that in both cities social discontent probably originated from a similar maritime context, while the general context was quite different in each case.

Another point to make is that the Genoese elites captured the Byzantine historians' interest. In particular, John Kantakouzenos observed the success of the Genoese mercantile aristocracy, he had friends in Pera and provided Emperor Andronikos III with allies belonging to the aristocratic families of De Mari, Doria and Spinola (Kantakouzenos, *Historiarum Libri*, Bk1, par. 8). Henceforth the imperial dynasty would be linked to Genoa's ancient prestigious families, and these aristocrats would be the new masters of Romania (For the bond between the Gattilusio dynasty and Genoa, see Wright, 2014, 129–185). The historian's disdain for the popular party, particularly when they exiled Pagano Doria, who had supported his homeland, reflects his sympathy for the rich magnates and probably corresponds to his view of the situation in Byzantium.

Facing each other: enduring suspicions and attempts at conciliation

A multiplicity of factors made any understanding between Byzantines and Latins difficult. First, there was the language barrier, although it was felt less as an impediment to communication and more as a marker of cultural difference. Indeed, there was linguistic understanding between Greeks and Latins but it was limited to the essentials. Furthermore, since the time of Anna Komnene the emperor had at his disposal experts of the language spoken by the Latins and of their usages (Komnene, *Alexiade*, 2:209; on multilingualism, see Jacoby, 2008, 27–48). In Niketas' opinion, the Latins could not bear that the Byzantine they had captured ignored their language. He tells us that during the conquest of Thessalonica it was very dangerous for a Greek to be completely unaware of the Latin's habits and the language spoken by them.[13] The Latins, on the other hand, tended to know a little Greek (Niketas himself turned to some Latin soldiers who were able to understand him: cf. Choniates, *Historia*, 1:590.74–76). The language difference generated considerable disdain for the Latins. Niketas, speaking about the crusaders in Constantinople, thought that even the sound of the language spoken by the Latins was not harmonious and considered their speech to be too shrill and fast.[14] This was one of the negative characteristics generally attributed to the Latins by Greek intellectuals. The attitude of Archbishop Michael Choniates, Niketas' brother, towards the Italians is even more telling. In his letter of encouragement to Manuel Beriboes he speaks about the *barbarophonoi* Italians and their tyranny. Despite this tyranny, he encourages him not to abandon his philosophical studies. The archbishop insists on linguistic difference and notes that owing to their pronunciation they confuse *Christou latreia* (the worship of Christ) with *chrysolatreia* (the worship of gold) (Choniates, *Epistulae*, 241: no. 148.29–38). Moreover, in his letter to Archbishop Theodore of Euripos he says that the barbarous Italians who are not able to appreciate harmonious and elegant words are akin to donkeys and to cockroaches, as the former are not able to appreciate the sound of lyre, or the latter the aroma of balm (Choniates, *Epistulae*, 238: no. 146.23–25).

The cultural inferiority of the Latins was a firm conviction among the Byzantines, but over time glimmers of understanding manifested themselves. Demetrios Kydones, who appreciated Latin culture, considered the knowledge of the Italians inferior to that of the Greeks. Nevertheless, he praises the learning of Greek culture by individuals like his Italian protégé Paulus from Milan who aimed to improve his knowledge (Kydones, *Correspondance*, 1: no. 435.15, 47; for the relation between Paulus and Demetrios, see Kianka, 1995, 99–110). In the Palaiologan period, the unionist defenders of the filioque had accepted the Latin theological ideas and were usually favorably disposed towards accepting Western help as well (Kolbaba, 2001, 130–132). In this context, in his oration on accepting Latin aid (*Pro Subsidio Latinorum*), delivered in Constantinople in 1366, when the expedition of Amadeus of Savoy in support of Byzantium was about to materialize, Kydones makes the point that Rome, mother-city of Constantinople, remained as an outpost in the West sending the Byzantines to govern Asia, the

two cities being essentially one, while Constantine was a Roman who honored the city which he founded (that is, New Rome) with the name of his homeland, the ancient Rome. Alluding to Amadeus' crusade, Kydones moreover argues that the Byzantines had nothing to fear from these allies who would offer their support to the empire asking nothing in exchange (προῖκα) (Kydones, *Oratio pro subsidio Latinorum*, in MPG, 154:978–979, 986; Kianka, 1995, 103).

On the other hand, the arrogant behavior of the Genoese and their accumulated wealth to the detriment of Byzantium created considerable resentment. This was frequently expressed through the use of animal imagery. By the end of the 13th century, there were new conflicts between Genoese and Venetians in Constantinople, and the former viciously attacked the latter. On this occasion, George Pachymeres compared the Genoese to wild boars.[15] Moreover, John Kantakouzenos recalls the comparison of the Genoese to donkeys. He explains that they were considered as such even by other Latins due to the fact that the Genoese, when they do not fear the worst, do what they should not do, like the donkeys who, if they are not under the fear of being hit hard, do not keep their route ahead as well (Kantakouzenos, *Historiarum Libri*, Bk 4, par. 11). The context of this comparison is the attack on Constantinople by the Genoese who took advantage of the emperor's illness. Nikephoros Gregoras further elaborates on the negative judgment of the Genoese. Considering that their ambition was to become lords of the sea and that, after the Venetians and the Catalans had defeated them in 1353, they submitted to Milanese dominance, the historian compares the Genoese to the camel in Aesop's fable 'Zeus and the camel', which, instead of getting the horns it wanted, lost its ears (Gregoras, *Byzantina Historia*, Bk 28, par. 16) .

The events in the middle of the 14th century, when the Genoese galleys refused the obligatory greetings to the *basileus* on entering the capital (Pachymeres, *Relations Historiques*, 2:537), showed their arrogance in the face of the emperor. But the story of the welcome given to the basileus Manuel in Genoa in 1403 (Stella, *Annales Genuenses*, 262–263) and the satisfied account of John VIII's visit to Milan to Duke Filippo Maria Visconti, who was also lord of Genoa in 1423, are revealing of a new attitude (Decembrio, *Vita Philippi Mariae*, 108–109). I would underline that Manuel II was the first ruling emperor to be welcomed in Genoa. In fact, before then, the Genoese, to judge by their political plotting in Constantinople, had only welcomed a usurper, the obstinate John VII whom they supported for a short time (Balard, 1978, 1:94). The welcome to Byzantine emperors in the 15th century shows that the sense of belonging to a common tradition, revived by the Turkish peril, on the one hand, and the clear and still felt perception of the prestige of Byzantium, on the other, brought the Genoese milieu closer to a feeling of community towards Byzantine civilization. Notwithstanding this seemingly positive attitude, the Italians went on asking for benefits from the emperor. According to George Sphrantzes, the Venetians, who felt themselves nearer to the empire, expected a prestigious marriage. Despot Constantine Palaiologos was supposed to marry Doge Francesco Foscari's daughter. But when Constantine became emperor, he refused to go through with the marriage. Faced with this refusal the doge got angry and took his revenge by reducing the Venetians' commitment to the city's defence (Sphrantzes, *Cronaca*, 136–138). Moreover,

in telling this story, George Sphrantzes probably intended to suggest that the Venetians never lost sight of their aim to dominate Constantinople possibly even through marriage, while in Doukas' opinion the Genoese of Pera were indeed in a complicated situation and during the siege they paid both sides, but were not able to mislead the Ottomans (Doukas, *Istoria Turco-Bizantină*, 333).

Despite the alternation of various peoples and the variety of characteristics of the Latins who turned up in the empire, the Byzantines remained highly mistrustful of them. They expected from the Westerners help which they were not able or not prepared to give. Particularly at the end neither the Genoese nor the Venetians did anything, or gave very little help, to save the empire, but they still appreciated its prestige and the chance of enrichment it offered. On the other hand, the Byzantines were ultimately aware that the former had been the most intolerable allies, but the latter had been the most untrustworthy allies, or rather the most dangerous enemies.

In conclusion, the Byzantines' perception of the Western world at the time of the crusades formed the basis of their subsequent opinions about the Westerners. Regardless of the terms they used to describe them, they considered the Latins as a unified, monolithic entity characterized by their aggressive behavior and their different customs – similar to the barbarians who were essentially the antithesis of the Byzantines. The terms used by the authors depended on their knowledge but, above all, they chose names corresponding to their contemporary context and circumstances. For instance, as shown above, they called the Normands, Sicilians, when this people dominated Sicily, and they used specific names for the cities and their citizens when they became relevant for the empire (whether helping or damaging it). At first, the Byzantine authors' attitude towards the Italians was ambivalent but, afterwards, two events caused increasing hostility against them: first, the Fourth Crusade and then the behavior of the Genoese and the power they gained within the empire after 1261. In spite of specific political or cultural circumstances, however, Byzantine perception of the Western world was constantly influenced, on the one hand, by a long-standing policy and, on the other, by a deeply ingrained ideology. The former was the diplomacy meant to help the empire survive through Latin support; the latter was a firm certainty of the Byzantine superiority, which prevented a real understanding between Byzantium and the other peoples, including the Latins. This attitude represented the actual continuity in Byzantine-Latin relations from the crusades to the Ottoman conquest.

Notes

1 Komnene, *Alexiade*, 1:146.11, 147.32, 148.3,12,15,26,29; 2:51.30, 52.10, 53.4,14, 54.5, 56.29–31; 3:42.14, 43.2,4,6,8,18,21, 44.18, 45.21, 46.22, 47.4,10,15,19.

2 Eustathios of Thessalonica, *Espugnazione*, 32.35, 34.6,11,15,16,21,25,31, 36.4, 60.10, 68.14, 70.2,4, 72.24, 82.18, 86.7,23,32, 92.7,15,35, 110.29, 114.8, 122.23, 124.18, 126.15, 128.7,1,21,30,33, 130.8,19,20,31, 134.20, 136.15, 138.12, 148.23.27, 150.9.

3 Eustathios of Thessalonica, *Espugnazione*, 60.10, 68.14, 72.24, 86.7,23,32, 114.8, 122.23, 124.18, 126.15, 128.7, 12, 21, 30, 33, 130.8,19,20,31, 134.20, 136.15, 138.12, 148.23–27.

4 Eustathios of Thessalonica, *Espugnazione,* 82.9, 86.17, 94.20, 114.5–6,15,26,35, 116.17, 118.15, 120.8,30, 134.26, 136.6, 138.6,29; the term is once referred to the Iberian red hat, worn by the Byzantine general David.

5 Eustathios of Thessalonica, *Espugnazione,* 86.30, 88.31, 94.26, 122.31.
6 Choniates, *Historia*, 1:155.73, 322.44, 398.17, 653.94; Kazdhan, 2001, 88–89, mentions also a reference to Armenians as ′barbarian′: see Choniates, *Historia* 1:26.69.
7 Choniates, *Historia*, 1:623.72–73, 624.12–5,92; Choniates mentions Martin of Pairis instead of Peter Capuano who was the papal legate: see Choniates, *Grandezza e catastrofe*, 3:362, 613, note 226.
8 Anna Komnene mentions honors and presents which the Venetians received from the emperor, and talks about her father's fear of Genoese and Pisan fleets, which he nevertheless admired; on the other hand, she was quite suspicious of the Celts, i.e. the crusaders, who, in her view, aimed to seize the empire and were impudent: cf. Komnene, *Alexiade*, 1:146.24–6, 148.12–20, 2: 206.28–73, 209.26–9; 3: 43.23, 44.18, 45.21, 46.29, 47.4,10,15,19.
9 Bertolotto and Sanguineti, *Nuova serie di documenti*, no. 16; the instructions to the Genoese ambassadors in May 1201, before they were sent to Emperor Alexios III, mention the estates given by Manuel I to Baldovino Guercio, which were sequestered at the time of Gafforio's piracy as a revenge on the Genoese and were then returned to Baldovino by Alexios III: 'placuit tandem domino Manueli ei casalem et possessiones in feudi beneficium assignare quod beneficium et possessiones sanctissimus imperator ei reddit et redditum confirmavit et tenuit ipse Balduinus per plura tempora imperii sui et pro beneplacito suo postea occasione Gafforii ei casalem ipsum et possessiones impediri fecit'.
10 Choniates, *Historia*, 1:545.37, 552.84; for Pisan piracy, see Brand, 1968, 214–216**:** indeed the Pisans lost Alexios III's favor since 1201, however according to Choniates some Pisans fought against the crusaders on occasion of their first assault to the capital.
11 Hilsdale compares the iconographical pattern of the pallium to the rhetoric framework of enkômia and concludes that the artifact recalls a moment before Michael VIII full legitimacy as emperor: cf. Hilsdale, 2010, 151–199; see also Kalavrezou, 2012, 354–369.
12 Stella, *Annales Genuenses*, 128–129; on the sociopolitical situation in Liguria and the context of rebellions in Savona and Genova in particular in the 14th century, see also Petti Balbi, 2007, 101–125.
13 Choniates, *Historia*, 1:300.94–98; it is noteworthy that Niketas translates Latin titles into Greek equivalent: for instance, see *strategos* for *kontos*, *logothetes* for *kankelarios*: cf. Choniates, *Historia*, 1:200.88, 201.89, 308.96–97.
14 Choniates, *Historia*, 1:575.65–66, 602.5; his criticism on language goes back to Anna Komnene, who shows also disdain for Robert Guiscard's verbal arrogance: cf. Komnene, *Alexiade*, 2:228.14–16; 3:51.26–29.
15 Pachymeres, *Relations historiques*, 3:269.14–15; Niketas Choniates compares to wild beasts the Bulgarians and the Vlachs (cf. Choniates, *Historia*, 1:26.73–6 , 398.15–16), a comparison also found in12th–century Byzantine literature referring to the Latins (the reference is to Manganeios Prodromos: cf. Jeffreys & Jeffreys, 2001, 108–109).

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Part II

Byzantium and the West during the Early Crusades

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4 Byzantium and the Crusades in the Komnenian era

Perception and reality*

Athina Kolia-Dermitzaki

During the 1980s, after the establishment of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East, the crusading movement attracted scholarly interest on a large scale. As a result, a series of related books and articles have been written and a significant number of conferences have been organized. A number among them examined the evolution of ideas and realities that led to the formation of the crusading idea and to the First Crusade, while others dealt with the special characteristics of this idea (Erdmann, 1977; Rousset, 1945; Rousset, 1983; Riley-Smith & Riley-Smith, 1981; Riley-Smith, 1986; Phillips, 1997; Flori, 2001; Balard, 1996; Kedar, Riley-Smith & Hiestand, 1997).[1]

However, up to now the issue of Byzantium and the Crusades has mostly been studied either in a number of articles that examined the mutual mental or political attitude of both while having as their main subject other specific items, or in handbooks of Byzantine history, books in the form of monographs on the Crusades (usually composed by specialists of the 'Western' Middle Ages) or on a Byzantine emperor's reign (such as Paul Magdalino, 1993, on Manuel Komnenos, or Angeliki Papageorgiou, 2017, on John II Komnenos). There are, of course, two significant exceptions: Jonathan Harris has dealt specifically with Byzantium and the Crusades in his homonymous book, where he attempts to shed light on their relations focusing on the nature of the Byzantine Empire and its supporting ideology (Harris, 2006). Ralph-Johannes Lilie, in his *Byzantium and the Crusader States*, examined thoroughly and in-depth the political and military aspects of the relations between the Byzantine Empire and the Latin states created by the crusaders in Syria and Palestine; an area particularly important for the Byzantines, strategically as well as ideologically (Lilie, 1993).

As may be seen in the bibliography at the end of this chapter, I have also delved into the issue Byzantium and the Crusades in my monographs and articles.

* This chapter is an expanded version of the paper I delivered at the 2014 conference. Meanwhile, 2016 saw the publication of a study by N. Chrissis, on 'Byzantine Crusaders: Holy War and Crusade Rhetoric in Byzantine Contacts with the West (1095–1341)' [= Chrissis, 2016]; Chrissis' contribution examines a number of points also covered in the present study but it is primarily an in-depth analysis of the goals that were served by the rhetoric used by the Byzantine leadership, whereas the present examination focuses on the adoption of crusader ideology by the Byzantines.

The aim of this chapter is to highlight and summarize the salient points of Byzantine perceptions of the crusading idea (primarily, the notion of 'holy war') by comparison to corresponding Western ones. On this basis, and with the help of case studies pertaining to the First and Second Crusades (1096–1099 and 1147–1149, respectively), it will study and attempt to explain the attitude of the Byzantine government and of certain members of the Byzantine élite and ascertain whether the leadership's perceptions correspond to their reactions. The first two Crusades have been selected for this examination because it was these that played a key role in shaping the Eastern Romans' perceptions and attitudes vis-à-vis this movement. By the time of the Third Crusade (1189–1191), perceptions and emotions had already solidified on both sides; the Norman attack of 1185 and the rumoured Byzantine alliance between Isaakios Angelos and Saladin were basic complementary factors for this consolidation for the Byzantines and the Westerners respectively (for the Norman attack see Brand, 1968, 174–175 and Kolia-Dermitzaki, 1994, 49–53; for the alliance see Brand, 1962; Lilie, 1993, 230–239; Harris, 2006, 274–279; Angelov, 2006, with note 1 for the relevant bibliography; and, more recently, Neocleous, 2010).

Perception

On the basis of the extensive relevant literature, I shall first give the main points of the conception of the Crusade in the West, since a definition of this concept is indispensable for the understanding of the Byzantine perception of, and attitude towards, this movement. Thus, for the people of the West, the Crusade was conducted under a divine mandate and was aimed at defending the Churches of the East. More specifically, its objectives were: a) to offer assistance to fellow Christians who were being persecuted by Muslims, and to take revenge for insults against God (insults due to the occupation of the land of His martyrdom, the looting of Churches and the persecution of the faithful), b) to restore Christian control of the Holy Land, and c) to assist in the expansion of the Christian world, the *Christianitas*. The person who had the authority to initiate, organize, and conduct the campaign was the bishop of Rome, regarded as the representative of God on Earth. The pope granted a papal standard (the *vexillum sancti Petri*) and promised indulgence (or, according to another interpretation, remission of penance) for those killed in battle. He also provided the crusaders with material privileges as well. The presence of the cross on the uniforms of the crusaders, their ritual purification before the battle, and the connection with pilgrimage are additional features of the Crusade (see indicatively: Rousset, 1983, 69–109; Erdmann,1977, esp. 35–56 and 182–89, for the significance of the symbols; Mayer, 1965, 15–46; Blake, 1970, 11–31; Cowdrey, 1970; idem, 1995; Kolia-Dermitzaki, 1991a, 37–66; Tyerman, 2004, 27–32).

The first aim of the Crusade has been extensively discussed by the abovementioned scholars; here, I will rather comment on the second (Jerusalem) and third aims, beginning with the latter, the expansion of Christendom, of *Christianitas*, and its conception in the West and in the East (see indicatively: Delaruelle, 1980,

esp. 11–32, 40–41; Vismara, 1974, esp. 72–78; Pellegrini, 1991, with n. 2 for literature up to the time of publication. Cf. Daly, 1960, 43–91; Kolia-Dermitzaki, 2003, 73–74; Magdalino, 2004, for a parallel examination of the idea of *Christianitas* in the West in the 7th and the 11th century).

From approximately the middle of the 11th century, certain processes in the West led to war in the service of the Church and gave a new meaning to the term *Christianitas*. Such processes included the Carolingian theory of the obligation of the supreme leader to defend the Christians and to ensure the spread of Christianity, the acknowledgement by the Church of the imperative need to defend Christians and the Christian religion in general (the *Christianitas*) against infidels, and the demand of the papacy for an ecclesiastical reform along with a leading role for itself in political affairs. Thus, *Christianitas* became equivalent to *respublica christiana*, i.e. it acquired both a religious and a political meaning (apparent especially in the texts of the First Crusade),[2] comprising the people of Christian faith in West and East. The most important issue regarding the Western concept of *Christianitas* is that the unifying factor of this new Christendom, composed of two empires, each with a secular leader (the *imperator Romanorum* in the West and the *imperator Graecorum* or *Constantinopolitanum* in the East, according to official Western documents and chronicles), and several peoples, was the head of the Roman Church, the pope (Nicol, 1986, esp. 169–172; Pellegrini, 1991, 86–98; Schieffer, 2003; Kolia-Dermitzaki, 2014, regarding the issue of the two emperors).

Thus, the expansion of Christendom (or *Christianitas*) meant for Westerners the extension of the Christian faith into – among others – the areas which the Christians of the crusader states conquered (indicating the possibility of proselytism that would be granted to the liberated Church). At the same time, however, it was also conceived as 'winning back into the unity of peace the Church across the water and the two patriarchal Sees (of Antioch and Jerusalem) that had cut themselves off from the obedience to the Roman See' (meaning the installation of Latin patriarchs at the head of the Churches of Antioch and Jerusalem), according to Otto of Freising (*Deeds*, Bk 1, par. 35[34]–36[37]), and similar evidence from other Latin sources (e.g. Odo of Deuil, *De profectione Ludovici*, Bk 4, 68–71). Consequently, *Christianitas* – or rather the unity of *Christianitas* – for Rome presupposed its unification via the ecclesiastical subjugation of all Churches to it and, of course, the removal of the 'Schism' of 1054 (Nicol, 1986, as above; Pellegrini, 1991, 99).[3] This view, and the effort to achieve unity in this form, was one of the factors which cultivated the crusading idea.

On the other hand, the Byzantines always perceived *Christianitas* in conjunction with the concept of *Romanitas* with the citizens of the Empire being both 'Romans' and 'Christians' (Christophilopoulou, 1993, 241–244; Chrysos, 1996);[4] the second term *Χριστιανοί* is encountered from the 9th century onwards, especially in the 10th even more frequently as encompassing the first. A few examples, showing the use of the term 'Christians' in the place of 'Romans', are very indicative of the conceptualization of both by the Byzantines. The 10th-century author Symeon Magister and Logothete often makes use of the word 'Christians'

(*Χριστιανοί*) in order to denote the citizens or the army of the Empire: when facing the siege of the capital by the Bulgarian ruler Symeon in June 924, the commanders of the *tagmata* responded to the plea of Emperor Romanos I Lakapenos, who 'exhorted and impelled them to come out of the city, attack the enemy and fight for their fatherland, they willingly assented to die for his reign and the Christians' (… *παρῄνει τούτοις καὶ προὐτρέπετο κατὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐξελθεῖν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ὑπεραγωνίσασθαι. Οἱ δὲ συνέθεντο ἑτοίμως τῆς αὐτοῦ βασιλείας καὶ τῶν Χριστιανῶν ὑπεραγωνίσασθαι* [Symeon Magister, *Chronicon*, 318.168–171]).[5]

Theophanes (*Chronographia*, 20.8–9) concludes his description of the war between Constantine and Licinius in 324, the defeat of the latter and the restoration of peace in the Roman Empire in the following manner: 'And in this way the affairs of the state of the Christians enjoyed perfect peace' (*καὶ οὕτω λοιπὸν τελείας ἀπήλαυσε γαλήνης τὰ πράγματα τῆς Χριστιανῶν πολιτείας*). Referring to the events that five centuries later obliged Michael I Rangabes (811–813) to abdicate and surrender the throne to Leo V (813–820), Theophanes (*Chronographia*, 502.12–16) uses the same term: 'the *strategoi* and the army … implored Leo, the <patrician and> *strategos* of the Anatolics, to help the common cause and protect the state of the Christians' (*Οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ καὶ τὰ πλήθη ... ἐδυσώπουν Λέοντα, τὸν <πατρίκιον καὶ> στρατηγὸν τῶν ἀνατολικῶν, βοηθῆσαι τῷ κοινῷ καὶ τῆς τῶν Χριστιανῶν πολιτείας ἀνθέξασθαι*). In both cases, the *Χριστιανῶν πολιτεία* is meant as the *respublica christiana* of the Westerners, but at the same time includes the notion of the Roman Christian State (i.e. the Empire).

Precisely due to this dual meaning of *Christianitas*, the Byzantines felt a particular bond to the Western world, with which their Empire had once formed a politically and religiously united *οἰκουμένη* (Koder, 2002, for the concept and the boundaries of the Byzantine *οἰκουμένη*; Chrysos, 1996). Extremely revealing on this issue is the testimony from a letter written by Michael Psellos, in the name of Michael VII circa the end of 1072; it was addressed to Robert Guiscard with the aim of entering into intermarriage and alliance with the Norman lord. In this letter the Byzantine Emperor makes the following point: 'the two hegemonies (i.e., the Byzantine and Norman ones) have the same beginning and root (meaning the Roman Empire) and the same saving word (i.e., the Christian religion) spread among both, and the same eyewitnesses of the divine mystery proclaimed the word of the Gospel'. He thus considered that, 'it is inappropriate and inconsiderate, those who are united by a common religion … and who agree on major issues, to disagree on the minor ones and fight with each other …, since that is to slice at the body itself and dissect its very members' (*...μία τίς ἐστιν ἀρχὴ καὶ ῥίζα ταῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς ἡγεμονίαις, καὶ ... ὁ αὐτὸς σωτήριος λόγος ἀμφοτέραις ἐφήπλωται, καὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ αὐτόπται τοῦ θείου μυστηρίου καὶ κήρυκες τὸν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου λόγον ταύταις διήχησαν.Οὐκοῦν ἄτοπον καὶ ἀλόγιστον τοὺς κατὰ τὴν εὐσέβειαν συνημμένους καὶ συνηρμοσμένους ... καὶ ὁμονοοῦντας περὶ τα μείζονα, ἑτερογνωμονεῖν περὶ τὰ ἐλάττονα καὶ στασιάζειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους.... Τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ κατατομὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ σώματος καὶ τῶν οἰκειοτάτων μελῶν σπαραγμὸς καὶ διαίρεσις* [Psellos, 'Deux lettres', no 2, 214 = Sathas, *Μεσαιωνική Βιβλιοθήκη*, no 144, 389]).[6]

This perception of a bond with the people of the West, however, changed inevitably and gradually after the four Norman attacks against their empire (1081–1085, 1107–1108, 1147–1149, 1185) (Kolia-Dermitzaki, 2008), the increasing presence and privileged position of Italian merchants in the Empire from 1082 onwards, and the encounter of the Byzantines with the large armies of the three first Crusades (Koder, 1987; Hermans, 1990, esp. 1–4; Kolia-Dermitzaki, 1994).

Regarding, now, the liberation of Jerusalem and the Holy Land as an objective of the Crusade under the leadership of the pope, the Byzantines were of a completely different opinion. For them, only the secular authority, the emperor – in his capacity as representative of God on Earth and defender of the Church – was competent to proclaim and wage such a war, while their own objective was solely to re-conquer Christian and Roman lands lost to non-Christian enemies and not to expand *Christianitas* (=*Romanitas*) by means of this kind of war, which the crusaders sought (Kolia-Dermitzaki, 1991a, 345–352, 390–391, 401–403; cf. Laiou, 1993;[7] eadem, 2006; Stouraitis, 2009, 201–204, 304–323). Being the cradle of Christianity and the place of the Passion of the Lord, Jerusalem was definitely a source of particular attraction and strong emotions to Christians in the East. Apart from that, however, the Holy Land was also a former part of the Roman Empire. Therefore, due to both these reasons, it was potentially a bone of contention for Byzantium within the framework of a policy that presented Jerusalem as a military objective in an expedition peppered with traces of 'holy war', not only on Komnenian times (see below on John II and note xix), but also during the reigns of Isaakios II Angelos and Theodore I Laskaris, according to two panegyrics by Niketas Choniates addressed to the aforementioned emperors in 1190 and 1210/1211, respectively (Kolia-Dermitzaki, 1991a, 335–337, with n. 50; Angelov, 2006, esp. 61, 65. For a different perspective, cf. Angold's chapter in the present volume).

Examining further the notion of the Crusade in the West, the terms used by the Latin sources to indicate this movement show its close connection with religious actions. Thus, participation in it was considered to be a pilgrimage (*peregrinatio*), service for God (*Dei servitium*), a journey to Jerusalem (*iter hierosolymitanum*) on the path of God (*via Dei*), and the crusaders were the soldiers of Christ (*milites Christi*), pilgrims of God (*peregrini Dei*), a holy people (*gens sancta*), while their army was a Christian army (*exercitus christianus*), the army of God (*exercitus Dei*), a sacred army (*agmina sacra*) (Kolia-Dermitzaki, 1991b, 171–174, for references to the Latin sources; cf. Rousset, 1945).

The study of the Byzantine historiographical sources shows a common characteristic: namely, the lack of enthusiasm, even the indifference, concerning the crusading movement and also the absence of any characterization of it as a sacred task being carried out following a divine order. Consequently, the terminology employed by the Byzantines in order to refer to the *milites Christi* of the Latin chroniclers is free of any religious connotation. They are ethnological terms or purely military, such as 'Alemannians', 'Celts', 'Franks', 'Western powers', 'Western regiments', 'Latins'.[8] In a similar way, the Crusade is referred to without there being any linkage with a sacred, God-pleasing objective. The '*via Dei*' and

'iter hierosolymitanum' of the Latins becomes an 'assault', 'movement', 'massive movement', 'nations' invasion', 'march to Palestine' (Kolia-Dermitzaki, 1991b, 164–168, for references to the Greek sources). With the exception of the last case, the other terms contain an element of aggressive disposition and implicitly or explicitly indicate the suspicion, or, in other cases, the belief that at essence this movement had its sights set against Byzantium. It was only natural that this impression had been created among the Byzantines following their experiences from the First Crusade and the consequences this had on the relations between the Eastern and Western realms of *Christianitas* (Runciman, 1951, 169–171; idem, 1986, 15–22. Cf. Kolbaba, 2000, 12–18).

Ideological acceptance or political necessity?

There are, however, a rather limited number of cases where a religious dimension of the enterprise is admitted. Two of them come from the *Historia* of Niketas Choniates. The first excerpt is a harangue read out by Louis VII to his army on the eve of the battle on the banks of the River Meandros, around 1st January 1148, during the march of the French crusaders across Asia Minor. The main elements of this address are the holy purpose of the Crusade, which was to wage war for Christ against the godless, the remission of sins through participation in this campaign, and the presence of Christ at the head of this 'holy army' (*παρεμβολὴ ἁγία*), the 'God's chosen army' (*στρατὸς θεόλεκτος*):

> O comrades-in-arms, that our expedition was undertaken for Christ and that we chose this present course seeking the glory not of men but of God, each and every one of you clearly knows. … Because of this, we have renounced the comforts of home and have willingly separated ourselves from our families, … we are exposed to dangers, waste away from famine, freeze from the cold, … we have the earth for our couch, the sky for our roof; … (everyone knows) that the barbarians, …, are the enemies of the cross of Christ. … Even though we be concerned about our going straight to the eternal mansions (for God is not so unjust that he does not … admit us into the virgin meadows and shady resting places in Eden, for we have abandoned our country and have chosen to die for him rather than to live) … now stand bravely and fight stoutly… As we are a sacred host and a God-chosen army, let us not ignobly love our lives more than a Christ-loving and everlastingly remembered death.
> (trans. Magoulias, *O City of Byzantium*, 40–41)

> (Choniates, *Historia*, 68.74–69.9: *Ὅτι μέν, ὦ συστρατιῶται, ἡ ἡμετέρα αὕτη κίνησις διὰ Χριστὸν καὶ ὡς εἱλόμεθα τὴν προκειμένην μὴ τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκ Θεοῦ δόξαν θηρόμενοι, ἴστε δήπουθεν καὶ ὑμεῖς ἅπας σαφῶς ..., οἳ τούτου ἕνεκα τοῖς μὲν ἐπ' οἴκου ἐνευπαθεῖν ἀπειπάμεθα καὶ τῶν οἰκείων ἑκουσίως ἀπεξενώμεθα ... κινδύνοις παραβαλλόμεθα, λιμῷ τηκόμεθα, κρύει πηγνύμεθα, ..., κλιντῆρα ἔχομεν τὴν γῆν, στέγην τὸν οὐρανόν, ... καὶ ὡς ...*

> *οἱ βάρβαροι ἐχθροὶ εἰσὶν τοῦ σταυροῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ... . Εἴπερ οὖν τῆς εὐθὺ τῶν ἀθανάτων μονῶν πορείας μέλλον ὑμῖν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄδικος ὁ Θεὸς, ὡς ... μηδ' ἀκηράτων μεταδιδόναι λειμώνων καὶ σκιερῶν ἐν τῇ Ἐδὲμ καταπαύσεων οἳ ... ἀνθειλόμεθα τοῦ ζῆν τὸ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ θανεῖν) ... στῆτε γενναίως ἄρτι καὶ ἐρρωμένως διαγωνίσασθαι. ... Ἐπεὶ οὖν παρεμβολὴ ἁγία ἡμεῖς καὶ στρατὸς θεόλεκτος μὴ δὴ φιλοψυχήσωμεν πρὸς φιλόχριστον καὶ ἀείμνηστον τελευτήν*)

Of course, the fact that here the author recounts the view of the French leader does not permit us to know whether he himself – being well aware of crusading ideology and practices (Kolia-Dermitzaki, 1994, 33–38) – was of the same view, or if he prepared this piece based on certain information which simply represented the stance of the person who purportedly uttered these words.

The second case is a posthumous praise for Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, the German ruler who died after the victorious battle of Ikonion during the march of the German troops of the Third Crusade (1189–1191) through Cilicia. According to the author, Frederick's

> … burning passion for Christ was greater than that of any other Christian monarch of his time. Setting aside fatherland, royal luxury and repose, the worldly happiness of enjoying the company of his loved ones at home, and his sumptuous way of life, he chose instead to suffer affliction with the Christians of Palestine for the name of Christ, … pressed forward, even to die in the name of Christ. Thus the man's zeal was apostolic, his purpose dear to God …
>
> (trans. Magoulias, *O City of Byzantium*, 229)

> (Choniates, *Historia*, 416.32–417.46: *... τῷ τοῦ Χριστοῦ πόθῳ πυρούμενος ὑπὲρ τοὺς ὁπουδήποτε τῶν τότε Χριστιανῶν αὐτοκράτορας πατρίδα καὶ χλιδὴν βασίλειον καὶ ἀνάπαυλαν καὶ τὸν οἴκοι μετὰ τῶν φιλτάτων ὄλβον καὶ τὸν ὑπερήφανον βίοτον παρωσάμενος εἵλετο συγκακουχεῖσθαι τοῖς κατὰ Παλαιστίνην Χριστιανοῖς ... ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὀνόματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ τῆς τοῦ ζωοπαρόχου τάφου τιμῆς ...· ἐπορεύετο ... ἀποθανούμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὀνόματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ. Οὕτως ἀποστολικὸς ἦν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ὁ ζῆλος καὶ θεοφιλὴς ὁ σκοπὸς ...*).

Clearly, the Byzantine author is here praising the crusading idea through the German leader, an idea that Frederick sought to serve. It has been argued that both the speech of Louis and the praise of Frederick reflected Nicetas's favorable stance towards the crusading idea and that his intention was rather to present the Crusade as a pious and valiant enterprise that the Byzantines misunderstood and mismanaged (Simpson, 2013, 316–319). In spite of the interesting arguments supporting this view, I am not fully convinced that the Byzantine author used both the aforementioned passages as a pretext in order to express his opposition to the way the Byzantine authorities manipulated the particularly delicate and complex situation caused by the presence of the crusading armies on their territory

(see Magdalino, 1993, 46–61, 66–76, on Manuel's policy). Taking into account, on the one hand, the fact that Niketas expressed his mistrust of the crusaders' motives when describing in his History the Second and the Third Crusade (*Historia*, 60.45–61.55, 401.21–26, 403.71–77,) and more strongly in his oration of 1190 to Isaakios II Angelos (*Orationes et epistulae*, IX, 89.21–90.4, 99.21–100.13), and, on the other hand, the context of the above-mentioned two passages, I would rather suggest that Choniates was indeed a supporter of a 'holy war' theory, yet at the same time he profoundly distrusted the objective of the crusading armies and of their leaders. I find it quite possible that Choniates added these passages to his narration of the events in order to underline the contradiction between the theory of the crusading idea and the practice of the Crusade itself.[9]

Two further examples of ideological acceptance derive from the Byzantine imperial chancery itself. The first is the letter of Alexios I Komnenos addressed to Oderisius, abbot of the monastery of Monte Casino, written in March or April of 1098 (Hagenmeyer, *Kreuzzugsbriefe*, no XI, 78–79, 296). In this document, referring to the death of many crusaders, knights and foot soldiers during the martial enterprises against the Muslims, the emperor states: 'They are blessed because they died for a good cause (*bona intentio*). For this reason, we should not consider them as dead, but as alive who moved to an eternal and incorruptible life' (Hagenmeyer, *Kreuzzugsbriefe*, no XI, par. 5–6: *beati quidem sunt, ut in bona intentione finem mortis dantes. Propterea minime oportet nos illos habere ut mortuos, sed ut vivos et in vitam aeternam atque incorruptibilem transmigratos*).[10]

The second piece of evidence also comes from an official imperial document: the letter of Manuel I Komnenos to Pope Eugenius III (dated August 1146), when the latter announced to the emperor the proclamation of the Second Crusade through the delegates of the king of France, Louis VII. In this letter, the Byzantine emperor declared: 'when I was informed that he (the French king) moved on the path of God [note the Western terminology he used here] to get vengeance for the holy churches, … I was greatly pleased with this movement, which was intended to benefit Christians and to stamp out and annihilate the enemies of God' (Lampros, 'Αὐτοκρατόρων τοῦ Βυζαντίου χρυσόβουλλα', 112.5–113.4: *ἐκίνησε* [Louis VII] *εἰς τὴν ὁδὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, δι' ἐκδίκησιν τῶν ἁγίων ἐκκλησιῶν … . Ἀναμαθοῦσα οὖν ἡ βασιλεία μου τὴν τοιαύτην συγκίνησιν μεγάλως αὐτὴν ἀπεδέξατο ὡς εἰς ὠφέλειαν τῶν Χριστιανῶν γενησομένην καὶ κατάπτωσιν καὶ ἀφανισμὸν τῶν ἀθέων ἐχθρῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ*). This letter must have been well-known to Niketas Choniates, because in his account of the Second Crusade he writes that the emperor, responding to the ambassadors who brought the letter asking permission for the crusading army to pass through imperial territory and also for a supply of markets, hid his anxiety and 'with little sincerity lavished high praise on their action and pretended to admire them for their pious intention' (trans. Magoulias, *O City of Byzantium*, 36; Choniates, *Historia*, 61.71–73: *ἐπαινεῖν ὑπερβαλλόντως τὸ δρώμενον ὑπεκρίνετο καὶ ἄγασθαι αὐτοὺς τῆς εὐσεβοῦς προσεποιείτο προθέσεως*). Niketas repeats Manuel's statement to the pope almost verbatim, giving at the same time his own interpretation for the emperor's real feelings (disbelief and

suspicion), based on the military preparations and defensive measures Manuel ordered after the announcement of the arriving crusading army:

> Distrustful and suspicious lest they be wolves coming in sheep's clothing or lions concealed in the disguise of an ass, …, or the lion's skin to be patched with the fox's, he assembled the Roman forces, deliberated openly on the state of public affairs, expounded in detail on the mighty army that would be passing through, reckoned the large number of cavalry, …, portrayed the myriads of foot soldiers … and also told and everything that the tyrant of Sicily … had perpetrated against the maritime provinces … . Furthermore, Manuel repaired the City's battlements and secured the circumference of the walls. He issued coats of mail to the troops, armed them with brazen lances, stiffened their resolution with swift horses, and plucked up their courage with the distribution of monies…
>
> (trans. Magoulias, *O City of Byzantium*, 36)

> (Choniates, *Historia*, 61.81–62.3: *Ὑποβλεπόμενος δὲ καὶ διεννοῶν, μή πως ἐν δέρματι προβάτων λυκιδεῖς ἔρχωνται ἢ ὄνῳ ὑποκρύπτονται λέοντες … ἢ τὴν λεοντὴν ξυνέχωσι τῇ ἀλωπεκῇ, τὰς ῥωμαϊκὰς ἀθροίζει δυνάμεις, συνδιασκέπτεται κοινῇ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν, τὸ πλῆθος τῶν παρελευσομένων στρατῶν διέξεισι, τῆς ἵππου τὸ πολὺ καταλέγει, …, τῆς πεζεταίρας μοίρας παρίστησι τὸ μυρίανδρον …, αλλὰ καὶ ὅσα ὁ ἐκ Σικελίας τύραννος, …, κατὰ τῶν παραθαλασσίων χωρῶν διαπράττεται … . Καὶ δὴ τὰς μὲν πυργοβάρεις ἐπισκευάζει τῆς πόλεως καὶ τίθησιν εὐερκέα τὴν ὅλην τοῦ περιβόλου περίμετρον, τῇ δὲ στρατιᾷ χιτῶνας φολιδωτοὺς χορηγεῖ κοντοῖς τε καθοπλίζει χαλκήρεσι καὶ ἵπποις δρομικοῖς διεγείρει τὸ φρόνημα καὶ χρημάτων ἐπιρρώννυσι διαδό σεσιν…*).

The two official documents, on which I shall comment further later on, attest to the acknowledgement of the crusading ideology by the Byzantine emperors.

However, apart from those official statements, there is – as far as I know – no other praise of the crusader movement in Byzantine sources of the period, with the exception of the two excerpts from the *Historia* of Niketas Choniates.

The lack of positive comments in the writings of Byzantine authors could *prima facie* be attributed to their ignorance of the special features of the Crusade. However, the Byzantine authors who included a description of the events of the Crusades (Anna Komnene, John Kinnamos, Niketas Choniates) had adequate knowledge of at least some of their main features. The objective of the campaign put forward by the crusaders seemed to be well known, at least to the upper class, the elite close to the center of power, via letters exchanged between popes and Western rulers on the one hand and Byzantine emperors on the other. Anna Komnene refers to the granting of the papal standard, the *vexillum sancti Petri*, to the secular leader of the Crusade, Hugues de Vermandois, in Rome. According to the author, the ambassadors sent by the French prince to the Byzantine duke of

Dyrrachion after the former had made landfall informed him 'that our Lord Ubus is on the point of arriving, and is bringing with him from Rome the golden standard of Saint Peter. Understand, too, that he is the leader of the whole Frankish army' (Anna Komnene, *Alexias*, Bk 10, ch. 7, par. 3: *ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν Οὗβος ὅσον ἤδη καταλαμβάνει ἀναλαβόμενος ἀπὸ Ῥώμης τὴν χρυσῆν τοῦ ἁγίου Πέτρου σημαίαν, ἀρχηγὸν δὲ τοῦτον ἐπίστασο τοῦ φραγγικοῦ στρατεύματος ἅπαντος*; trans. Dawes, *Alexiad*, 180). This reference indicates that Anna was well aware of the procedure and the symbolic significance of this action. The oath of chastity taken by the crusaders before meeting the expedition is yet another detail in the knowledge of Anna Komnene (*Alexias*, Bk 11, ch. 6, par. 7) and Niketas Choniates (*Historia*, 575.70–77). Consequently, adequate awareness of the principal features of the crusading idea and practice by those authors, and consequently of the upper social class at least, is an uncontested fact.

In order to give an answer – if possible – to the question posed in the title of the present chapter, one should examine more closely the two official documents referred to above, i.e. the letters of Alexios and Manuel.

The letter to Oderisius was sent from Constantinople in March or April 1098, according to Hagenmeyer (*Kreuzzugsbriefe*, 78–79, 296), evidently before the departure from Constantinople of the imperial army under the leadership of Alexios that was meant to assist the crusaders in the siege of Antioch. Thus, we could explain the context of the letter under the prism of these events: Alexios was aware of the accusations of ineffective support of the whole enterprise on his behalf that were widespread among the crusaders and were disseminated in the West as well by several crusaders who were returning or had already returned home via Italy and were disaffected by his overall policy towards them (Hagenmeyer, *Kreuzzugsbriefe*, 241–242, 296) (e.g. his demand that they take an oath of fealty to him, his support of their army by only a single detachment under Tatikios). Therefore, suspecting that they might present their own version of the events – which would have shown him in a negative light –, he reassured the abbot of all kinds of help he had already offered and would continue to offer (respecting his part of the agreement with the leaders of the crusaders in Constantinople) to those who 'perform a task pleasing to God'; he also praised the *bona intentio* of the participants of the Crusade and accepted that they gained eternal life. His intention was to persuade Oderisius and – via this highly respected personality and his close relationship with Urban – the Westerners in general that he was a supporter of the Crusade idea.

The question is whether these were his true feelings or he expressed himself in this way under pressure from circumstances brought about by the arrival of the crusaders, and mainly after the departure of his representative, Tatikios, and his army midway through the siege of Antioch.[11] I have already suggested that the idea of war which we now call 'holy war' (Kolia-Dermitzaki, 1991a and eadem, 2012, for the use and meaning of the term) with almost all the characteristics of a Crusade (except the exercise of leadership by the pope instead of the emperor – since the latter was by definition the head of the army, according to the political ideology of the Byzantines – and the granting of absolution

by the official Orthodox Church) had been promoted by the Byzantine state as early as the wars against the Sassanids (mainly at the end of the 6th and the first half of the 7th century) and the successful efforts to reclaim territory from the Arabs (in the 10th century).[12] Therefore, we must presume that Alexios could indeed recognize the Crusade as God's well-meaning work, in other words as the defense of the Christians and the liberation of the Eastern churches, since its overall ideological framework was not opposed to the corresponding ideology of the Byzantines themselves (Karayannopoulos, 1988; Ahrweiler, 1975). With regard to the gift of eternal life as a reward for the warriors who died in the course of their participation in such an enterprise (a war against 'infidels'), Byzantium was also familiar with this theory, as is demonstrated by the existence of liturgical rites and public orations that refer, either explicitly or implicitly, to similar rewards, notwithstanding the fact that, when the subject was broached in the 10th century, the official Church had rejected the notion (Kolia-Dermitzaki, 1991a, esp. 126–141, 248–260, 355–365; Kolbaba, 1998, 205–207; Stephenson, 2012; Chrissis, 2016, 262–263). Did the Byzantine emperor espouse such a view? The fact is that historians who describe Alexios' military operations against Muslims (Nikephoros Bryennios, Anna Komnene, John Zonaras) make no allusions to such an eventuality, for which the letter addressed to Oderisius is our only piece of evidence.

Certainly, the emperor wished to convince the letter's addressee, a close collaborator of the pope, that he was upholding his end of the bargain with the crusaders to provide them with support in their endeavor. Let us not forget that as early as 1089 Alexios had initiated a policy of rapprochement with the West with regard to Church matters, a rapprochement which aimed at restoring relations with Rome: responding to Urban's diplomatic mission to Constantinople in 1088, sent there to discuss the issues that had caused the 'Schism' between the two Churches, Alexios initiated – through the standing (*endemousa*) synod of Constantinople in 1089 and its decision to restore the pope's name in the liturgical diptychs (Holtzmann, 1928, no. 2, 61–62) – contact between the primates of the two Churches with a view to solving their differences through a joint council. For reasons too complex to analyse here, the council was never convoked, nor do we know of any response on the matter on the part of Urban. Therefore, the issue was still outstanding when Alexios was writing his letter to Oderisius (Frankopan, 2012, 19–23, 95–96, 194; Mamagkakis, 2014, 450–456) and one of his priorities was the maintenance of good relations with the Holy See: after all, the pontiff was also the commander-in-chief of the *milites Christi*, according to crusader ideology. An additional reason was the fact that the Crusade was still ongoing.

On the other hand, however, the emperor's specific choice in driving home the message to the abbot of Monte Cassino that he recognized the significance of the crusaders' offer, in other words the reference to them being rewarded with eternal life, allows us to argue that not only did Alexios not find the assurance given by Pope Urban in Clermont unacceptable (an assurance with which he himself was naturally familiar), but that he possibly accepted it himself.[13] Approximately half

a century later, during the reign of his grandson, Manuel I, reference to acquiring eternal life due to the emperor's participation in a victorious war against infidels (the Turks) was made in public, in the poem Manganeios Prodromos composed in Manuel's honor. Even if the source in question is laudatory and probably propagandistic in nature,[14] the fact remains that this reference was not considered offensive by the general public, or at least by the poet's audience.

Manuel composed his answer to Eugenius almost 50 years later, in August 1146 (Dölger & Wirth, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden*, vol. 2, no. 1348), in a different political context. It was after the experience of the First Crusade and its results, and of the so-called 'Crusade' of Bohemond in 1107/1108; it also followed the recognition of the royal title of the Norman ruler Roger II of Sicily in 1139 by Pope Innocent II and the establishment of good relations between the French and the Normans (Tounta, 2008, 31–36). One of the most crucial problems for the Empire was the creation of the crusader states in the East and especially of the Norman principality of Antioch. Besides, the position of the Byzantines was precarious at that time, since they had been at war with the Turks until a short time before: the announcement of the Crusade had forced Manuel to abandon his campaign against Masud I, sultan of Ikonion, and come to terms with the Seljuk ruler; an act that caused the mistrust of the Latins and accusations of treason leveled against the emperor (Magdalino, 1993, 42, 51–52). Moreover, the Norman threat was always imminent, as was demonstrated by the attack of Roger II the following year (1147), and the fear of an alliance between Normans and crusaders was justified. Thus, it is clear that Manuel had no choice but to accept the crusaders and at the same time to prepare his army and people and to repair the walls of Constantinople. Moreover, he gave orders to part of his troops to shadow the German army (the Germans under the leadership of Conrad III were the first to pass the Byzantine border at Braničevo) from a distance, in order to prevent them from plundering and foraging, as attested to by Choniates (*Historia*, 61.78–62.9. Cf. Kinnamos, *Epitome,* 70.20–71.2) and the French eyewitness of the events, Odo of Deuil (*De profectione Ludovici*, Bk 3, 41–43, 45, Bk 4, 67). It was in this political context that Manuel praised the decision of Louis VII to walk 'on the path of God to get vengeance for the holy churches'. Was it plain political expediency that impelled him to adopt the Western vocabulary of the Crusade? Or could we assume that, given his attraction towards the chivalric ideal and his esteem for the military and commercial value of the Latins (Angold, 2003, 29–31), this was his conception of the Crusade?

I believe it was political necessity that forced him to respond to the pope's (and the Crusade leaders') request to allow the crusading army to pass through imperial territories, to undertake to facilitate their passage and organise markets for them and to pretend that this enterprise pleased him greatly. In the first place, let us not forget the aforementioned political framework within which Manuel had to maneuver. Secondly, there were two important parameters that influenced Byzantine policy in the region of the crusader states:

The first parameter is the fact that the first three *basileis* of the Komnenian dynasty continuously strived in the beginning to reclaim/annex Antioch and

then – when this proved unfeasible because of the various entanglements this would cause with the kingdom of Jerusalem and mainly with the papacy and the West in general – to have Byzantine suzerainty over it recognized by diplomatic and military means[15] [Lilie, 1993, 61–66, 72, 75–87 (Alexios), 117–130, 134–141 (John), 142–145, 165–166, 176–183, 184–187 (Manuel); Magdalino, 1993, 36–42, 66–69. See also the contribution by Cheynet in the present volume]. The city and its region were extremely important to the Empire from a strategic, political, economic, and ideological point of view (Ciggaar, 2001; Todt, 2004, 177–178; Todt & Vest, 2014); only a few years earlier, in 1138, John II Komnenos had forced – though not without encountering resistance – its ruler, Raymond of Poitiers, to recognize his position as the emperor's vassal, a recognition which was renewed in 1145 before Manuel (Lilie, 1993, 142–145, 179–181; Runciman, 2:211–214, 217–218; Magdalino, 1993, 41, 42 with n. 47). Therefore, the presence of a crusading army in Northern Syria en route to Jerusalem would reinforce both the morale and the forces of those recalcitrant Latins who opposed Byzantine suzerainty over the principality of Antioch. This prospect was highly unwelcome to Manuel and his political aspirations in the region.

The second crucial parameter was the political ideology of the Byzantines, in conjunction with Byzantine 'holy war' ideology when it came to fighting non-Christians (in this case Muslims). The former parameter brought the Byzantine ruler in direct confrontation with his German counterpart over the title of Roman emperor and 'Roman ecumenicity' (Kolia-Dermitzaki, 2014), a title that – as far as the Byzantine side was concerned – set up the *basileus* as defender (*δεφένσωρ*) and avenger of the Church (Pseudo-Kodinos, *Traité des offices*, 253.25–26) and, by extension, of the Christians, while at the same time recognizing him as supreme military commander (as mentioned above). The latter, precisely because of these two qualities he possessed, made him responsible, as well as the competent authority, for the decision to declare war in order to defend the Christians and their Churches. Thus, the preexisting perception of undertaking wars which were presented as (or considered) 'holy' caused a contradictory attitude on the part of both citizens (at least of some among them, since we do not know the stance of all strata of Byzantine society) and rulers of Byzantium: On the one hand, a positive attitude is indicated by the fact that Byzantine works of historiography, rhetoric, and poetry, even polemical works against the doctrinal and liturgical 'divergences' of the Latins composed after 1204 (e.g. the list of religious errors by Kontantinos Stilbes), do not condemn the idea of crusading (Kolbaba, 1998, 212–218; eadem, 2001, 118; Kolia-Dermitzaki, 2012, 128–129);[16] they only record a suspicion towards the actual intentions of the crusaders vis-à-vis the Empire – as we can see, for instance, in Anna Komnene (*Alexias*, Bk 10, ch. 5, par.10), John Kinnamos (*Epitome*, 67.3–10: '…the whole western array had been set in motion, on the handy excuse that they were going to cross from Europe to Asia to fight the Turks en route and recover the church in Palestine and seek the holy places, but truly to gain possession of the Romans' land by assault and trample down everything in front of them'; trans. Brand, *Deeds*, 58), and Niketas Choniates (*Historia*, 61.73–62.3 – see the relevant passage above).[17]

A similar framework defined the political actions of Manuel's father, John II Komnenos, whose wars against his Muslim adversaries both in Asia Minor and in Syria were portrayed in the sources (especially in works of oratory and poetry, but also historiographical ones)[18] as being permeated by a 'holy war'/Crusade character (Kolia-Dermitzaki, 1991a, 330–337, with the relevant sources; Papageorgiou, 2016, 43–48; Angold, in this volume; cf. Magdalino, 1993, 420–421).[19] The mantle of 'holy warrior' was picked up by his successor Manuel, both in his foreign policy in the region of Syria and Palestine[20] dealing with the crusader states and within the framework of Byzantine ideology with regard to emperor and 'holy war'. Since, according to the latter, the Roman emperor (the *basileus*) – as was mentioned above – was the leading figure in this godly work, as representative of God on earth and leader of Christendom, it absolutely stood to reason that the two members of the Komnenian dynasty would seek to incorporate their political aspirations and military enterprises in this region into a project of reconquest or – given the new geopolitical map that had resulted from the First Crusade – imposing suzerainty over the old Roman territories. In this way, they essentially and practically claimed from the Westerners the role of protector of Christendom (as the Byzantines perceived *Christianitas*) and – by extension – of the regions that constituted the cradle of the Christian faith. The Byzantine emperors would be assisted in their efforts by the subjugated rulers of the crusader states. Thus, the latter would now help carry out the work they themselves had undertaken by then: the preservation of the territories already gained and put under Christian dominion.

Therefore, I lean towards the view that the phrasing 'on the path of God to get vengeance for the holy churches … to benefit Christians and to stamp out and annihilate the enemies of God' was an expression of Manuel's crusading ideal; it stemmed not from an admiration of the idea of chivalry and of the military and economic value of the Latins, but from the fact that the Byzantine perception of the goals and value of a 'holy war' was exactly the same. Consequently, the *basileus* was not betraying his own convictions and values when he adopted those particular expressions; he simply used them in an effort to approach the ecclesiastical leader of the West, so that immediately afterwards in the letter – after the promises to provide markets and guides – he could proceed to the request that the crusaders 'honor' him as well (in general and without going into specifics), just as the previous ones had 'honored' his grandfather: *καὶ ἑτοίμη ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ βασιλεία μου εἰς τὸ ὑποδέξασθαι τούτους καλῶς· καὶ πόρους αὐτοῖς εὐτρεπίσαι καὶ πανηγύρια· πλὴν θέλει καὶ ἡ βασιλεία μου ἵνα καὶ ἐκεῖνοι τὰ εἰς τιμὴν ταύτης ποιήσωσι, καθὼς ἐποίησαν καὶ οἱ προδιελθόντες Φράγγοι, εἰς τὸν ἐν βασιλεῦσιν ἀοίδιμον πάππον τῆς βασιλείας μου· ἀγωνισθήτω οὖν πρὸς τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ἁγιωσύνη σου* … (Lampros, 'Αὐτοκρατόρων τοῦ Βυζαντίου χρυσόβουλλα', 113.4–10; 'and our Majesty is prepared to welcome them; and provide them with victuals and market fairs. In return, however, our Majesty desires that they too pay homage to our Majesty, just like the Franks that passed through here before have done towards our Majesty's grandfather, the emperor of blessed memory. Your Holiness should also strive to that effect…'). This was the first

means by which he sought to secure the safety of his subjects and the integrity of his empire. The second included the measures he took to deal with the arrival of the crusading army, as described by Choniates. This obligation, which stemmed from his position as *basileus* of the Romans, was not incompatible with the acceptance of most of the elements of crusading ideology.

A further insight into Manuel's perception of Crusade and holy war in general is provided by John Kinnamos (*Epitome*, 70.20–71.9, 72.15–73.18): Manuel, being cautious about the ostensible purpose that the German crusaders maintained they were pursuing, 'the alleged march to Palestine' (*τὴν ἐς Παλαισ τίνην δῆθεν πορείαν*) as the Byzantine author puts it (ibid., 73.16), did not want to issue the order to attack them, so that they would be prevented from further plundering and acts of violence to the detriment of his citizens (mentioned also by Niketas Choniates, *Historia*, 62.6–9, and by Odo of Deuil, *De Profectione Ludovici*, Bk 3, 40–42, 54, Bk 4, 66), despite the favorable conditions for the Byzantine detachment sent by Manuel in order to restrain the crusaders from plundering; he would order an attack if they turned to violence more openly. This means that the emperor was willing to tolerate the transgressions of the German crusaders, as long as the goal they projected proved to be real. Even if this decision of Manuel was dictated by political or military necessity, its interpretation by Kinnamos is, I believe, a clear indication of the recognition that war against 'infidels' in the region of Palestine had garnered in Byzantium during the reign of Manuel.

Conclusions

Recapitulating what has been established by the analysis above, we can proceed to the following conclusions:

a) The perception of the content of *Christianitas* differed considerably on either side of the Christian world. For the Western world, beginning in the 11th century, as a result of a long process dating back to the time of the coronation of Charlemagne (800) and within the framework of Church reform, *Christianitas* acquired not only a religious meaning, but also a political one. It became coterminous with *respublica christiana*, which encompassed the Christians of both East and West. The link between the two and the supreme authority over both was the head of the Church, the pope. The expansion of Christendom was included in the aims of the Crusade, in the sense of unifying Christendom through its subjugation (that is, of the Eastern Churches too) to the Roman Church.

   The Byzantine view had always considered that there was a direct link between Christendom and the concept of *Romanitas*. The citizens of the Empire were both Christian and Roman. In the 9th century, however, and more so in the 10th century, this connection is so close that the terms 'Christians' and 'Romans' become identical; this much is evident in sources that often use the first term to denote the identity of the Byzantines. Influenced by the

theory of ecumenicity, the latter recognize the secular ruler, i.e. the *βασιλεὺς Ῥωμαίων*, as the leader of Christendom. As protector of the Christians and their Church, he is responsible for declaring and prosecuting wars that project and/or promote the aims of a ‘Crusade’/’holy war’; for the ‘Romans’, these include the reclamation of lost Christian Roman territories from the Muslim conquerors, mainly Syria and Palestine.

b) The Byzantine authors, though well aware of the Crusade as an institution and of its most salient elements, refuse to adopt the Western terminology even if they seem to be well versed in its vocabulary and the ideas accompanying it. Besides, they do not praise the idea of crusading, with the exception of two passages in Niketas Choniates. A striking point, however, is that, on the other hand, there does not exist in the Byzantine texts even a single passage against the idea of fighting a war for the Church and the Christians; there is only disbelief and suspicion about the real intentions of the ‘Western armies’ and their leaders.

c) On the contrary, according to letters sent out by the imperial chancery in the Komnenian era, Byzantine rulers Alexios I and Manuel I adopt Western views and use Western terminology with regard to crusading. If one bears in mind the particular circumstances of the time which shaped the relations between Byzantines and Westerners on a political and ecclesiastical level in each of these cases, one would assume that this adoption was exclusively due to political necessity. Nevertheless, as the foregoing analysis has shown, Byzantine rulers did not seem to be averse to the ideology of Western-style ‘holy war’; their use of Western terminology in their official correspondence with representatives of the Western Church in all probability does not evince a retreat from their convictions forced by the circumstances.

The fact remains, however, that the evidence at our disposal is very limited and the distinction between perception and reality in the stance of Byzantium towards the crusading idea cannot be clear-cut – at least during the Komnenian period that was examined here, because things change later on. Political expediency that has to be taken into consideration when examining the sources, and the scarcity of explicit relevant references in them, do not allow modern scholars to draw a clear line separating perception from reality.

Notes

1 The crusade-related bibliography of the previous three decades is very extensive, thus the relevant studies referred to in this chapter are only indicative. On the development of crusader historiography, a presentation of the several aspects of the ideology and motivation of the crusading movement, and extensive relevant bibliography, see Constable, 2001; cf. Tyerman, 2004, 218–233.

2 As an example, see Baldric of Dol, in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades, Historiens Occidentaux*, 4:14 (cited by Pellegrini, 1991, 89, n. 95): ‘Agite iam, Christiani, accurrite et vos et vestram rempublicam defentite. Commune periculum est in quo sumus; commune discrimen est in quo laboramus’.

3 Cf. the argument of those representatives of the Western Church who supported the capture of Constantinople by the army of the Fourth Crusade (Geoffrey of Villehardouin, 2, par. 225; trans. Marzials, 56): 'Wherefore we tell you, said the clergy, that this war is lawful and just, and that if you have a right intension in conquering this land, to bring it into the Roman obedience, all those who die after confession shall have part in the indulgence granted by the Pope'.

4 Stouraitis, 2014, limits the identification of *Christianitas* with *Romanitas* solely to the political and educated élite of Constantinople, excluding the 'provincial masses' (as he calls the regional common people), with the exception – *grosso modo* – of their élite: a rather audacious view based on sources written in their majority by this same élite. Page, 2008, 55–58, rightly pinpoints the cases of subjects of the Empire who could not be considered as 'Romans': on the one hand Orthodox Christians that bore no 'ethnic Roman identity' (e.g. Bulgars after their conversion, Arabs converted to Christianity), and on the other, non-Orthodox Christians (e.g. Monophysites) dwelling within the Byzantine borders after the annexation of peripheral territories in the south and east of the Empire in the 10th and first half of the 11th century. Along the same lines as Page, although he does not cite her, Kaldellis, 2017, makes a thorough review of the sources in chronological order, convincingly refuting Stouraitis' points and arguing – in my opinion correctly – that a 'national Roman identity' was recognized by every level of provincial and Constantinopolitan society, an identity 'defined on the one hand by cultural traits such as language, religion, customs, food and dress, and on the other by belonging to a specific named polity, the πολιτεία of the Romans' (p. 200).

5 Cf. Skylitzes, *Synopsis*, 216.42–46; 338.49–50. See also Symeon Magister, *Chronicon*, 207.75–80 [the inhabitants of the Byzantine Empire who suffered by the fiscal measures inflicted on them by Nikephoros I (802–811)], 235.70–71, 304.130. Cf. (always indicatively) Theophanes, *Chronographia*, 479.20–21, 486.10–12, 488.8–9, 491.13–16, 491.25–29, 492.25–28, 500.30, 501.27–32, 502.16); Nikephoros, Patriarch of Constantinople, *Short History*, par. 65, 15–17 ('Under these circumstances the Roman State was in extreme distress, inasmuch as the struggle for power among those men aroused an internecine war among Christians': *ἐντεῦθεν ἐν μεγίσταις συμφοραῖς τὰ Ῥωμαίων διέκειτο, ὁπηνίκα ἡ παρ' ἐκείνοις περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἅμιλλα τὸν ἐμφύλιον Χρι στιανοῖς ἀνερρίπισε πόλεμον*); Genesios, *Regum libri quattor* 51.40–41; Attaleiates, *Historia*, 153.13–15; 165.16–18 ('[Nikephoros III Botaneiates] assumed alone the struggle against the foreigners and the care for the Christians': *τὰ κατὰ τῶν ἀλλοφύλλων παλαίσματα καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν Χριστιανῶν φροντίδα μόνος ὑπέρχεταί τε καὶ ἀναδύεται*); 224.25–28; 237.25–26; Anna Komnene, *Alexias*, Bk III, ch. X, par. 3–4; Bk XIV, ch. IV, par. 1. It must be stressed that the term *Χριστιανός* is more often encountered in its religious meaning rather than its political one. However, the use of the term 'Christians' (*Χριστιανοί*) to denote the Byzantines in their dual capacity as Romans and Christians gradually diminishes and almost disappears in the 12th century, a period of gradual preponderance of Romanness in the written Greek sources. Could this observation mean that by this time *Romanitas* was *a priori* perceived – in a more unequivocal way than previously – as including *Christianitas* (in its Eastern dogmatic form), i.e. 'Roman' equals 'Christian' and not vice versa?

6 For a discussion of the circumstances in which the letter was composed, the issue of the existence of two almost identical letters by Michael VII to Robert Guiscard and the date of their composition, see Kolia-Dermitzaki, 1997.

7 The author examined the concept of Just War in Byzantium, based mainly – if not exclusively – on the *Alexiad* of Anna Komnene in the first place and the *Taktika* of Leo VI in the second, thus putting quantitative and chronological limits on her research.

8 On the terms used by the Byzantine authors of the 11th and 12th centuries to designate the peoples of the West, see Kazhdan, 2001, 84–91.

9 I am not rejecting, however, the assertion of Simpson, 2013, 316–319, that Choniates disapproved of the way the Byzantine emperors (especially Isaakios II) managed the

problems of the two crusades. Cf. Angelov's view (2006) that Choniates belonged to a party opposing the alliance between Isaakios and Saladin (see below) and arguing in favour of a cooperation with the Westerners in order to support Holy Land against the Muslim threat, highlighting the constant interest of the Byzantines in the protection and recovery of this area.

10 Only the Latin version of the letter has survived (Hagenmeyer, *Kreuzzugsbriefe*, 78, 79; Dölger & Wirth, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden*, vol. 2, no 1208); apparently the official translation from the Greek original by a member of the imperial chancery. According to the Byzantine protocol, in cases of a non-Greek-speaking addressee the Greek imperial letter was followed by a translation in the language of the recipient (Dölger & Karayannopoulos, 1968, 90–91). On the close relations between the famous Italian monastery and the Byzantine Empire, especially in the 11th century, see Bloch, 1946/1986. There are, however, two letters by emperors of the Angeloi dynasty, namely Isaakios II (Tornikes, *Lettres et discours*, 336–345) and Alexios III (Hageneder, *Register Innokenz' III.*, 2:390–393, no 201 (210)), addressed to Celestine III and Innocent III in 1193 and 1199, respectively, which seem to praise the crusading movement, within the framework of a policy that could not ignore the reality of the Crusade and Western sensitivity towards it (Chrissis, 2016, 259, 268). I believe, however, that what is projected in these two letters is not actually the recognition of the idea of crusade (despite the fact that, as has already been mentioned, this ideology was acceptable in the Byzantine realm), but the covert disdain towards its practical application. Isaakios (Tornikes, *Lettres et discours*, 341.4–345.13), expressing his deep sorrow for the failure of the Third Crusade, failure that – in his opinion – was due to the lust for power and rivalry of its leaders, and asking the pope to unite all Christians against the 'spiritual and earthly Satan', i.e. the Muslims, who assaulted the Holy Land, stressed on the one hand the ineffectiveness of the crusading movement, while on the other hand he put forward the need for a close connection between the Christians, Western and Eastern, and for the recognition of the fact that, as far as the West is concerned, Byzantium is not the enemy [this was the impression that the actions of Frederick Barbarossa during the Third Crusade had left to the Byzantines (on the reasons behind his hostile attitude and the terms of the humiliating agreement Isaakios had been forced to ratify, see Brand, 1968, 178–187; cf. Kolia-Dermitzaki, 2014, 374–375)]. Alexios III (Hageneder, *Register Innokenz' III.*, 2:392.9–29) also used the argument stemming from the attitude of the German crusaders under Barbarossa to justify/explain to the pontiff the non-participation of the Byzantines in the military operations of the Latins aimed at liberating the Holy Sepulchre (Jerusalem). The fact that the ones who should be accused by Innocent are those who did not act for Christ, but went against the divine will, is particularly stressed.

11 On the reasons behind his departure and the contradictions between the Latin sources and the *Alexiad* describing the event and the refusal of Bohemond to relinquish the city to the emperor, in accordance with the terms of the treaty between Alexios and the Crusader leaders, see Lilie, 1993, 33–41; Shepard, 1988, esp. 189–199, 263–276; Harris, 2006, 65–68.

12 Due to the political and military conditions created by the arrival of the Seljuks in the 11th century and their expansion in Asia Minor, a significant decrease in the promotion of a 'holy war' ideology (but not its wholesale eradication) has been noted. See Kolia-Dermitzaki, 1991, 321–322, 325–329.

13 A different interpretation has been provided by Hagenmeyer, *Kreuzzugsbriefe*, 297.

14 Cf. Magdalino, 1993, 459: '… the encomia are valuable supplements to the narrative sources not only as quarries of "facts", but also as mirrors of policies and situations in the making'.

15 The claim was based on the agreement between Alexios I and the leaders of the First Crusade that any former Byzantine possessions captured by the crusaders would be

returned to the Byzantines [Anna Komnene, Bk 10, ch. 9, par. 11 and ch. 11, par.5. See Pryor, 1984, for the relevant Latin sources and an enlightening analysis of the oaths taken by the leaders and the difference in understanding their context between the two parties (Alexios and crusaders). Cf. Harris, 2006, 135], as well as on the 1108 treaty of Devol (Dölger & Wirth, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden*, vol. 2, no 1243; Lilie, 1993, 75–82; Pryor, 1984, 130–132; Christophilopoulou, 2001, 70–73; Rowe, 1966; McQueen, 1986). Bohemond had reneged on the agreement when he turned Antioch into his private principality (Shepard, 1988, esp. 189–199, 263–276).

16 At the same time, however, one does not come across a positive appraisal of it either, with the exception of the aforementioned passages in Choniates, as well as one in Anna Komnene (Bk 10, ch. 5, par.10), where the intention of the 'pauper' (*ἁπλούστε ροι*) crusaders of Peter the Hermit to make a pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulchre and the Holy Land in general is implicitly mentioned as worthy of praise (and we can also note that the author is evidently familiar with the link between crusade and pilgrimage). Evidence for a similar sympathetic attitude towards those participating in the so-called People's Crusade is also provided by a Western source, Albert of Aix (in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades, Historiens Occidentaux*, 4:282ff).

17 Cf. the view of Roche, 2015 – not wholly convincing, in my opinion – on the influence of the propaganda disseminated by court poets on how the events of the Second Crusade are presented in the work of Kinnamos (mainly) and Choniates.

18 For an analysis and evaluation of these sources, see the sixth chapter of Magdalino, 1993.

19 See the passage in Choniates, *Historia*, 42.26–31, where the emperor himself states his intention to go to Jerusalem, worship at the Holy Sepulchre, and drive the enemies 'of foreign race' out of the region. Cf. Angelov, 2006, 60, who points out that Choniates 'quoted expressions word for word' from his own Epiphany oration to Isaakios II, delivered in 1190.

20 I believe that Manuel, whose political priorities during the early part of his reign did not seem to include facing the Turks in Asia Minor (Christophilopoulou, 2001, 124–125), did not present the limited campaigns against them as being steeped in the spirit of Byzantine 'holy war'. A possible exception is the large-scale expedition against Ikonion in September 1176, which ended with the debacle at Myriokephalon. Lilie, 1993, 211–214, and Magdalino, 1993, 96–97, characterized it as a 'crusade', basing their conclusions on a letter addressed to Pope Alexander III (January 1176), in which Manuel asked the pontiff to inform Western rulers of the emperor's intention not to desist from making war against this unlawful race (and in this way impel them to undertake a new crusade?). Chrysos, (2012, 81–86), disagrees with the attribution of a crusading spirit to the expedition in question. It is true that the characteristics of a holy war are nowhere to be found described in historiographical sources, while we come across a reference to posthumous rewards in the aforementioned homily of Euthymios Malakes, delivered on 6 January 1176. Yet is it possible that the disaster which befell this expedition resulted in passing over in silence by the sources its promotion as a 'crusade' during its preparatory stage? (see also Kolia-Dermitzaki, 1991a, 328–329, 385).

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5 Some thoughts on the relations between Greeks and Latins at the time of the First and Fourth Crusades*

Jean-Claude Cheynet

The relations between Latins and the Byzantine Empire have been the topic of numerous studies, as they have shaped the history of Europe to this day. Two key events have marked this history, giving it a distinctive tinge: the First Crusade and the capture of Constantinople by the warriors of the Fourth Crusade in 1204. These events have been looked upon as the main markers of an ever-growing hostility between the two parts of Christendom, which explains the attack of 1204, following a series of brutal crises.

Many works have added nuance to this over-simplifying viewpoint, including those by D. Queller and T. Madden (Queller & Madden, 1997; Madden, 2008), A. Andrea (Andrea, *Contemporary Sources*) and M. Angold on the Fourth Crusade (Angold, 2003), as well as the recent synthetic study by P. Frankopan on the First Crusade (Frankopan, 2012). They have allowed us to reconsider this historical period of one-and-a-half centuries, which cannot be reduced to a mere march towards a growing mutual hatred.

The expedition which we call the First Crusade must be considered separately from the other crusades, for it was developed without a precedent as far as the East is concerned, at least on this scale. As P. Magdalino has already explained well, modern-day crusade historians are specialists of the Latin world, which has led some to downplay, or even to overlook, the role of the Byzantines in organising this expedition (Magdalino, 1996). The recent book by P. Frankopan on the First Crusade makes this criticism even sharper, but conversely overstates, it seems to me, the influence of Alexios Komnenos.[1]

It is indeed important to separate different levels of activity – the religious, the political and the economic – which are linked, but evolved at a different rhythm. The events of 1054 have made more of an impression until now, but, at the time, the consequences of the rupture between Michael Keroularios and the papal envoys were underestimated. Their immediate impact is hard to grasp since this conflict finds no echo in the Byzantine narrative sources, which does not necessarily mean that this affair was of no importance for the faithful of the Church of Constantinople (Cheynet, 2007).

* Translated from French by Nikolaos G. Chrissis.

Turkish pressure as the real cause of the expedition

The reactions provoked by the Turkish invasion, which progressed at a greater pace after the defeat of Mantzikert, show how distinct the political links were from religious relations. The arrival of the Turks into the Near East was not primarily directed against the Eastern Romans, even though Toghrul Beg let his troops, including the Turcomans whose unruliness he feared, plunder Armenia and Anatolia in the name of the jihad. The most intense fighting actually took place between the Turks and the Arabs (those from Upper Mesopotamia and from Syria) as well as the Fatimids, but even more so among the Turks themselves.[2] There were frequent splits within the Seljukid dynasty, leading to many rebellions, including that which resulted in the long-lasting hostility between the Seljukids of Persia and their relatives who settled in Anatolia many times with the complicity of Byzantine authorities.

For half a century, the emperors had been hiring numerous Frankish contingents, in order to fill a gap in the Byzantine military forces, by providing the heavy cavalry they needed. They used them extensively in the East, at the time when the Turkish pressure grew stronger, and deployed them as garrison troops in Edessa or in the theme of the Armeniacs (Shepard, 1992; Cheynet, 1997). This is the reason why the Muslim emirs of Syria and Palestine were not surprised to hear that some Latin contingents in the service the Empire were advancing in Anatolia. This seemed to them as the continuity of the previous emperors' recruitment policy. Apparently, some Muslims understood quite quickly the objectives of the Latins (Kedar, 2014). Rumours of Turkish atrocities, which had started to affect the imperial territory severely from the late 1040s, reached the West without requiring any intervention from the emperors. The accounts of the many Latin soldiers fighting in Asia Minor, who came back home after completing the period of service stipulated in their contracts, as well as those of the pilgrims, who, at that time, took, in great numbers, the land road via Constantinople and through Asia Minor to Antioch, were enough to move the Latin nobility. Michael the Syrian refers to the 'evils inflicted by the Turks on the Christians who went to pray in Jerusalem and were beaten, robbed… And when countless people had perished this way, the kings and counts were seized by zeal and set out from Rome…' (Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, 3:182). Alexios Komnenos had taken it upon himself to let many Christian leaders know about the misfortunes suffered in Anatolia (Shepard, 1997, 117). The desire to aid the Eastern Christians is explicitly attested among the crusaders, even if the desire to 'liberate' Jerusalem took precedence in their motivations (Riley-Smith, 1986, 23–24).

When Turkish pressure grew under the reign of Michael VII, the latter resorted to the usual solutions: dividing the opponents by pitting one group against another and hiring a large foreign contingent. This is what Basil II had managed to do with the Russians and Michael VII imitated the method by appealing to the Alans, the compatriots of his wife, Maria; but, while Basil II benefitted from full coffers, Michael VII could no longer afford to pay the Alans and most of them abandoned him. He then turned to the Latins and tried to lure Robert Guiscard into the East.

The papacy, Christian solidarity and Alexios Komnenos' call

Gregory VII did not remain insensitive to the plight of the Oriental Christians since he offered his help to the emperor and urged Latin soldiers to come to the Greeks' rescue.[3] The religious division had no political repercussions. The solidarity among Christians[4] and the objective of freeing the road to Jerusalem took precedence, confronted as they were with the Turks, who constituted, by way of the Turcomans' raids, an unprecedented and particularly brutal threat, if contemporary chroniclers are to be believed. The Byzantines had facilitated pilgrims' travel in the Empire by allowing the Latins to establish hospices in Antioch, Civetot and perhaps Adrianople and by multiplying their own *xenodocheia* in the course of the century (Ciggaar, 1996, 40–41).

During the first ten years of his reign, Alexios Komnenos was busy warding off the attacks of the Normans and the Pechenegs. This task, a priority to save the rich Byzantine provinces of the Balkans, which were providing the resources to defend Constantinople at the time, made it utterly impossible for the emperor to consider any reconquest in Asia Minor. As underlined by P. Frankopan, the emperor had established a sort of *modus vivendi* with the Seljukids of Nicaea, which may have enabled the latter to be considered as the representatives of the emperor in Anatolia and to acquire some kind of legitimacy towards the local population. But no document, not even the seals with the 'Byzantine' titulature of the sultans, can confirm this hypothesis for the time being. However, the capture of Antioch cannot have been suggested or confirmed by the emperor – who, allegedly, had entrusted the city to the Seljukid Suleyman (as argued by Frankopan, 2012, 51). Philaretos Brachamios and his subordinates, including Gabriel in Melitene, were the true representatives of the emperor in the Duchy of Antioch.[5] The loss of this city was a really heavy blow for the Byzantine army, as it removed all hope of launching an attack from both sides, when the time came, against the Turks who had settled in the Asia Minor plateau.

Yet, once the Balkan provinces were pacified, part of the Byzantine aristocracy, which had been stripped of its properties in the East, became eager to retrieve them, as the vast domains in Anatolia had been lost not too long before. What could be seen as a form of imperial inaction undoubtedly led to several plots against Alexios, starting with that of Nikephoros Diogenes in 1094 (Cheynet, 1990, 395–396; Frankopan, 2006, 257–274).

All the specialists agree that Alexios couldn't fight in the East with the army he had rebuilt with so much difficulty, given that the battle of Lebounion against the Pechenegs had been won in 1091, only with the decisive help of the Cumans, circumstantial and uncertain allies. The *basileus* had to leave large contingents to garrison the Balkans due to the continued pressure from the people from the steppes, north of the Danube, as evidenced by the invasion of the Cumans, probably in 1095.[6] The emperor thus had to reinforce his much-weakened military forces. For this reason, he sent emissaries to the Council of Piacenza to request the help of Latin troops, but also to the monarchs of the West, including the German emperor Henry IV.[7] This phase is very little known on the Byzantine side, since

we only have access to the testimony of Anna Komnene, who had to disprove, several decades after the events, the accusation that her father was responsible for the creation of the Latin principality of Antioch, and the account of John Zonaras, which is rather short as regards the crusade and is unfavourable to the emperor.[8] The chroniclers of the crusade are silent on the role of the emperor before the pilgrims' arrival in imperial territory.

There is no doubt that the emperor wanted to reinforce the *tagmata* of Latin mercenaries, especially with cavalry. But was he only thinking of ordinary mercenaries? Michael VII, following an initiative from his predecessor, Romanos IV Diogenes, had created a precedent, by calling in a powerful Norman leader, Robert Guiscard, who had just stripped the Empire of its Italian provinces. After a shift of alliances, the Normans had placed themselves under papal protection, during the pontificate of Gregory, the initiator of the eponymous reform. By suggesting a marriage between the heir of the Empire, Constantine Porphyrogenitus, and Guiscard's daughter, Michael VII was hoping, on the one hand, to give a semblance of Byzantine legitimisation to the occupation of Apulia and Calabria (Bibicou, 1959/1960, 43–75) and, on the other hand, to enrol Guiscard in a campaign in Anatolia, where many Normans were already fighting.[9] The vicissitudes of power struggles within the Empire put an end to this project.

For his part, Alexios had also obtained the support of the count of Flanders, a powerful member of the Western nobility, who, after a pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 1089, had come to visit him in his winter quarters in Bulgaria and had allegedly sworn an oath of fidelity; then, in 1090, at a crucial moment, he had sent him 500 knights. To a large extent, this episode prefigures the type of relations that the emperor wanted to establish with the crusade leaders in 1096–1097, as he did not expect the count of Flanders to become a docile subordinate in his service. Alexios also knew first-hand how hard it was to command this type of army unit, composed mostly of foreigners. He was the one who had managed to quash the rebellion of the powerful Normand leader Roussel de Bailleul, at the time of Michael VII.

An expedition to the East with no real precedent

Apart from the rewards granted by God to those who would perish while fighting in his name, we do not know the exact contents of the speech delivered by Pope Urban II at the Council of Clermont in 1095, in particular as regards the political goals of the expedition; however, according to contemporary chroniclers, he called on influential nobles to commit to supporting their brothers in the East. Constantinople was already a new Jerusalem since it had gathered the Old and New Testament relics of old Jerusalem, including the True Cross, small fragments of which were often distributed by the emperors to the Latin nobles passing through Constantinople. What place did the real Jerusalem hold among the objectives of the massive pilgrimage that the pope had proclaimed? It is certain that Urban II preached the necessity to reclaim Jerusalem and the Holy Land from the infidels,[10] but the fear that Constantinople might fall, probably evoked by

the Greeks, could perhaps provoke a more immediate reaction than the capture of the Holy City by an obscure Turkish emir, Atziz. At that time, the Muslims were not the priority enemies of the Latin Christendom, except in Spain and in southern Italy, and the spirit of Holy War was not widespread in the ranks of Western nobility. J. Riley-Smith has shown that the utilitarian view of the crusades is anachronistic. In their majority, the knights who were departing for faraway lands were not the younger siblings who had been given no inheritance, nor were they adventurers thirsty for plunder; on the contrary, the cost of the trip corresponded to several years of income (Riley-Smith, 1997, 21).[11] Going on a pilgrimage was the expression of the desire to expiate sins through a long march that exposed participants to a constant threat of death.

It is somewhat paradoxical that the First Crusade took place at a time when the Holy War for Christians and the Jihad for Muslims were no longer topical, except perhaps for the Turcomans. The Eastern Christians appreciated the role of the great Seljukids, especially of Malik Shah who had restored peace. For this reason, the Armenian Matthew of Edessa eulogized this sultan (Matthew of Edessa, *Armenia and the Crusades*, 153). But this time of peace did not last past the assassination of Malik Shah in 1092 and, in the following years, atrocities against Christians resumed in Syria and Palestine.

J. France, one of the leading experts on the crusades, insists on the major role that Urban II had in promoting the expedition, as he managed to change the mindset of part of the Latin nobility, and notes that the provinces where the pope went, as part of his trip before the Council of Clermont, are those that provided the highest number of participants. Quite judiciously, he remarks that the pope could not have known how successful his preaching was to prove and what shape the expedition was to take (France, 1996, 43–56).

Urban II's political aims have been underlined by all the scholars: to consolidate the papal pre-eminence and to put pressure on the Byzantine emperor so that the latter might incite the patriarch to negotiate church union under the conditions imposed by Rome. This approach was to have a long future and was to be deployed until the fall of Constantinople.

The agreements with the leaders of the expedition

Alexios had sent envoys to the Council of Piacenza and requested assistance from Latin princes. In his latest book, P. Frankopan considers that negotiations took place between the pope and the emperor in order to know who would come, how to organise supplies and what the goals of the enterprise would be. Indeed, talks must have taken place between the pope and the emperor, but we do not know their content. It was probably difficult for the pope to measure the impact of his appeal and therefore to make precise requests; besides, it was hardly his role. Yet, if Urban II himself ignored how many would join the coming expedition, Alexios was also unable to estimate the size of the reinforcements he could expect. Thus, it is important not to brush aside completely the remark made by Anna Komnene about her father's astonishment at the number of Latins reaching Constantinople.[12]

P. Frankopan also assumes that, long before they reached the territory of the Empire, Alexios had negotiated with all the leaders of the major contingents, except Peter the Hermit, whose army was formed, it seems, outside the strict papal framework (Frankopan, 2012, 113–114). We do not have any trace of such talks. Undoubtedly, the itinerary of the Count of Toulouse remains intriguing, since his decision to take a more difficult route, rather than to reach the Via Egnatia via Italy, led Raymond to face serious logistical difficulties.[13] P. Frankopan's idea that, by taking this route, the count of Toulouse would weaken the position of Constantine Bodin, who was at the same time one of the toughest opponents of the emperor in the Balkans and an adversary to Pope Urban II, is seducing (Frankopan, 2012, 116). However, it is unlikely that the pope would have tolerated the use of pilgrims in order to weaken a Christian prince. Let us remember how fiercely Innocent III criticised the Venetians, before excommunicating them for convincing the crusaders to capture Zara on their behalf (Queller & Madden, 1997, 89–95). Raymond's choice could actually be explained, because the route going through Hungary and Belgrade was saturated, because of the proximity of ports on the Adriatic where supplies could be found, or perhaps because he hoped he could find such supplies in the Byzantine outposts established against Constantine Bodin.

If Alexios had negotiated in advance with the leaders of the main contingents, the question of the hierarchical relation or, conversely, of the independence between these great nobles and the emperor would have been settled beforehand. This was clearly not the case before the Westerners' arrival at Constantinople, especially as regards the most powerful among them, none other than the Count of Toulouse. Furthermore, there is nothing to indicate that Alexios had been informed about Bohemond's initiative to take part in the expedition.

The agreements, which were more or less easily concluded between the Frankish leaders and Alexios, established a framework for cooperation between the Latins and the *basileus*. By pledging allegiance to the latter, the former recognised Alexios' pre-eminence. However, they were not of the same type as the contracts signed between Latin soldiers such as Hervé Frankopoulos or Roussel de Bailleul, who were under the emperor's orders, in exchange for a *roga*. Instead, they were a contract of service according to which the emperor was under no obligation towards them, except for supplying provisions and providing military assistance. Alexios found it judicious to provide the Latin leaders with a significant amount of money, but this was largesse aimed at creating a favourable reputation among them and their troops. This generosity made it possible to allay the poverty of numerous pilgrims, who had depleted their travelling supplies, by giving them enough to buy victuals from merchants without needing to loot or forage. In return, the Latins committed to returning some reconquered territories to the Greeks. All these points are well-known. The negotiations between Bohemond of Taranto, at the head of a contingent that was quite modest but of great worth, and Emperor Alexios, have been the subject of much speculation, because of the importance given to them by Anna Komnene in the *Alexiad*. Now, we can follow the conclusions of J. Shepard: he shows convincingly that both protagonists knew

their respective ambitions very well and that the latter were not incompatible.[14] Bohemond's request to obtain the office of *Domestikos ton Scholon* of the East, left vacant since Philaretos Brachamios' disappearance, was not incongruous with the circumstances and was perhaps accepted, despite the relevant denial of Anna Komnene and the absence of any such information in the Latin sources. It is a fact that the negotiations between Bohemond and Alexios had remained secret, apart from the hearings with the other Frankish leaders (Pryor & Jeffreys, 2012, 31–32, 34, 39–40, 62, 76–77; Flori, 2007a, 97–112). Indeed, it is possible that a Norman, Hervé, might have already received an overall command over Anatolia (Seibt, 2010, 89–96). But several times over the course of the previous century, the *Domestikos ton Scholon* had also taken on the role of Duke of Antioch, especially at the time of Philaretos Brachamios. Thus Bohemond contemplated, no doubt, to keep Antioch.

Does that mean that Alexios had foreseen from that moment that Bohemond would betray his oath? The latter had in fact been a bitter and formidable enemy of the Empire in 1081–1085. At that time, the conquest of Balkan provinces constituted the only opportunity for Bohemond to create a kingdom for himself since he was not the heir of Guiscard. Besides, Alexios had already taken into his service some Normans from the entourage of the Norman leader, such as Peter of Aulps or Guy, from the Hauteville family. For his part, Bohemond was aware that his presence was undesirable by Roger Borsa in Italy and that he could not hope to obtain the support of Roger of Sicily, who was on good terms with Alexios at that time. Unlike the great majority of pilgrims who intended to return to their country of origin, Bohemond had a future only in the East and his success required the benevolence of the emperor, at least at the beginning. On the other hand, using the qualities of defeated opponents was one of the permanent features of imperial policy. Alexios himself counted on his Pecheneg regiments, defectors or survivors of the massacre of 1091. The negotiations between Bohemond and Alexios, therefore, should have been fruitful and even sincere to a certain extent.

Did Alexios Komnenos use the new threat hanging over Jerusalem, which was no longer under the control of the Fatimids, with whom the Byzantines had cordial relations, as the Turks were their common enemies? We do not know how dense the diplomatic exchanges were between the Byzantines and Fatimids in the last third of the 11th century. A balance between the two powers had been achieved since the reign of Constantine IX Monomachos, even before the Turkish advance towards Syria, as the two former opponents were satisfied by partitioning Syria among themselves; Antioch was given to the Empire and Damascus to the Fatimids, while Aleppo was a source of disputes, which, however, did not give rise to excessive tensions. Let us remember that the destruction of the Holy Sepulchre by the Fatimid Caliph Al-Hakim in 1009 provoked a rather moderate reaction by Basil II, who evidently considered that this event was primarily the result of the caliph's personal provocation, which would not last, and that the Fatimid policy had not changed radically. This event does not seem to have struck people's minds in the West very much, even though this destruction of the Holy Sepulchre took place at a time when the pilgrimage to Jerusalem was

gaining ground; however, Frankish mercenaries were not yet hired *en masse* by the *basileis* to serve in Anatolia, which reduced the flow of information between the borders of Anatolia and the Latin world.

P. Frankopan insists on this evocation by Alexios of the deliverance of Jerusalem, whereas J. Harris entirely refutes this assertion. The latter considers that Theodore Skoutariotes's statement, according to which Alexios used this stratagem in order to entice Western knights, is worthless because his text was written two and a half centuries after the events (Frankopan, 2012, 93; Harris, 2014, 128–129). Harris's argument is weakened by the quality of the additional information given by Skoutariotes, who uses old sources, which are no longer at our disposal. However, the beginning of such a particular massive pilgrimage cannot be explained by the arguments of Alexios Komnenos. On the other hand, by handing out pieces of the Cross to the nobles travelling via Constantinople, the emperor and his predecessors contributed to the development of a cult of the Cross in the West, as evidenced by the churches dedicated to the Holy Cross.

There has been some debate in order to establish the state of mind of the crusaders when they left Constantinople; however, J. Shepard demonstrated clearly, through the use of a series of little-known Latin texts, that the accusations of double-dealing against Alexios Komnenos by the chroniclers of the First Crusade do not reflect common opinion and that some of the crusader leaders, probably followed by their troops, praised the emperor's generosity and his efforts, in particular with regard to logistics, to make the common enterprise succeed, or later his care to ransom the Frankish knights captured by the Fatimids.[15]

Antioch, the key to the East

Alexios, who had to stand against the Turkish emirs of western Asia Minor as well as the Danishmendids in the Pontus, had nevertheless one objective as a priority: to regain control of the traditional military route passing through Nicaea, then Dorylaion and finally reaching Antioch, with different branches either through Ankara or through Caesarea.[16] What mattered was to control Nicaea and Antioch, without which no reconquest of Asia Minor could be envisaged. Keeping Nicaea made it impossible for the Turks to reach the Bosporus or the southern shores of the Propontis and thus protected Constantinople. Yet the importance of Antioch in this scheme should not be underestimated. Since its reconquest in 969, it was the pivotal point for Byzantine defence in the East.[17] Keeping Nicaea without having control over Antioch constituted a failure for the Byzantines and regaining Antioch would give back to the Empire its military capital in the East, in an area where Alexios's authority was still recognised, at least nominally.[18]

This objective coincided with that of the Latins, who, in any case, were not encouraged to retake towns outside this route, letting the Byzantines recapture Philadelphia or Smyrna. For the Latins, there was no problem in leaving both cities in the hands of the Byzantines, since it guaranteed safety to the pilgrims heading for Jerusalem, as was the case before the arrival of the Turks.

During the secondary crusade of 1100–1101, Alexios strived to weaken the other Turkish emirate of Anatolia, that of the Danishmendids, no doubt thinking that he would soon regain control over Antioch and Cilicia. After successfully regaining a strong foothold in Trebizond and in the Pontus, a region he knew particularly well as he had fought there against Roussel de Bailleul, the *basileus*, by destroying that emirate, was hoping to gain a second base which would make it possible to trap the Turks in a pincer and cut their route towards Iraq and Persia, whence new Turkish warriors used to come. His plan was all the more sensible as Melitene was still in the hands of the *protonobelissimos* Gabriel. In this affair, Alexios Komnenos had set the objective he wanted to achieve, but he was supported only by his allies within the Latin world, Raymond, count of Toulouse, and Stephen, count of Blois. Anna Komnene tries to make us believe that her father was against this initiative, which she attributes to the Latins' wish to free Bohemond of Taranto, who was held by the Danishmendids. But it would have been surprising if these Frankish leaders, who were the closest to the emperor, had acted against the will of the latter. Anna Komnene did not want to ascribe the blame for the failure of the expedition to her father, whereas some among the crusaders did not hesitate to do so. The other groups of crusaders, those from Nevers, Bavaria, etc., did as they pleased, without consulting with the *basileus*, and perished on the road to Antioch, decimated by Turkish arrows.

On the Frankish side, the lesson of this first wave of expeditions to the East was that logistics were of paramount importance, as long as the land route remained the main way to reach the new Latin states in the East. It was impossible to hope to cross Asia Minor without the support of the emperor. The Greeks knew the Anatolian routes better, while after the First Crusade, the number of Latin soldiers who had fought for the Empire in the East prior to 1081 decreased rapidly. The Greeks could also offer strategic assistance, even if the abandonment of Alexios' expedition to Antioch had raised doubts regarding the Empire's military capacities.

On the Byzantine side, the results were positive, since the crushing defeat of the Seljukids in Dorylaion had left the Turkish emirs without support and enabled the Empire to retake the western provinces of Anatolia, a region which had great economic potential, even though it was largely devastated. On the other hand, the lack of control over Antioch compromised the Byzantine reconquest of the plateau of Asia Minor and hindered them from providing support to the young Frankish states of Syria and Palestine.

It is necessary to underline how different this first Latin expedition to the Holy Land was from the following ones. Its objectives were not clearly determined, but the assistance to the Eastern Christians was a decisive motive for taking action. In this respect, P. Frankopan is right in highlighting how important the Byzantine Empire's commitment was in organising the First Crusade – something which is so often overlooked. The symbiosis between the two halves of Christendom has largely been underestimated, as historians have focused on the numerous but circumstantial points of contention, instead of concentrating on the mass of Latins who were returning home in awe of their trip

to Constantinople.[19] The events of Antioch in 1098 were impossible to predict[20] and Alexios Komnenos was well on the route to Antioch to join the Latins, before being dissuaded from continuing by Latin deserters, including his friend Stephen, Count of Blois. This episode, which was a matter of a few days, changed the nature of relations between Byzantines and Latins. Bohemond's control over Antioch – the hero of Dorylaion, who always encouraged the crusaders to maintain their efforts in battle and therefore gained immense personal prestige – created a long-lasting source of tensions and changed the image of Alexios among the Latins.[21] Moreover, Bohemond managed to paint a negative image of Alexios before a wide audience in Europe, which was not counterbalanced by the praise of many Latin soldiers regarding the emperor.[22]

Even though it was aimed at reinforcing the meagre numbers of Latins in the Holy Land, the secondary crusade of 1100–1101 also followed the previous model. It first serves the interests of the *basileus* who wanted to weaken the Danishmendids, as the expedition of 1096–1097 had done for the Seljukids, even if the liberation of Bohemond, kept prisoner by the emir Amir Ghazi Gümüshtekin, was an added motivation to take this route. Alexios used the support of Raymond of Toulouse and Stephen, Count of Blois, Chartres and other cities and the husband of William the Conqueror's daughter, who were more powerful princes than Bohemond. The failure of this expedition marks the end of projects with truly common goals for the Latins and the Byzantines.

The later crusades fell entirely within the framework of Latin interests; surely they did not exclude cooperation with the Byzantines, but they were geared towards maintaining the Latin states in the East, which were henceforth the major concern for Westerners. The Latins in the East mistrusted the Greek influence and did not permit the installation of Melkite patriarchs in Antioch and Jerusalem. Let us add, from a more general point of view, that the upheavals in Syria and Palestine at the end of the 11th century were due much more to the Turkish invasion than to the settlement of the Latin warriors, whose numbers were probably under 10,000 in 1099.[23]

The Empire, an indispensable source of logistical and financial support

In any case, the Latins drew some lessons from this 'First Crusade': the Empire was rich and could provide considerable financial assistance, which appealed to the knights, as their funds were insufficient for such a long journey; it could also provide abundant supplies and guides.

There was no crusade during the reign of John II Komnenos, but the strategic aims of the Empire remained identical: to retake the Anatolian plateau from the Turks, always according to the same plan, by launching a double attack from Antioch and the Pontus. This continuity, in terms of military goals, explains the attacks against the Danishmendids, conducted steadfastly by the emperor, and those against the principality of Antioch. They also justified the creation of a major command in south-eastern Anatolia for Manuel, his youngest son.

It happens that, for more than four decades, no powerful Latin armies in need of Byzantine logistical aid crossed the imperial territory, as it was only after the capture of Edessa by Zengi that new Latin contingents made their way via the land route towards the Latin States of the East. Circumstances were different then, since the army leaders were sovereigns and the emperor could hardly consider making them his subordinates. However, Conrad, as well as Louis VII, expected from Manuel supplies and guides for the routes of Anatolia. The fact that the inhabitants of Constantinople worried about the presence of powerful armies outside the city's walls does not indicate that they were, in principle, hostile towards the Latins. Under Alexios, the Constantinopolitans had had the same reaction in 1096 and, in 1201–1202, the Venetians had also wanted to push back the troops of the Fourth Crusade who had settled outside their city, waiting to embark. It is undeniable that Odo of Deuil, the main French chronicler of the Second Crusade, adopted a malicious tone towards the Greeks, for it was necessary to justify the failure of the crusade in the eyes of his readers in the West, but King Louis VII and Manuel, who were about the same age,[24] seem to have had good personal relations; later, in 1180, the Capetian even betrothed his daughter to the son of Manuel, Alexios II, making the latter Philip Augustus's brother-in-law.

Manuel Komnenos had not relinquished his father's ambitions and wished to drive away the Turks from Anatolia. The strategic situation had not changed. It was necessary to attack the Seljukids. The emperor changed radically his attitude towards the Latins in the East, by posing as the protector of the Latin States. He wanted to control Antioch, an indispensable condition to enable an attack against the Seljukids, but without possessing it directly, by turning the Latin prince into an ally instead. This is the reason why he bought the remaining fortresses of the county of Edessa. The campaign of Myriokephalon in 1176 illustrates the emperor's plan. The speeches that accompanied the mobilisation of the army had crusading overtones (Chrysos, 2012). The plan was for a pincer movement, as the emperor's nephew, Andronikos Vatatzes, led an army towards Amaseia, which had recently fallen in the hands of Sultan Kilidj Arslan II. The emperor marched towards Ikonion with his strong army, which included a contingent from Antioch under the command of his brother-in-law, Baldwin of Antioch. The disastrous result of this expedition is well-known, but the plan should be seen as part of the Byzantine strategy, since Alexios, Manuel's grandfather, had thought of the best way to benefit from this influx of Latin warriors.

The second legacy of Manuel, in the eyes of the Latins, was the supply of men and money to the Latin states. In short, he fulfilled what the crusaders already expected from his grandfather. This change of attitude was facilitated by the destruction, one generation earlier, at the battle of the *Ager Sanguinis*, in 1119, of most of the Norman cavalry and by the death of Roger of Salerno, the prince of Antioch, which removed one of the most obstinate opponents of the Byzantines, at least in the East. Manuel wanted the Latins in the East to consider the Empire as their recourse, at the time when the pressure by Nur ad-Din, and then by Saladin, was growing stronger (Cheynet, 2004, 115–125).

When the latter took Jerusalem, he brought about the Third Crusade. The strategic conditions had changed. For the Byzantines, the idea of retaking the Anatolian plateau was unrealistic, as the Seljukids had totally driven out the Danishmendids, making any offensive from the direction of Byzantine Pontus bound to fail. Cilicia had been retaken by the Armenian Roupenids, making it pointless to possess Antioch directly or indirectly. On the other hand, it was necessary to contain the offensives of Kilidj Arslan II; and Isaac II Angelos, who continued, to a large extent, the policy that his predecessor Andronikos Komnenos had started, had found a fall-back ally; this could not be the Roupenid prince, who had gained his freedom at the expense of Byzantium, but rather Saladin, who wished to expand towards the North against the Seljukids (Magdalino, 2007, 93–106). This was still the old strategic idea of enveloping the Turks of the Anatolian plateau, a plan that survived Manuel Komnenos' failure at Myriokephalon in 1176.

Among the crusaders, only the Germans of Frederick Barbarossa followed the traditional land route. The German emperor had no other goal but to reach Antioch as fast as possible. He negotiated the passage of his army with Isaac Angelos, with the guarantee that the necessary supplies would be provided. There was nothing new here; however, Isaac's alliance with Saladin and Frederick Barbarossa's policy in Italy vis-à-vis Byzantine influence changed the climate of the negotiations at Adrianople, in 1190, which were carried out under duress. Isaac obtained only the guarantee that Frederick's army would not encamp before the walls of the Byzantine capital. Once this was achieved, the rest of the expedition could continue without problems, except on the road to Ikonion, on account of a change of leadership at the sultanate; Kilidj Arslan had been unexpectedly toppled by one of his sons, who was displeased with the agreement between his father and Frederick (Choniates, *Historia*, 413).

From then on, the Empire had nothing to gain from the crusade, while the Latins were thenceforth using primarily the sea route, which was cheaper because it was faster. This development should have made it possible to avoid any risk of confrontation between the Byzantines and the Latins, all the more so as it made logistical support from Byzantium less useful for crusading. However, the Latins had not forgotten that the Empire constituted a possible source of supplies and money for the Latin states of the East. Without even considering going through Constantinople, the German Emperor Henry VI tried to make the Byzantines contribute financially to his forthcoming crusade. Having conquered southern Italy and Sicily, Henry VI thought of himself as the heir to the Norman kings and their claims in the Balkans. The German emperor thus put pressure on Alexios III Angelos and, after ill-tempered negotiations, obtained from him the considerable sum of 1,600 pounds of gold, in order to pay his own troops. Alexios had to levy a specific tax, the *alamanikon*, which made him unpopular (Choniates, *Historia*, 478–480). Luckily enough, Henry VI died, still young, in September 1197, before the Byzantine tribute was sent to him. This episode signals a new stage in the relations between the Byzantines and the crusaders. The Latins, perhaps overestimating the wealth of the Empire as they frequented its shiny capital,[25] were demanding, against the *basileus*' will, enormous amounts of money, which were

no longer justified by the passage of crusaders through the lands of the Empire. The Byzantines, for whom the crusade no longer brought any benefit and was even a source of nuisance at times, as was the case with the loss of Cyprus, had no intention of paying for such an enterprise.

The diversion of the Fourth Crusade: a logical consequence of the policy of the Komnenoi

The same scenario was played out again with the Fourth Crusade, further complicated by division within the imperial family. The crusaders, who had *a priori* no reason to sail to Constantinople, quickly gave in to the offer made by the pretender to the throne of Constantinople, the young Alexios, son of Isaac II Angelos, because of the financial difficulties they had been facing since they had assembled in Venice, and which were aggravated as their departure was delayed for too long. Alexios III had not carefully prepared the defence of his capital because he had only realised at the last minute that the crusaders intended to come to Constantinople; and when the threat became real, he thought he was safe behind the city's walls (see most recently Cheynet, 2015, 171–192). When Alexios IV Angelos was placed on the throne, the young and inexperienced *basileus* realised that he had overestimated the resources of the Empire and had to levy heavy taxes for the benefit of the crusaders. The Byzantines considered that they need not fund the Latins, whose victory would bring no gain to them. This incomprehension led to the final catastrophe of April 1204; but, paradoxically, it had partly been provoked by the policy of the Komnenoi, in particular Manuel, who had imprinted into the Latins' minds that nothing could be done in the Holy Land without the support of the Empire. This policy had been more and more contested by the Byzantine elites, who were aware of the external difficulties facing the Byzantines, especially in the Balkans.

Conclusion

We can indeed see a certain logic in the evolution of the attitude of the Byzantines and the Latins towards what we call the crusades. Initially united around the same goals, they became opponents after Bohemond gained control over Antioch. The real upheaval at the end of the 11th century came not so much from the arrival of a few thousands of Latins in the Near East, but rather from the arrival of tens of thousands of Turks. Nevertheless, the Latins and the Greeks were not permanent adversaries; from the first Muslim counter-offensives, they constantly thought about the advantages that an alliance would bring to both sides. Manuel Komnenos hoped he could make up for the loss of Antioch by exercising indirect sovereignty over the Latin states of the Holy Land, facilitated by the payment of substantial subsidies. The tragedy of 1204 is largely a consequence of this collaboration which had been desired and proposed at some point by Manuel Komnenos; but, at that point, such a collaboration had become pointless for the Greeks, while it seemed vital for the Latins.

In the relations between Greeks and Latins in the East, between 1054 and 1203, if we set aside Norman aggression,[26] the periods of solidarity were much more significant than the episodes of conflict, which although real and sometimes violent, were intermittent and limited to particular groups within the Byzantine society, such as the merchants and craftsmen of the Byzantine capital who participated in the pogrom of 1182. This fact is partly concealed by our two most important Byzantine sources, the *Alexiad* of Anna Komnene and the *History* of Niketas Choniates, as both authors had good reasons to foreground the conflicting aspect of these relations: the former to exonerate her father from the loss of Antioch to Bohemond and the latter to explain the fall of Constantinople, something unthinkable before 1203.

Notes

1 See the review of this book: Harris, 2014.

2 The career of Suleyman, son of Kutlumush, illustrates this well. Lord of Nicaea, he seized Antioch, then killed the Uqaylid emir of Aleppo and Mosul, Muslim ibn Quraysh, before being killed by Tutush, brother of Malik Shah, in 1086.

3 On Gregory VII's policy towards the Empire, see in particular: Cowdrey, 1988, 145–169. The preparation of a 'crusade' in 1074 to help the Eastern Christians was based on reports on the latter's plight, and Gregory's plan was organised without any action on the part of the emperor at the time, Michael VII (ibid., 154).

4 The schism of 1054 did not profoundly alter the feeling of solidarity between Christians over the next century-and-a-half (Daly, 1960, 43–91). To anyone who might counter-argue that the disputes between Latins and Byzantines were many, one could answer that within the Latin world, this same solidarity did not prevent numerous and often bitter wars.

5 Philaretos Brachamios's career took him to the top of the Byzantine hierarchy, finally obtaining the dignity of protosebastos. Apart from emperors, he may be the person with the highest number of surviving seals. The testimony of Matthew of Edessa against Philaretos, who is supposed to have fought against Christians around 1084, is to be taken with a pinch of salt, on account of Matthew's great hatred of the Chalcedonian Armenians. The lieutenants of Philaretos in Edessa and Melitene continued to defend the populations which were in their charge (see most recently: Cheynet, 2008, 391–410; Seibt, 2009, 281–295).

6 The Cumans had joined a pretender to the throne, who was supposed to be a son of the late emperor Romanos Diogenes (Frankopan, 2005, 147–166; the author believes that the pretender was a genuine son of Romanos).

7 All the relevant references are given in Frankopan, 2012, 87–100.

8 On this diplomatic activity of Alexios, J. Shepard has gathered some explicit testimonies, besides the famous letter to the Count of Flanders, which was certainly rewritten on the basis of an original (Shepard, 1988b, 102–11).

9 On the military aspect of the relations between Byzantines and Normans, see most recently Theotokis, 2014.

10 For a recent examination of the objectives of the crusade invoked by Urban II, see Riley-Smith, 2004, 536–537.

11 The author highlights the fact that those who survived went back poor, with few exceptions, but haloed with glory (Riley-Smith, 1997, 149).

12 Anna Komnene. *Alexias*, 297. Matthew of Edessa, *Armenia and the Crusades*, 164, also takes up the image of locusts and of the crusaders' multitude which was impossible to count like the sand of the sea.

13 On the logistical difficulties caused by the influx of Latins, see most recently Bell, 2010, 38–71.
14 For a very detailed analysis, in particular of the contradictions of Anna Komnene's narrative, see Shepard, 1988a, 185–277.
15 These praises were conveyed in letters from crusader leaders such as Stephen of Blois, but also in the accounts of simple knights such as Odo Arpin (Shepard, 2003, 16–18).
16 On the routes of Asia Minor, see Avramea, 2002, 75–76.
17 On the history of Byzantine Antioch, see most recently the synthesis by Todt & Vest, 2014, 189–228.
18 An inscription, unfortunately mutilated, was preserved above a gate of the fortress of Edessa, referring, probably in 1094, to the Roman authority and to Alexios Komnenos (last publication: Saunders, 1995, 301–304). In Melitene, the titulature of Gabriel comprises the title of emir, as was also the case with Theodore Hethum of Edessa (Zacos & Nesbitt, 1985, nº464 and Cheynet, 2001, nº34).
19 Few of them have left their testimony, with some exceptions. For an example of a successful visit, see Ansellem, 1999, 283–288. For an overview, see Ciggaar, 1996.
20 In the treaty of Deabolis, Alexios and Bohemond acknowledged that the agreement concluded in 1097 in Constantinople had not been respected due to 'unforeseen events' (Anna Komnene. *Alexias*, 413).
21 See, among others, Flori, 2007b, 717–746, and Carrier, 2012, 228–229. The same author notes that Fulcher of Chartres, who was the chaplain of Stephen of Blois, wrote his *History* of the expedition to Jerusalem in several stages, the first of which is thought to have been completed in 1101, while the other two, written afterwards, were much more critical of the emperor (ibid., 212).
22 For example, the letters of Stephen of Blois to his spouse, including the one written during the siege of Nicaea in 1097: 'I was extremely happy to reach the city of Constantinople by the grace of God. The emperor received me in a dignified, honourable manner and as affectionately as if I were his son. He gave me numerous valuable gifts and there is no duke, count or other powerful person in the whole of God's or our army he trusts or favours more than me. Truly, my love, his Imperial Highness has often said and continues to say that we should entrust one of our sons to him; he has promised that he will personally honour our son in such a great and distinguished manner that our son will harbour no grudge against us. I am telling you the truth when I say that this man has no equal alive on earth today. He showers gifts on all our leaders, his presents are making the lives of the knights easier, and his banquets are reinvigorating the poor.' (Hagenmeyer, *Epistulae*, 138; translation by Barber & Bate, *Letters from the East*, 15–16). For the testimony of a combatant of a more modest rank, see Shepard, 2003, 11–27. Some clerics also paid a visit to the emperor, as a certain Guillermus who came to Constantinople after his brother and was entrusted by the emperor with the task of supervising the rebuilding of Nicomedia, which had been destroyed by the Turks (Shepard, 2005, 298–299).
23 The leading specialist in the military history of the crusades estimates that 14,000 fighters, including 1,500 horsemen, besieged Jerusalem in July 1099 and that fewer than 10,000 men were present at the battle of Ascalon that same year (France, 1994, 131).
24 Louis VII had been born in 1120 and Manuel in November 1118. Oddly enough, they both died in September 1180.
25 Constantinople remained an incredibly rich city compared to those of the West. Indeed, the very negative appraisal of the government of the Angeloi is starting to become more nuanced (see Simpson, 2015, and particularly on financial resources Smyrlis, 2015, 159–178).
26 On the role of the Normans in shaping Byzantine feelings of fear and enmity towards the Latins, see Kolia-Demirtzaki, 2008, 32–53.

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6 Crusader perceptions of Byzantium, *c.*1095 to *c.*1150

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The relationship between Byzantium and the West is inevitably overshadowed by the events of April 1204, when the armies of the Fourth Crusade sacked the city of Constantinople. This led some historians to characterize this broader interaction as 'a classic case of the clash of civilizations' (summarized in Harris, 2014a, 2–5). At first glance, a review of Western European, and especially crusader, perceptions of Byzantium seem to substantiate this. They were, in a word, negative. The harsh opinions based on the First Crusade narrative, known as the anonymous *Gesta Francorum*, circulated widely (*Gesta Francorum*; Bull, 2012). A few decades later, in the aftermath of the failure of the Second Crusade (1145–49), Abbot Peter the Venerable of Cluny expressed the view that the Greeks should be punished for their 'unheard of and lamentable treachery' because of the 'great amount of blood of the army of God that was spilled by so much wickedness' (Peter the Venerable, *Letters*, 1:395).

Some historians have argued that the matter is more multi-faceted; the present chapter follows this increasingly accepted line. Persuasive material from a Byzantine perspective has been assembled and cogently evaluated by various scholars (Harris, 2014a; Wright, 2011; Shepard, 1997). The present essay takes a largely Western standpoint, using particular sources (including less well-known texts) to scrutinise further aspects of this complex and contradictory relationship. The chapter seeks to offer some explanations for the appearance, spread and the persistence of these negative perceptions. The long list of key players signals the inherent scope for complexity: Byzantium, the crusaders, the papacy, the rulers of France, Germany, Sicily and the Seljuk Turks of Ikonion, to name but a few. The argument put forward here is in part a matter of diverse theological, strategic and political interests, but also concerns wider issues of historical writing and textual transmission as well. Furthermore, within the broad heading of contact with 'Byzantium', refinement is sometimes needed. Are sources talking about an individual emperor? The Greek Orthodox faith? The city of Constantinople? The Greek people more broadly? They do not always differentiate, but, where they do, it is worth noting. Equally, views from one of these aspects can bleed across into the others and stand as a single image.

A predictable starting point is the events of 1054, the serious dispute often described as a schism between the Orthodox and Latin Churches. This episode

has been widely debated and in many quarters is no longer seen as the unambiguous fracture it once was. It did, however, highlight (in the West, certainly) the existence of differing understandings of doctrine, authority and status (Harris, 2014a, 47–52). An example of the last of these points relates to the position of Constantinople as patriarchal see, something not recognized by the papacy since the 5th century, although this would change after the Latin conquest of Constantinople in the Fourth Crusade (Chrissis, 2012, 31–35).

Three years after the crushing Turkish victory at Manzikert in 1071, Pope Gregory VII twice looked to help the oppressed Christians of Constantinople (whom he stated were being 'slaughtered like cattle') through the ambitious summons of Western arms-bearers as the *fideles sancti Petri*. He proposed to lead the campaign in person and to recover Jerusalem, bringing the Church of Constantinople (and the Armenians and other Eastern Christian denominations) back into agreement with Rome (Cowdrey, 1982, 27–40).

While little came of the plan, relations continued to improve more broadly. In 1088, Pope Urban II lifted a bull of excommunication on Emperor Alexios (placed there because his predecessor Nikephoros III Botaneiates was a usurper) and asked that the Latin churches in Constantinople be opened once more (Frankopan, 2012, 19–21). At a less rarefied level, we can see the visits to Constantinople by Western churchmen, such as Joseph of Canterbury, who was in the city around 1090. He managed to see the magnificent relic collection in the imperial chapel where he enthusiastically venerated relics of Saint Andrew (Haskins, 1910, 293–95). The presence of one Guillermus, a former monk of Cormery (near Tours) as a chaplain and priest to the Western (largely Flemish) contingent in the forces of the emperor garrisoning Nicomedia, around 1090/1 is also of note (Shepard, 1997, 116–18). The engagement of such Western knights, most notably those led by Count Robert I of Flanders was a further manifestation of more positive tenor. In a more theoretical vein, Anselm of Canterbury espoused a toleration of the different practices between Orthodox and Latins and hoped for compromise and for negotiation on the bigger issues, such as the *filioque* clause (Chadwick, 2003, 222–27).

That said, as Harris has persuasively argued (in part as a counter to the downplaying of the Schism of 1054) reports of the breach produced by the legate Humbert of Silva Candida did circulate widely in Italy, Flanders and Germany and stood as a powerful vindication of papal authority, fully in tune with the evolving agenda of the reform movement (Harris, 2014b, 2–4, 16). The Norman conquest of southern Italy brought an especially harsh edge to relations between one group of Westerners and Byzantium. Open conflict resulted in the Greeks losing their hold on the region in 1071; a decade later, the Normans invaded western Greece achieving a major victory at Dyrrachion before being forced back a couple of years later.

By the time of Pope Urban II there was, as one would or should expect, a variety of views and issues in play, some based on theological grounds, others on more earthly issues. The wish to help Emperor Alexios fight the Seljuk Turks and his request for military help at Piacenza in March 1095 stand at one end of a spectrum that extends across to the decades of hostility between Byzantium and

the Normans of southern Italy. Cumulatively, however, and when coupled with the powerful rhetoric of the preachers of the First Crusade calling for the liberation of Jerusalem in return for the offer of unprecedented spiritual rewards, there was sufficient groundswell of goodwill to help the Eastern Christians and to anticipate a positive relationship with Alexios when the expedition reached his lands. It is also worth noting that Guibert of Nogent's account of Urban's sermon at Clermont makes generous reference to the dignity of the imperial city of Constantinople (Guibert of Nogent, *Dei Gesta*, p. 111; Chrissis, 2012, 32–33). Thus, many thousands of Westerners responded positively to the appeal for the First Crusade.

The consequences of the First Crusade for relations between Byzantium and the West would be immense. Events and perceptions of the campaign were reported through the interpretive lens of numerous authors and then absorbed and assimilated by the audiences who read or heard these works. As we will see from looking at just a few of these sources, they reflect a continued diversity of views, albeit often broadcast on a wider stage and in far stronger terms.

This is not the place to rehearse the events of the First Crusade in great detail, suffice it to note that Alexios required the leaders of the campaign to swear an oath to him, promising, most notably, to return cities, countries or fortresses that had formerly been held by the Greeks; all except Raymond of Saint-Gilles agreed and the latter at least swore to maintain the emperor's life and honour. The emperor gave the Westerners substantial quantities of treasure and may well have appointed Bohemond of Taranto his *Domestikos* (commander) of the East (Pryor & Jeffreys, 2012, 31–79). Alexios's support was, as Fulcher of Chartres acknowledged, vital: 'For it was essential that all establish friendship with the emperor since without his aid and counsel we could not easily make the journey, nor could those who were to follow us by the same route' (Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia*, 178–79; trans. Fulcher of Chartres, *History*, 80). The expedition successfully recovered Nicaea in June 1097 but Alexios was, in the short-term, reluctant to move further away from Constantinople and could not lead the campaign in person. The crusaders traversed Asia Minor and, after a lengthy siege, captured Antioch, although the decision by the emperor to turn back from his march eastwards to help them was used as a reason to justify Bohemond's refusal to hand over the city as promised once it fell to the Latins in June 1098. The following year, as the main armies took Jerusalem, open conflict broke out between the Antiochenes and the Byzantines in Cilicia (Lilie, 1993, 3–66; Frankopan, 2012, 126–72; Harris, 2014a, 59–81).

The starting point of many accounts of the First Crusade was the anonymous *Gesta Francorum* which, as is well known, became the basis for many of the other versions of the campaign, including that of the Poitevin priest, Peter Tudebode (probably also written in the Holy Land), Robert the Monk and Guibert of Nogent (France, 1998, 29–42). The *Gesta*'s views reflected the author's likely southern Italian Norman heritage and, among other things, described Alexios as 'the wretched emperor' and a man of 'fraud and cunning', while his general Tatikios was simply a liar and faithless (*Gesta Francorum*, 10–11, 17, 35–36).

Robert the Monk was comfortably the most popular of the texts, completed *c.*1110 and circulating very widely indeed; the survival of over 80 Latin manuscripts from the 12th century, an incredible figure, bears testimony to this (Robert the Monk, *Historia*, xvii–lxxiv). His attitude leant towards the liberation of the Eastern lands, rather than Eastern Christians, although he viewed the inhabitants as treacherous. Often found bound with Robert's narrative is a letter falsely attributed to Alexios, addressing Count Robert I of Flanders and begging for help against the Turks, suggesting that he would rather the city fell under Latin rule than that of the Turks. This latter document was probably part of an effort to justify Bohemond's attack on the Byzantines in 1107–8 (Paul, 2010, 544; see also below).

Guibert of Nogent, who wrote *c.*1109, was scathing about the Greeks on the basis of their ethnicity and on the practices of the Eastern Church. As he commented with regard to the latter: 'Since they deviate from faith in the Trinity so that hitherto they who are in filth become filthier… as the punishment for the sin proceeding from this they have lost the soil of their native land to invading foreigners' (Guibert of Nogent, *Dei Gesta*, 92). Finally, Alexios himself was seen as hostile, fraudulent and treacherous and his people heretics. The timing of Guibert's writing does mean, of course, that he was exposed to the propaganda of Bohemond of Taranto's recruitment tour of 1106–7 (discussed below) and this may well have exerted a strong influence on his views (Ní Chléirigh, 2011, 164–74). It is not the place to analyse every First Crusade narrative but one might note that outside of the main *Gesta* tradition, another important eye-witness text, that of Raymond of Aguilers, was vehemently anti-Greek as well (Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 38, 44).

My main interest here lies with two other authors, one of whom is slightly less familiar, perhaps, but whose writings give us a more variegated view of the Greeks: Baldric of Bourgeuil and Bartolf of Nangis. Neither of these men went on the First Crusade but composed their accounts in the West. Baldric has recently been edited by Biddlecombe (Baldric of Bourgeuil, *Historia*), while Bartolf (Bartolf of Nangis, *Gesta Francorum Iherusalem expugnantium*, henceforth *GFIE*) remains relatively neglected.

Baldric's *Historia Ierosolimitana* was another of the *Gesta* derivatives (Baldric of Bourgeuil, *Historia*). Baldric was also a poet and letter-writer who composed the text in 1105 as abbot of Bourgeuil and then modified it a little after May 1107 when he became abbot of Dol in Normandy. He may have mined the *Gesta* for information but was scathing about the 'uncultivated and disheveled text'. He wanted to write an exemplar for others, adding stylistic polish as well as theological refinement. His text is known through 24 surviving manuscripts, a good number, indicating a strong level of circulation. Baldric was an educated man and very well connected with the religious and secular hierarchies of northern France, giving him a good forum for his views (Baldric of Bourgeuil, *Historia*, 10–11). Baldric saw the First Crusade as a chance to help defend the Christian family, a group that included the Eastern Church, in what was a very Augustinian concept of the kinship and unity of the Church. He also wrote of the Eastern Church as

the mother Church that bore forth divine wisdom and the gospels (Baldric of Bourgeuil, *Historia*, xlii–xlvi; Biddlecombe, 2014, 9–23).

The other main source under discussion here is Bartolf of Nangis. Long thought to have written his *Gesta Francorum Iherusalem expugnantium* in the Holy Land, it is now considered that he was possibly a Fleming, who composed his text in northern France. His narrative was a conscious and explicit re-write of the chronicle of Fulcher of Chartres (who took part in the crusade and settled in the Levant), although, as we will see, he certainly represents different positions from time to time (Edgington, 2014, 21–35). Fulcher, as Ní Chléirigh (2011) has commented, was capable of reflecting Urban II's agenda of helping the Byzantines as fellow-Christians. He was also comfortable with the idea of entering Constantinople to pray in its churches and could see the need to swear an oath of loyalty to Alexios. But while Fulcher praised Constantinople for its beauty, the wonderful relics there and its status as a trading centre, Bartolf's account is far more detailed. He recounts:

> Oh how great a city, how noble, how delightful and how filled with churches and palaces built with wonderful skill, what spectacles and what marvels of engraving in brass and marble are contained within the city! On one side the sea and an impregnable wall bounds the city, on the other a valley and a double ditch, and a wall of immense size and strength with towers in its circuit. Frequent voyages bring to the citizens at all times necessities in abundance. Cyprus, Rhodes, Mytilene, and Corinth and innumerable islands minister to this city. Achaia, Bulgaria and all of Greece likewise serve the city and send to it all their choicest products. Moreover, the cities of Romania in Asia and in Europe, and also the cities of Africa never cease sending donatives to Constantinople. Greeks, Bulgars, Alans, Cumans, Petchenegs, Italians, Venetians, Romans, Dacians, English, Amalfitans and even Turks and many gentiles, Jews and proselytes. Cretans, Arabs and people of all nations come to this great city.
>
> (Bartolf of Nangis, *GFIE*, 494; Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia*, 176–178; both translated in Fulcher of Chartres, *History*, 79).

Aside from providing an informative list of the multitude of Byzantine trading partners and giving a flavour of the cosmopolitan nature of Constantinople, this is patently admiring in tone. Most Latin writers were, of course, impressed and amazed by the city and its buildings, but some either contrasted it directly with the behaviour and morality of the people, or often with the Emperor Alexios himself (Guibert of Nogent, *Dei gesta*, 141–144). Bartolf, however, is consistently positive about Alexios. He was complimentary of him as an ally after the siege of Nicaea; he did not mention the departure of the Greek general Tatikios from the army and most significantly of all, he exonerated the emperor from charges of failing to support the crusaders at Antioch as he had promised. These episodes were widely used as 'proof' of Alexios's falsehood and used to justify Bohemond taking and holding Antioch and for much subsequent hostility

against the Greeks (Bartolf of Nangis, *GFIE*, 495, 501–502; Guibert of Nogent, *Dei Gesta*, 182–183). Yet this apparently callous and treacherous abandoning of the crusaders may well have had a reasonable explanation. Bartolf wrote:

> It came about that when [Stephen] in the course of his flight met Alexios the emperor of Constantinople, who was hurrying with all his army to reinforce the Christians at Antioch, he made him return to Constantinople, saying that he was being troubled in vain, since the Christians had lost their lives and all had perished. Alas, servant of deceit, servant of treachery… The falsehood of this wretch's lies harmed the emperor greatly, since if he had arrived at the siege, he would have obtained God's favour and human praise; and perhaps the city of Antioch would have been subjected to his power.
>
> (Bartolf of Nangis, *GFIE*, 501–502, trans. Edgington, 2014, 26)

Bartolf continues in this sympathetic vein by noting that, in trying to help the crusaders, the emperor actually incurred losses of territory because he had stripped other areas of 'Romania which were already subject to him' of their inhabitants, fearing that they might be retaken by the Turks, and thus he abandoned fertile land that remained uncultivated to the time of writing (Bartolf of Nangis, *GFIE*, 501–502, trans. Edgington, 2014, 26). In Fulcher's version of Stephen's departure, he simply stated that 'some withdrew from the siege through cowardice, some through fear of death, first the poor, then the rich. Then Count Stephen of Blois left the siege and went home to France by sea' (Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia*, 227–28; trans. Fulcher of Chartres, *History*, 97). In other words, he just about avoids explicit criticism of Stephen and he omits the fateful meeting with Alexios.

What is crucial to explaining Bartolf's tone is probably the fact that he wrote from the first, now lost, recension of Fulcher's work and this text was not coloured by later tensions with Byzantium – some influenced by alternative or less detailed accounts of the crusade and a wish to justify Bohemond's actions at Antioch (Edgington, 2014, 22–27). Nonetheless, across the spectrum of crusade chroniclers, as Ní Chléirigh shows, Fulcher should clearly be regarded as holding a sympathetic view of the Greeks (Ní Chléirigh, 2011, 174–81).

Relations between Byzantium and the West were not helped by controversy over appointments to the patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem, with the Latin candidates residing in situ and the Orthodox forced to remain in Constantinople, a cause of much ire to the emperor. The failure of what is called the '1101 Crusade', in essence a further wave of Westerners, including the penitent Stephen of Blois and contingents from Bavaria, Lombardy and Aquitaine, exacerbated matters further. The crusaders repeated the oath required of their predecessors and had some military support from Alexios, but the campaign ran into trouble in Asia Minor and many of the men were killed or captured. The remnants got back to Constantinople, where some were ferried on to the Holy Land, again to little effect (Harris, 2014a, 81–82).

One eye-witness account of this was produced by an anonymous German cleric who, when in Jerusalem in 1101 'read a little book', probably something akin to the *Gesta Francorum*. The author reflected suspicion of Alexios during negotiations between the emperor and the expedition's leaders at Constantinople in both 1097 and especially in 1101 suggesting that his 'usual kindness' was false. He then blamed the emperor for being faithless and 'the machinations of that treacherous man' that had imprisoned the crusaders in places that were 'narrow, impassable and uninhabitable, known to the enemy but unknown to us'. He was said to favour the Turks more than the Christians. As Manuel Komnenos would discover forty or so years later, suggestions of any kind of agreement with the Seljuks, regardless of either truth or practicality, were immediately regarded as an unambiguous sign of treachery. When, in 1105, Alexios was rumoured to have handed Nicaea back to the Turks, he revealed himself as 'the long-concealed toxic madness of the hateful and thus far secret persecutor of His Church.' In fact, he had done no such thing, but the extreme language used in the text indicates just how badly he could have been perceived ('The 1106 Continuation of Frutolf's Chronicle', 44–53, 153, 163–66, 184–85).

Just to show the variety of perspectives on this episode, another contemporary German chronicler, Albert of Aachen, reported the rumour of imperial duplicity but noted that 'in truth, as reported by truthful and distinguished men, he was not to be blamed for this crime at all for he frequently warned and informed the army about the wastelands and shortages and Turkish ambushes… and told them they could not march securely and safely along this route.' Thus, individuals of stature in Germany were prepared to defend Alexios and to exonerate him (Albert of Aachen, *Historia*, 633–37).

Another event to exert a significant influence on many histories of the First Crusade took place just a few years after the fall of Jerusalem. In 1105, Bohemond of Antioch arrived in Italy to start recruiting supporters for a new campaign. Late in the year, he met Pope Paschal II and they discussed fighting the Greeks as well as helping the Holy Land. The prince was given a papal banner and a papal legate, Bruno of Segni, was dispatched to accompany him. The party moved up to France where the ground had been prepared by another crusade veteran, Richard of Salerno. There is considerable controversy as to whether this propaganda effort included circulating copies of the *Gesta Francorum* or something akin to it (reasonably likely) and just how immediate a stimulus (or not) this visit was to the production of other narratives. As Paul argues, the tour itself was most probably dominated by visual and performative elements (Paul, 2010; Rubenstein, 2016; Robert the Monk, *Historia*, xxxiv–xli). As one of the heroes of the First Crusade – and with most of the other leaders dead or still in the Levant – crowds flocked to hear Bohemond speak of his adventures. Orderic Vitalis, writing in Normandy in 1141 placed this campaign in a continuum with the First Crusade and the 1101 expedition; it was 'the third expedition from the West to set out for Jerusalem' (Orderic Vitalis, *Ecclesiastical History*, 3.182). Bohemond's visit culminated with his wedding to Constance of France, the eldest daughter of King Philip I. As Naus notes, his speech there 'connected the revered First Crusade

with the upcoming expedition to Byzantium lending the latter a degree of respectability' (Naus, 2016, 28). Bohemond 'urged all those who bore arms to attack the emperor with him, promising them wealthy towns and castles in return'. He reiterated his appeal to arms again at the Council of Poitiers a few weeks later. Suger, later abbot of Saint-Denis, was present and wrote of the planned 'journey to Jerusalem'. Bohemond himself described it as an 'Iter Jerosolimitanum' and his force as 'Dei exercitus.' For all this talk of a focus on the holy city, his campaign headed first to western Greece where it soon collapsed (Orderic Vitalis, *Ecclesiastical History*, 6.68–73, 100–105; Suger, *Gesta*, 48; trans. Suger, *Deeds*, 45; Phillips, 2007, 29–30; Whalen, 2010).

From the perspective of this chapter, the hugely positive reception given to Bohemond as a crusading hero and then his ignominious defeat had the effect of adding to a negative picture of the Greeks in a number of quarters. The endorsement, however tacit, by Pope Paschal II, of a crusade that would involve conflict with the Greeks was significant too. As an early example of the flexibility of crusading, this is of note, but it enshrined the enmity shown by the Normans into holy war. That said, it did not seem to take much root; God's evident disapproval of the attack meant that it was not an obvious case to be referenced in future.

In literary terms, the continued spread and then copying of texts presumably had some impact during the first few decades of the 12th century. Such narratives often acted as the basis for writers of the next generation and thus perpetuated and reinforced stereotypes and attitudes, good or bad. Some authors worked from sources that were essentially sympathetic, such as Orderic Vitalis's heavy use of Baldric of Bourgeuil in his 'Ecclesiastical History' of the late 1130s. Likewise, William of Malmesbury mined Fulcher of Chartres in the lengthy crusade section of his 'Deeds of the Kings of England'. On the other hand, Henry of Huntingdon employed the *Gesta Francorum*, as did the Monte Cassino chronicler in the 1130s who also engaged with Raymond of Aguilers' account (Phillips, 2007, 21–28). On top of this had to be layered the impact of contemporary political events, such as continued tensions between Sicily and Byzantium, as well as further attempts at improving relations between the two Churches.

But it was not all gloom and doom. As Bartolf had mentioned, traders from across the Latin West flocked to Constantinople as a great Christian entrepôt to the Black Sea and parts of the Near East. The Pisans signed an official agreement in 1109–10 to give themselves a 'favoured nation' status, although those less advantaged would hardly praise the Greeks for this (Edgington, 2014, 31–34). The broader political scene exhibited sufficient fluency for particular parties to lean towards the Greeks at times, or for the Byzantines to reach out to them. Often this might start as a purely political matter, but the theological issues could not simply be ignored and it seems that there are times when the emphasis was on the latter.

Alexios had written to Paschal with proposals for Church union and also expressed sympathy concerning the recent hostility of Henry V of Germany. Tensions between Orthodox and Latin patriarchs over Antioch were problematic and when Paschal put forward his own suggestions for the union of the

Churches, he did so on the basis of the Patriarch of Constantinople recognizing the primacy and reverence of the apostolic see. An embassy of 1117 probably covered the now familiar ground of Antioch and Church union (Lilie, 1993, 92–95; Russell, 1978, 88). Callixtus II dispatched a delegation under Archbishop Roffridus of Benevento to John Komnenos in 1123–24. The emperor approved of the reasons given by Callixtus to reunify the Churches, but the exchange led nowhere (Stroll, 2004, 445–46).

Just over a decade later, we see another effort to engage with the theological issues, although this was, almost inevitably, intertwined with secular matters too. In the autumn of 1135, John Komnenos sent envoys to Emperor Lothar III at Merseburg to seek military support for his forthcoming campaigns against the Norman Sicilians. By way of reply, Bishop Anselm of Havelberg visited Constantinople and engaged in a series of extremely cordial debates over the differences between the Catholic and the Orthodox with Archbishop Niketas of Nicomedia (Lees, 1998, 40–47, 222–81; Russell, 1978, 85–120). The first was held on 10 April at the Hagia Eirene and such was the interest it aroused that a second session was hosted at the much larger Hagia Sophia. Anselm wrote a lengthy account of his visit in a poem, the *Antikeimenon* (Book of Antitheses), although this was not produced until 1150 which could have influenced the tone and content (Anselm of Havelberg, *Dialogues*, 188, cols. 1159–1248). The debates covered the *filioque* clause, the contrasting sacramental rites and the issue of papal primacy. The bishop tried to persuade his audience of the acceptability of different expressions of faith in the Latin West and the sharing of the common ground of one faith. He praised the various monastic houses he saw in Constantinople, such as the imperial foundation of the Pantokrator and the monastery of (Christ) Philanthropos (Lees, 1998, 213–14). His account of the debate shows him hopeful of bridging the differences between the two sides: 'Truly we seem to differ not in the great things but in the smallest'. Niketas proposed a Church council to form 'one people under one Lord Jesus Christ, in one faith, in one baptism, in one ritual of sacraments': a call for Christian unity. Lees expresses a measure of scepticism about Anselm's account and worries that the attitudes displayed by Niketas seem too close to a Latin position for the likely tastes of his local audience and authorities. But he does allow for the possibility that these discussions were conducted in a positive manner and did not end in the bitterness that had so often characterized such exchanges (Lees, 1998, 47).

Not all was so cordial, however. The year after Anselm's visit to Constantinople, a Greek embassy to Lothar attacked the papal position on the *filioque* clause and, in a debate with Peter the Deacon, described the papacy as a worldly, warmongering and militaristic institution (Peter the Deacon, *Chronica,* 833; Rowe, 1959, 120). From the Western perspective, Pope Innocent II reacted with outrage at the news that John Komnenos had invaded Antioch in 1137–38 and demanded that any Latins in his army remove themselves on the basis that the emperor was a schismatic (Phillips, 2007, 15).

The date of composition of Anselm's work, 1149–1150, is worth further comment. This was, of course, in the immediate aftermath of the failure of the Second Crusade. While, as we will see below, a part of the French contingent

blamed Manuel Komnenos for their travails, the attitude of King Conrad III and the Germans was quite different. The Germans and the Greeks were united in their dislike of the Sicilians. In January 1146, Manuel Komnenos had married the king's sister-in-law, Bertha of Sulzbach, marking an important development in the relationship. In the course of the crusade, letters from the king praised Manuel for his warm welcome in Constantinople in early autumn of 1147. The emperor had then offered shelter and space for Conrad to recover after his army was mauled by the Seljuk Turks in October 1147 and his doctors helped the king recover from a serious illness: 'from what we heard he showed us more honour than any of our predecessors'. The Greeks also provided ships to get Conrad from Constantinople to the Holy Land in the spring of 1148 to enable him to continue with the campaign. Communications after the collapse of the siege of Damascus in 1148 made no mention of Greek betrayal (Conrad III, *Diplomata*, 354–57; trans. Barber & Bate, *Letters from the East*, 45; Phillips. 2007, 173–84, 212–14, 226–27).

On his way home from the crusade, Conrad went via Thessalonica and there (October 1148) he made a treaty with Manuel that committed him to a campaign against Norman Sicily the following year (John Kinnamos, *Deeds*, 71–72). Roger, of course, had invaded Greek lands just as the Second Crusade was underway, a hugely provocative act. Once Conrad reached home, ill-health and a rebellion by the powerful Welf clan stopped the putative invasion, although the king was forced to present a lengthy and slightly awkward explanation to the Greek emperor justifying why he had not acted as agreed (Conrad III, *Diplomata*, 404–6; Reuter, 2001, 150–63).

In the spring of 1149 Anselm of Havelberg had travelled to Italy on ecclesiastical business and there he met Eugenius III. The pope himself had just been visited by a Greek envoy, perhaps looking to take the temperature of the papal attitude towards Byzantium in the aftermath of the crusade. The Greek delegate also discussed the differences between the Latin and Orthodox rites and, given the similarities with the issues covered earlier by Anselm and Niketas, the pope asked the bishop to document, in the text that became the *Antikeimenon*, what might be said to the Greeks. In other words, at a time of hugely complex political alliances, conflicts and rivalries between, variously, the papacy, the rebellious Roman citizens, Roger II, Conrad, Manuel and the French court and Church, Eugenius was still taking a keen interest in these doctrinal matters, although it might be naive to suggest that this was entirely unconnected with broader events too (Egger, 2018, 79–81).

Anselm managed to fall foul of Conrad on his return to Germany and it was during his exile from court in Havelberg that he wrote the *Antikeimenon*, as well as producing a standard litany for the diocese of Magdeburg. In the course of the latter he noted that 'the Greek names *Kyrie eleison, Christe eleison* are allowed in the first invocation of the Holy Trinity in order to show that the Greeks and the Latins hold the same catholic faith', a clear affirmation of his own sincere wish to emphasize commonality between the two groups (Lees, 1998, 91, 109–10).

It is also interesting to register that Anselm of Havelberg had met Eugenius at Dijon on 30 March 1147 (Acht, 1955, 668–73). With the Second Crusade poised

to set out in an environment flushed with optimism and a sense of Catholic expansionism, Eugenius had engaged with the issue of relations with the Orthodox once more. Given his expertise in the Orthodox-Latin relationship, Anselm might have hoped to be dispatched to Constantinople with the main body of the crusade, but the unexpected addition of the campaign against the Wends had complicated matters. This extension of the crusade into northern Europe and to lands adjacent to his own diocese meant the pope wanted him to act as a legate there and Anselm had to remain in the West (Phillips, 2007, 133–34). As his *Antikeimenon* showed, he was frustrated as to why the Latins and Orthodox could not be reconciled. The schism was, he suggested, offensive to Christ (Anselm of Havelberg, *Dialogues*, cols. 1161–62). In the same text, he argued: ‘He who does not love the unity of the Church does not have the love of God; he who is opposed to that unity, just as Saint Ambrose the archbishop of Milan said, wholly makes himself a heretic’ (ibid., col. 1209).

With Anselm unavailable, Eugenius had to find an alternative churchman and he chose Bishop Henry of Moravia. In a letter from mid-July 1147, the pontiff wrote to Henry: ‘Since we have the greatest confidence regarding your love and we know that the king’s good counsel lies in the highest degree in your wisdom and dispensation, we commend to your concern, in the matter of urging the king [Conrad], that you concentrate your efforts by all means on advising him that he strive for the honour and exaltation of his holy mother the Roman Church and that he may work faithfully to join to her the Church of Constantinople in the way it was known once to have been, in accordance with the power granted to himself by God’ (Eugenius III, *Epistolae*, col. 1252). Eugenius may briefly, therefore, have aspired to use the crusade to generate some form of grand Christian alliance against the infidel and to crown the campaign with the re-unification of two of the denominations of Christendom. In the end, Henry too was distracted by the emergence of the Wendish Crusade and never went to the Holy Land.

The possibility of either Anselm or Henry engaging with the Orthodox when heading east with the army of Conrad III had been a mixture of practical politics and, for Anselm certainly (with the apparent support of Eugenius III), a genuine wish to advance the relationship at a theological level, too. Such cordiality would not, however, extend to all those travelling with King Louis VII of France in the other main contingent of the crusade. As we saw above, some of the more critical accounts of the First Crusade were produced in France and then copied and further circulated. Other material that has not been evaluated here, such as the *Chansons de geste*, should also be considered relevant. Louis himself had been presented with a splendid compendium of the works of Fulcher of Chartres, Raymond of Aguilers and Walter the Chancellor on his marriage to Eleanor of Aquitaine in 1137 (Rubenstein, 2004). Odo took an account of the First Crusade with him to the east in 1147–48 (Phillips, 2003, 84).

As Odo of Deuil observed concerning the gathering at Étampes in February 1147 that evaluated the best route to travel to the Holy Land, ‘there were men in the assembly who said that the Greeks, as they had learned either by reading or by

experience, were deceitful' (ibid., 13). That said, simply reading or hearing a less than glowing account of the Byzantine-Christian relationship did not necessarily guarantee hostility towards the Greeks, as we will see shortly in the case of King Louis VII of France.

There was, however, a further serious contextual issue of note and once again, it had more of a bearing on the French side of the crusade. In 1137–38 and 1142, Emperor John Komnenos had led military expeditions to southern Cilicia and Antioch, asserting Greek authority in the region and in the second campaign with, as Niketas Choniates wrote, 'a burning desire to unite Antioch to Constantinople' (Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 22). John's death in a hunting accident in April 1143 tempted Prince Raymond of Antioch to recover areas that had fallen under Byzantine control. In furious response, the new emperor, Manuel Komnenos, sent down a fleet to punish him. This forced the prince to travel to Constantinople in person to humble himself before the emperor and to acknowledge the reality of Greek overlordship (Niketas Choniates, *Annals*, 31; Barber, 2012, 169–73; Phillips, 2007, 15). Raymond – or Raymond of Poitiers as he was known before his marriage to the heiress of Antioch, Princess Constance – was the uncle of Queen Eleanor. The princess herself was a relative of King Louis through her father, Bohemond II of Antioch, who was the son of Bohemond I and Louis's aunt, Constance of France. In other words, there was a close relationship between the French royal house and the rulers of the principality. Compounding this recent hostility, the crusaders also learned that Manuel had made a twelve-year truce with the Seljuk sultan of Ikonion (Konya): from his perspective, undoubtedly a prudent move, but from the viewpoint of the crusaders, an arrangement that was hard to justify (Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 55; Phillips, 2007, 52–59).

Historians' views of the French on the Second Crusade tend to be coloured by the eye-witness narrative of Odo of Deuil, the king's personal chaplain. Odo found much to be critical of: the oleaginous behaviour of the Byzantine envoys, the differences in doctrine and the problems of the *filioque* clause, as well as the treaty with the Turks. This has led some writers to characterize him as, in the case of Runciman, 'hysterically anti-Greek throughout', while in a much more measured assessment, Angold notes that 'Odo of Deuil and western opinion generally found it easiest to blame Byzantium' (Runciman, 1952, 274, n.2; Angold, 1997, 11).

On closer examination, however, Odo reflects a more complicated approach (Phillips, 2003, 80–95). His primary agenda was certainly to show King Louis VII ('our peaceful king') in as good a light as possible, but he did comment positively on the fact that 'the congregations of the Churches and the entire clergy, always received him with due reverence and honour, issuing forth from their cities with icons and other Greek paraphernalia'. Celebrations for the feast of Saint Dionysius, parts of which were performed in Greek at the abbey of Saint Denis anyway, were also very much appreciated (Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 45, 69; Huglo, 1966, 74–83; Mayr-Harting, 1993, 237–40).

It was Bishop Godfrey of Langres who was the most overly aggressive to the Greeks. When, in the summer of 1147, the French were outside Constantinople,

he advocated an assault on the city, which he regarded as weak and defended by 'inert' people. His justification was based on the assertion that 'Constantinople is Christian only in name'. He was furious about the recent attacks on Antioch and saw John's death as divine judgment on the emperor's 'shameful life'. He also railed against the establishment of an Orthodox patriarch ahead of a Latin one in the city of St Peter, 'setting one altar against another' (Odo of Deuil, *De profectione*, 68–71). While this found some support, others – as Odo was careful to report – suggested that the emperor may have had good reasons to fight at Antioch and that any campaign against Constantinople was contrary to their vow (ibid., 70–71). The fact that Louis did not endorse Bishop Godfrey's advice presumably shows recognition of its strategic and theological weaknesses. Indeed, Louis himself reported that he had been joyfully and honourably received by the emperor on his arrival at Constantinople and later recalled his time in Constantinople in warm terms. Once the French moved into Asia Minor, Louis did attach some blame to the Greeks for their feeble support of the crusader armies and there emerged in French sources a suspicion that the Seljuks were, tacitly at least, encouraged to harass and to attack the Westerners (Suger, *Epistolae*, 496; Louis VII, *Epistolae*, 82; Phillips, 1996, 85–90; Lilie, 1993, 154–63).

Odo's views are, again, perhaps less clear cut than one might expect. He did acknowledge that the crusaders' own indiscipline was partially to blame for arousing the emperor's fears and he noted Manuel's worries over the possibility of the French armies combining with those of Roger II of Sicily, whose acutely well-timed (or badly-timed, from a Greek viewpoint) invasion of the Peloponnese was a source of real concern in Constantinople.

In conclusion, tracking the relationship between the Latin West and Byzantium in this period is a complex and multi-faceted task. Backgrounded by the Schism of 1054 and political events of the late 11th century, it was pushed hard into the spotlight by the First Crusade. Initially seen as a chance to bring the two groups much closer together and possibly to bring about a Union of the Churches, episodes during the crusade and one of its most notable outcomes, the formation of the Frankish principality of Antioch, gave rise to many different interpretations and attitudes on the Byzantine side and, as we have seen most particularly here, from the Latin perspective, too. By no means were all of the latter hostile, but the launch and aftermath of Bohemond of Antioch's crusade of 1106–8 generated much animosity, which may well have permeated into various written texts. The subsequent copying and circulation of these chronicles in the first decades of the 12th century extended the messages – both positive and negative – contained therein. Relations continued to be a blend of theological and political interplay until the Second Crusade. In the context of a pope again looking to bring the two Churches closer together, once more events on a campaign produced controversy and spawned a variety of interpretations. The study of further materials, such as the second generation of First Crusade narratives and the *chansons de geste*, can be identified as further opportunities to add greater granularity to this intriguing subject.

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7 The perception of Westerners in the court of John II Komnenos

Angeliki Papageorgiou

A lot has been written, and even more has been said, on the image of the Westerners during the reign of the Komnenoi. These studies, however, focus either on the reign of Alexios I or on that of his grandson, Manuel I, and hardly ever, save only as an aside, on the time of John II, whom Niketas Choniates had described as the most important of the Komnenian rulers (Choniates, *Historia*, 47).

It is true that John's reign lies between the first two crusades and that the emperor never had to face hordes of crusaders advancing against his capital, Constantinople. Nevertheless, John had to manage an already formulated situation in the East, that of the crusader states, and to try solving one of the key issues of his father's Oriental policy, the question of Antioch. Furthermore, John, like every emperor before him, had to play a balancing act and form the proper alliances with the states of Western Europe, in order to serve the aims of his policy. Thus, there is no shortage of Westerners mentioned in the speeches of the second Komnenos' court orators, and the image they draw is worthy of attention and study (Papageorgiou, 2017).

The first Westerners to come in direct contact with John II were the Venetians, as early as 1119, when they requested the renewal of the chrysobull, granted to them by his father, Alexios I; John turned them down. Between 1122 and 1126, when the emperor finally renewed the chrysobull granting privileges to the Venetians, they had been attacking the islands of the Byzantine Empire, pillaging many of them in the process, as a means of exerting pressure on the emperor (Dandolo, *Chronicon*, 227, 233–235; Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia*, 658–658, 758–761; *Historia Ducum Veneticorum*, 73–74; Pozza & Ravegnani, *Trattati*, 51–56; Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, 78, 95–98; Cerbano Cerbani, 'Translatio Isidori', 321–324; Lilie, 1984, 367–374; Nicol, 1988, 76–80, 90–91, 411–412; Jacoby, 1994, 155–161, 349–356; Papageorgiou, 2017, 247–258). However, despite the fact that the Venetians were a major problem for John II for several years, court orators do not mention them even once. Perhaps this testimony *e silentio* might be more telling than a possible mention of them. In my opinion, there are two probabilities; one, orators at the court of Komnenos considered the emperor's handling of the Venetian affair a failure, since he eventually renewed his father's chrysobull; consequently, they might have thought it unwise to refer to the case; two, the loathing and disdain for the Venetian people on the part of

the orators was such that the latter did not wish to dignify the Venetians at all with a mention.

The second eventuality is not so unlikely, if one takes into account John Kinnamos' reference to the Venetians (Kinnamos, *Epitome*, 281.5–22). When he is about to begin the narration of the events that led to the pogrom against the Venetians of Constantinople in 1171, the historian of Manuel I's reign first devotes an historical retrospect to their course since the times of Alexios I. According to the author, the excessive conceit of the Venetians grew stronger precisely because of the commercial privileges granted to them by Alexios, as their sudden enrichment reinforced their innate tendency towards arrogance. That was also the main reason, again according to Kinnamos, behind John II's decision to rid himself of the Venetians. However, pillaging the Aegean islands and, mainly, sacking Tyre with very little difficulty intensified Venetian arrogance to such a degree that it reached the point of *τύφος*. This term used by the historian is quite interesting because it denotes arrogance that has now reached the level of inanity, of folly. According to Kinnamos, their insolence and conceit reached the point of *απόνοια* ('madness'), when John II proceeded to renew the chrysobull. Kinnamos continues the description of the Venetians by saying that the 'willfulness which appears to be successful is capable of being swept on to folly' (Kinnamos, *Epitome*, 281.19–20); indeed, the Venetians went so far as to assault and savagely abuse even the relatives of the emperor himself.

The aforementioned colorful and hardly flattering description of the Venetians by John Kinnamos naturally serves the purpose of his narrative, which is none other than to justify the actions of Manuel I. Nevertheless, one cannot doubt the fact that Kinnamos' perception of the Venetians could not have differed from the perceptions at least of the inhabitants of Constantinople, who had first-hand experience of the advancement and increasingly unpalatable attitude of the Venetians.

The relations between Byzantium and the German Empire are inextricably linked to the threat posed by the Normans during the period in question. Already from the time of Alexios I, the Normans had established themselves as Byzantium's enemies. Moreover, Roger II's ascension to the throne and his coronation as king of southern Italy and Sicily was dangerous for both empires. John II had an additional reason to worry about the growth of Norman power, since Roger was showing an interest in Antioch and his actions suggested that he intended to claim it (Chalandon, 1907, 124; Caspar, 1968, 357–359; Lilie, 1984, 376–377; Papageorgiou, 2017, 258–271).

By 1135, the Normans controlled the Adriatic and the Mediterranean as far as Africa and they also had designs on Antioch. In that same year, John II sent an embassy to the German emperor, Lothar III (*Annales Erphesfurdenses*, 540; *Annalista Saxo*, 769; *Petri Chronicon*, 833; *Annales Magdeburgenses*, 185; *Canonici Wissegradensis continuatio*, 141; *Annales S. Petri*, 18; Caspar, 1968, 357–359; Lilie, 1984, 377–379; Papageorgiou, 2017, 263–268).

During the period 1140–1142, John II saw to the renewal of his alliance with the Germans. The emperor made one more diplomatic move, securing the marriage of his younger son, Manuel, to a relative of the German emperor

(Kinnamos, *Epitome*, 22–23; Otto of Freising, *Chronik*, 549; Otto of Freising, *Deeds*, 54–56; Caspar, 1968, 360–362; Lilie, 1984, 384–389; Makrides, 1992, 272–279; Papageorgiou, 2017, 268–271).

In 1136, the Byzantine emperor renewed the commercial privileges of Pisa within the empire, in order to secure the city's neutrality vis-à-vis the military campaign he was planning in Cilicia and Antioch. Renewing the privileges at that particular moment was meant to reassure Pisa that its commercial activities in the region were guaranteed in the event of Byzantine domination (*Annales Pisani*, 240; Lilie, 1984, 379–381; Jacoby, 1994, 358–358, 362–364; Papageorgiou, 2017, 271–277).

In 1142, while John was in Antioch, Genoa sent an embassy to begin negotiations with Byzantium. In this way, the Italian maritime republic was demonstrating its interest in commercial activities in the region, as well as its certainty that the Byzantine emperor would prevail (*Cafari Annales*, 19–20; Papageorgiou, 2017, 271–277).

John II managed to take advantage of the uneasiness of the Germans, the pope, the Venetians, Pisa and Genoa over the expansion and strengthening of the Normans in order to form alliances with all of them. These alliances not only ensured that Byzantium would be free of the Norman threat, almost at zero cost since, despite the promise of military assistance, the latter was never provided, but also secured the neutrality of the Western powers with regard to John's pursuit of his main goal, Antioch. The success of the emperor's diplomatic efforts may be measured from the Norman ruler's reaction; feeling trapped by the coalition of powers ranged against him, Roger sought an alliance with the Byzantine Empire, the same state that he had invaded in the past, that he threatened with his rising power both from the West and from the East, and that he was destined to threaten again in the future. Therefore, Roger's efforts to conclude an alliance with Byzantium make it abundantly clear that John's policy in this department was highly successful (Kinnamos, *Epitome*, 91; Chalandon, 1907, 127; Caspar, 1968, 361–362; Tounta, 2008, 37–39, 45–46; Papageorgiou, 2017, 270–271).

So, contrary to John's policy towards the Venetians, the success of which is debatable, the nexus of relations with Germany, Genoa, Pisa and the Normans built by the emperor brought only benefits to Byzantium. Consequently, one might expect that the court orators would have made exhaustive references to the way the emperor dealt with the aforementioned peoples. However, not only is this not the case, but all of the events that we mentioned above would have been unknown to us had it not been for the references made to them by the Latin sources. It is as if the orators either ignore or disregard John's successes on the diplomatic field. Of course, it is a fact that diplomatic successes are usually extolled when they derive from military operations and the alliances mentioned above did not require the use of military methods.

The only author who makes incidental references to the Westerners is Theodore Prodromos (Prodromos, *Gedichte*, I: 179.85–88, 180.89–103, IV: 207.221–230, XXIX: 346.13–20, XI: 257.131–140). These references are only made in order to confirm the strength of John's domination and, if one were to rely solely

on Prodromos' words, one might get the impression that Germans, Celts and Italians were all Byzantium's vassals – to say the least. Of course, hyperbole and a sense of imperial superiority inherent to orators allowed for the glamorization of reality. The only reference to actual events, again only in the form of an allusion, is made by Nikephoros Basilakes when he wants to stress the level of John's success in Antioch. To quote the orator's own words: *Τί φῂς ὁ τῶν Σικελῶν ἀρχηγέτης, ὁ διαπλοϊζόμενος κιβδήλοις βουλαῖς καὶ ἀδοκίμοις ἐννοίαις ἐπινηχόμενος;* ('What are you talking about, leader of the Sicilians, you who sail across false decisions and swim across unlawful titles?') (Basilakes, *Encomî*, 118). Basilakes refers to the unlawful appropriation of Antioch by Bohemond during the First Crusade (*κιβδήλοις βουλαῖς*) and most probably to the adoption of the royal title by the Norman ruler (*ἀδοκίμοις ἐννοίαις ἐπινηχόμενος*), reproaching him for his arrogance.

We get a much clearer picture of the Westerners in the crusader states because those states, particularly Antioch, were the focus of John's foreign policy. The region was of great interest to Byzantium, as its recapture had been an aim before the First Crusade, while according to the Treaty of Devol, signed by Bohemond in 1108 (Komnene, *Alexias*, 413–423), Antioch was to return to Byzantium's sphere of influence. Enforcing the terms of this treaty, which until 1137 had been a dead letter, was one of the primary aims of John's policy (Papageorgiou, 2017, 327–347).

John II originally tried to achieve his goals by diplomatic means. Included in this effort are his – ultimately unsuccessful – maneuvers to arrange a marriage between his son Manuel and Constance, heiress to the principality of Antioch (Amouroux-Mourad, 1988, 80–82; Criscuolo, 1972–1973, 545–546; Prawer, 1969, 324–325; Papageorgiou, 2017, 331–332). The emperor finally managed to accomplish his designs for Antioch and sign a treaty with Prince Raymond, according to which the city would revert to Byzantium's sphere of influence. Furthermore, should the Byzantine emperor capture the cities of Syria, he would be their suzerain. Byzantine domination over Antioch was recognized even in the event that John II did not fulfill the terms of the treaty that pertained to him. This constituted a significant diplomatic victory for Byzantium. Moreover, the emperor's aim to be recognized as a 'crusader' was realized by the signing of the treaty in question and publicly declared with a triumphal procession through Antioch (Kinnamos, *Epitome*, 18–20; Choniates, *Historia*, 27–31; William of Tyre, *Deeds*, 92–99; Michael the Syrien, *Chronique*, 245; Orderic Vitalis, *History*, 503–509; Amouroux-Mourad, 1988, 82–84; Asbridge, 2000, 101–103; Auge, 2000, 275–277; Lilie, 1984, 383–384; idem, 1988, 120–125, 128–130; Papageorgiou, 2017, 327–347).

Among the objectives of John II's second expedition in Cilicia and Antioch was Jerusalem. If the emperor managed to become its overlord, he could achieve his ultimate goal, which was the annexation of all the crusader states to the Byzantine sphere of influence. For his part, John wanted this union to be concluded smoothly, with the agreement of the leaders of the crusader states. After the diplomatic effort failed, John intended to use his army in order to implement his plans, but in the end he was thwarted by his premature death (William of

Tyre, *Deeds*, 124–127; Basilakes, *Encomî*, 99; Choniates, *Historia*, 39; Schreiner, *Kleinchroniken*, 57; Papageorgiou, 2017, 347–358).

John II's efforts in 1142–1143 to establish a Byzantine presence in Antioch and expand it in the other crusader states, dynamic though they were, were left unfinished because of his untimely death. The emperor's ambition – which he achieved up to a point – was for his role as protector of the Christians in the East to be acknowledged; he had managed to have Byzantium's dominion over Cilicia and its claim on Antioch recognized (Papageorgiou, 2017, 347–358).

Because of John II's two campaigns in Cilicia and his ambitions for Antioch, Byzantine authors took advantage of the opportunity to express their opinions on the region's Latins. Thus, according to them, the Latins are conspicuous for their folly and refusal to accept insults. Although they are headstrong, they change their minds depending on their interests, deceiving those who had counted on their word. They are arrogant, but realize that they are not strong enough militarily to face the Byzantine emperor and have the tendency to retreat, even if only temporarily (Choniates, *Historia*, 38–40; Basilakes, *Fontes*, 348; Kinnamos, *Epitome*, 16). This image corresponds to a great degree to what the Byzantines perceived as reality, as well as to the attitude of the Latins, particularly those of Antioch. More specifically, while at first the Latins refused John's requests regarding Antioch (*headstrong*), when they saw that they could not face a possible attack by Byzantine troops, they accepted the emperor's terms (*they change their minds depending on their interests*), but, even though they joined John's army in an effort to reclaim strategic points in Syria, essentially they remained idle, according to what William of Tyre claims (*deceiving those who had counted on their word*).

It is clear that the Latins of Antioch presented a negative image in the eyes of the Byzantines. Despite the negative perceptions regarding Westerners, the time had not yet come when a Byzantine would have nothing good to say about them. When John II conducted a triumphal procession through the streets of Antioch during his second Cilician campaign, Choniates mentions that all the people of Antioch participated in the triumph (Choniates, *Historia*, 31). A significant portion of the city's population was made up of Latins. The fact that participation was massive is also confirmed by Basilakes (Basilakes, *Encomî*, 117, 120–124) Latins taking part in a purely Byzantine triumphal procession, despite the objections one might express with regard to mandatory participation, is significant because it demonstrates that relations between Westerners and Byzantines had not deteriorated to such a degree that the citizens of Antioch would refuse to take part in a Byzantine ceremony. The Latins obviously continued to consider the Byzantines as allies – for reasons of their own, of course, as has already been analyzed – against a common enemy that did not belong to the Christian community: the Turks.

Belonging to the same faith, despite the doctrinal disagreements that continued to exist, was still viewed by the Byzantines as important. It is significant that, when John II realized that the Antiocheans had no intention of fulfilling their promises, he showed patience because he did not wish to fight against Christians (Choniates, *Historia*, 38–40). Furthermore, the Byzantines considered the Antiocheans, as

well as all Latins in general, as devout and very Christian (Basilakes, *Encomî*, 120–124; Theiner & Miklosich, *Monumenta*, 2). Consequently, the Byzantines continued to believe that they shared the same faith with the Latins and accusations against them, such as 'schismatic' or 'heretic', are nowhere to be found in our texts.

With regard to individuals, information is rather scarce. The sources only refer to Raymond, prince of Antioch. Raymond is portrayed as a typical Latin. He is headstrong and arrogant, but, when he feels the need for the emperor's help, he begs for it, he is mollified, submits, forms an alliance and makes promises, but later tries to recant. The image of Raymond does not differ from the perception of Westerners in general. His actions are only magnified because of his authority, but, as for the rest, he is not differentiated from the average Latin. For this reason, his characteristics are not stressed nor highlighted. To the Byzantines, Raymond did not seem to be an important personage.

Before we conclude this overview of how the orators in John II's court perceived the Westerners, I believe it is necessary to also examine their image when they are included among the enemies of the empire in general. At a time when Byzantium was threatened both by the West and by the East, it is natural that the Byzantines would often not distinguish between all those they considered as enemies of the empire. Many times they treat them as a whole and, when referring to them by name, they mention them alongside each other in the same breath, in order to underline the multitude of enemies John II had to face.

To begin with, all of them without exception are characterized as 'barbarians' (Basilakes, *Fontes*, 348; Kinnamos, *Epitome*, 18–19). Even the Latins, who, when treated separately, were not branded as such, become barbarians as well when incorporated into the main body of enemies (Prodromos, *Gedichte*, passim; Basilakes, *Fontes*, 331, 334, 352, 355, 358; Italikos, *Lettres*, 232, 276–277, 287, 288, 289; Lampros, 'Αὐτοκρατόρων τοῦ Βυζαντίου χρυσόβουλλα', 173; Kurtz, 'Unedierte Texte', 79). Thus, all enemies have the usual attributes of the barbarian, such as boastfulness and braggadocio, which the emperor subdues (Prodromos, *Gedichte*, 277, 254, 274, 331). The term 'barbarian' is attributed to nations, kingdoms, principalities and cities (Prodromos, *Gedichte*, 214, 234, 238, 340; Italikos, *Lettres*, 232; Kurtz, 'Unedierte Texte', 79). Despite their power, John handles them like clay, their cries are heard everywhere, their spilled blood is like an ocean and they are put to flight, they are cowardly, even though they might show fleeting courage, they are immediately terrified to the point of tears, for they are not familiar with the emperor's stratagems and he himself destroys the 'barbarian vexation' (*βαρβαρικὴ σκοτομήνη*) (Prodromos, *Gedichte*, 242, 246 (b), 274, 282, 283, 284, 312; Basilakes, *Fontes*, 331, 331, 334, 355, 358; Italikos, *Lettres*, 276–277). Furthermore, the barbarians are characterized by greed (Basilakes, *Fontes*, 352) and stubbornness (Italikos, *Lettres*, 287) and are likened to snakes (Basilakes, *Fontes*, 355). The empire's only options with regard to the designs of the 'barbarians' were captivity, subjugation or extermination.

Enemies range far and wide, from West to East, from North to South, from land to sea (Prodromos, *Gedichte*, 238, 246 (c), 270, 273, 274, 282, 305, 337, 342–343, 347;

Basilakes, *Fontes*, 332–333; Italikos, *Lettres*, 232; Kurtz, 'Unedierte Texte', 79). The orators never stop stressing that fact in order to show the multitude of enemies the emperor had to face and how they were all ultimately defeated by him. These nations wore bronze armor and charged headlong, but they were caught in the net like fish, while their élan was like the fury of the dogs against a lion (Prodromos, *Gedichte*, 234; Kurtz, 'Unedierte Texte', 75; Basilakes, *Fontes*, 355–356). That was due to their corruption, cowardice and wickedness. Furthermore, they were godless and impious, not only against God, but also against the emperor himself, whom they dared to oppose (Prodromos, *Gedichte*, 240, 280; Basilakes, *Fontes*, 355). This last perception is combined with the Byzantine belief in the sanctity of the emperor's person and in his mission as defender of the faith and constitutes an indirect shot at the Latins, who dared question what Byzantines acknowledged as true.

Often, the authors feel the need to enumerate the enemies, so that, in this way, they can stress the multitude and significance of John Komnenos' successes and denigrate each people individually, by including them in a common framework. Thus, Komnenos terrorizes the Gauls, is feared by the Scythians (Pechenegs), the Celts bow down to him and he receives tribute from the lands of the Danube (Prodromos, *Gedichte*, 207). The Italians, the Syrians, the Latins, the Isaurians, the Cilicians: all capitulate and are subjugated (Prodromos, *Gedichte*, 257). The Turks are exterminated, the Scythians (Pechenegs) and Dalmatians (Serbs) are killed, the Cilicians are conquered, the Italians lose their conceit, the Parthians are enslaved, the ancient great city of Babylon is threatened and Egypt is intimidated (Prodromos, *Gedichte*, 277). Even after the death of John II, the Italians are terrified of him, the Arabs bristle, Babylon is afraid and India trembles even at the sound of his fame (Prodromos, *Gedichte*, 346). All the nations of Europe are put to flight, the Dalmatians (Serbs) and Scythians (Pechenegs), the Normans, who are characterized as living in anarchy: all of them bow their heads to John, who admits that he had help from God (Basilakes, *Fontes*, 334).

To summarize, it may be argued that, when the Byzantines treat their enemies as a whole, they do not acknowledge any positive qualities in them. On the contrary, negative traits that characterize each individual enemy are collectively attributed to all of them. The aim of the writers in these instances is to praise the emperor's accomplishments, which could not have been achieved by being lenient towards the enemy. Any clemency shown is reserved for isolated cases, where there is a detailed analysis of each individual enemy. In the passages I have just analyzed, exaggeration is allowed since it serves the main aim of the orators, namely the glorification of John II.

In conclusion, it may be argued that, despite the lack of trust in – and occasionally the prejudice against – Westerners, anti-Latin feelings are not particularly strong yet, unless 'Franks' are treated in conjunction with other peoples or when Byzantine views against the Venetians are concerned. It is noteworthy that nowhere in the sources of the period in question are Westerners referred to as barbarians. It is true that they exhibit such barbarian traits as arrogance, but the term itself is not used. The fact that the term 'barbarian' was not used with respect

to the Latins, even when the latter bore the corresponding characteristics, is very significant, because it shows that, if nothing else, there were still some points of contact between Byzantium and the West, alongside the persistent Byzantine reservations. The perception of Westerners was going through a transitional stage. During the period in question, even in the face of many telltale signs, the Byzantines were unwilling to let go of their positive expectations regarding the Westerners' actions and character. It was only during the reign of Manuel that they would start voicing unambiguous anti-Latin sentiments, which would ultimately be vindicated when Byzantium fell to the Latins in 1204.

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8 A 12th-century perspective on Byzantium's Western neighbours

The witness of Manganeios Prodromos[1]

Elizabeth Jeffreys

Virtually everyone interested in literature from the Byzantine 12th century will be familiar with the name Manganeios Prodromos. This is the term conventionally used today to distinguish one 12th-century poet surnamed Prodromos from another. Manganeios' modern nickname derives from his passionate pleas to be allowed access to the charitable *adelphaton* attached to the Mangana monastery in Constantinople, but there is no manuscript authority for the form and the poet's given name is unknown. He has often been confused with Theodore Prodromos, unsurprisingly, since their life-spans are very similar; Theodore died ca. 1159, Manganeios ca. 1161 (Jeffreys & Jeffreys, 2015, 50 n. 3); some of their writings cover the same topics and genres and are written for the same patrons; they make similar complaints about ill-health and old age. But, while Theodore was perhaps the most versatile of the Komnenian men of letters from the mid-12th century, with a large surviving corpus of texts in prose and verse, all that we have from Manganeios shows that he was much more limited. Manganeios most certainly is not Theodore. As far as we know Manganeios worked only in verse, writing on commission for the emperor and also for members of the leading aristocratic establishments, notably for the sevastokratorissa Eirene, to whose household he was attached in some capacity (Jeffreys, 2014, 181 n. 23). There is as yet no complete edition of his ca. 18,000 lines of verse.[2]

Modern historians of the 12th century are quite interested in Manganeios; he is, for example, much cited, though in partial quotation only, by Emmanuel Miller in the second volume on the Greek historians in the *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades* (Miller, *Recueil*) and over a century later was used extensively by Paul Magdalino in his magisterial study of Manuel I (Magdalino, 1993). The reason for this interest is that for the twenty years covered by his writings, from 1142 to ca. 1161, Manganeios offers what seems to be an immediate response to events in and around Constantinople. His response is immediate because he was employed to celebrate particular occasions and his clients wanted a recognizable reflection of what happened yesterday. This applies to his sometimes huge encomia on the emperor Manuel, which may have been actively commissioned by the emperor or, more probably, produced by Manganeios in the hope of a commission; but it also applies to verses requested by, for example, a mother to accompany a votive offering made after her son had been injured in battle. What Manganeios has to

say has not been filtered through several decades of hindsight, as is the case with the narratives of Kinnamos or even more so of Choniates.

In this chapter, I will consider three cases where Manganeios can be seen reacting to Byzantium's Western neighbours. The questions that will be kept in mind are: what his reactions were, whether they differed over time and whether differences can be perceived between his reactions and those of other 12th-century writers.

First, however, it is necessary to define what is meant here by 'Westerners'. I am thinking, simplistically, in terms of peoples on the Western borders of Byzantine territory and then of representatives of those peoples who ended up within the Byzantine borders. In the first category, I would put Germans and French, including Normans; these could be summed up in Manganeios' terminology as Latins. With these, I would also include Hungarians and Serbs, whom I would class as non-Latin Westerners. In the second category, those within the borders, I would put the mixed band of Westerners who could be categorized as crusaders: French and German groups who encroached onto Byzantine territory en route to the Holy Land and also those who subsequently established themselves in certain areas, such as Antioch. All of these are Christian, although distinct from the Byzantines through not being Orthodox and distinct also from the Muslim Turks (who are not part of this discussion). Westerners, therefore, are to be found both outside and inside Byzantium's territorial boundaries.

Second, where or in what circumstances, for my purposes, can we consider that Byzantines, as represented by Manganeios, encountered these Westerners? First, there were encounters in conflicts at the borders, outside the empire's territorial limits – broadly speaking. Thus, we find that Manganeios, in the course of encomia, reports on Manuel's clashes at sea with the Norman Roger in 1149 (e.g. Manganeios Prodromos, *Poems* [hereafter MP] 4.45–167; 6.152–258; 28. 1–83) and on Manuel's campaigns in the Northern Balkans against Hungarians and Serbs in 1149 and 1150–1 (e.g. MP 1; 2; 7.103–61, 248–575). There are also encounters within the borders; Manganeios reacts on two occasions to the presence of crusading forces on Byzantine territory, in 1147/8 with the passage past Constantinople of the French and German contingents of the Second Crusade (MP 20 and 24; Jeffreys & Jeffreys, 2001), and in 1158–9 when Manuel campaigned in Cilicia in an attempt to deal with consequences from the crusader occupation of Antioch (e.g. MP 9, 10 and 35; Jeffreys & Jeffreys, 2015).

Manganeios himself will have encountered individual Westerners within Constantinople itself since Westerners (by any definition) were present in the city throughout the 12th century (Ciggaar, 1996, 21–44, 78–101). Constantinople had claims to be a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural city, as demonstrated by Tzetzes' comments on the number of languages that he was familiar with and that could be heard on the streets outside his house (Tzetzes, *Theogony Epilogue*, 304–306). The emperor Manuel's preference for Westerners as advisers was notorious and unpopular (Choniates, *Historia*, 204–205; Magdalino, 1993, 221–223); Manuel's empress Bertha-Eirene was German, Manuel's brother-in-law Roger was Norman, one of his sisters-in-law was possibly also Norman. Yet the Western

background of these individuals seems invisible to Manganeios, although the case of the empress is interesting. Here, Manganeios seems to deny any ethnic difference by claiming an affinity though rank and a historical commonality. Bertha-Eirene is a scion of the Caesars:

> A statue of a regal maid, from the race of the Caesars,
> descendant of the glorious and revered Julian heroes
>
> [Ἄγαλμα κόρης ῥηγικῆς, τῆς ἐκ Καισάρων γένους,
> τῆς ἐξ ἐνδόξων καὶ σεπτῶν ἡρώων Ἰουλίων·]
>
> (MP 13.94–95; Miller, *Recueil*, 756. Cf. MP 4.584, 17.70, 29.39, 29.50).

This is much the attitude shown by Theodore Prodromos in 1142 on her arrival in Constantinople for marriage to the then-emperor's youngest son (Prodromos, *Historische Gedichte*, no. XX). For Theodore, Bertha-Eirene is an honoured representative of Old Rome. She is thus assimilated into the Byzantine state hierarchy of Constantinople, the New Rome, by descent from the Caesars of Old Rome, as well as by marriage. But Bertha-Eirene is in a special category and there are particular reasons for the phrases used about her, which are discussed below.

The first case to be considered is one which was examined some years ago (Jeffreys & Jeffreys, 2001). In 1147, the armies of crusading Westerners passed through the Balkans on their way to the East.[3] The main contingents were formed from the French forces under Louis VII and the German forces under Conrad III. There are accounts in Kinnamos (*Epitome*, Bk 2, par. 14–16) and Choniates (*Historia*, I:62–66) of their passage south and east, through and past Constantinople; there are also two poems by Manganeios, nos. 20 and 24, which cover some of the same ground, although Manganeios makes little reference to Louis and the French. While the tone of the narrative historians is not courteous to the 'barbarians', for both make much of Conrad's stupid pride, neither are vituperative. What is being described is a difficult situation where a large body of armed men of uncertain intentions has to be provisioned and moved through Byzantine territory, where the locals, not unnaturally, are hostile.

The most striking incident that caught Manganeios' attention was the flooding of the German camp on the plain at Choirobacchoi; it is also described by both Kinnamos (*Epitome*, Bk 2, par. 14) and Choniates (*Historia*, I:64–65). Overall, for Kinnamos and Choniates, neither the Byzantines nor Germans appear in a good light, with the Byzantines probably guilty of bad faith on more than one occasion. Manganeios' poems, however, are produced in the context of a jubilant celebration of the emperor's prowess in releasing the city from the threats posed by the large forces that had arrived menacingly on Constantinople's outskirts.

Manganeios' tone is not balanced; Manuel is full of all possible virtues, he labours tirelessly for the city (MP 20.465–466, 24.67–69), he is Christ-like (MP 20.97–99, 24.10), he is a second David (MP 20.353–356, 24.87), a second Solomon (MP 20.578, 24.6), he is an unshakable rock against which the enemy

hurls itself in vain (MP 24.106–113), he is the celestial light that illuminates the New Rome (MP 24.202–203). Conrad, the German leader, on the other hand, is a Sennacherib sweeping down on Constantinople like a wolf on the fold (MP 20.20), he is boorish, arrogant and destructive, a chameleon, a fox in disguise, a savage beast (MP 20.6–11, 323–327). However, it is worth noting that, in 1142, Theodore Prodromos had regarded Conrad, who was Bertha's sponsor, as noble and renowned (Prodromos, *Historische Gedichte*, no. XX, 37–47).

For Manganeios, Conrad's armies are wild boars and Gadarene swine rolling in mud (MP 20. 215–219), they are ants (MP 24.54), they richly deserve the flood with which the river Melas [Black] overwhelmed their camp in the evening darkness (MP 20.239–241). The catastrophic flood at Choirobacchoi (near Adrianople) indeed offered Manganeios irresistible opportunities for scathing puns. Thus, the Bacchic frenzies caused by the swirling river drowned the swinish invaders appropriately (MP 20.133–134, 184–189). 'Choiro-' [pig-/swine-] and '-bacchoi' had suggested the ravings of the classic Maenads. Later the armies' crossing point at Pikridion offers more openings for hostile punning, this time on the crusaders' bitter fate ('pikros' = 'bitter'; MP 20.298–300). Their subsequent near starvation is also mocked; at the monastery of St Mamas in the Constantinopolitan suburbs, the famished Westerners are made by Manganeios to babble for 'mam' [food] in Greek (modern as well as medieval) baby talk.

Of the many verbal and metrical tricks that Manganeios has in his technical poetic repertoire, he has a particular fondness for wordplay and, in poems 20 and 24, he finds many occasions for crude jeering based on puns (Jeffreys & Jeffreys, 2001, 112–114). He attempts with striking vigour to denigrate the German forces and their leader for their rough, uncivilized customs. These culminate in their alien religious practices, which lay them open to charges of Judaizing (MP 20.21–30). I take from this, and from Manganeios' enthusiasm for Manuel's successful management of the threat, that the panic generated by these armies was considerable. From internal evidence, the poems were written for presentation shortly after Conrad and his forces had moved across the Bosphoros in September 1147; the memory of the threat of a few weeks previously would still have been intense. It is this sense of menacing threat that is missing from the pages of Kinamos or Choniates, even if hostility is apparent. I would suggest that Manganeios is giving us the raw emotion of the moment as experienced by the inhabitants of Constantinople and it is bitter.

The second case concerns events of a few years later. In the late autumn of 1149, in the aftermath of his sea-battles with Roger II and the Normans of Sicily off Corfu, Manuel decided it was necessary to launch a Byzantine response to the hostile coalition of Serbs and Hungarians, which had been formed to divert him (unsuccessfully, as it happened) from action against Roger. Manuel made a swift foray north from Pelagonia into Raska against the zupan Uros, successfully pursuing and putting to flight the Serbian forces (Stephenson, 2000, 229–234). As with the last example, this episode is recorded by Manuel's historians and by encomiasts. Thus, we have accounts by Kinnamos (*Epitome*, Bk 3, par. 6) and Choniates (*Historia*, I:89.73–91.8), the historians and, this time, by

two encomiasts – both Theodore Prodromos (*Historische Gedichte*, no. XXX) and Manganeios Prodromos (MP 26; Miller, *Recueil*, 761–763). As before, the events referred to in all these texts are recognizably the same, despite their differing lengths; Manuel's forces moved swiftly and captured fortresses (there are more details on these in Kinnamos than in Choniates); this caused Uros to take ignominious refuge in the mountains. Having made the necessary impact on the Serbian troops and their leader, Manuel returned, again swiftly, to Constantinople. He was back there by Christmas when, to quote Choniates, 'a magnificent triumph was awarded him' (*Historia*, I:90:5–6). It is this triumph that is celebrated in Theodore Prodromos' poem, where the central block of two hundred lines (at XXX.173–330) is devoted to Manuel's exploits in the Zygos mountains. It would have been for this triumphal celebration that Manganeios' much shorter poem was produced, as is declared in its title, 'For the emperor when he arrived back from Serbia with victory', and its opening lines:

'Opening your gates like a mother's arms,
city of Sion, receive your emperor
as he comes with great power and glory'.

[Ὥσπερ ἀγκάλας μητρικὰς ἀνοίξασα τὰς πύλας,
πόλις Σιών, ὑπόδεξαι τὸν αὐτοκράτορά σου
μετὰ πολλῆς ἐρχόμενον δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης.]
(MP 26.1–3; Miller, *Recueil*, 761)

The motifs that are common to all four accounts are chiefly that Manuel hunted the zupan Uros and his army of Serbs and that the Serbs were put to a humiliating flight. Thus, Choniates has Manuel pursuing the 'barbarian regiments as if they were herds of cattle or flocks of goats' (*Historia*, I:90:94–95), while Kinnamos has the zupan 'rushing to the mountain and fleeing the danger with all speed' (*Epitome*, Bk 3, par.6). Theodore diminishes the zupan by comparing him to a mosquito stabbing a lion (Prodromos, *Historische Gedichte*, no. XXX. 255–256) and develops hunting vocabulary over some twenty lines or so; the Serbian troops are hunted like hares and deer (ibid., no. XXX.270–275) as the imperial hunter summons up his huntsmen to drive their prey out of their lairs (ibid., no. XXX.278–281). Manganeios also has the hunting motif:

'You set your hunting dogs against the Serbs
and immediately saw your dog's tongues covered in blood,
and fulfilled the old prophecy of David.
Your tracker dogs searched the rocks
and captured the terrified Serbs like hares,
and made them tame and manageable'.

[Τοὺς κύνας τοὺς θηρευτικοὺς κατὰ τῶν Σέρβων πέμψας
εἶδες εὐθὺς αἱμοβαφεῖς τὰς γλώσσας τῶν κυνῶν σου,

καὶ τοῦ Δαυὶδ ἐπλήρωσας τὴν πάλαι προφητείαν.
Οἱ ῥινηλάται κύνες σου τὰς πέτρας ἐρευνῶντες
ὡς λαγωοὺς ἐζώγρησαν τοὺς πτοιαλέους Σέρβους,
καὶ τούτους ἀπειργάσαντο συνήθεις, χειροήθεις.]

(MP 26.30–35; Miller *Recueil*, 762)

Manganeios cannot leave matters there with a mere generality, but has to skewer the zupan with cowardice:

Your majesty's boldness and your great daring
compelled Ouresis to hide in the mountains,
making a rock his hiding-place, like a hare.
Terrified of the irresistible rush of your attack,
Ouresis could not bear the sight of your Majesty's boldness,
and fled and camped with the horned deer,
like a deer with high antlers, like an antelope living in the mountains.

[Τὸ τολμηρὸν τοῦ κράτους σου καὶ τὸ πολύ σου θάρσος
ἐν ὄρεσι τὸν Οὔρεσιν ἠνάγκασε κρυβῆναι
καταφυγὴν ποιούμενον ὡς λαγωὸν τὴν πέτραν.
Τὴν ἀνυπόστατον ὁρμὴν τῆς προσβολῆς σου φρίττων
ὁρᾶν οὐκ εἶχεν Οὔρεσις τοῦ κράτους σου τὴν τόλμαν
καὶ φεύγων συνηυλίζετο μετὰ τῶν κερασφόρων,
ὡς ἔλαφος ὑψίκερως, ὡς πλάτων ὀρειφοίτης.]

(MP 26.39–45; Miller, *Recueil*, 762)

Manganeios has, however, already ratcheted up the emotive tension by his inability to resist the opportunities for contempt and derision offered by Uros' name; in his fear, the zupan loses control of his bodily functions:

Ouresis, who was depressed with fear and urinated over his thighs,
was totally beside himself at the event,
fugitive, mountaineer, urinator from the intoxication of fear.

[Οὔρεσις φόβῳ συσταλεὶς καὶ τοὺς μηροὺς οὐρήσας
ἄλλος ἐξ ἄλλου γέγονεν ἐκ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος
φυγάς, ὀρείτης, οὐρητὴς ἐκ τῆς τοῦ φόβου μέθης.]

(MP 26.36–38; Miller, *Recueil*, 762)

Here it is as well to remember that the Byzantine sense of humour, and especially of satirical humour (as explored by, for example, Garland, 1990 and Haldon, 2002), relied heavily on slap-stick, prat-falls, farts, the absurdity of gleaming bald heads and the overall ridiculousness of the human body; this is simply another example of the same mentality. However, it is worth contrasting Manganeios' words with Theodore's more measured phrasing. He too had noted

the punning possibilities offered by Uros' name but restricted himself to calling Ouros οὑρεσίτροφον, 'mountain-reared' (Prodromos, *Historische Gedichte*, no. XXX, 197). Mangenios' unsubtle crudity could well have been one of the reasons for his lack of success at court, especially when contrasted with Theodore's wittier range of ripostes.

On this occasion, both Manganeios and Theodore are writing very shortly after the completion of the campaign that is celebrated; Theodore's text is specifically stated to be for festivities on Christmas Eve in 1149 in terms that suggest an official commission (Prodromos, *Historische Gedichte*, no. XXX, 3–4, 399–401), while Manganeios' encomium is presumably also intended for that occasion, though there is no indication whether it was actually performed. As with the episode with Conrad in 1147, discussed above, there is a contrast between Manganeios' vehemence and the other records of this event, while there is a congruence over events and reactions to those events. Manganeios magnifies what Theodore's lines suggest are generally held sentiments, in this case that the Serbs are cowardly wretches. Unlike the situation in 1147, the events to which Manganeios is responding are not taking place nearby. It is most unlikely that he was present on the campaign he describes, so he would have had access in some way to reports from the battlefront. There is a scholarly consensus, summed up in Jeffreys (2011), that when Manuel operated outside Constantinople, his management system ensured a flow of acceptable information back to the capital: hence the agreement in outline that is found so frequently in the accounts of his activities on campaign.

The third case deals with an episode for which Manganeios' witness has recently been fully published (Jeffreys & Jeffreys, 2015). In the autumn of 1158, Manuel decided that the outrageous activities of Thoros of Armenia and Renauld of Châtillon, crusader prince of Antioch, needed to be restrained – in particular both parties needed to be reprimanded for ravaging Cyprus, while Thoros' claims to control much of formerly Byzantine Cilicia had to be curbed; Manuel also wished to build relations with Baldwin of Jerusalem and the Latin Kingdom. He set out from Constantinople late in 1158, pressed hard through Anatolia to Attaleia, caused Thoros to flee to the mountains in panic, moved on through Cilicia, camped at Mopsuestia and received a penitent Renauld before making a formal entry into Antioch; Manuel returned to Constantinople by June 1159. A group of 6 poems within Manganeios' corpus (MP 8, 9, 10, 23, 34, 35) refer to events on this campaign. Covering more than 1600 lines (nearly a tenth of Manganeios' surviving work), with several poems individually being of considerable length, they presented Constantinopolitan audiences with encomiastic accounts of Manuel's achievements whilst he was away from the city. The audience most frequently addressed is the Senate, that is, a largely honorific body made up of senior aristocratic males of varying degrees of political and social influence, not a few of whom may well have been disaffected and hostile to Manuel. There is the usual question whether the poems were ever actually performed, that is, given a public reading – which is clearly the

intended mode of publication and the reason for Manganeios' writing them. More acutely than in the other two cases presented here, there is the question of how Manganeios knew what went on. While it is just possible that he might have been present on the Serbian campaign in 1149 and he certainly would have been in Constantinople in 1147, there can be no question of his ever having been in the camps at Mopsuestia or Antioch. The answer has to be that this is yet another demonstration that reports were indeed sent back from the front-line, as discussed in Jeffreys (2011). Further evidence for these reports comes from the other witnesses to this campaign, indicating that the recipients were not confined to Constantinople. For this phase of Manuel's activities, there are now further witnesses, in addition to the to-be-expected Kinnamos and Choniates: namely the Latin William of Tyre and the Armenian Gregory the Priest, who continued Matthew of Edessa's history of Armenia (Jeffreys & Jeffreys, 2015, 51–53). As is the situation with the two other cases discussed here, Manganeios shares with these some salient episodes – the most dramatic of which is the ritual humiliation of Renauld of Châtillon. In MP 9 and 35, Manganeios depicts the abased leader in shabby clothing, noose around his neck escorted by priests with processional crosses. Manganeios asks:

> What, Senate of the Romans, is happening to the Latin,
> the boastful, reckless, swaggering, vain Latin?
>
> [Τί δαί, Ῥωμαίων σύγκλητε, τὰ κατὰ τὸν Λατῖνον,
> τὸν ἀλαζόνα, τὸν θρασύν, τὸν σοβαρόν, τὸν κοῦφον]

(MP 9.1–2)

His tunic is short, torn, stripped of decoration,

> his inadequate tunic, which has been cut short,
> the bareness of his knees, right down to his feet,
> the pathetic tear near his flanks,
> the knot around his neck, the strange condemnation,
> the compulsory disgrace, the rope of a noose,
> and the unsheathed, double-edged, avenging sword,
> which is visible at a distance and shining in his hand,
>
> [τὸ τοῦ χιτῶνος ἐλλιπές, τὸ κεκολοβωμένον,
> τὸ τῶν γονάτων ἀσκεπὲς ἄχρι ταρσῶν ἐσχάτων,
> τὸ ῥῆγμα τὸ περιπαθές, τὸ παρὰ τὰς λαγόνας,
> ὁ περὶ τράχηλον δεσμός, ἡ ξένη καταδίκη,
> ὁ τῆς ἀνάγκης ἔλεγχος, ὁ σχοῖνος τῆς ἀγχόνης,
> καὶ τὸ γυμνὸν καὶ δίστομον καὶ παλαμναῖον ξίφος,
> τὸ πόρρωθεν φαινόμενον καὶ στίλβον ἀνὰ χεῖρα,].

(MP 9.51–54)

What has happened to the 'haughty, arrogant tower of the Antiochenes' [τὸν γαῦρον, τὸν ὑπέροχον Ἀντιοχέων πύργον] (MP 9.82), who now goes bare-legged and bare-foot in the dust?

Manganeios puts grovelling words of explanatory penitence into Renauld's mouth, piling up vituperative epithets, which reach their climax in poem 35. For example:

> How many years have passed and how many seasons have circled
> without seeing an innovation of such a kind and size,
> the prince of Antioch, a proud ruler,
> pitiful, self-condemned, with a rope around his neck,
> entirely stripped bare and cropped on all sides,
> weeping and wailing and earnestly pleading
> with the purple-born shoot, my emperor?
>
> [Πόσων ἐτῶν παραδρομὴ καὶ πόσων χρόνων κύκλος
> οὐκ εἶδε καινοτόμημα τοιοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτον,
> Ἀντιοχείας πρίγκιπα, περιφανῆ δυνάστην,
> οἰκτρόν, αὐτοκατάδικον, τραχηλοδεδημένον,
> γεγυμνωμένον πάντοθεν καὶ παρακεκομμένον,
> θρηνοῦντα καὶ στενάζοντα καὶ καταδυσωποῦντα
> τὸν πορφυρόφυτον βλαστόν, τὸν αὐτοκράτορά μου]
>
> (MP 35.39–45)

The culmination comes in the final lines:

> Who has seen an arrogant, haughty Latin,
> insolent, huge, bold and reckless,
> brought down from his conceit and pride and unrestrained boldness
> to the depths of extreme humility,
> to an unexpected fall and the ruin of death,
> as in the case of the mad Prince of Antioch?
>
> [Τίς εἶδεν ὑπερήφανον, ἀγέρωχον Λατῖνον,
> ὑπέροφρυν, ὑπέρογκον, θρασὺν καὶ τολμητίαν,
> ἐκ τύφου καὶ φρονήματος καὶ θράσους ἀκαθέκτου
> εἰς ἄκραν καταντήσαντα ταπείνωσιν ἐσχάτην,
> καὶ πτῶσιν ἀπροσδόκητον καὶ συντριβὴν θανάτου,
> εἰς οἷαν ὁ παράφορος Ἀντιοχείας πρίγκιψ]
>
> (MP 35.72–77)

The foil to this abject degradation is Manuel. He is presented in the first place as the summation of all that is merciful and benevolent, who looks graciously on the abject prince, receives him pityingly and 'tells him to live again and see the sunlight' (MP 35).

But Manuel is also mighty and terrifying:

> East and West have been shaken and amazed;
> all were astounded at the fall of the prince
> and his sentence by self-condemnation,
> and have cried out, 'There is but one great sovereign,
> my dread emperor, my porphyrogennetos'.
>
> [Ἐσείσθησαν, ἐξέστησαν ἀνατολὴ καὶ δύσις·
> οἱ πάντες κατεπλάγησαν τοῦ πρίγκιπος τὴν πτῶσιν
> καὶ τὴν αὐτοκατάκριτον ἐκείνου καταδίκην,
> καὶ «Μέγας» ἀνεβόησαν «εἷς μόνος αὐτοκράτωρ,
> ὁ φοβερός μου βασιλεύς, ὁ πορφυρόβλαστός μου».]
>
> (MP 35.61–65)

In MP 10, Manuel is displayed by Manganeios in perhaps the most vivid account in all Byzantine literature of an imperial *adventus*, when Manuel enters Antioch on horseback in full imperial accoutrements:

> You placed your foot in the stirrup,
> set yourself upright on the horse's back like some tower,
> in an instant you appeared to the whole crowd high in the air
> wearing a pearl-studded cloak weighed down with gold
> easily on your shoulders like a light tunic.
>
> [καὶ σὺ τῷ κρίκῳ τοῦ ποδὸς τὴν βάσιν ἐνστηρίξας
> ἐπὶ τῶν νώτων ὄρθιος ὡς πύργος τις ἱδρύνθης,
> καθάπερ ἐπ᾽ ὀκρίβαντος ἢ στήλης ἐπηρμένης,
> ἐν ἀκαρεῖ μετάρσιος παντὶ φανεὶς τῷ πλήθει,
> χλαμύδα καταμάργαρον χρυσῷ βεβαρημένην
> ἐπ᾽ ὤμων φέρων ἀβαρῶς ὥσπερ χιτῶνα κοῦφον.]
>
> (MP 10.102–107)

The technique is blatant; the more glorious Manuel appears, the more abject is the Latin leader. Once again, the essence of the situation, this contrast, is present in the other witnesses, who minimize neither the humiliating position in which Renauld politically places himself and is placed nor the magnificence of Manuel's imperial presence. Manganeios, however, has made the contrast nastier.

Before concluding, I would like to draw attention to one of the problems that Byzantine historians and encomiasts faced from the late 11th century onwards, when large numbers of Latins in the shape of crusaders began to come into closer contact than previously with the Greek-speaking end of the Mediterranean. These invasive Latins claimed Rome as part of their cultural heritage (Shawcross, 2003). But so did the inhabitants of Constantinople, the *Romaioi* (Romans). Constantinople had been the New Rome since its re-foundation in the 4th

century. No wonder then that Manganeios, and to a lesser extent Theodore, stresses the vigour of their New Rome, as against that of the Old Rome that was asserted to be theirs by the boorish intruders: the tension is obvious. It is this tension that is behind the phrases used of Bertha-Eirene and her descent from the Western Caesars. Strikingly, it is from this time that Ausonia, the archaic name for Southern Italy, begins to be used as an alternative element in Byzantine encomiastic claims for Manuel's territorial authority (Fisher, 1979, 445–446). Manganeios more frequently acclaims Manuel as emperor of the Ausonians than as emperor of the Romans, neatly disambiguating the two Romes, the old and the new, but making a tacit statement of Byzantium's prior claim. The use of Ausonia by Manganeios and Theodore – and other 12th-century writers – needs further investigation; its appearance cannot be entirely due to metrical convenience (undoubted though that is).

This chapter has a simple point and has presented its cases simplistically. In the three situations I have outlined here, Manganeios Prodromos reports Byzantine interaction with intrusive Westerners. The Westerners he shows us function both as groups, that is, the armies of Serbs and crusading Latins, and as individuals, the leaders of the groups, that is, Conrad, Uros and Renauld. Manganeios presents all as despicable specimens of humanity. Their foil is the Byzantine emperor, who is displayed as everything that is magnificently glorious and gloriously magnanimous, with a long and illustrious heritage. Over the decade from 1147 to 1159, Manganeios has not changed his mind; there is no such thing as a decent Westerner. Or is there? I have suggested that there were not a few assimilated Westerners in Constantinople in the mid-12th century; we hear nothing about them in the texts I have been referring to today. Perhaps familiarity, as well as high rank, could bring acceptance. Perhaps the outsider could become an insider. But that would be too much to conclude from Manganeios' silence here. On the gross outsiders Manganeios is much more outspoken than the narrative historians. There are many reasons for this; he is not constrained by the formal pressures of semi-official history, he is writing ephemeral works for oral performance, he has to grab his audience's attention as best he can. The result is lavish praise for the emperor and chauvinistic diatribes to satisfy the groundlings, resulting in very bad press for Westerners.

On the evidence of Manganeios Prodromos, we must assume that the Byzantine man-in-the-street was xenophobic and blinkered.

Notes

1 I should like to thank Nikos Chrissis for his invitation to take part in a most instructive and agreeable conference. This chapter retains much the informality of its original oral presentation.

2 The long-announced edition by Elizabeth and Michael Jeffreys is still in preparation. Details on the contents of the manuscript in which all but four of Manganeios' poems are preserved can be found in Mioni, 1970, 116–131 and Magdalino, 1993, 494–500. References to, and quotations from, Manganeios' work in this chapter are to the forthcoming edition and translation, which uses the poem numbers in Mioni's catalogue entry, preceded by MP.

3 For a reevaluation of the nature of the Second Crusade, see the papers collected in Roche & Jensen, 2015. It should be noted that Roche's contribution (Roche, 2015) draws extensively on the unpublished edition, translation and commentary of MP 20 and 24 by E. and M. Jeffreys that was distributed informally at the Dumbarton Oaks symposium in 1999; this symposium led to Laiou & Mottahedeh, 2001 and Jeffreys & Jeffreys, 2001. For details of the intricate publishing history of MP 20 and 24, see Jeffreys & Jeffreys, 2001, 101, n. 1.

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9 De-centring 12th-century Constantinople

Archbishop Eustathios and the Norman conquest of Thessalonica revisited*

Catherine Holmes

The final years of the 12th century and those at the start of the 13th witnessed two of the most hostile encounters between Byzantium and the West. The first of these was the Norman attack on Thessalonica in 1185; the second the sack of Constantinople in 1204 by the Venetians and the army of the Fourth Crusade. The attack of 1185 is documented and lamented in considerable detail by Eustathios, the highly erudite Byzantine archbishop of Thessalonica.[1] The comments that Eustathios makes in a long narrative account of the build-up to the raid and events during the attack itself bear witness to some fundamental antipathies that are often associated with East–West relations at this time, as well as conveying hints of the processes of accommodation that could exist alongside hostility. As such, Eustathios undoubtedly provides valuable testimony for the complex interplay between perception and reality in Byzantine–Latin encounters that was integral to political change and identity-formation in the rapidly changing eastern Mediterranean world of the later 12th and early 13th centuries (for more on the value of Eustathios's testimony in this sense, see Holmes, 2012, 31–60). But in this chapter, I will suggest that while Eustathios's text provides important evidence for the evolving relationship between the Byzantine empire and the Norman kingdom of Sicily, as well as for Byzantine attitudes towards Latins, we need to take care before assuming that his viewpoint and experience were typical of all Byzantines, particularly of those who lived in the provinces. Eustathios's is a principally Constantinopolitan account of events and attitudes, whereas Thessalonica was, by this period, a rather different place from the Byzantine capital. While stressing the distinctiveness of Thessalonica is not a new idea, most historians have tended to construe that unique character in terms of that city's relationship with Constantinople (e.g. Macrides, 1990, 189–197; Talbot & Spieser, 2003; Necipoğlu, 2009, esp. 41–118; Russell, 2010; eadem, 2013).

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In this chapter, I want to move beyond a binary reading and draw attention instead to Thessalonica's relationships with areas *outside* the imperial capital, above all to its connections with the West. The evidence for this alternative, de-centred view of Thessalonica is piecemeal, but that which exists, including (somewhat paradoxically) hints from Eustathios's own text, suggests that, by the late 12th century, Thessalonica had become a crucial meeting point for peoples and cultures from both the East and West. It was not a pale reflection of the cosmopolitan Constantinopolitan metropolis, but was rather a point of intersection in its own right, in which distinctions between Byzantium and the West were far from clear-cut.

Tensions between Constantinople and Thessalonica

The Norman raid of 1185 was in many ways a moment of high-level political encounter between two long-standing, heavy-weight Mediterranean adversaries, each with different religious and ethnic identities and clearly defined political centres; on the one hand, there was Byzantium, until recently, governed by Emperor Manuel Komnenos (1143–80) and now under the control of his cousin Andronikos Komnenos; on the other, the Normans of Sicily, led in 1185 by King William II, grandson of Byzantium's bitter foe Roger II. This high-power rivalry is picked up at the start of his text very clearly by Eustathios. William is said, for instance, to have borne the Byzantines long-term hatred for the attempts made by Manuel Komnenos to destabilise his dynasty; to have launched the attack of 1185 in order to emulate his father (William I); and to have planned to transfer his capital from Palermo to Constantinople (Eustathios, *Capture,* 58). Also striking in this context of rivalry is the explicit connection that Eustathios makes between political disintegration within Byzantium following the death of Manuel in 1180 and the Norman assault of 1185. He dedicates the first substantial section of his narrative to a description of the scrum for power in Constantinople among the various members of the Komnenos family after 1180, a mêlée from which Andronikos Komnenos emerged victorious in 1183, but only after he had murdered Manuel's young son, Alexios II (Eustathios, *Capture,* 18–58). Eustathios then establishes a link between the bloodiness of Andronikos's own path to the throne and the Norman raid on Thessalonica, by telling us that Andronikos's coup gave rise to a tide of dissidents who appealed for aid from various foreign powers. Among these dissidents was *anothe*r Alexios Komnenos, the great-nephew of Manuel, who journeyed to the court of William II, trying to persuade the king to back the claims to the imperial throne of a pseudo-Alexios II (Eustathios, *Capture,* 56–58; Magdalino, 2008, 660–661). He also refers openly and in entirely negative terms to the massacre of the Latins in Constantinople in 1182, which Andronikos fomented during his rise to power: 'The supporters of Andronikos overcame not only those Latins who took arms to oppose them but also those whose helpless state made them objects of pity: both women and children fell to their swords' (Eustathios, *Capture*, 32–34). Indeed, he claims that the Norman outrages of 1185 were so appalling, precisely because of the

anti-Latin attacks in Constantinople three years earlier: 'These events set a pattern for our own suffering' (Eustathios, *Capture*, 36).

After establishing this context of rivalry between two centralised states in the early stages of his text, much of the rest of Eustathios's account is taken up with more detailed testimony about the raid on Thessalonica itself. These passages include, most strikingly, a series of vivid depictions of violent Latin depredations against the local populations, above all the attacks and humiliations visited on the representatives and symbols of the Orthodox faith, including on the church of the city's patron saint Demetrios (Eustathios, *Capture*, 114–116, 120–122). In narrating these events, Eustathios uses a very striking rhetoric of ethnic, cultural and religious otherness. Great play is made of the invaders' apparent disregard for sacred objects, their liking for that which was cheap and base and their failure to recognise that which was expensive (Eustathios, *Capture*, 114–148). Not all was friction, for a close reading of Eustathios's text also reveals a rather more complex reality behind this polarised rhetoric. As Eustathios himself points out, the two sides were not exclusively Byzantine or Latin. Byzantines fought on both sides, as did German mercenaries. Also numbered among the 'Latin' Norman force were Muslims, while among the inhabitants of the Byzantine city were Armenians, Serbs, Jews and probably Latins (Eustathios, *Capture*, 70, 88, 92–94, 124–126). Some Normans were co-operative; Alduin the commander of the Normans and one of his lieutenants, the Muslim eunuch Amir, are said to have stopped the plundering of the city; to have understood the significance of precious goods; to have tried to return plundered books to Eustathios; to have given him a considerable sum of gold; and to have made donations to the shrine of St Demetrios (Eustathios, *Capture*, 116, 126–128).

For the historian of state rivalry in the 12th-century Mediterranean or the scholar of identity-formation, the detailed testimony of hostile encounters and uneasy co-operation between Latins and Byzantines in Eustathios's text provides rich pickings. But to focus on these aspects of the text alone is to overlook the significance of other vital contexts to and tensions within Eustathios's account: namely the importance of Constantinopolitan politics as well as the sometimes-vexed relationship between that capital-centric world and a Thessalonian locality, which enjoyed connections with a far more complex set of Mediterranean social and political milieux than Constantinople alone. These contexts and tensions become particularly apparent if we change our methodology from one in which particular episodes of Byzantine and Latin interaction within the text are identified and hostile discourses analysed to one in which the overall structure of the text, Eustathios's purpose in writing, and his intended audiences are put under the spotlight.

The Constantinopolitan character of Eustathios's account and its uneasy relationship with the Thessalonian locality are made particularly clear by the archbishop's decision to dedicate the first third of his account to a very substantial portrait of recent Constantinopolitan politics. Central to this capital-centric section of the narrative is, as we have already seen, Andronikos Komnenos's rise to power and his time in imperial office. But, Eustathios's construction of an

image of an exceptionally violent emperor at the head of a dysfunctional empire was not entirely disinterested analysis. Instead, one of the principal purposes of at least this part of his text seems to have been to place the blame for the raid of 1185 on two representatives of the Komnenos family: the emperor, Andronikos Komnenos, himself and David Komnenos, the governor of Thessalonica. The former he chastises for creating a climate of fear among his underlings; the latter for wilting in that climate, for refusing to furnish Andronikos with proper intelligence about the strengths of the Normans (which meant that reinforcements were slow in arriving) and ultimately for deserting both the citizens and the archbishop himself in their battle with the invaders (Eustathios, *Capture*, 12, 70–72 for Andronikos; 8–12, 68–80 for David). That Eustathios sought to create scapegoats for the 1185 attack within the Byzantine elite should not really surprise us because, as his own text makes clear, Eustathios had himself been uncomfortably close to both Andronikos's regime in Constantinople and David's at Thessalonica, a proximity which left Eustathios open to allegations of incompetence and corruption from both the inhabitants of Thessalonica and from Isaac Angelos, the new emperor who had replaced Andronikos Komnenos in Constantinople shortly after the Norman raid (Eustathios, *Capture*, 12–14 for David; 14 for Andronikos; also noted by Odorico, *Thessalonique*, 29–34). And, indeed, at different points in the text itself, Eustathios struggles with the task of trying to create distance from a discredited party that he once supported: 'I know that I was a supporter of the man [David] before the siege and in times of peace I used to praise his actions… but what are we to do now when we have found that praiseworthy man changed…. I would never put friendship in the first place and let truth come second' (Eustathios, *Capture*, 12–16, quotation at 13).

However, while identifying the rhetorical tricks that Eustathios uses to rescue himself from implication in the disasters of Andronikos's reign is important, also relevant here is the identity of his audience, or rather, audiences. The basic structure of his text provides some clues here. After a short preface which sets out the narrator's conception of history (Eustathios, *Capture*, 4–18), comes that substantial Constantinopolitan section dealing with Andronikos's rise to power (Eustathios, *Capture*, 18–58); this is then followed by the narrative of the fall of Thessalonica itself to the Normans – an account which is not only shot through with instances of Latin barbarism, but is shaped by a highly personalised rendering of Eustathios's own long-suffering role, his imprisonment by the Normans and his energetic action as an intermediary figure who tried to mitigate the effects of the invasion for the inhabitants of the city (Eustathios, *Capture*, 60–152). Finally, at the end of the text, we find a short interpretation of the raid as punishment for sin and an exhortation to avoid misdoing in the future (Eustathios, *Capture*, 154–158). Although much work remains to be done on understanding how these sections fit together, it seems plausible that the different parts were written at different times for different audiences. The introduction and the narrative about Constantinopolitan politics between 1180 and 1185 can be read as an apology for the author's association with the regime of Andronikos Komnenos: perhaps written to curry favour with the new Angelos regime; perhaps to explain his

behaviour to a sceptical local audience of Thessalonians; perhaps both. This part of the text may have been composed at a later date to act as an introduction to the subsequent sections, which may themselves have originally constituted a free-standing homily delivered to a Thessalonian audience in the months after of the raid.[2] A provincial audience for those later sections in the text would certainly fit with one of Eustathios's most prominent messages found towards the end of his account: that it was the citizens' own sins which had brought disaster on the Thessalonians, above all their failings of greed and usurious behaviour (Eustathios, *Capture*, esp. 154–155).

Much work remains to be done on unpicking this complex text, but what is clear is that Eustathios's account *as we now have it* represents a very Constantinopolitan interpretation of the events of 1185, but one in which deep tensions between the imperial capital and Thessalonica are also visible. In this context, it is worth noting that this is not the only place in which division between capital and province is evident in Eustathios's written production. For, in blaming the citizens' avarice and greed for the 1185 raid, Eustathios was elaborating on an anti-acquisitiveness theme he pursued in many of the other homilies and treatises he wrote while resident in Thessalonica as archbishop, and such chastisement about the greed of the local population, it has been argued, was merely one of many issues over which Eustathios found himself at odds with the interests and activities of those who lived in and around Thessalonica. For Michael Angold, for instance, Eustathios was a hard-line representative of an episcopal group trained in Constantinople, who worked closely with imperial power throughout the 12th century to develop both the image and the reality of a carefully ordered Orthodox Christian society. The problem, however, for churchmen like Eustathios was that Byzantines in the provinces were not so easily persuaded to behave according to precepts laid down by the Constantinopolitan episcopacy; and nowhere was this truer than in Thessalonica. There was, in other words, a very big gap between perceptions of correct social and moral conduct as expressed by Eustathios, representative of the imperial episcopacy, and that of his local Macedonian flock.[3]

Thessalonica: alternative centre?

Explaining the gap which appears to have opened up by 1185 between Eustathios and his Thessalonian flock is not easy, but an important context to their estrangement may be the various social, trading and spiritual networks to which 12th-century Thessalonica belonged, and which collectively made the city a commercial entrepôt and a devotional centre that was quite distinct from Constantinople. My starting point is the fact that Thessalonica had always been a place where different peoples from far-away places met. To paraphrase David Jacoby, it had long been difficult to work out who exactly counted as a 'foreigner' in Thessalonica – so long was the city's track record as a site of ethnic, religious, cultural and economic encounter (Jacoby, 1993, 86). In this context, we should recall that the cult of St Demetrios as the patron of the city had developed in the context of the city's long-standing engagement with the local Slav population in the 6th and

7th centuries (Lemerle, *Les miracles*; Macrides, 1990, 189–193). Thessalonica was also the birthplace of Cyril and Methodios, missionaries to the Slavs in the second half of the 9th century (Vlasto, 1970, 32–33). Meanwhile, for much of the 9th to early 11th centuries, it was an important centre for military operations in Byzantium's struggles with the Bulgarians (Stephenson, 2000, 47–79; Holmes, 2005, 403–428). That Thessalonica continued to be a meeting point of Balkan peoples during the 12th century is made clear by Eustathios's own reference to the city's population of Serbs (Eustathios, *Capture*, 94; Laiou, 2002, 2:725–726). Nor was Thessalonica only a significant meeting place for the inhabitants of the Balkans; it had also long enjoyed an important maritime position, which brought it into contact with other parts of the Byzantine empire, including Constantinople, but also with Arab sea warriors and, perhaps, Arab traders, too. The most famous point of contact between Thessalonica and the Muslim seafaring world was obviously the 904 slaving raid against the city, conducted by Leo of Tripoli (Kaminiates, *Capture*; for further discussion about the historicity of the Kameniates' testimony, see Odorico, *Thessalonique*, 14–19). Evidence from the archives of the monasteries of neighbouring Mount Athos suggests that Arab raiders remained active in this region until at least the late 10th century.[4] But, of course, most important for this particular chapter is the degree to which sea- and land-based contacts had opened up between Thessalonica and Italy by the end of the 12th century.

An Italian presence in Thessalonica can be dated to as early as the 12th century, but assessing its size and organisation is more difficult. We know that by 1165 the Venetian monastery of St Nicholas of the Lido had a dependent house in Thessalonica. However, David Jacoby has seen little reason to assume the presence of large numbers of Italian merchants in the city, aside, that is, from Venetians, until after 1192, when trading concessions in Byzantine regions outside Constantinople were granted by the imperial authorities to the Genoese and Pisans (Jacoby, 1993, 88–90). Yet, the 12th-century picture may have been more buoyant. In 1185, for example, Eustathios himself refers to a neighbourhood of the *bourgesioi* – which suggests a permanent Latin trading presence (Jacoby, 1993, 90). In 1197, as Jacoby points out, the Pisans asked for a *restitution* rather than an institution of trading facilities, as well as for a consul to manage its merchants' affairs, all of which may imply a rather longer history of trading connections with the city (Jacoby, 1993, 89). Meanwhile, convincing – if elusive – evidence for extensive Western trade with Thessalonica is the account of the fair of St Demetrios, found in the mid-12th-century Byzantine satire *Timarion*: a celebration said to be attended by merchants from as far afield as the western Mediterranean (Romano, *Timarione*, 53–54; Vryonis, 1981, 202–204). Moreover, there is documentary, hagiographical and archaeological evidence from territories further south that, during the 12th century, Italian investment was contributing to a boom in the local economy of central Greece and the Peloponnese (for a summary see Shawcross, 2009, 13–17; see also Armstrong, 2002, 361–368). Historians of the economic expansion of northern Italy in the 12th and 13th centuries have also highlighted the interest that Italian trading cities

with limited agricultural hinterlands, such as Venice and Genoa, had by this point in accessing sources of bulk food products (Abulafia, 1977). Thessalonica's position at the centre of one of the principal grain-producing areas of the Aegean would surely have made it attractive to Italian traders; some of the earliest surviving Venetian documents for Thessalonica are concerned with the grain trade (Jacoby, 1993, 93).

Moreover, the openness of Thessalonica to contact with the Italian world during the centuries leading up to 1185 is confirmed by other evidence. This comes from the mid-10th century onwards and concerns travelling holy men, such as St Fantinos, a monk from Calabria who spent the last years of his life in the 960s and 970s in Thessalonica. His journey to Thessalonica from southern Italy varies according to which of the two versions of his life one reads. However, what is annoyingly inconsistent data for the biographer of Fantinos is a boon to the historian of movement and contact; for the fact that it was considered possible that St Fantinos *could* have travelled to Thessalonica using *either* a mainly seaborne route from Patras to Corinth and thence to Euboea *or* a more land-based route via Athens and Larissa is excellent evidence for the existence of multiple pathways (Follieri, 1997, 548–553). Nor need we assume that Fantinos represents a one-off example. The late 10th-century life of St Luke of Phokis also indicates that the Gulf of Corinth was lined, even at that time, with small maritime points which linked the Adriatic world to that of the Aegean and between which travelled not only holy men but also traders (Connor & Connor, *Saint Luke of Steiris*, esp. 84–85, 110–111; the hagiographer's reference at pp. 140–141 to the deeds and miracles of Luke being as many as the 'seaside places' is particularly striking). It is, therefore, likely that many were travelling in a multitude of directions through this region: some moving westwards from Byzantium to southern Italy, and perhaps on to Rome; others travelling east and southwards from western Europe, through Byzantium and on to holy places in Palestine (for numismatic evidence of pilgrims passing from Italy through central Greece on their way to the East, see Penna, 2002, 657); still others headed in the direction of another sacred place – the holy mountain of Athos, where not only Greek, Georgian, Rus, Bulgarian and Serb monasteries were to be found, but also an Amalfitan house of Benedictines (Lemerle, 1953, 548–566; Bonsall, 1969, 262–267; Speake, 2002, 58). Many must have passed through the key port city of Thessalonica.[5]

In what ways do such highways and seaways opened in the 10th and 11th centuries, accessible to traders, holy men and pilgrims, help us make sense of the Byzantine–Norman encounter of 1185? Answers to this question may emerge if we consider the proposition that such pathways acted as arteries in the spread of devotional practices shared by communities in the West, especially Italy, as well as in Byzantium. Such a suggestion is, of course, highly provisional and requires a great deal more research. However, one area which appears interesting in this regard is the dissemination of the cult of the military saints from Byzantium to regions to the west under Latin control. Hints of such connections surface in the *Historia* of Niketas Choniates, above all in a passage about the mid-12th-century raiding activities of Roger II, when the author mentions that,

during their attacks on central Greece in the 1140s, the Normans stole a wonder-working icon of the holy warrior Theodore from Corinth (Choniates, *Historia*, 76).[6] More striking still is the way in which connections between Byzantium and Latins, especially those based in the Mediterranean, were shaped by the cult of Demetrios, the patron saint of Thessalonica. Of course, not all devotional objects and images of Demetrios should be attributed to the region of Thessalonica alone. Instead, this military saint enjoyed a cult which was widely disseminated across the Byzantine empire. Devotion to the saint was also cultivated by imperial authorities in Constantinople (a point made by Magdalino, 1990, 198–201). However, even allowing for caveats, there is quite a striking congruence between the pattern of traders and holy men outlined above and manifestations of the cult of Demetrios in the western half of the Byzantine empire and in Italy in the 11th to 13th centuries: a pattern that we might tentatively suggest amounts to a network of connections which were centred on the myrrh-producing shrine of the saint in Thessalonica, but which radiated out in different directions; connections which were then punctuated by images of the saint on important routes within and between the Byzantine Balkans and Italy. Reasonably close to Thessalonica, these images include the large, late 12th-century portable mosaic icon of Demetrios at the Monastery of Xenophontos on Athos and a Middle Byzantine stone relief of the saint on the western façade of the Xeropotamou also on Athos.[7] Further away, several monumental mosaic and fresco depictions of the saint had long been visible to visitors at the monastery of St Luke of Phokis (Demetrios is portrayed, together with a series of other military saints, including Theodore, in the *katholikon* and the crypt: Connor, 1991, 44–45). Meanwhile, integral to this set of connections were not just key locations with representations of the saint, but also the vehicles of devotion, especially portable images of Demetrios acquired by pilgrims and other travellers. These images appeared on encolpia, reliquaries, ampullae and possibly portable mosaic icons, many made in Thessalonica itself, but others manufactured elsewhere, including, by the 13th century, glass medallions featuring the saint produced in Venice, which, as David Buckton has argued, may have followed 12th-century Byzantine models (Walter, 2003, 82–83; Evans & Wixom, 1997, no. 116; Evans, 2004, no. 206; Buckton, 1981, 187–189).

Meanwhile, there is evidence that this putative network extended into areas which came to be dominated by Norman power. We know, for example, that a church dedicated to St Demetrios had been established in Bari when the city was still under direct Byzantine control. Around the same time, a medallion portrait of Demetrios was produced (in 1024–5), alongside depictions of several other Byzantine military saints, in the decorated borders of the city's Latin cathedral's *Exultet* roll (Mayo, 1987, 375–389). The arrival of the Normans in the mid-11th century did not erode the presence of Demetrios, but, if anything, enhanced it. Demetrios was said by Norman historians to have been a trusted military associate during the conquest of southern Italy and Sicily. He was also named as a supporter of the First Crusaders in their struggles outside Antioch by the author of the *Gesta Francorum*, a text usually believed to have a southern

Italian provenance (see wider discussion in Lapina, 2009, esp. 104–108; for reference in the *Gesta Francorum* see Hill, *Deeds*, 69). Nor did the Normans' interest in Demetrios diminish during the 12th century. Instead, he was one of the two most frequently portrayed military saints in the mosaics that decorate the 12th-century monuments of Norman Sicily (the other being St Theodore).[8] Meanwhile, his image also appeared on some issues of copper coinage produced during the reign of Roger II at Bari and Messina (Travaini, 2007, 62–64, esp. n.100 and fig. 2.34). These southern Italian manifestations are interesting because they point to a long-term awareness and veneration for Demetrios among the Normans, which may help to explain the rather complex attitude that they displayed to the cult of Demetrios when they attacked Thessalonica in 1185. For, as we have already seen, according to Eustathios's testimony, on the one hand, the Norman army sought to break up the saint's tomb; on the other, the Normans rendered offerings of money, precious metal and books.

Conclusions and implications

In concluding, I should stress how provisional is this picture of Thessalonica as a city which was tied into an economic and devotional network that straddled the western Balkans and southern Italy. Much more research is needed on both its economic and devotional characteristics before arguing conclusively for its existence and for the central role that Thessalonica played within it. But, if this highly provisional picture of a Thessalonica as a hub for engagements between the Byzantines and their neighbours has anything to recommend it, then what conclusions should we draw about relations between Byzantium and the West during the later 12th and early 13th centuries?

In the first instance, the existence of a long-standing Balkan–southern-Italian network in which Thessalonica played a crucial role makes it difficult to interpret the attack of 1185 in terms of East–West, Latin–Greek hostility alone, however extensive the anti-Latin rhetoric of Eustathios's valuable account. Just as important, the well-established connections I have described also make it hard to interpret the instances of co-existence described in Eustathios's text simply as pragmatic but essentially temporary Byzantine collaboration with Latin invaders, an accommodation which was easily dismissed once the Normans had withdrawn from the city.

This is not to deny that there was some contemporary anti-Latin sentiment in Byzantium. Eustathios, in common with many contemporaries, such as Niketas Choniates in his description of the Latin attack on Constantinople in 1204, demonstrate a striking ability to call upon a raucous and yet highly developed anti-Latin discourse in the process of constructing their narratives. Indeed, in their insistent emphasis on the impurity and bestiality of the Latins, Constantinopolitan authors, such as Niketas and Eustathios, seem to articulate in narrative form the extremely hostile and scatological anti-Latin tropes, which Tia Kolbaba has identified as characteristic of the lists of Latin errors that were produced by elite Byzantine authors from this period onwards. Such language may also have been part of a

desperate and reactionary attempt on the part of a conservative Constantinopolitan elite to use the language of ethnic and religious hatred to reinforce their own authority during times of political uncertainty, although whether such insistent rhetoric on the part of a Constantinopolitan cleric like Eustathios cut much ice with a Thessalonian audience that found itself at the centre of a commercial and devotional network featuring participants from across southern Italy, the Adriatic and the Balkans, is debatable (Kolbaba, 2000).

The suggestion that there was a long-standing and constantly evolving series of commercial and devotional connections between Thessalonica and neighbouring regions also has another important implication, this time as far as Latin attitudes towards Byzantium are concerned. Elizabeth Lapina has demonstrated, drawing on a vast array of examples, just how widespread was the western European audience for the cult of Demetrios by the late 11th century, particularly among the Normans of southern Italy, including those who went on crusade (Lapina, 2009; the cult had even reached Normandy by the mid-11th century). For Lapina, however, the Norman interest during the 11th and on into the 12th centuries was principally a matter of 'hostile appropriation' in a context of bitter regional competition and the search for legitimacy. Thus, Demetrios's appearance among the crusaders in the narrative of the *Gesta Francorum* was an aggressive Latin response to Alexios Komnenos's failure to send an army to help the Latins when they were in desperate straits at the siege of Antioch in 1098 and a useful tool for cementing the lordship of the Norman Bohemond in northern Syria. Similarly, Lapina portrays the enemies of Byzantium a century later, both in the East and the West, as eager to appropriate Demetrios in pursuit of political aims. This was the ambition not only of the Normans in 1185 but also of Peter and Asen, the Bulgarians who rebelled against Byzantium in 1185–6. They famously built a chapel to Demetrios at Trnovo, where they tried, according to Niketas Choniates, to persuade their followers that the saint was going to decamp after abandoning his home in Thessalonica (Lapina, 2009, esp. 104–112; Stephenson, 2000, 288–290; original reference Choniates, *Historia*, 371; Dobyčina, 2012, 113–126).

At this point, I certainly would not wish to overturn the argument that Byzantine military saints were sacred capital who could be appropriated by competitor regimes at moments of high political tension. Undoubtedly, rivalry between Byzantium, the Normans and a wide variety of other Mediterranean powers, including Venice, was intense during the 12th and early 13th centuries. Wresting control over valued assets away from one's rivals was an important strategy in the building and legitimising of power. The Normans were extremely skilled at seizing the human, material and sacred resources of their competitors and turning those assets to their own advantage (for Norman appropriation from the Islamic world, see Johns, 2002). These resources were often extracted at the point of a sword. Violence was an integral part of Norman political culture. Even if Eustathios exaggerates and distorts how we understand the attack on Thessalonica in 1185, the city was undoubtedly subjected to an armed assault. However, beyond the Norman violence, and behind a tug-of-war for control of crucial symbols of authority, legitimacy and divine protection, I would suggest

that there was also a more deeply rooted and constantly evolving devotional culture that was shared by both Latins and Byzantines. Indeed, this conclusion would tally with recent investigations into other Byzantine cults which the Normans are sometimes thought to have appropriated in a purely hostile manner. For instance, as Rowan Dorin has shown, the cult of St Nicholas was already firmly established in Bari long before the saint's relics were forcibly transported in 1087 to Apulia from Myra in Byzantine Anatolia (Dorin, 2008, 37).

Proving that late 12th-century Latin expressions of interest in Demetrios were as much based in a long-term, shared devotional culture as in short-term gesture politics is difficult, but one final anecdote may be revealing. In his own somewhat shorter account of the Norman raid of 1185, Niketas Choniates adds a crucial detail to Eustathios's presentation of events.[9] At the moment when the Normans set upon the shrine of Demetrios, Niketas Choniates tell us that the Latins took away the famous myrrh that was exuded by the saint's shrine to use as a condiment or to wipe on their footwear (Choniates, *Historia*, 305–306; on the association of myrrh with the shrine of Demetrios, see Bakirtzis, 2002, 175–192). This reflection on the part of Choniates appears amid a torrent of invective about the bestial abuses of the Latins. As such, it can appear to be yet another instance of one of our Constantinopolitan informants representing all Latin practices as debased and degenerate. Yet, it is possible that an entirely different reality lay behind this presentation of the Latins' treatment of Byzantine sacred materials. Instead of dishonouring the myrrh of Demetrios, the Normans may, in fact, have been responding in an entirely traditional Byzantine manner to the liquid which exuded from his shrine. Indeed, Niketas himself alludes to the fact that the Normans considered the excretion of myrrh a miracle. It has been argued that the decision by the Normans to cover themselves in myrrh was an attempt to neutralise the power of the saint, rather than a sign of common devotion, although, even if that were the case, then the decision to take such precautionary action still speaks of a profound awareness among the Normans of the saint's potency (Cormack, 1989, 552). But there are reasons for preferring the idea of a common cult and an increasingly shared devotional culture between Normans and Thessalonians. In that context, we should note that it was not only in 1185 that myrrh from the tomb was used in a conflict situation; nor was the action of smearing necessarily a novel, alien or abusive Latin practice. The same had been true more than a century earlier when, faced by the army of the rebel Bulgarian commander Peter Deljan, the inhabitants of Thessalonica themselves had responded by smearing their own bodies with the myrrh of Demetrios (Skylitzes, *Synopsis*, 413; see also Macrides, 1990, 194–195).

The pathways which crossed at Thessalonica are evidence for the very complex patterns of interaction in the central and eastern Mediterranean, which developed before and during the period of the crusades. These were configurations of contact and exchange which cut across many of the binaries – East versus West, Latin versus Greek/Orthodox, perception versus reality – which are so often used to interrogate Byzantine–Western relations. Faced with connections of this sort, we should perhaps ask more frequently: who, where and what exactly was 'Byzantium'? Who, where and what was 'the West'?

Notes

1 Eustathios, *Capture*, includes the Greek text originally edited in Eustathios, *Espugnazione*. For a French trans. of Eustathios's narrative, see Odorico, *Thessalonique*.
2 Eustathios, *Capture*, 4; Leone, 1964, 267–269. It has also been suggested that two entirely free-standing narratives were later brought together, possibly in the early 1190s, when Eustathios left Thessalonica and went into self-imposed exile (Angold, 1995, 188–190; Magdalino, 1996, 228); not all are convinced by this dating: Kazhdan, 1984, 134–136.
3 Odorico, *Thessalonique*, 28–29; Angold, 1995, 183–188. Magdalino, 1996, 236–238, applies a different emphasis, seeing the archbishop genuinely trying to act as an intermediary between Constantinople and his see, despite local hostility.
4 Ostrogorsky, 1949, 187–194; epigraphical evidence points to a mosque in Athens in the later 10th century, suggesting trade between the Muslim world and Byzantine Greece at this point: see Miles, 1964, 19–20.
5 St Athanasios, the mid-10th-century founder of the Lavra monastery on Athos, built a small port for his foundation in response to the large numbers of monks and pilgrims. Visitors came from Rome, Italy, Calabria and Amalfi; they included St Fantinos, who travelled to Athos from Thessalonica (Lemerle, 1963–1964, 1:79, 80; Noret, *Vitae Duae Antiquae*, 74, 176).
6 The cult of Theodore, focused from late antiquity on sites in northern Anatolia, had diversified and spread across Byzantium and beyond by this point. Striking in the context of Latin engagement with Theodore may be the presence of the main shrine of Theodore *Stratelates* (the General) as far west as Serres in Macedonia by the 12th c. (as opposed to that of Theodore Tiron, which remained in Anatolia): Haldon, *A Tale of Two Saints*, 11.
7 Demus, 1991, 26–28 and fig. 4; Speake, 2002, 54 (one of a pair of icons of military saints, the other being St George). There is another Middle Byzantine stone relief of Demetrios on the western façade of San Marco in Venice (Demus, 1960, fig. 40; Lapina, 2009, 112).
8 Images of Demetrios appear, often in the midst of depictions of other Byzantine military saints, especially Theodore and George, at Cefalù, the Martorana church in Palermo, the Cappella Palatina and Monreale (Demus, 1950, 13, 43, 75, 118; Kitzinger, 1976, 295, 305–306; Borsook, 1990, 10, 23, 64).
9 On Eustathios's account as a key source for Choniates' narrative of the attack, see Simpson, 2013, 91–92, 124–125.

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10 The fall of Jerusalem in 1187 to Saladin and its impact on Byzantine opinion*

Michael Angold

In his *History,* Niketas Choniates considers the fall of Jerusalem in 1187 to Saladin on two separate occasions. He first deals with it very roughly in its correct chronological place, as part of his account of the Third Crusade, but it is done so briefly that it is easy to miss. All he says is that the Germans set out on an expedition against the Saracens, who had occupied Palestine and taken Jerusalem by storm (*κατὰ τῶν τὴν Παλαιστίνην κατασχόντων καὶ τὴν Ἱερουσαλὴμ ἐκπορθησάντων Σαρακηνῶν*: Choniates, *Historia,* 417.65–66). The word used is *ἐκπορθῶ*, which can also mean lay waste or plunder. In other words, it conveys a sense of disapproval and dismay. This is quite different from the second occasion, on which Niketas Choniates deals with this event. This time he is commenting on the horrors of the crusaders sack of Constantinople in April 1204. He uses the fall of Jerusalem to Saladin as a way of demonstrating Muslim humanity, by way of contrast to the inhumanity displayed by the crusaders at the sack of Constantinople. He tells us quite correctly that the Muslims allowed the Frankish inhabitants of Jerusalem to leave against the payment of a ransom. Niketas Choniates goes out of his way to absolve the Muslims of brutish behaviour of the kind displayed by the crusaders towards the citizens of Constantinople (Choniates, *Historia,* 576.84–94).

Of course, the first passage was written before the crusaders arrived before Constantinople in August 1203, while the second passage was written after the fall of the city in April 1204. Generally speaking, Niketas Choniates is much better disposed towards the Latins in the first version than he is in the second. But even in the first version, his sympathies lay not so much with the Latins as with the Crusade (Simpson, 2013, 316–319). A case in point is the famous passage from Niketas Choniates's account of the Norman sack of Thessalonica in 1185, in which Niketas talks of Latins and Byzantines being diametrically opposed. 'We do not have a thought in common!' (Choniates, *Historia*, 301–302). Astonishingly enough, this was not a passage interpolated after 1204 but formed part of the original version. It is the most venomous and triumphalist denunciation of the Latins in the whole of his *History*. But it was a way of driving home an important point: the

* Angold (2016b) provides an expanded version of this paper.

Normans, who stormed Thessalonica, were not crusaders. They therefore knew no moral restraints, for the Crusade had the effect of taming the unbridled passions of the otherwise barbaric Latins. You only have to read Niketas's account of the passage of the German crusaders under Frederick Barbarossa four years after the Norman conquest of Thessalonica to see that the historian still thought of the Crusade as a force for good. He also held it aloft as a framework, within which Byzantine and Latin could co-operate (Choniates, *Historia,* 416–417).

If by that time there were reservations at the very highest levels of Byzantine society about the value of co-operation with the Crusade, Niketas Choniates's sympathy for the Crusade harked back to the general approval it enjoyed at the Komnenian court. In a letter to Abbot Oderisius of Monte Cassino written in 1098 just after the passage of the First Crusade through Constantinople, Alexios I Komnenos regretted that so many crusaders had gone 'to the eternal tabernacles…. but they are blessed, since they met death with the right intention, wherefore we should scarcely consider them dead, but rather living, having departed to the eternal and incorruptible life' (Hagenmeyer, *Kreuzzugsbriefe*, no. XI, 153, par. 5–6). It would be difficult to find a more perceptive and sympathetic presentation of the Crusade ideal, as it was taking shape at the time of the First Crusade. Contrary to received opinion, the Byzantines had no difficulty in understanding the First Crusade. They regarded it as a legitimate manifestation of holy war (Kolbaba, 1998; Kolia-Dermitzaki, 1991 & 2012; Chrissis, 2016, 260–265).

More contentious was the fate of Jerusalem, for its holy places came under Byzantine protection and the appointment of its patriarch was ultimately in the gift of the Byzantine emperor, as the Fatimid caliph had specifically acknowledged in 1027 (Biddle, 1999, 74–88; Pringle, 2007, 10–12). Latin appropriation of the patriarchate of Jerusalem – and for that matter of Antioch – pointed to intractable differences separating Byzantium from the Latin West. Famously, Sir Steven Runciman singled out the Latin appropriation of the patriarchate of Antioch in 1100 as the beginning of the Great Schism (Runciman, 1955, 108). That is how it looks in retrospect, but at the time Byzantine churchmen worked with considerable persistence and subtlety to reach an understanding satisfactory to both Greek and Latin. Central to their thinking was the status of the Church of Jerusalem. In 1112 there was a conference in Constantinople between the Archbishop of Milan Peter Grossolano and various Byzantine divines, one of whom was Niketas Seides. At issue was the question of papal primacy. Seides countered Roman assumptions with a novel proposition: he urged the claims of the Church of Jerusalem to an honorary primacy by virtue of its seniority in terms of its antiquity over all other Churches (Darrouzès, 1965, 51–59; Gahbauer, 1975; Kolbaba, 2001, 126–127). It was a position which put the spotlight on the Church of Jerusalem in the immediate aftermath of the crusader conquest. If in the debates between the two Churches, which occurred after 1204, Byzantine theologians used the primacy of Jerusalem as a way of celebrating Orthodox ecumenicism against Rome's claims to ecclesiastical domination, in the 12th century it was used more as a symbol of the co-operation of the two Churches on terms of rough equality.

This became a *Leitmotif* of Manuel I Komnenos's foreign policy, but it had its roots in the work of his father John II at the end of his reign. Niketas Choniates puts a very interesting deathbed speech into John's mouth, in which he talked of his desire to visit Palestine 'to ascend the mountain of the Lord, as the Psalmist puts it, and to stand in His holy place; justified by the law of war to drive away the encircling enemy, who have often seized the Sepulchre of our Lord, just as in former times the gentiles took the ark by force of arms.' (*πρὸς Παλαιστίνην αὐτήν, ὅπου τὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεως πτῶμα πεσὼν ἀνήγειρεν ὁ Χριστός, ἐπὶ σταυροῦ τὰς χεῖρας διεὶς καὶ μικραῖς ῥανίσι κόσμον ὅλον εἰς ἕνωσιν ἀγαγών, ἀναβῆναι δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ ὄρος Κυρίου, κατὰ τὸν ψάλλοντα, καὶ στῆναι ἐν τόπῳ ἁγίῳ αὐτοῦ, μετελθεῖν δὲ πολέμου νόμῳ καὶ τὸ κύκλῳ πολέμιον, ὅπερ ὡς τὴν πάλαι κιβωτὸν οἱ ἀλλόφυλοι τὴν τοῦ Κυρίου σορὸν πολλάκις εἶλε δορύκτητον*) (Choniates, *Historia*, 42.26–31). Niketas is almost turning the Byzantine emperor into an apologist for the Crusade, but it reflected the climate of opinion at the Komnenian court. Pilgrimage to Jerusalem, which in a Byzantine context had hitherto been a preserve by and large of ascetics (Talbot, 2001) was now taken up in court circles. John's brother Isaac is the first of the Komnenoi known to have made the pilgrimage to Jerusalem. This was in 1136. It can be seen as an act of atonement for his disloyalty to his brother, which made possible their subsequent reconciliation (Kurtz, 'Unedierte Texte', 107–108; Prodromos, *Gedichte,* no. XL, 391–393). In Isaac's wake came a cousin, the monk Adrianos Komnenos, later to become archbishop of Bulgaria. He may have been on a diplomatic mission to the crusader court, but he took the opportunity to make his pilgrimage to the holy places. As the orator Nikephoros Basilakes put it, 'breathing in Christ entire, your [i.e. Adrianos's] whole being was suffused with the Saviour' (Basilakes, *Orationes*, no. 2, 26–48, at 47.11–12; Varzos, 1984, 1:159–169, no.28). The same orator congratulated the Emperor John for making the routes across Anatolia safe for pilgrims (Basilakes, *Orationes,* no. 3, 56.12–17). The emperor himself, as an earnest of his desire to go on pilgrimage to Jerusalem, had a large gold lamp made for presentation to the church of the Holy Sepulchre (Kinnamos, *Epitome*, 25; Kinnamos, *Deeds*, 28–29. Cf. Italikos, *Lettres*, no. 44, 290.1–6).

Manuel I Komnenos was not immediately able to build on his father's work. He was distracted first by the passage of the Second Crusade and then by the threat from the Normans of Sicily, which involved him in a costly and unsuccessful campaign in southern Italy. But from 1158 he was able to pick up the pieces. His donations to Palestinian foundations are well documented (Jotischky, 1995, 65–100; Weyl Carr, 1982). The spirit in which he undertook this work is spelt out most clearly in the mosaic decoration of the church of the Holy Nativity at Bethlehem, which was completed under his auspices in 1169 (Hunt, 1991; Pringle, 1993, 137–56; Jotischky, 1994). The iconography proclaimed the emperor's commitment to ecumenical concord. The devices of ecumenical and local councils, which decorate the walls of the nave to the north and to the south, were an effective declaration of adherence to a common set of beliefs. The church of the Holy Sepulchre might have been a more striking choice for such a declaration but, so soon after the rebuilding and rededication of the church in 1149, this

was surely not practical. The church of the Holy Nativity served almost as well. The fact that it was in Latin hands underlined the theme of reconciliation, which was emphasised still more by its Latin bishop's decision to set up several images of the Emperor Manuel Komnenos, including one in the holy sanctuary above the Cave, which was traditionally Christ's birthplace. Manuel Komnenos's work in Palestine suggests very strongly that he understood Jerusalem as a symbol of the integrity of Christendom, for which, 'as the heir of the crown of Constantine the Great' (Mango, 'Conciliar Edict', 324.5–8), as he styled himself, he bore direct responsibility. In other words, Jerusalem and the holy places mattered to the Byzantine emperor in a way not felt perhaps since Herakleios returned the Holy Rood to Jerusalem in 630.

Something of this comes out in the *Ekphrasis* of the holy places traditionally ascribed to John Phokas (Phokas, *Compendaria Descriptio*, 928; idem, 'Skazanie', 1–28; idem, 'General Description', 315–336), but now known thanks to Haris Messis (Messis, 2011; cf. Külzer, 2003) to have been the work of the Grand Hetaireiarch John Doukas (Stone, 1999), who in 1177 was one of the leaders of a Byzantine embassy to the court of Jerusalem. It must have been completed on his return to Constantinople because Manuel Komnenos is referred to as still living. The stray reference to the late Emperor, Komnenos Porphyrogenitos, is to Manuel's father John (Phokas, *Compendaria Descriptio*, 953C, §24.24–25; idem, 'Skazanie', 24.7; idem, 'General Description', 331)

There are two clear purposes behind the *Ekphrasis*: to emphasise the immediate importance to Byzantium of the holy places and the spiritual value of pilgrimage and to celebrate the work of Manuel Komnenos, which had set a Byzantine stamp on the holy places.

But this view of Jerusalem and the holy places was not the only one current at Manuel Komnenos's court. There are grounds for believing that John Doukas was deliberately trying to counter the impression left by Constantine Manasses of his time spent in Palestine on an earlier diplomatic mission to the court of Jerusalem for Manuel Komnenos (Manasses, 'Hodoiporikon'; Manasses, 'Traveller'; cf. Marcovich, 1987; Malamut, 2010). Constantine Manasses was one of those *literati* who littered the Komnenian court (Magdalino, 1997, 161–164; cf. Nilsson, 2010). He wrote, among other things, a romance – *Aristandros and Kallithea* – as the fashion of the time dictated. It harked back to Achilles Tatios and his romance of *Leukippe and Kleitophon*, which may explain why John Doukas made an otherwise unnecessary allusion to this romance in his *Ekphrasis* of the holy places (Phokas, *Compendaria Descriptio*, 932D, §6.1–2; idem, 'Skazanie', 5.7–8; idem, 'General Description', 318). It looks very much like a veiled reference to his disobliging precursor, who had found almost nothing of value in the Holy Land. Manasses had taken the pilgrim trail to Jericho and the Jordan, but it had left him disillusioned (Manasses, 'Hodoiporikon', 331–333, §1, vv. 218–293; Manasses, 'Traveller', 186–190). He never wished to see Jericho again; not even in his sleep. As for the Jordan, its waters were murky and unfit to drink (Manasses, 'Hodoiporikon', 333, §1, vv. 286–291; Manasses, 'Traveller', 190). Capernaum was an abomination and Nazareth a hellhole (Manasses, 'Hodoiporikon', 333–334,

§1, vv. 294–330; Manasses, 'Traveller', 190–192). How Christ put up with it was quite beyond the comprehension of Manasses, who preferred to put his trust in the city of Byzantium that had nurtured him (Manasses, 'Hodoiporikon', 334–335, §1, vv. 331–336; Manasses, 'Traveller', 192).

Manasses was aiming for comic effect. His appeal was to his audience back in Constantinople, which to his way of thinking was the only place in the world that a civilised man could live. Religion did not come into it. He was not holding up Constantinople as a New Sion, which was on a par, if not superior to, the Old. But that does not mean that there were not others, who did wonder about the relationship of the Old and the New Sion, now that thanks to the crusader conquest the Old had acquired a much higher profile than formerly. This became an issue towards the end of Manuel Komnenos's reign, when his strategy of 'entente' with the West, of which Jerusalem was the emblem, came in for increasing criticism in ecclesiastical circles. One episode, in particular, underlined its fragility. It revolved around Leontios, the Orthodox patriarch of Jerusalem (*Life of Leontios*, 1–11; Rose, 1985; Kaplan, 2004). In 1177 Manuel Komnenos judged that conditions in the crusader kingdom of Jerusalem now favoured the return of the patriarch from exile. He was wrong. Leontios went out with the embassy, of which John Doukas was one of the leaders, but it failed to obtain any official consent for the patriarch to return to the church of the Holy Sepulchre. When he did visit it, he went as a pilgrim, but the Latin clergy, irked by his presence, hatched a plot to assassinate him (*Life of Leontios*, §84–85, 132–134). Seeing how badly things were going, Manuel recalled him to Constantinople, but not before Saladin had got wind of what was happening and invited Leontios to take up residence in Damascus. If the patriarch politely declined the offer, once he was safely back in Constantinople, he handed his correspondence with Saladin over to the emperor, as a way of contrasting the latter's courtesy with the murderous intentions of the Latins (*Life of Leontios*, §87, 134–136). Here were the seeds of a changing attitude towards Saladin at the Byzantine court.

There was also a second episode from the closing years of Manuel Komnenos's reign, which was more innocuous, but less easy to interpret. It concerned John Mesarites, the son of an important official at Manuel's court. In his teens, he found religion and conceived a desire to become a hermit in the Palestinian desert in line with advanced thinking at the imperial court, prompted perhaps by John Doukas's idealisation of Palestinian monasticism. The young man had an accomplice in his tutor, who smuggled him aboard a ship bound for Acre. His father was distraught and begged the emperor to fetch him back, which with remarkable efficiency he did. The reaction at court to the young runaway is given in detail in the funeral speech delivered over his grave by his brother thirty years or more later. We do not have to believe every word put into the mouths of the emperor and of the runaway's father, but they do convey credible responses. The emperor reprimanded him for putting himself at risk among the brutish people he was bound to find abroad (Mesarites, 'Epitaphios', §12, 25–26) and forgetting that the only place for a civilised young man was Constantinople; in other words, he

was setting out the line taken by Constantine Manasses. With greater subtlety, the boy's father urged the claims of Constantinople as a city, which was every bit as holy as Jerusalem. It was sanctified by the presence of the relics of the passion, which he itemised (Mesarites, 'Epitaphios', §13, 27–28). You did not have to run away to Palestine to bask in an aura of sanctity.

The idealisation of pilgrimage to the holy places, as set out in John Doukas's *Ekphrasis*, had the unintended consequence of highlighting the competing claims to sanctity of the Old and New Sion. These were of little consequence, while Manuel Komnenos pursued a policy of détente with the West and sought a Union of the Churches as the basis for cooperation in the shape of a Crusade. However, after the Byzantine defeat at Myriokephalon in 1176, this strategy began to falter. By the turn of the century, Byzantine opinion was placing greater weight on the relics of the passion as the new Ark of the Covenant and on Constantinople as the New Sion (Magdalino, 2004; Lidov, 2012; Patlagean, 1994). It may well have been a delayed reaction to the failure of Manuel Komnenos's policy of détente, but it does not manifest itself until twenty years or more after the death of Manuel Komnenos and then in the writings of one man, Nicholas Mesarites (Kazhdan & Franklin, 1984, 224–255; Angold, 2016a, 55–68), who had a vested interest in the relics of the passion, because he happened to be guardian or *skeuophylax* of the chapel of the Pharos. In other words, we should not forget that the emphasis on the relics of the passion was associated more with the turn of the 12th century and, as much as anything, may have been part of a reaction to the fall of Jerusalem.

After Manuel Komnenos's death, Byzantium went through one of its periodic succession crises (Brand, 1968, 14–116). This was temporarily resolved with Isaac II Angelos's fortuitous ascent to the throne in 1185. Everything suggests that he hoped to resume Manuel Komnenos's style of kingship, which would put a special emphasis on Jerusalem as part of a revival of the alliance with the Frankish states of Outremer. His appointment at the very beginning of his reign of his spiritual mentor Dositheos to the patriarchal throne of Jerusalem suggests that this was indeed the case (Choniates, *Historia*, 405.14–20). However, events conspired to throw him into the arms of Saladin (Brand, 1962, 176–181; Neocleous, 2010 & 2013). The loss of Cyprus to the usurper Isaac Komnenos impeded communications with the crusader states (Choniates, *Historia*, 369–370; Varzos, 1984, no.138, 298–301). Then the new emperor's Latin orientation was compromised by the defection in 1187 of his brother-in-law Conrad of Montferrat. The latter's marriage to Isaac Angelos's sister the year before was at the centre of the emperor's overtures to the West (Choniates, *Historia*, 382–384, 394–395).

At first sight, it looks as though Dositheos might have been chosen as Orthodox patriarch of Jerusalem in the expectation that his Venetian birth would recommend him to the Franks of Outremer (Choniates, *Historia*, 405.15–16). But any such hope was overtaken by events. Less than two years after Dositheos became its patriarch, Jerusalem fell to Saladin. It necessitated a reappraisal of Byzantine policy, which became all the more urgent when a Crusade to recover Jerusalem began to take shape. At the Byzantine court, opinion divided between those who urged support for the Crusade, and those headed by Dositheos, who counselled

opposition to the passage of the German Crusade under Frederick Barbarossa through Byzantine territories. There has never been a convincing explanation for his venomously anti-crusade stance. Niketas Choniates makes it very clear that Dositheos was behind Isaac Angelos's decision to contest the passage of the German crusaders (Choniates, *Historia*, 404.1–13). It cannot, in the first instance, have been a matter of the patriarch acting purely and simply as a propagandist of imperial policy, because it was still in the process of being worked out. It is far more likely his opposition to the Third Crusade reflected the opinion of his clergy, who resided with him in exile at Constantinople. Its members were still smarting at the treatment handed out by the Latins to his predecessor Leontios. Now that his hopes of reviving Manuel Komnenos's policies were in tatters and there was the prospect of German crusaders marching through the Byzantine empire, the grievances of the patriarchate of Jerusalem, dressed up as an opportunity to liberate Palestine (Choniates, *Historia*, 432.69–73), seemed to offer Isaac Angelos new avenues to explore. These pointed to an understanding with Saladin, who had, in any case, recently helped him to rescue his brother Alexios from a Frankish jail (Brand, 1962, 169–70).

Isaac's main bargaining counter was the mosque in Constantinople (Reinert, 1998, 140–143), where the *khutba* was still intoned in the name of the Fatimid caliph, whom Saladin had overthrown. Saladin was happy to take up Isaac's offer that the mosque should return to an Abbasid allegiance. In the summer of 1189, he sent a *minbar* or pulpit to adorn the mosque at Constantinople, as a way of emphasising its return to the Abbasid caliphate (Bahâ' al-Din, *Saladin*, 121–122). In his correspondence with Saladin Isaac claimed that he had done all he could to impede the passage of the German crusaders through his empire. Saladin and his advisers were unimpressed. They calculated that Isaac's overtures to Saladin had only been made out of fear of Frederick Barbarossa. They therefore turned down the request made by Isaac after the death of Frederick Barbarossa for the return of the church of the Holy Sepulchre to the Orthodox clergy and for possession of the Holy Rood, which had fallen into Saladin's hands after the battle of Hattin (Bahâ' al-Din, *Saladin*, 201–202). Isaac had absolutely nothing to show for his opposition to the passage of the Third Crusade. He had been comprehensively outplayed: humiliated militarily by Frederick Barbarossa and diplomatically by Saladin.

Isaac waited until the break-up of the Third Crusade before replying to Pope Celestine III's request to reopen negotiations on the Union of the Churches. We can infer from the emperor's letter something of his reaction to the fall of Jerusalem to Saladin. He admitted that it pained him to see the holy places in the possession of the impious and infidel, but then had the gall to blame this on the rivalries of the crusade leaders which had brought down God's wrath (Tornikes, *Lettres*, 341.20–26). Already a connection is being made between the loss of Jerusalem and the moral failings of the crusaders. But this was far from being universally accepted by Byzantine opinion. There was opposition to the emperor's decision to challenge the passage of the Third Crusade through the empire. It is reflected in Niketas Choniates's account of these events, which depicts the German Emperor Frederick Barbarossa in heroic terms and conveys the underlying spirituality of

the Crusade with great sympathy (Choniates, *Historia*, 416–417). With Byzantine opinion divided over the Third Crusade it is easy to understand why the immediate reaction to the fall of Jerusalem to Saladin was so muted. It was not a sign of indifference; it was a function of contention and uncertainty within Byzantine political society.

This political climate explains why it was only after the crusader conquest of Constantinople that there was definitive expression of Byzantine views on the fall of Jerusalem. In retrospect, it could be fitted to a pattern that culminated in 1204. This, as we have seen, is what Niketas Choniates did, but making this connection even more trenchantly was the exiled Patriarch of Constantinople John X Kamateros, who shortly before his death in 1206, wrote a tract entitled: 'On the harm done to us by the Latins'. (Arsenij, *Tri stat'i*, 84–115) It dismisses them as tomb robbers for their depredations in Constantinople and contrasts this with their claim to be venerators of the Lord's sepulchre. It casts doubt on the sincerity of their professed desire to rescue Jerusalem from the Muslims. The patriarch goes on: 'It is your wish to wrest Ailia – Jerusalem, in other words – from the Arabs. Wherefore Christ allowed your "carcasses to be scattered in the wilderness" (Heb. 3, 17), knowing that [His] Sepulchre would be a cause of trouble and that possession of Constantinople would become an issue.' (*Ἐπιποθία δὲ ὑμῖν ἀποσπᾶσαι τὴν Αἰλίαν ἐκ τῶν Ἀράβων. Διὸ καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς, εἰδὼς ὡς Τάφος μὲν προβληματιζόμενον, τὸ δὲ ὑποκαθήμενον ἡ τῆς Πόλεως ἀναζήτησις ἀφῆκε καταστρωθῆναι τα κῶλα ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ.*) (Arsenij, *Tri stat'i*, 85.20–28). The quotation from St Paul's epistle to the Hebrews, which the patriarch applies to the crusaders, is worth giving in full: 'But with whom was he grieved forty years? Was it not with them that had sinned, whose carcasses were scattered in the wilderness?' (Heb. 3, 17). St Paul is, of course, referring to the children of Israel and their forty years in the wilderness, but the patriarch is using it to bring out the meaning of the defeats suffered by the crusaders, first at the hands of the Muslims at the battle of Hattin and then at the hands of the Bulgarians at the battle of Adrianople. They were the wages of sin, as the patriarch makes clear a little further on: 'Not so long ago you were driven from Jerusalem by the Arab. Does that mean that the Arabs are stronger in their faith than your Church and its leader? But the Scythian and the Bulgarian also overcame you and slaughtered you. Does that mean that they are holier than you are?' (*Ἐδιώχθης καὶ σὺ ἐκ τῆς Ἱερουσαλὴμ οὐ πρὸ πολλοῦ. Ὁ διώξας Ἄραψ. Ἆρα κατὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς οἱ Ἄραβες τῆς σῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ τοῦ προέδρου ταύτης ἀμείνονες τὴν πίστιν. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Σκύθης καὶ ὁ Βούλγαρος κατηυμεγέθησέ σου, κατέσφαξέ σε. Ἄρα σοῦ ἱερώτερος.*) (Arsenij, *Tri stat'i*, 90.10–20). The meaning is clear: the sins of the crusaders deprived the Crusade of its moral value. We can understand this in the case of Constantinople. This is what the patriarch means when he says that 'possession of Constantinople would become an issue', but what could he have meant by the Holy Sepulchre becoming a cause of trouble? It is possible that he has the rivalries of the leaders of the Third Crusade in mind, but that fails to make sense of 'leaving your carcasses scattered in the wilderness', given that in purely military terms the Third Crusade was rather successful. Hattin is the best, perhaps the only context, to

which it can apply. In that case, the patriarch must in all likelihood be referring to the rival claims of Orthodox and Latin to the church of the Holy Sepulchre, which as a result failed to act as a symbol of a united Christendom. Instead of uniting Christendom the Crusades divided it with a series of terrible consequences, which revealed their lack of moral value, beginning with the fall of Jerusalem to Saladin.

Byzantine eyes were opened. The Crusade no longer commanded the respect that it once enjoyed. There was deep contempt for those who bore the cross on their shoulders. In the words of Niketas Choniates: ‘Still more [to blame] were those who bore the cross on their shoulders (*τὸ δὲ πλέον, οἱ τὸν σταυρὸν ἐπ’ ὤμων ἀράμενοι καὶ πολλάκις κατὰ τούτου…*). They were exposed as frauds. Seeking to avenge the Holy Sepulchre they raged openly against Christ and criminally encompassed the destruction of the Cross by means of the cross they bore on their backs!’ (*Ὄντως λογοποιοὶ ἐξεφάνθησαν καὶ τοῦ θείου τάφου διφῶντες ἐκδίκησιν κατὰ Χριστοῦ προδήλως ἐλύττησαν καὶ μετὰ σταυροῦ τὴν τοῦ σταυροῦ κατάλυσιν ἠνομήκασιν, ὃν ἐπινώτιον ἔφερον.*) (Choniates, *Historia*, 575–76. Choniates’s words were echoed by Nicholas Mesarites, who concluded his account of the sack of Constantinople as follows: ‘Such was the reverence displayed towards the things of God by those, who bore the cross of our Lord on their shoulder.’ (*τοιοῦτον τὸ σέβας περὶ τὰ θεῖα τῶν ἐπ’ῷμον ἀραμένων τὸν τοῦ κυρίου σταυρὸν*) (Mesarites, ‘Epitaphios’, 47, 1–2). Mesarites also took to task those who bore the cross of our Lord on their shoulder, for their sacrilegious use of the oath ‘by the holy sepulchre’ (Mesarites, ‘Katechetikos Logos’, 27.22–29), which was also the battle cry of the armies of the Latin Empire of Constantinople (Henri de Valenciennes, *Histoire*, §539). Mesarites was employing sarcasm to demonstrate how nonsensical the ideal of the Crusade had become in Byzantine eyes.

Admittedly, it took the sack of Constantinople to bring into perspective the fall of Jerusalem to Saladin; and it was only after 1204 that the Byzantines became critical of the ideas and practices which sustained the Crusade. In his ‘Griefs against the Latins’ Constantine Stilbes, the bishop of Kyzikos, presented Latin Christianity in a new light (Stilbes, ‘La mémoire’; Angold, 1989, 67–69; Kolbaba, 2000, 32–87). It had been perverted by its espousal and promotion of war, at the heart of which lay the Crusade. He pointed to the use of indulgences, which made possible the forgiveness not only of past sins and crimes but also of those still to be committed (Stilbes, ‘La mémoire’, 69.133–142). He pointed to the way those dying in battle were supposed to go directly to heaven, which may have had no canonical foundation, but was widely believed by those participating in the Crusades (ibid., 77.273–275). He also claimed that bishops sprinkled naked youths with holy water, which turned them into invincible warriors (ibid., 67.106–109). This may be a garbled version of the making of a knight. There was a section of the treatise which dealt with the excesses of the crusaders during the sack of Constantinople. Stilbes paid special attention to one bishop carrying the cross before him, who played a prominent role in the storming of the city (ibid., 84.400–403). This was proof, if proof was needed, of the perversion of Latin Christianity. Echoing this was Nicholas Mesarites, who observed: ‘Thus did their

own bishops teach them to behave! How would you describe them – Bishops, who are soldiers, or warriors, who are bishops?' (Mesarites, 'Epitaphios', 47.2–4)

To the fall of Jerusalem in 1187, the ideal of the Crusade not only had the general approval of Byzantine opinion, but it also provided a framework for co-operation between Byzantium and the crusader states; and more generally between Byzantium and the West. Though it took time to articulate the precise meaning of the fall of Jerusalem, the difficulties encountered by Isaac II Angelos in his handling of the Third Crusade revealed in a practical way the loss of understanding and trust between crusaders and Byzantines, now that Jerusalem was gone. It was as though from a Byzantine perspective the Crusade had lost its merit. In retrospect, the loss of Jerusalem magnified the enormity of what was done in 1204 and convinced Byzantine opinion that the Crusade was the prime expression of a faith perverted by its addiction to violence.

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Part III

Cross-cultural Contacts in the Margins of East and West

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11 Admiral Eugenius of Sicily (12th century)

Court poetry and political propaganda in a cross-cultural environment

Eleni Tounta

When the Normans conquered Southern Italy and Sicily in the 11th century, they imposed their rule over a region marked by the co-existence of three different cultural communities: the Lombards, the Italo-Greeks and the Muslims. From the 7th century onwards a variety of political processes had created in the Italian *Mezzogiorno* a framework of symbiosis between these communities which, their conflicts notwithstanding, developed channels of communication and exchange that led to various forms of political and cultural interaction (Kreuz, 1991; Loud, 2000, 12–59; Metcalfe, 2003, 1–30; Peters-Custot, 2009, 85–221). The conquests and the consolidation of Norman rule in the Duchy of Apulia under Robert Guiscard (1059–1085) and the County of Sicily under his brother Roger I (1071–1101) did not challenge the cultural background of the conquered communities. It has been argued that since the newcomers formed a minority and were also warriors with no skills in running the administration of their political entities, out of necessity they adopted the already existing administrative systems relying on Italo-Greek and Muslim officials (von Falkenhausen, 2013, 57–59).

Although this argument is no doubt true, it is likely that other profound political reasons also led the Norman rulers, members of a single family—the Hautevilles—to count on this cultural variety. These reasons should be sought in the conflicts between the Norman rulers and their magnates, especially the Southern Italian ones, and the Holy See, the overlord of the Norman dominions, which began to escalate in the 12th century when Count Roger II (1105–1154), Roger I's son, after having united the County of Sicily with the Duchy of Apulia (1128), became king (1130). In order to acquire the necessary socio-political basis for the consolidation of their power, the Hautevilles sought to create for their subjects—regardless of their cultural roots—a common identity based on political allegiance to the new rulers. From Roger II's reign onwards both the political identification of the cultural communities with the royal dynasty and the emergence of Sicily as the royal administrative centre became the basic components of a distinct Sicilian identity which was strongest in Sicily itself and in Calabria, the dominions that had constituted the County of Sicily (Tounta, 2012, 95–129, 134–148; Tounta, 2013). Within this framework, the Norman rulers adopted the political and symbolical imagery of the Byzantines and Arabs in order to shape forms of self-representation that would not only be recognisable to their

Italo-Greek and Arab subjects but would also enable them to assert their rule over their vassals, the kingdom's magnates and their overlord, the Holy See.

This policy created a multicultural and multilingual environment that at the king's court and administrative centre in Palermo in particular assumed a transcultural form, at least until the middle of the 12th century, when the Latin culture gradually started to gain ground (Houben, 2013, 19–33). Under the reign of Roger II the Greek language was predominant at the court, as may be deduced from the charters issued, both public and private (von Falkenhausen, 1998, 253–308). Royal coins bore Byzantine, Arab and Latin forms at the same time and were thus marked by a high degree of cultural hybridisation (Mallette, 2011, 32–36), and the same can be argued for the royal buildings (Tronzo, 1997; Britt, 2007). Moreover, Italo-Greeks and Arabs shaped the intellectual quests of the court, which also exhibited a significant translation activity, since philosophical and scientific texts were rendered from Greek and Arabic into Latin (Houben, 2002, 98–100).

The present chapter focuses on the construction of power discourses—an essential part of politics—in this multi- and transcultural environment in order to discuss two interrelated issues raised by these special cultural conditions of the Palermitan court. The first concerns transculturality in the field of the expression of political ideas, while the second concerns the act of communication itself. Unlike court officials who were to a significant degree bi- or even trilingual, the kings themselves and their Latin magnates had no command of Greek or Arabic (Metcalfe, 2003, 102–105). This fact did not prevent Greek and Arabic speakers from writing in their own languages court poetry which, as far as the construction of power discourses is concerned, contributed to the shaping of royal self-representations. In what way could these poems have been understood and, therefore, succeeded in their performative function?

More specifically, the study focuses on two court poems written in Greek by Eugenius of Sicily, a Greek-speaking native of Sicily. Eugenius (c. 1130–1202) was descended from an Italo-Greek family from Troina (in north-eastern Sicily) that settled in Palermo in the 12th century. His family must have been of political importance, since his grandfather and namesake, Eugenius, and his father, John, had held the office of admiral. No information has reached us about Eugenius's education and early court career. From 1174 to 1189 he was the head of the *duana baronum* (*magister duane baronum*), a branch administrative office in Salerno in charge of royal lands and properties in Southern Italy, with the exception of Calabria. In 1190 he received the title of admiral from King Tancred (1189–1194) and his office remained confined to fiscal functions in Southern Italy. When Emperor Henry VI (1190–1197) invaded Sicily in 1194 to conquer his 'dowry dominion' as a result of his marriage to Constance, the last heiress of the Hautevilles, Eugenius was accused of conspiracy and was imprisoned in Trifels Castle in Germany. He was released in the same year to resume administrative functions in Southern Italy. Moreover, Eugenius was a man of letters, a poet and a translator, being certainly trilingual. He wrote twenty-four poems in Greek, in the Byzantine iambic twelve-syllable metric form. He translated Ptolemy's *Optic* from Arabic into Latin, the so-called *Vaticinium Sibyllae Erithreae* from Greek

into Latin and he amended the Greek translation of *Stephanites kai Ichnelates*, a collection of Persian fables (von Falkenhausen, 1993; Cupane, 2013, 249–253). His literary activity indicates the close relationship between the Italo-Greeks and Byzantine culture and the importance of the Greek-speaking school of philosophy and rhetoric in Palermo (Houben, 2002, 100–102) in which Eugenius—one can hazard this hypothesis—had probably been trained.

The poems under consideration may have been written in the second half of the 12th century during the reign of William I (1154–1166) and they most likely represented Eugenius's attempt to enter and become established at the royal court. The first poem (Eugenii Panormitani, *Versus Iambici*, poem XXIV, 127–131) is addressed to 'the most glorious and victorious King William' (ibid., Inscriptio, 127: *πρὸς τὸν ἐνδοξότατον τροπαιοῦχον ῥῆγα Γουλιέλμον*) and it is, unsurprisingly, a warm encomium of King William I.[1] It is in this poem that the poet calls himself '*philosophos* and nephew of the admiral Basileios' (Ibid., Inscriptio, 127: *Στίχοι Εὐγενίου φιλοσόφου, ἀνεψιοῦ Βασιλείου τοῦ ἀμηρᾶ*), thus showing his main qualification for a court career. The second poem is titled 'On kingship' (Eugenii Panormitani, *Versus Iambici*, Poem XXI, 113–117) and, at first sight, it appears to be a verse treatise on monarchy. Both are written in Greek, in the Byzantine iambic twelve-syllable metric form. Moreover, they attracted the attention of Evelyn Jamison, who interpreted them in accordance with her basic—yet not accepted by the research—argument that the admiral had also been the author of the *Liber de regno Siciliae*, a narrative on the history of the kingdom between 1154 and 1169 (Jamison, 1957, 61–69).

On reading the encomium, the reader will be reminded of the Byzantine-style rhetoric and iconographic representations of King Roger II (Puccia, 2009, 240–255).[2] The editor of the poem, Marcello Gigante, has clearly pointed out that the praise is structured around the motifs and vocabulary of contemporary Byzantine court poetry, in accordance with the rules of epideictic rhetoric followed by the Byzantines.[3] The poem starts by affirming the king's omnipotence over the natural world, land, sea and sky, since his command was created and approved by God Himself (v. 1–7). There follows a comparison to the sun that goes down at the sight of the shining king, and to the sky that cannot match the king in height (v. 8–15). In conformity with the rules of rhetoric, the admiral presents Fortune as recognising William's power and surrendering to him (v. 16–17). After a reference to his full array of virtues and his outward appearance, William is presented as being more glorious than his ancestors (v. 18–35). The encomium goes on to praise the king for his administration of justice (v. 36–39), his military virtues and the fear he inspires in his enemies (v. 40–55), for his securing the peace and protection of orthodoxy, for his mercifulness, his wisdom (v. 56–75), and even for the architecture of his palace, for which he is compared to the ancient Cretan King Minos (v. 76–78). According to the poet, the king is exalted even by Momus, the Greek god of censure (v. 79–81).

The encomium culminates in a comparison that alludes to the schema of the four empires, thus investing the king with imperial prerogatives: 'Rome and City of Constantine, remain silent and cease your former clamor. Caesars have been

sent far away into the darkness, since the rising Sicilian light extinguishes thy lamp and vainglory. You, Macedon, know thyself and make way; here is something superior, recognise it, even though you may be unwilling. You, Cyrus, withdraw so as not to show your poverty' (v. 83–89: *Λήξατε Ῥώμη καὶ πόλις Κωνσταντίνου, / σιγᾶτε καὶ παύσασθε τῶν πάλαι κρότων, / Καίσαρας ἐκπέμψασα μακρὰν ἐν σκότει. / Σβέννυσιν ὑμῶν τὸν λύχνον καὶ τὸν τῦφον / τὸ Σικελικὸν ἔξαν ατεῖλαν σέλας. / Γίνωσκε σαυτόν, Μακεδών, τόπον δίδου· / ἰδού τι κρεῖττον, στέργε κἂν ἀκουσίως. / Ἐγγωνιάζου, Κῦρε, μὴ φανῇς πένης·*). Eugenius continues to exalt the king above all heroes (v. 90–94) and concludes his poem with a *polychronion* (v. 95–98) and states that the other 'basileis' offer gifts and tributes to the Sicilian 'basileus', since they recognise that he is worthy to rule (v. 99–102).

It would be pointless to perceive the poem merely as a display of flattery intended to secure royal favour for its author. Through the forms and strategies of epideictic oratory Eugenius depicts a concrete image of the sovereign which the king should endorse in order to confirm the characteristics attributed to him and persuade his subjects to accept his real power. The performative function of the text, therefore, is aimed not only at the person represented but also at the receivers of this ideal royal image, who should be identified with the kingdom's magnates, since it is primarily their political stance that should be affected.[4] The Byzantine political imagery of the omnipotent *basileus* corresponded to the political relations prevailing at that time in the kingdom. The peculiar conditions under which the Norman conquests had taken place, meaning the overlordship of the Roman Church, gave rise to a political system that diverged from the Western medieval norms of the *konsensuale Herrschaft* in which the magnates participated in the governance of the kingdom (Schneidmüller, 2000). The first count of Sicily, Roger I, instituted for his dominion the hereditary succession, since he was a direct vassal of the Duke of Apulia and not of the Holy See which, nevertheless, recognised the *ius hereditarium* for the county. When his son and the next count, Roger II, assumed the ducal office in 1128, after the childless death of Duke William I (1111–1127), and annexed the Duchy of Apulia to the County of Sicily, the principle of hereditary succession was consequently taken to include his new territory. When he was elevated to the kingship in 1130, the kingdom's magnates lost much of their political power, since they had no right to elect their ruler. It was for this reason that the Southern Italian magnates had already contested Roger II's claims on the ducal office and expressed their dissatisfaction by rebelling against him. Not even Roger II's royal coronation was able to restrain them from uprisings that continued for almost ten more years (Houben, 2002, 41–75; Deér, 1972, 164–211). His son and successor, William I, also had to face their fierce opposition in the years 1155–56 and 1160, since he stopped convening assemblies, thus reducing their political power even more (Chalandon, 1907, 199–235, 262–290; Delogu, 1983, 197–198).

Violence was not the only means by which the kings addressed the rebellions. 'Battles' were also waged on the field of propaganda, that is to say, through textual representations with a high performative value, since they created both

for the represented agents and for the receivers specific socio-political roles which should govern their political stances.[5] It is within this framework that the *laudes regis* addressed by Eugenius to William I should be perceived.[6] Eugenius, acquainted with the Byzantine political culture, understood the political relations of the Norman Kingdom of Sicily and translated them into a Byzantine poetic language which was capable of intervening in these relations to the king's benefit. The Byzantine motifs of royal omnipotence over nature, the king's specific relation to God, who permits this omnipotence, and the comparison to, or inclusion in, the schema of the four empires strengthen the royal prerogatives and legitimise the king's centralised power over his vassals.

As has already been said, Eugenius was not the first to introduce into Sicilian political culture motifs characteristic of Byzantine political language. In this regard, it would be useful to focus on the Italo-Greek monk and preacher Philagathos Kerameus (probably d. 1154) and on the sermon he had given in the Capella Palatina on the feast of Saints Peter and Paul (c. 1143–1153), in which he had exalted Roger II's rule and had praised him for his merits, including his construction of the royal chapel.[7] The Italo-Greek preacher addresses Roger II as 'basileus' and implicitly defines the hierarchical order that should be observed between the king and his subjects. At the top of this hierarchy is omnipotent God, since the king is presented as the only protector and benefactor of the people below Him: 'The first cause of all these is God from Whom derives and by Whom is done anything of benefit to human beings. The second is the pious, redeeming and clement king, when he takes care of his subjects' (Filagato da Cerami, *Omelie*, sermon XXVII, 174: *Τούτων δὲ πάντων αἴτιος τὰ μὲν πρῶτα Θεός, παρ' οὗ πᾶν ὅ τι χρηστὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις προῆλθε καὶ γίνεται, δεύτερον δὲ βασιλεὺς εὐσεβῆς, σωτήρ, εὐμενής, ὅτε τοὺς ὑπηκόους ὁρᾷ*). In concluding his sermon, Philagathos wishes that 'Christ, who gave him the royal power, may maintain his sceptre in peace and tranquility' (Filagato da Cerami, *Omelie*, 182: *Τούτῳ τὰ σκῆπτρα διατηρήσοι ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ γαληνότητι ὁ δοὺς αὐτῷ τὸ κράτος Χριστός*).

However, what distinguishes Eugenius from the other Italo-Greek writers is that he also exploited concepts of political philosophy to form political discourses. His second court poem, possibly written after William I's death on the occasion of the succession of his son William II, far from being a simple treatise on kingship, is closely related to William's encomium, as far as its performative function is concerned. At the end of the poem, the author addresses a number of 'akroatai' (listeners) who, I firmly believe, should be identified with magnates of the kingdom whose attitude towards the royal power Eugenius seeks to manipulate.[8] Unlike the encomium, this poem draws on ancient Greek and Roman, as well as on medieval political philosophy. This 'eclecticism' is revealing of the cross-cultural environment of the court and, of course, of Eugenius's erudition.

The author starts his poem by explaining the origins of social life:

> When the original creation of our first two parents increased into a widely dispersed multitude, it seemed to the disadvantage of human nature,

> weaker than that of all the other creatures bred upon the earth, to lead an utterly solitary life. For truly this is natural only to God, who cannot be affected by suffering or want, and to the cruel state of the beasts, whose lot it is to dwell in the wilderness. Wherefore associations of men grew up, households, city-states, unions of people, so that each might render mutual aid and afford to kinsfolk and neighbours at call of need that active help without which no man can support life. (v. 1–14: Τῆς πρωτοπλάστου τῶν γεναρχῶν δυάδος / αὐξουμένης εἰς πλῆθος ἐσκεδασμένων, / οὐ συμφέρειν ἔδοξε τῇ βροτῶν φύσει, / ἣν γαῖα πάντων ἀσθενεστέραν τρέφει, / ἕκαστον ἄγειν ἰδιαίτατον βίον. / Καὶ γὰρ Θεοῦ πέφυκε τοῦτο καὶ μόνου / ἀνενδεοῦς τελοῦντος ἀπαθοῦς ὅλως, / ἢ τῆς ἀπηνοῦς ἕξεως τῶν θηρίων / οἰκεῖν λαχόντων τοὺς ἀνημέρους τόπους. / Ἐντεῦθεν οὖν ἄθροισις ἐθνῶν ἐξέφυ, / οἶκοι πόλεις τε καὶ λαῶν συναυλίαι, / ὡς ἄλλος ἄλλῳ τὴν βοήθειαν νέμοι, / ἀρωγὸς ὀφθεὶς συγγενῶν ἢ γειτόνων, / χρείας καλούσης, ἧς ἄνευ οὐδεὶς μένει).[9]

Abandoning the Aristotelian idea of human sociability, Eugenius seems to draw on Platonic doctrines about human frailty as the driving force behind the formation of social entities.[10] Yet, the reference to human weakness, placed after the fall of Adam and Eve, echoes the biblical doctrine on human imperfections caused by original sin. This would have helped Eugenius's audience to understand his argument better.

Nevertheless, Eugenius continues, social life was characterised by internal strife, perils and misfortunes (v. 16–18). In these circumstances, 'the foresight of prudent men made provision for this and found a twofold remedy: the one derived from monarchy and the other from aristocracy' (v. 15, 19–21: *Προεῖδεν ἡ πρόνοια τῶν ἐχεφρόνων· / ... φάρμακον εὗρε τῶν δε τῶν παθημάτων / διπλοῦν, τὸ μὲν προκύπτον ἐκ μοναρχίας, / τὸ δὲ προϊὸν ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας*).[11] In these verses the poet outlines the beginnings of civil life, meaning politically organised social life. What captures our attention is the reference to prudent men who invented the forms of government derived from monarchy and aristocracy. Such a theory has no origin in ancient Greek thought since, according to Aristotelian doctrine, the first political communities were founded by heroic lawgivers (Aristotle, *Politics*, 1260 b–1274 b). It rather echoes a Ciceronian idea which, as expressed in *De Inventione* and *De Oratore*, had ascribed both the genesis of social life and its political organisation to wise orators who, by virtue of their wisdom and eloquence, persuaded humans, who had previously lived like beasts, to form civilised communities. From the first half of the 12th century onwards, scholastics were dealing with the Ciceronian orator and his social role, albeit in the field of rhetorical studies. However, after the middle of the 13th century, civic growth placed this discussion in the context of politics, highlighting rhetoric as the science of governing (Nederman, 1992, 75–95). If his audience were able to make the connection between the 'prudent men' and the orators, Eugenius could, through this argument, secure his own place at the court and increase his persuasive capacity. Whatever the case may have been, Eugenius's intellectual choice testifies to his

knowledge of contemporary Latin thought and therefore the cross-culturality of the Palermitan court.

The reference to two instead of the three forms of government established by Aristotle may have been drawn from Plato (Jamison, 1957, 66; Gigante in Eugenii Panormitani, *Versus Iambici*, 114). Whatever the case, from a historical perspective it is important to associate this passage with the political relations in the Sicilian kingdom, as they had been shaped by the tensions between the centralised royal power and the nobility's ambitions. While monarchy was a reality, the reference to aristocracy, although no such system of government existed in the Middle Ages, was intended for the kingdom's magnates who were fighting, even by force of arms, to increase their political role in accordance with Western medieval norms. A mention of the 'politeia', the third form of government, would have been rhetorically useless since it was not a concept that would have been understood by the poem's audience.

The description of the two forms of government that follows is revealing of Eugenius's aim and narrative strategies: 'For never could mortal nature prosper unless it were to bow to one or other of these forms of government. Every people in fact is guided into greater security either by the good counsel of the best of the citizens or by the authority of a king with sovereign power' (v. 22–26: *οὐ γὰρ ποτ' εὐπράξειε γηγενῶν φῦλα, / μὴ θατέρῳ κύπτοντα τῶν εἰρημένων· / ἢ γὰρ ἀρίστων ἀστικῶν εὐβουλίας / ἰθύνεται πᾶς δῆμος ἀσφαλεστέρως / ἢ βασιλικῆς ἐν κράτει σκηπτουχίας*).[12] It is the term *εὐβουλία* (good counsel), which the author links to aristocracy, that prompts me to argue that Eugenius is seeking to converse with the kingdom's magnates. This term alludes to *consilium* (counsel), which as a practice was an essential component of the *Konsensuale Herrschaft*. Medieval kings ruled their kingdoms jointly with the most important magnates, who were the king's vassals. Their participation in the government of the kingdom was legitimised by their sworn feudal obligation to offer to their lord *consilium et auxilium* – counsel and military assistance. From the end of the 10th century onwards, the magnates, especially in the French kingdom, succeeded in imposing hereditary succession on their feudal bonds with the kings, thus enhancing their political role (Ullmann, 1961, 117–211). As has already been stated, this was not the case in the Kingdom of Sicily. Nevertheless, Eugenius intentionally presents the two forms of government as equivalent, even if he balances two totally different political concepts: *εὐβουλία*, meaning the participation of the magnates in the government of the kingdom, and *βασιλικὴ ἐν κράτει σκηπτουχία*, that is to say, royal sovereignty. In this way he captures both the attention and the *benevolentia* of his listeners, thus manipulating the magnates' stance towards the royal power. The following verses support this argument.

Eugenius abruptly abandons the concept of aristocracy and declares his intention to 'describe the image of the newly crowned king' (v. 27–28). Before that, however, he tells us that he is going to illustrate his argument by drawing an analogy with animals and for this reason he uses a metaphor about shepherds and their flocks probably drawn from Plato (Jamison, 1957, 67; Gigante in Eugenii Panormitani, *Versus Iambici*, 114–115): 'The shepherd of the flock is not chosen

from it (for the ram does not pasture the sheep, nor the bull drive the herd of cows), but from a race as much higher and more excellent as is the difference between a rational being and a dumb animal … In the same way our own rulers should in truth be of a nobler order' (v. 30–34, 39–40: *ὧν ποιμενάρχας οὐκ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ληπτέους / ἔγνωμεν (οὐκ ὄϊς γὰρ ὁ κριὸς νέμει, / οὐ βουκολεῖ βοῶν δὲ ταῦρος ἀγέλην), / ἀλλ' ἐκ γένους προὔχοντος, ὑπερκειμένου, / ὅσῳ λογικὸν ἀλόγου διαφέρει· … Ἐχρῆν μὲν οὖν γε τοὺς παρ' ἡμῖν κοιράνους / τάγματος εἶναι μᾶλλον ἐξ ὑπερτέρου*).[13]

In the following verses he explains his previous statement: 'But since it is not possible for us to reach up a higher sphere nor to bring down from Heaven immaterial supramundane princes to be our kings, we appoint out of necessity from among ourselves these present governors to rule with our consent' (v. 43–47: *Ἐπεὶ δὲ χωρεῖν ἔνθεν οὐκ ἔνι πρόσω / μηδ' ἀύλους ἄνακτας ὑπερκοσμίους / ἄγειν μοναρχή<σον>τας ὑψόθεν κάτω, / τούτους ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡγμένους / ἄρχειν ἐφ' ἡμῖν τάττομεν πεπεισμένοις*).[14] The 'we' of the poet obviously refers to the magnates, the noble order of society, who are presented as choosing their ruler from among themselves and consenting to his power. Given the institution of hereditary succession in the Sicilian kingdom, the reference to the appointment of the king by the magnates and their subsequent *consensus* to his rule probably intends to create a sort of familiarity between them and the king, who is presented as emerging from their superior *ordo*. Nevertheless, the idea of the consensual exercise of power has been implicitly abolished through the comparison of the king with the shepherd and his subjects with the flock. The hierarchical power relations between kings and magnates are further accentuated by the rational-irrational schema which determines the shepherd-flock metaphor.

After a reference to the virtues that rulers should display, such as temperance, justice, mercy, prudence, affability (v. 48–66), the last few verses summarise the poet's main argument and reveal his political goal: 'In short, I would say, even if I seem to be saying something hard for my listeners to accept, that the ruler needs to bear towards his subjects and they again towards him such a relationship as the one existing between shepherds and flocks, that is to say, as I maintain, between rational and irrational beings' (v. 67–73: *Ὡς συντεμὼν εἴποιμι, κἂν δοκῶ λέγειν / τοῖς ἀκροαταῖς πρᾶγμα δυσχερὲς ἄγαν, / χρὴ τὸν κρατοῦντα τοῖον ὑπέχειν λόγον / πρὸς τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτὸν συμπαραβεβλημένους / -αὐτοὺς δὲ πάλιν τῷδε συγκεκριμένους- / ὁποῖός ἐστι ποιμένων καὶ ποιμνίων, / ἤτοι λογικῶν φημι καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων*).[15] The magnates, even if it is hard for them to accept, should surrender to their 'shepherd', or they will perish. The performative function of the poem lies in its capacity to produce knowledge which organises socio-political life. The poem constitutes an epistemic, political discourse which consolidates the established power relations, since it incorporates them in a well-structured theoretical framework on the genesis and development of civil life. The metaphor of the shepherd emerges as the central argument of this theory because of its high symbolic value. Despite its ancient Eastern Mediterranean origins, it is integral to the medieval theological-political imagery, legitimising strictly hierarchical power relations (Foucault, 2007, 169–240). Through this generated knowledge the poem can

influence the way its listeners perceive both the royal power and their own place in the kingdom's political community, thus stabilising the existing hierarchy.

Both of the poems under consideration reflect the political situation that had been created in the kingdom by the conflicts between the kings and the magnates; their common aim is to consolidate the prevailing power relations to the king's benefit. Their performative function consists in shaping the political attitudes of both the king and the magnates by influencing the way in which these agents perceive the power relations. The first poem achieves its purpose through the encomiastic literary form by creating images of the royal power to which both the sovereign and his subjects should conform. The second creates a discourse upon the genesis and the nature of monarchy that the king can use in order to control the political life of the kingdom. Both poems are representative of the Sicilian court's transculturality. The author, a Greek-speaking Italo-Greek with a good command of Latin and Arabic, is able to manage different cultural systems. Motifs and vocabulary of Byzantine court poetry and rhetoric, ancient Greek and Roman political thought, and Western medieval political imagery are creatively combined to meet and to mould the expectations and mental horizons of his audience.

Let us now turn to the second question posed at the beginning of the chapter, which concerns the act of communication, at least in the field of political discourses. The question about the language comprehensibility of the poems has no easy answers. In what way could the intended audience of the poems, most of whom were Latin-speakers, understand them? On the one hand, the symbiosis of different cultural communities under the same rule, the frontier character of the kingdom, and the immigration into the kingdom of people from both West and East must have produced a significant degree of multilingualism (Bischoff, 1961, 212). In such a context what matters is efficient communication rather than the degree of proficiency in the use of language, with the exception of officials (Dursteler, 2012, 47–77). On the other hand, it is undeniable that poetic language in general creates difficulties that impede the understanding of power discourses. In such cases, translators and interpreters would have functioned as mediators between poets and their audiences. Eugenius himself may have played such a role thanks to his knowledge of three languages.

Why, then, did he not write his poems in Latin, since he intended them for the kings themselves and the Latin magnates? To answer this question, it is useful to take into consideration the construction of the kingdom's community. As has been previously argued, the Norman kings were seeking to create a Sicilian political identity that transcended the cultural differences without, however, abolishing them. Consequently, not only did the different languages remain in official and private use, but, at least up until the middle of the 12th century, they were predominant at the Palermitan court. In this context, the use of the Greek and Arabic languages corroborated and consolidated the new identity. Within the framework of court poetry, the use of these languages functions in a way that has more to do with a ritualised performance than with the act of communication itself. It shapes the political imagery of the Sicilian kings and acquires a ritual dimension,

in which the language itself is the message. The performative use of the different languages affirms the multilingual character of the Sicilian court, thus creating a common imagery through the allegiance of the different multicultural groups to the royal family. Apart from Eugenius's poems, the preaching in Greek of Philagathos Kerameus in the Capella Palatina mentioned earlier also supports this argument. An important indication is to be found in a completely ritualised context: in a Sicilian coronation *ordo* of the 12th century, it is ordained that 'after the reading of the epistle the *laudes regis* should be sung, first in Latin and then in Greek' (Elze, 'Tre Ordines', 455, par. 20: *Lecta epistola cantentur laudes regis, latine prius, postea grece*). Therefore, Greek and Arabic, apart from their function as bureaucratic languages, also entered the field of ritual performance and became part of the ritual as one of the symbols that conveyed meaning. Since the form together with the content bore the weight of the performance, the meaning, that is to say, the primacy of the Sicilian kings, could be comprehended by anyone, irrespective of their cultural origins.

Notes

1 Cupane, 2013, 265–268 argues that since Eugenius praised the king among others for his building activities (v. 70–78), the poem was addressed to William II, during whose reign new palaces and churches had been erected. In my opinion, it is a motif denoting the imperial virtue of embellishing the capital.

2 Besides, the communicative power of Italo-Greek encomiastic poetry is attested by its continuity in the 13th century and the adoption of its motifs even by representatives of Latin culture, as Michael Wellas was the first to point out: Wellas, 1983, 107–112.

3 Gigante in Eugenii Panormitani, *Versus Iambici*, 43–47, 202–206. Unlike Jamison, 1957, 61–64, Gigante regards the poem as a rhetorical exercise that lacks any historical reality. For the poem's structure and motifs, see also Cupane, 2013, 256–264. For the Byzantine influence on Italo-Greek rhetorical production, see Trapp, 2003, 145–146.

4 For the performative function of epideictic rhetoric, see among others Webb, 2003, 127–135; Mullett, 2003, 151–170.

5 A relevant interesting example is the historical work of Alexander of Telese (12th century) who, as I argue, narrated Roger II's battles against the kingdom's magnates in order to legitimise the king's effort to monopolise the use of legitimate violence in his territory and to persuade the magnates to conform respectively. See, Tounta, 2014.

6 Jamison, 1957, 63 supports the view that the poem should have been written after William's victory on the Byzantine army in 1156.

7 For Philagathos, see among others Houben, 2002, 101–102. The rhetorical style of Philagathos had been equally influenced by the Byzantine sermon tradition, as argued by Maguire, 2003, 219–220.

8 I do not agree with Jamison, 1957, 64 and 68, who states that the poem was written c.1160 to criticise William I's governance, presenting the qualities that a king should have and that William lacked.

9 Translated by Jamison, 1957, 65.

10 Jamison, 1957, 65–66; Gigante in Eugenii Panormitani, *Versus Iambici*, 113. For sociability and/or human weakness as driving forces in the formation of societies in ancient Greek and Roman political philosophy, see among others Steinmetz, 1969, 181–199.

11 Translated by Jamison, 1957, 66, slightly changed.

12 Translated by Jamison, 1957, 66, slightly amended for clarity.

13 Translated by Jamison, 1957, 67.
14 Translated by Jamison, 1957, 67.
15 Translated by Jamison, 1957, 68, except for the last verse, which is in my opinion wrongly translated as 'whether, as I maintain, these consist of rational beings or of brute beasts'.

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12 A detail of the Third Lateran Council (1179)

The leper king of Jerusalem and the papal policy in the East

Nikoletta Giantsi

The claim was made a long time ago by European historians that leprosy spread to the European continent as a result of the crusades in the East (Rambaud, 1885, 1:376), which was the disease's 'sale residu' (Michelet, 1880, 3:256). This view began to emerge from the middle of the 18th century (Astruc, *De morbis veneriis*, 7; Simpson, 1841, 324), even though historians, scholars and philologists of older periods had already demonstrated in their works the existence of leprosy in the West as early as the first centuries A.D.[1] The most important supporters of that view were undoubtedly Diderot and D'Alambert through their *Encyclopedia*, in which the early emergence of leprosy was seen as a further argument against religion: 'Christians, after creating kingdoms of brief duration, after extinguishing the world and devastating the earth, after committing myriads of crimes and of serious hideous deeds, did not bring back as a fruit of their operations anything else but leprosy' (De Jucourt, 1765, 9:395–396; Malouin, 1765, 393–395).

Nonetheless, since the 19th century, expert opinion has been divided. A number of historians started publishing articles and studies, especially in medical journals, which supported the view that even though leprosy existed in the West before the crusades (Lecouvet, 1865; Simpson, 1841, 301–330; Simpson, 1842, 121–156, 394–429; Andral, 1875, 20:342; Kaposi, 1881, 2:294; Leloir, 1886, 265), the disease's greatest expansion occurred during the years of these expeditions. However, another group of researchers supported the diametrically opposed view, that the crusades had no connection whatsoever with the diffusion of leprosy in the West.[2]

There can be no doubt that leprosy existed in Europe before the crusades. Particularly interesting on this subject is the information that can be gleaned from the texts of Church councils or canon law. These texts prove that leprosy was not a sporadic phenomenon and that the cases of individual lepers seen in many hagiographical texts were not only part of an effort to strengthen the adherence of the faithful to the Church, but actually represented a great problem for the time, which is why it became necessary to make relevant provisions in canon law. In other words, if leprosy did not exist in Europe before the crusades, there would not really be a need to make legal provisions for the disease. Nonetheless, from the 6th century, there were already at least three regional councils (Orleans 549, Tours 567, Lyon 583) which dealt with the issue of leprosy and even suggested

ways to relieve lepers through the aid provided by the Church authorities and institutions (Pontal, 1989, 292). The Council of Orleans in 549 decided that bishops should provide food and clothing for the lepers of their locality, while the Council of Lyon in 583 decided that the care for lepers of every region should be a concern of the local bishop, in order to prevent the movement of lepers from one area to another.[3] The council deemed it proper to make each bishop responsible for supplying those infected with the disease, whether born in the diocese or merely living in it, with so much nourishment and clothing that they could be reasonably denied visits to other inhabited places.[4]

A similar impression is given by the laws of the barbarian tribes that had settled in Roman territory, especially the laws of the Lombards. According to the Edict of Rothar (643), king of the Lombards (636–652), lepers were forced to quit not only their homes but their hometowns as well. Simultaneously, the lepers were alienated from any property and even from the right to manage it, since they were considered as dead, from the day they were expelled:

> If someone gets infected by leprosy and is recognized (as a leper) by the judge or the people, and after he is expelled from the town or his house to live alone, he does not have the right to sell his fortune or cede it to a third person, for from the day he was expelled from his dwelling, he is considered as dead. Nonetheless, while he still lives, it is appropriate that he is nourished by what he has left.
>
> *De Lebroso, si quis leprosus effectus fuerit, et cognitum fuerit iudici vel populo certa rei veritas, et expulsus foris a civitate aut casam suam, ita ut solus inhabitet, non sit ei licentia res suas alienare aut thingare cuilibet personae. Quia in eadem diae, quando a domo expulsus est, tamquam mortuus habetur. Tamen dum advixerit, de rebus quas reliquerit, pro mercedis intuitu nutriatur.*
>
> (Bluhme, *Leges Langobardorum*, 4:41)

The long-standing perception that the crusades were responsible for the diffusion of leprosy in the West is, in my opinion, due to the fact that from the 11th century onwards, references to it are multiplied, since charitable institutions grew in number, a fact that gave chroniclers the chance to refer to this specific disease (Kurth, 1891, 26). At the same time, it is true that leprosy was already a real threat for the armies of the crusaders in the East. In addition, the treatment of the disease was directly related to the charitable action of the Hospitallers (Stathakopoulos, 2006, 255–273, where one can find the earlier literature), who, following the crusades, developed a notable activity in Western Europe as well. Nonetheless, at this point, another parameter should also be taken into account. A parameter that could possibly –in combination to what has already been presented – contribute to the formulation of a new hypothesis.

On 5th July 1174, Baldwin IV was crowned the sixth Latin king in Jerusalem, despite the fact that he was a leper. Seven years later, in his crusade encyclical of January 1181, *Cor nostrum et,* Pope Alexander III (1159–1181) asserted that

the failures of Christian crusaders to protect the Holy Land were due to the disharmony that was brought upon the region by the leper body of the king which contaminated the office that he was invested with:

> [B]ecause there is no king who can rule this land, since he, namely Baldwin, who holds the government of the kingdom, is so gravely scourged by the just judgement of God (*justo Dei judicio flagellatus*) something we believe you are all aware of, and was indeed punished so severely, that he can hardly bear the torments that his body is going through. How great damage, alas, how severe loss in people and properties should be endured due to his sins, by this land for which our fathers have given their blood in the fight against the infidels, something that comes to our minds with great emotion.
>
> (MPL 200:1294. Cf. Pegg, 1990, 265; Edbury & Rowe, 1988, 63)

Alexander's outlook is, in a way, reminiscent of Byzantine political concepts regarding the physical integrity which was necessary in order for the ruler to exercise his imperial duties to the full. Nevertheless, the pope did not invoke Baldwin's physical disability, but the fact that this was a result of a 'just' divine punishment towards a sinner. Therefore, he regarded that Baldwin was not appropriate, not on account of his physical impediment, but on account of the sin that caused it. Alexander's successor on the papal throne, Lucius III (1181–1185), shared his ideas, as shown in the letter *Cum cuncti praedecessores,* that he sent in 1184 to the King of England Henry II (1133–1189) (Kehr, *Papsturkunden in Sizilien*, 329). In the Latin East, though, those who elected Baldwin to be king did not seem to agree with the papal view: according to the description of William of Tyre, during an official ceremony which was attended by all the princes of the kingdom, four days after the death of his father Amalric in 1174, young Baldwin took up the crown from the hands of the patriarch of Jerusalem. I will not go deeper into the critique of the arguments that led Mark Gregory Pegg to interpret this case as 'a contrast between the natural and social body in the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem', a contrast that was contrary to the views which dominated during the same period in the West as demonstrated in the arguments of the two popes.

I would like, however, to draw attention to specific points concerning Pope Alexander III, who is an emblematic figure of the 12th century (for a very detailed discussion and earlier literature on the life and work of Pope Alexander III, see Clarke & Duggan, 2016). He was Italian, a graduate of the Law School of Bologna and student of Gratian; as cardinal first and later as pope he took over the affair of supporting the Italian cities against the German Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, who aimed at the creation of a unified empire including the subjection of Italy and, therefore, the erosion of the territorial possessions of the Holy See. Already, under Hadrian IV (1154–1159), the future pope had taken part as Cardinal Rolland Bandinelli in the Diet of Besançon (1157), during which he clashed with the emperor and his representative Rainald of Dassel as to the exact definition of the terms of acquisition of the empire as a *beneficium* (which the

pope, on the one hand, interpreted as a *benefice*, and the emperor, on the other, as a *fief/feudum*). After the death of Hadrian IV, Rolland was elected pope under the name of Alexander III, while Frederick supported the election of Cardinal Octavian as Victor IV. About twenty years later Frederick was forced to recognize Alexander III, following the formation of the Lombard League and the threat it posed to the emperor. Alexander III's legal background allowed him to carry out a significant legislative work as an expression of the care of the Holy See for all kinds of religious institutions – monastic communities, charitable foundations, etc. – which he protected with a series of decrees. His legal thought was crystallized in the Third Lateran Council (1179), which also decreed the election of the pope by a 2/3 majority of the College of Cardinals.

At the same time, the pope actively intervened in the exercise of secular authority across Europe, resulting in his direct involvement in the great political events that marked the second half of the 12th century. During that time, he clashed with almost all the secular rulers of the West and, in most cases, he was victorious: he humiliated Frederick Barbarossa after his defeat in Legnano (1176), he punished King Henry II of England after the murder of the Archbishop of Canterbury Thomas Becket (29 December 1170), he supported the king of Portugal, and he excommunicated the king of Scotland. At the same time, he managed to defeat the claims to the Apostolic See of the three antipopes who were elected by Frederick Barbarossa (Victor IV: 1159–1164, Paschal: 1164–1168, Callixtus III: 1168–1178) and of a fourth one (Innocent III: 1179–1180) who was proposed by the Roman Senate.[5]

However, besides his influence in the West, Pope Alexander III also had a potent presence in the East, being in contact with Emperor Manuel I Komnenos (1143–1180). By 1161, that is at the beginning of the schism with Barbarossa, the newly-elected (in 1159) pope had contacted Manuel through ambassadors in order to seek his support (Duchesne, *Liber Pontificalis,* 2:403; cf. Chalandon, 1912, 558). Paul Magdalino speaks about a papal letter to the Byzantine emperor, with which he petitioned for aid, 'promising [Manuel] vanities of vanities which he was not expecting' (Güterbock, 1949, 57–65; Norden, 1903, 89–106; Lamma, 1957, 2:69; Ohnsorge, 1947, 90–107; Magdalino, 2002, 64; Angold, 1997, 211–212; Kahl, 1977, 297; Classen, 1977, 207–224; Robinson, 1990, 489). The relationship between them evolved over the following ten years and in January 1176 the pope responded positively to Manuel's request regarding the launch of a crusade for the liberation of the Holy Land. However, time was running against the Byzantine emperor; in September of the same year, Manuel suffered a crushing defeat in Myriokephalon by the Turks, while the following year Alexander III was recognized by the humiliated Barbarossa in the treaty of Venice. During that period, at the peak of his influence, the pope called the Third Lateran Council (1179), which is considered as a most significant turning point regarding the treatment of lepers, because, on that occasion, the separation of lepers from the healthy ones was formally established for the first time.

We referred extensively to the activity of the pope in order to address the question of why Alexander's reaction to the coronation of Baldwin as king of

Jerusalem was so late in coming. Why was it that seven years had to pass from the accession of the Latin king on the throne of Jerusalem until the composition of the letter in which the pope called him a sinner on account of his illness (that is, in 1181)?

We could reasonably assume that the discussion regarding the lepers at the Lateran Council in 1179 and the relevant resolutions that were reached there were the result of a conscious manipulation which was aimed at the condemnation of Baldwin, as was revealed subsequently with the papal letter, and this signaled Alexander's attempt to take control of developments in the East. William of Tyre, the former tutor of King Baldwin and one of his main supporters (as well as the first one to perceive the illness of his student), was present at the council and of course realized the importance of the decision concerning the lepers. Upon his return he went to Constantinople where he stayed for a few weeks and then, in the company of imperial ambassadors, he continued his trip which included his visit to prince Bohemond III of Antioch and the Latin patriarch, 'with whom he discussed on behalf of the emperor' (William of Tyre, *Chronicon*, 1010; Magdalino, 2002, 103). The pope had come to the conclusion that Emperor Manuel could not help him in the realization of his plans and he had decided to strip him from his allies in the Latin East.[6] I believe that the visit of William of Tyre to Constantinople and then to Antioch along with the imperial ambassadors was meant to prevent that from happening.

Consequently, from the way events unfolded, we can hypothesize that Pope Alexander's reference to the illness of Baldwin, the leper king of Jerusalem, was used as a pretext meant to undermine his legitimacy in the eyes of the Christian world (since there were already other claimants to his throne), and the Lateran Council was the first formal step that would lead to this undermining. A more in-depth research regarding the background to the council could bring to light more details regarding the planning and the preparation of its agenda, which would help determine when exactly the issue of lepers and leper hospitals entered the discussion.

Notes

1 Indicative cases exist in Du Cange, *Glossarium*, s.v. *Lazari*. The fact, nonetheless, that in this work there are no references to the terms *leprosi* and *miselli*, prior to the 10th century, probably misled the scholars that consulted this book, and as a result the view *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* prevailed. See also Muratori, *Antiquitates Italicae*, 1, col. 907.

2 This was the conclusion of the research carried out by Rudolf Ludwig Karl Virchow: Virchow, 1869; Virchow, 1860, 18:138–162, 273–329; Virchow, 1860, 19:49–93; Virchow, 1861, 166–198, 459–512. See also Hirsch, 1881-1886, but mainly Thijm, 1887.

3 The Council of Tours did not specifically deal with the issue of leprosy, but it repeated the previous decisions about the care of the ill and the paupers: Rakoto-Ratsimamanga et al., 1970, 4–14.

4 Sirmondi, *Concilia,* 1:378: *Placuit etiam universo Concilio, ut uniuscuiusque civitatis leprosi, qui intra territorium civitatis ipsius aut nascuntur, aut videntur consistere, ab*

Episcopo Ecclesiae ipsius sufficientia alimenta, et neccessaria vestimenta accipiant, ut illis per alias civitates vagandi licentia denegetur. Cf. in Beriac, 1988, 181. See also Ullmann, 1971, 11.

5 The term 'Senate' refers to a body that was constituted by merchants and burghers of Rome in 1143, in order to oppose the political plans of the pope and the nobility. This revival of the Roman Senate proved short-lived. Even though it did serve the rebellious momentum of its inspirers who connected it with classical antiquity, it did not survive in this context after 1155, when Frederick Barbarossa was crowned as emperor. See Benson et al., 1991, 341.

6 One can hardly find a better formulation to describe the pope's stance vis-à-vis Manuel, than the one by Freed, 2016, 418: 'after Myriokephalon, it was no longer worth insisting on Manuel's inclusion; such pressure would alienate both William II, who had not forgotten that he had been left waiting at the altar by his Byzantine bride, and the Venetians, who remembered that Manuel had imprisoned their fellow citizens. The Byzantine emperor had ceased to be a significant player in Mediterranean politics'.

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13 Byzantium and Hungary in the late 12th century and on the eve of the Fourth Crusade

Personal ties and spheres of influence

Alicia Simpson

The second half of the 12th century is one of the most interesting and controversial periods in Byzantine-Hungarian relations. It was a time of frequent and close contacts between the Byzantine and Hungarian courts as witnessed by dynastic marriages and treaties of alliance, but also by intrigues, territorial disputes, and full-scale wars. In this context, the reign of Manuel I Komnenos (1143–80) has been regarded as the apogee of Byzantine power and influence in Hungary, and the emperor's success in securing the allegiance of the Hungarian kingdom and in extending imperial authority over Sirmium and Dalmatia have received extensive attention in modern scholarship (see especially, Browning, 1961; Magdalino, 1993, 78–83; Stephenson, 1994, 1996). In contrast, Byzantine-Hungarian relations in the years 1180–1203, that is, from the death of Manuel Komnenos to the arrival of the fleet of the Fourth Crusade in Constantinople, have not been the subject of detailed investigation apart from their inclusion in several broader studies (cf. Urbansky, 1968; Makk, 1989; Stephenson, 2000; Kosztolnyik, 2006). The reason for this is immediately apparent in the prevailing narrative of the period.

Manuel—himself the son of the Hungarian princess Piroska—had imposed his will on Hungary in the years 1162–7 and upon the death of the Hungarian King Stephen III in 1172 installed his own candidate, Béla, on the Hungarian throne. Béla III, younger brother of Stephen III and designated duke of Croatia and Dalmatia, had been taken to Constantinople in accordance with the Byzantine-Hungarian treaty of 1163 and betrothed to Manuel's daughter, Maria. His patrimonial lands in Hungary—to which the strategic region of Sirmium between the Danube and Sava rivers on the empire's northwestern frontiers was subsequently added—were ceded to Byzantium. In the following years, Stephen III attempted to regain Béla's patrimony for Hungary with the assistance of the Germans, the Czechs, and the Russians, but was decisively defeated by the imperial forces in 1167. Two years later, Béla's status as heir-apparent to the emperor changed when Manuel's second wife, Maria of Antioch, gave birth to a son, Alexios II. The betrothal between Béla and Maria was cancelled; the Hungarian prince received the rank of *caesar* and married the empress' half-sister, Agnes of Antioch. Having sworn a solemn oath to uphold the interests of the empire, he was installed as king of Hungary in the presence of an imperial delegation which had accompanied him

from Constantinople. He remained loyal to Manuel, sending allied troops for the emperor's campaign against the Seljuk Turks in 1176.

Following the death of his patron Manuel, Béla took advantage of the waning of Byzantine power to regain lost territories and extend the frontiers of the Hungarian kingdom at the expense of the empire. By 1182 the Hungarian king had annexed Dalmatia and Sirmium without opposition. The usurpation of Andronikos Komnenos instigated a further campaign in the region between Niš and Braničevo, where the Hungarians were able to occupy the string of territories extending from Belgrade to Sofia. In 1185 Béla concluded a peace treaty with Isaac II Angelos (1185–95), whereby the emperor would marry his daughter Margaret and receive the region of Niš-Braničevo as her dowry. In exchange, Isaac is said to have formally renounced all claims to Dalmatia and Sirmium. In the years that followed, Hungary remained a reluctant ally, in some cases defending Byzantine interests, and in others openly challenging the empire's position south of the Danube, notably in the imperial client state of Serbia. Ferenc Makk commented that in the contacts between Byzantium and Hungary during this period, 'Hungary was always the active, initiating partner, a fact indicative of both the increased power of the Hungarian kingdom and the weakening of the Byzantine Empire'. Indeed, following the overthrow of Isaac in 1195, Béla's son and successor, Imre (1196–1204), would claim the region of Niš-Braničevo for the Hungarian crown by virtue of the fact that it had constituted the dowry of his sister Margaret. By 1202 he would force Serbia to recognize Hungarian suzerainty, styling himself *rex Serviae*.

Given these developments it is not surprising that scholarly attention has been focused on the period 1160–80, which witnessed the restoration and consolidation of imperial power in the northwestern Balkans rather than the period 1180–1203, when the retreat of the imperial position in the region is manifestly evident from the facts on the ground (see also Simpson, 2016). Upon closer inspection, however, several of these facts are revealed to be suppositions and assumptions that have been perpetuated in modern scholarship due to the lack of evidence and interest. The most serious problem is the absence of a detailed narrative account of the events in the northwestern Balkans for this period. John Kinnamos, on whose general testimony the reconstruction of the previous period is largely based, does not go beyond the reign of Manuel. Niketas Choniates, who continues the story into the beginning of the 13th century, is highly selective and often vague in his reporting of events, and not usually interested in the precise details of military encounters and treaties. Therefore, the events of the period have been reconstructed and interpreted on the basis of asides in the narrative sources and references scattered in documentary evidence. The Hungarian conquests of 1180–83 are a case in point.

The annexation of Dalmatia is known through the testimony of Archdeacon Thomas of Spalato (Split), who relates that after the death of Manuel Komnenos his city once again became subject to the king of Hungary and that the Hungarian Peter was elected archbishop (Thomas of Split, *History*, 131). Further up the Adriatic coast, Zara came under Hungarian control, and documentation reveals

that by 1182 the Hungarian Count Maurus (Mor) had become governor of the entire maritime province (Smičiklas, *Codex Diplomaticus*, II, no. 178). There is no confirmation of a Hungarian conquest of Sirmium, but since the Hungarians invaded the region between Niš and Braničevo in 1182–3, it is usually inferred that they had already assumed control of Sirmium. Regarding the campaigns against Niš-Braničevo, opinion remains divided on the extent of the Hungarian conquest. According to Choniates, by the summer of 1182 Andronikos Komnenos had dispensed with the regency regime led by the empress-mother Maria of Antioch and assumed power in the name of the underage monarch Alexios II. Determined to ascend the throne, he first had to avail himself of the presence of Maria of Antioch. He accused the empress-mother, with or without justifiable reason, of treasonous collusion with the Hungarians. More specifically, Maria of Antioch is said to have enlisted the assistance of the Hungarian king (who was her brother-in-law), tempting him to attack the territories around the frontier fortresses of Braničevo and Belgrade (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:267).

Maria of Antioch was found guilty of treason and executed, most probably in late summer 1182. Meanwhile, the Hungarians continued their advance. In autumn 1183 Choniates reports that the Byzantine generals Alexios Branas and Andronikos Lapardas were fighting against the Hungarian forces ravaging the regions between Niš and Braničevo (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:277). When news arrived of the murder of Alexios II, Lapardas rebelled. He abandoned his post and fled to the East, but was captured and executed along the way. Branas, who had refused to join Lapardas' cause, apparently remained in the region, for Choniates reports that in the spring of 1184 Andronikos sent the general, who in the meantime had returned from Braničevo, to quell a rebellion in the eastern provinces (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:277–278, 280).

Choniates does not reveal the outcome of the Hungarian attack of 1183.[1] But he does tell us that Branas had already returned to Constantinople when Andronikos transferred him to the East in the spring of 1184. This suggests that the general's assigned task to defend the region against the Hungarian assault had been completed. More importantly, the historian's references to the Byzantine-Hungarian conflict in this period indicate incursions rather than territorial conquest. Several sources can be used to supplement his testimony. The author of the *Historia de Expeditione Frederici Imperatoris* reports that during the reign of Andronikos the Hungarian king, along with other kings and princes, attacked and seized Byzantine lands for themselves (Loud, *Crusade of Barbarossa*, 63). The *Life* of St John of Rila is more specific in stating that the Hungarians together with their king crossed the Danube River and conquered Greek lands as far as Sofia and that the relics of the saint were removed from that city and transported to Esztregom.[2] Finally, the *Life* of Stefan Nemanja states that the Serbian ruler came into agreement with the Hungarian king; together they attacked the territories as far as Sofia, destroying and leaving that city desolate. Significantly, the *Life* adds that the Hungarian king thereupon returned to his own domains (Hafner, *Serbisches Mittelalter*, I, 86), something which suggests that the combined Hungarian-Serbian offensive was primarily a raiding operation.

Although the evidence is contradictory, I do not think there are sufficient grounds that would allow us to speak of a Hungarian occupation of the Niš-Braničevo region, not to mention the territories extending all the way from Sirmium to Sofia. Perhaps the Hungarians occupied certain key positions, but this too is uncertain.[3] We need also to consider that as a result of the persistent conflicts with Hungary (1127–9, 1150–55, 1165–7) the Byzantines had recently bolstered the defenses of the region. Choniates testified that after 1165 the Byzantine generals Constantine Angelos and Basil Tripsychos repaired the fortifications of Semlin and Belgrade, built walls around Niš, and repopulated Braničevo (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:136). Archeological evidence dated to the mid-12th century confirms that the Byzantines strengthened the fortifications of Braničevo and constructed a new fortress in Belgrade. Fortifications and cemeteries along the Iron Gates segment of the Danube frontier are also attested in this period (Stephenson, 2000, 241–245; Curta, 2006, 331–332). Finally, a Byzantine army under the leadership of the empire's most accomplished general, Alexios Branas, opposed the Hungarian advance in 1183.

But if we hold that the Hungarians never occupied Niš-Braničevo, which region then did Béla restore to the empire as his daughter's dowry upon her marriage to Isaac Angelos? Here again, we need to take a fresh look at the evidence. In August or September 1204, King Imre of Hungary complained to Pope Innocent III (1198–1216), that the Bulgarian tzar, Kalojan (1197–1207), had occupied the territories that had been given by his father Béla as a wedding gift to his sister Margaret, the empress of the Greeks, and that he had invaded and laid waste to Serbia, a land subject to the Hungarian crown (Hageneder & Sommerlechner, *Register Innocenz' III*, 7: no.127). The identification of the lands that constituted Margaret's dowry has long been a matter of scholarly debate. Most have followed the views of Gyula Moravscik, who located the dowry in the regions of Belgrade and Braničevo, Niš and its surrounding area, and the lands around Sofia, that is, the territories thought to have been conquered by Béla in 1182–3 (Moravscik, 1970, 92–94). Indeed, the prevailing opinion holds that these regions were restored to Byzantium in the form of Margaret's dowry, and that in exchange Isaac renounced Byzantine claims to Sirmium and Dalmatia, which had already been incorporated into the Hungarian kingdom (Sweeney, 1973, 330–331; Fine, 1987, 9–10; Makk, 1989, 120; Stephenson, 2000, 283–284).

Further evidence on the issue is provided by Kalojan's letter to Innocent III at the end of 1203 or beginning of 1204, where the Bulgarian tzar, in his turn, complained to the pope that King Imre had invaded his lands and occupied five dioceses that belonged to Bulgaria. The four have been identified as Braničevo, Belgrade, Niš, and Sirmium, while the fifth might have been Vidin (Tautu, 1964, 391; Sweeney, 1973, 331; Madgearu, 2013, 129). It has been observed that the five dioceses and Margaret's dowry were located in roughly the same region (Tautu, 1964, 39).[4] What is important to note here is that the only area south of the Danube-Sava frontier was Niš and that this, according to the *Life* of Stefan Nemanja, had been conquered by the Serbs sometime after the joint Hungarian-Serbian offensive (Hafner, *Serbisches Mittelater*, I, 87). When the Western crusaders

passed through the region in 1189, they noted that the Serbs 'occupied the city of Niš with sword and bow and they claimed all the land around it as far as Sofia, which they had taken from the Greeks and made subject to their own rule' (Loud, *Crusade of Barbarossa*, 62). With this in mind, I do not see how we can accept that Margaret's dowry was located in the region between Niš and Braničevo, not to mention the lands as far south as Sofia.

But there is another problem as well and this has to do with the nature of the alliance concluded between Isaac and Béla. In late autumn 1185, and probably after the Byzantine victory over the Normans at the battle of Demetritzes on 7 November, Byzantium entered into negotiations with the kingdom of Hungary. Béla, who was recently widowed, requested the hand of a certain Theodora Komnene in marriage (Grumel & Darrouzès, *Regestes*, II–III, no. 1166). Theodora was a niece of Manuel Komnenos and the widow of the general Andronikos Lapardas. We have already seen that Lapardas had fought against the Hungarians in 1183, but also that he had rebelled against Andronikos upon learning the news of the murder of Alexios II. Since Béla specifically asked for the hand of Lapardas' widow, we should consider whether he wished to present himself as an adversary of Andronikos—an adversary who had been fighting on behalf of the interests of the empire all along. Whatever the case, at the end of 1185 the Synod of Constantinople refused to consent to the marriage, claiming that Theodora, unlike other women who had been forcibly tonsured by Andronikos and later released, was a widow who had accepted her new life in the convent. But this was merely an excuse; Isaac could not allow a Komnenian princess to be wed to a foreign ruler (Brand, 1968, 79).

At the same time, the emperor was eager to restore the Hungarian alliance, so he offered to marry Béla's daughter, Margaret, who was not yet ten years old (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:368). In this case, the canonical impediment to marriage under the age of twelve was swiftly brushed aside. On the Hungarian side, the previous betrothal of Margaret to Ottokar, Duke of Styria was promptly cancelled (Loud, *Crusade of Barbarossa*, 63). From Isaac's letter to Pope Celestine III (1191–8) in c.1193 we are informed that at the time of the emperor's marriage to Margaret, the Hungarian king renewed the oaths he had previously sworn to Manuel, which specified that he was never to infringe upon the rights of the empire and never to attempt to take Serbia (Tornikes, *Lettres*, 343). This means that the alliance required that the Hungarian king respect the territorial integrity of the empire. In this context, it is important to remember that whenever Byzantium contracted marriage alliances with foreign states, the other party was placed in a subordinate position and that the inequality of the relationship was often reflected in the oaths which foreign-in-laws were made to swear (Macrides, 1992, 274–275). In this sense, the personal ties forged between Isaac and Béla were a means of ensuring the latter's loyalty and subordination, just as they had been under Manuel Komnenos.[5]

Under such conditions it is inconceivable that Isaac would have accepted that the region of Niš-Braničevo be returned to the empire as his bride's dowry, for even if we maintain the Hungarians had occupied the area, these lands constituted

Byzantine territory properly restored to the empire (on this, see the discussion in Macrides, 1992, 278–279 and n.102). But perhaps Isaac would have accepted another region as Margaret's dowry, and here I mean the district of Sirmium. Manuel Komnenos had demonstrated great concern in acquiring control over this region since it guaranteed the security of the empire's northwestern frontiers. His claim to Sirmium was based partly on his familial relationship with Béla, since the district formed part of the latter's patrimony, and partly on the fact that a significant portion, if not the majority, of the native population embraced the Orthodox faith. The so-called 'Metropolitanate of Tourkia' with its episcopal seat at Bács was still active in this period, and when the emperor visited the city in 1164, he was greeted as a savior and liberator by its inhabitants (Stephenson, 1996, 43–45; 2000, 247–253). But Manuel was not the only Byzantine emperor to visit the region in the second half of the 12th century.

In his *History*, Choniates tells us that following military operations against the Vlachs and the Cumans in the region of Philippopolis (probably late autumn 1191), Isaac marched against the Serbs 'for having ravaged the land and destroyed Skopje'. He engaged them in battle somewhere on the Morava River and won a victory, with the Serbs suffering many casualties during their retreat. The emperor then passed through Niš and arrived at the Sava River to meet with his father-in-law, Béla. After a sojourn of many days, he returned to Constantinople (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:434). In an oration celebrating the victory, delivered probably in 1192, the historian is more specific. He tells us that the Hungarian king, hearing of the emperor's great victory over the Serbs, crossed the Danube to meet with him. Swallowing his former pride, he praised the victory, honored the emperor with appropriate gifts, and made obeisance to him. Having returned to his own lands, the king heralded the emperor's deeds and prepared for his upcoming visit, since he feared the imperial power which separates those nations that break their oaths from those which do not (Choniates, *Oratione*s, 32–33). When the time came the Hungarians lined the banks of the river and among them were all those who held high ranks and exceptional positions. Even before Isaac came ashore they proclaimed him their lord, and this was done in the presence of their own ruler, who was not offended, but joined in the acclamations (Choniates, *Orationes*, 33).

The campaign against the Serbs was obviously meant to enforce Byzantine claims of suzerainty over their lands. The subsequent meetings with Béla of Hungary had probably been planned well in advance. What is certain is that Isaac intended to remain in the area of the northern Balkans for quite some time since he had brought along the women of the court (presumably also his Hungarian wife Margaret) and had made Philippopolis his base of operations (Prinzing, 2012, 252–253). Following the victory over the Serbs, the Hungarian king travelled south to meet his son-in-law in an unknown location, presumably within imperial territory. The second meeting took place in Hungarian territory, most probably at Sirmium, since Choniates speaks of a location on the Sava (Prinzing, 2012, 252–253). Here, also according to Choniates, the subordinate status of the Hungarian kingdom was demonstrated in a most spectacular manner.

Now, even if we consider Choniates' description of the meeting as a rhetorical exaggeration for the purposes of imperial propaganda the question that still needs to be answered here is why would Isaac visit Béla in Hungarian territory if a meeting between them had already taken place in Byzantine territory? The answer, I believe, is that the emperor intended, through his presence, to reinforce his claims of suzerainty over the region of Sirmium, which he had received from Béla as Margaret's dowry. It cannot be coincidence that Margaret's second son by Isaac, John Angelos, later ruled over Sirmium (first appearing with the title *domino Sirmy et comite de Kewe* in 1235), having succeeded to the position held by none other than his mother Margaret (McDaniel, 1982/3, 44–45; Moravscik, 1970, 94).[6] What is more, documents from the early decades of the 13th century refer to bishops, monasteries, and inhabitants (Greeks and Slavs) who still observed the Orthodox rite in the region.[7] Therefore, Isaac did not renounce Byzantine claims over Sirmium as part of the Byzantine-Hungarian agreement but rather received the region as his wife's dowry.

At this point, we should consider a further piece of evidence that demonstrates how Isaac attempted to enforce his claims of suzerainty: the correspondence between the emperor and Archbishop Job of Esztergom (Tornikes, *Lettres*, 190–201). The dates, circumstances, and details of this exchange remain obscure. We possess only the letter of Isaac, written by his minister Demetrios Tornikes. From its contents it has been surmised that the emperor initiated the correspondence, and that the letter that has survived was preceded by a letter of response from the archbishop.[8] In essence, Isaac's letter debates two main theological issues (the eating of sacrificial meats and the procession of the Holy Spirit) in an attempt to demonstrate the errors of the Latin Church and defend Orthodox belief and practice (see in detail: Laurent, 1940, 66–76; Gastgeber, 2011, 170–182).

The letter has been interpreted as a manifestation of Isaac's desire to unify the Churches of Hungary and Constantinople under his own leadership (Moravscik, 1967, 339) or as a demonstration of imperial power in the increasingly fragmented political world of the Balkans (Gastgeber, 2011, 186). The second supposition is more likely but does not go far enough. In order to understand the correspondence, we need to remember that the political settlement imposed by Manuel on Hungary had stipulated, among other things, that the church of the Holy Crown of Hungary (i.e., the Cathedral of Esztergom) and its archbishop would be subject to the Byzantine emperor (Browing, 1961, 203). This does not imply the subjugation of the Hungarian Church to Constantinople, but rather suggests some sort of imperial power over the archbishop of Esztergom in whose hands lay the consecration and legitimacy of Hungarian kings (Stephenson, 1996, 39–40, 54–55). The advantages of this arrangement for the empire are obvious enough since it ensured that future candidates for the Hungarian throne would have to meet with Byzantine approval. But there were benefits on the Hungarian side as well, for the arrangement also meant recognition of the right of the archbishop of Esztergom to perform the coronation of Hungarian kings, something that was only confirmed by the Roman Church in 1212 (Berend, Urbanczyk & Wiszewsk, 2013, 191).

If we hold that the settlement imposed by Manuel Komnenos on Hungary was renewed under Isaac Angelos, as the emperor himself claims in the aforementioned letter to Pope Celestine III, then Archbishop Job of Esztergom was subject to Isaac, at least theoretically. This would explain why Isaac corresponded with the Hungarian archbishop, and also why the emperor adopted a conspicuously haughty tone towards him, reprimanding him for his obstinacy and addressing him in the manner of a school teacher to a pupil.[9] Regarding the circumstances that prompted the correspondence, Günter Prinzing has suggested that it should be viewed in the context of preliminary diplomatic contacts between the two courts in preparation for the meetings held in 1191/2. If this was the case, then it can be assumed that theological disputation was on the agenda. As the senior prelate of Hungary, Archbishop Job would have certainly been present at those meetings and would have also presumably held discussions with the emperor (Prinzing, 2012, 252–254).

Archbishop Job was no doubt a significant member of the Hungarian elite and maintained close ties with the royal house of the Árpads. We know that he served Béla as a diplomat and, in that capacity, he may have visited Constantinople (Laurent, 1940, 62–63; Bogvay, 1950, 119). Together with Béla, the archbishop was responsible for the production of the so-called 'Porta Speciosa', the magnificent west portal of the Cathedral of Esztergom, whose decoration scheme reproduced well-known Byzantine motifs on both an iconographical and an ideological/conceptual level (Bogvay, 1950; Ragusa, 1980).[10] In 1190, Béla confirmed the privileges of the archbishopric of Esztergom and the now lost portal depicted the kneeling figures of its donors (the king and his archbishop) and identified them as the representatives of temporal and spiritual power in the kingdom of Hungary. At around the same time, Béla introduced the Byzantine double cross (the so-called patriarchal cross) on the Hungarian coat of arms, and this was first represented on his coinage (Berend, Urbanczyk & Wiszewsk, 2013, 317).[11] The Hungarian king had spent his formative years in Constantinople, and thus his familiarity with and adoption of Byzantine motifs and imagery is not surprising. But perhaps the timing is significant, for taken together, the meetings, the correspondence, the 'Porta Speciosa', and the adoption of the Byzantine double cross indicate the close contacts in the early 1190s between Isaac on the one hand, and the Hungarian king and his archbishop on the other.

These contacts are best reflected in a diplomatic gift, the Esztergom reliquary, which Isaac is said to have presented to either King Béla or Archbishop Job.[12] The exchange of gifts was an essential part of medieval diplomacy. Gifts communicated the power and prestige of the sender and at the same time underscored the common links between sender and recipient (Cormack, 1992, 219–236). Gifts of sacred relics were especially important in Byzantine diplomatic practice since they emphasized the emperor's superiority and his unique role as the guardian of the most prized relics of Christendom (Mergiali-Sahas, 2001, 47–48). The Esztergom reliquary—a devotional icon-ensemble that contains a fragment of the True Cross arranged in the shape of a patriarchal cross—was a highly-prized and priceless object.[13] It is well known that reliquaries containing fragments of the

True Cross were presented as gifts by Byzantine emperors to foreign rulers or high-ranking religious officials. As such the Esztergom reliquary could only have been meant for an important recipient, that is, either King Béla or Archbishop Job. Though Hungarian interest in the motif of the patriarchal cross may perhaps originate with the relic of the True Cross that Stephen I is said to have received from Basil II, it is probably no coincidence that it was Béla who introduced it into the Hungarian coat of arms and at precisely the same time as Isaac was presenting his own gift of the reliquary, that is, 1190.[14]

From the above, I think we can safely conclude that Hungary was not the 'active, initiating partner' in its relations with Byzantium in the period following the death of Manuel Komnenos. Quite the contrary, the intense diplomatic activity of the early 1190s was initiated by Isaac, and if we are to judge by the adoption of the Byzantine double cross and the construction of the 'Porta Speciosa', it was well-received in the Hungarian court. It is true that Byzantine-Hungarian relations had been tested during the passage of the Third Crusade (1189–90), but Béla's actions during Isaac's conflict with the German emperor Frederick Barbarossa (1152–90) can only be taken to indicate his commitment to the Byzantine alliance. Let us recall that the Hungarian king, who had initially assumed the role of mediator between the two sides, withdrew the Hungarian contingent from the crusade when the Germans occupied Philippopolis (28 October – 5 November 1189). For the Germans, who were now in a state of open warfare with Byzantium, it was clear that Béla had become 'an indefatigable protector or helper to his son-in-law the Greek emperor, to the detriment of our men' (Loud, *Crusade of Barbarossa,* 60–61, 79).

Following the passage of the crusade, Isaac returned to the northern Balkans, committed to reestablishing the Byzantine position there, and this explains the intense diplomatic contacts with Hungary in the early 1190s. In c.1193, however, the emperor wrote to Pope Celestine III, complaining of a Hungarian attack on the Byzantine tributary state of Serbia and threatening military action if the Hungarians refused to withdraw (Tornikes, *Lettres*, 343–344). The Hungarian attack, dated to the winter of 1192–3, has been usually interpreted as another episode in the Hungarian expansion and Byzantine retreat. But it was probably the consequence of the recent agreement concluded between Byzantium and Serbia, whereby Isaac's niece Eudokia (daughter of the future emperor Alexios III) was married to the second son of the Serbian ruler Stefan Nemanja, also named Stefan. The younger Stefan was named heir apparent to the Serbian throne and his Byzantine bride Eudokia became 'joint heir to the paternal satrapy' (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:531). The dynastic link with Byzantium bound Serbia to the empire and strengthened its position in the region (Stankovič, 2015, 40–45). This cannot have been welcomed by the Hungarians. In the event, the dispute was probably solved diplomatically and did not have a permanent effect on the Byzantine-Hungarian alliance. By early 1195, Isaac had planned a massive expedition against the Vlach-Bulgarians with the assistance of his Hungarian allies, who agreed to attack the rebels from the north in conjunction with a Byzantine attack from the south (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:446).

This campaign was cancelled when Isaac was deposed by his brother Alexios in the spring of the same year. In fact, the usurpation of Alexios signaled the end of the Byzantine-Hungarian alliance, which as we have already seen was entirely based on the personal ties forged between Isaac and Béla. Alexios does not seem to have had meaningful diplomatic contacts with either Béla (who died in 1196) or his successor Imre. On the other hand, the new emperor carefully cultivated his relations with Serbia. Following the abdication of Stefan Nemanja in 1196, the younger son Stefan (rather than the eldest Vukan) inherited the Serbian throne. Stefan, who had been married to Alexios' daughter Eudokia, became son-in-law of the new Byzantine emperor and was granted the elevated title of *sebastokrator* (Maksimovic, 2000, 180–181). Vukan, who was not content with his territory of Zeta (Montenegro), turned to the Hungarians for assistance. In 1202 he seized Serbia from his brother with Hungarian aid and in exchange recognized Hungarian suzerainty. The following year, the Bulgarian tzar Kalojan, who had been in the process of expanding his empire westwards and had already occupied the string of territories stretching from Vidin to Sirmium, invaded the Serbian lands and conquered the region of Niš (Prinzing, 2002, 164–165; Madgearu, 2013, 128–129). This means that by the beginning of the 13th century the district of Sirmium and the Serbian lands had become contested areas between Hungary and Bulgaria. Byzantium was no longer involved.

With these developments in mind, I would be inclined to argue that the change of leadership in Constantinople in 1195 was a catalyst for the dramatic shifts in the balance of power in the northwestern Balkans (see also Simpson, 2016). The overthrow of Isaac marked the end of the Byzantine-Hungarian alliance and this is what allowed other powers to assert their claims over the region. Further, I consider this event, more than the death of Manuel Komnenos in 1180, as the decisive turning point for the retreat of the imperial position in the region of the northwestern Balkans—a position which Manuel had attained through great efforts and which Isaac had consistently struggled to maintain.

Notes

1 Makk, 1989, 118, assumes that Branas had driven the Hungarians back to Danube, but Choniates says nothing of the sort. On the other hand, it does not seem that Branas was immediately transferred to the East, thus leaving the Hungarians to conquer these regions unopposed as assumed by Stephenson, 2000, 282.

2 Patriarch Euthymios, *Life of St. John of Rila*: excerpts translated in Petkov, *Voices*, 348–349. The *Life* also informs us that the relics were returned to Sofia following the peace between Isaac II and Béla.

3 Cf. Makk, 1989, 176, no. 141. Also uncertain are the dates of the Hungarian campaigns. Makk, 1989, 118–119, speaks of three separate campaigns: the Hungarian campaign of 1182; the joint Hungarian-Serbian offensive in 1183; and a further (unattested) campaign in 1185.

4 Tautu had further argued that a large part of Margaret's dowry was located north of the Danube, but was ignored.

5 On the agreement with Manuel Komnenos, see in detail Stephenson, 1996, 40–59.

6 John Angelos probably ruled that part of the province which lay beyond the Sava, as well as the territory from Belgrade to Barancs and Mačva. Cf. Moravcsik, 1970, 94. Margaret herself is known to have been in possession of the part of Sirmium known as *Sirmia Ulterior* in 1229. Cf. Tăutu, *Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX*, no. 161.
7 On the situation of the Orthodox Church in this period, see Bonev, 1986; Iorgulescu, 1996; Achim, 2004.
8 On the possible dates, see Gastgeber, 2011, 167–168 (1189–91); Prinzing, 2012, 250–251 (1190–92).
9 On Isaac's haughty attitude, see in detail, Gastgeber, 2011.
10 The destroyed portal is known to us from a few surviving fragments, an 18th-century oil painting (now in the Museum in Esztsergom), and drawings and records of its inscriptions. Scholars have traced iconographic influences from both Western and Byzantine traditions, and this is certainly to be expected considering the historical and geographical position of the medieval Hungarian kingdom. Cf. Ragusa, 1980, 349.
11 Béla had also attempted to introduce the cult of the Orthodox saint St. John of Rila in Hungarian lands, but faced considerable opposition from the Hungarian Church. Cf. Makk, 1989, 121.
12 The will of a 17th-century Hungarian prelate, Cardinal Kutassyi, attributes the reliquary to the year 1190. Schreiner, 2004, 282, has argued that the gift was sent to Béla on the occasion of Isaac's marriage to Margaret and that the Hungarian king later (in 1190) donated it to the cathedral at Esztergom. On the other hand, Prinzing, 2012, has associated the reliquary with the correspondence between Isaac and Archbishop Job, and concluded that it was sent by Isaac as a personal/diplomatic gift to the Hungarian prelate.
13 On the exquisite reliquary, housed in the Cathedral Treasury of Esztergom, see Klein, 2004, 134–137; Hetherington, 2008.
14 I owe this suggestion to Kallirroe Linardou (personal communication).

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14 Nicaea and the West (1204–1261)

Aspects of reality and rhetoric

Ilias Giarenis

This chapter focuses on some critical aspects of the relations between the empire of Nicaea and Western powers. These aspects reveal important changes which took place in both politics and ideology (as expressed through rhetoric). Diplomatic documents, historiographical accounts, rhetorical works, and letters are examined comparatively in order to shed some light on the forms those relations took during the years 1204–1261, and on how political propaganda chose to present them. We will examine how the relations of the state of Nicaea with 'the West' developed over time, comparing at each stage the actual political and diplomatic developments with the way they were represented in the relevant sources. This way, we will be able to explore how reality affected ideology and vice versa. As we will see, there were crucial changes in this period, not only regarding the political, social, and economic realities but also in the expression and propagation of political ideology.

The capture of Constantinople in 1204 undoubtedly constituted a dramatic turning point in Byzantine history; it was actually the greatest disaster the Byzantine Empire had ever experienced since its establishment. It caused chaos in political, social, and economic life, shocked and dismayed the people of the empire, and changed the balance of power in ways which could be neither ignored nor neglected. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Latin conquest of the city, the centrifugal tendencies which had already existed before 1204 accelerated. While some Byzantines tried to regroup in western Asia Minor, they were challenged by the new Latin rulers in Constantinople and the Morea and by the Seljuk Turks who were eager for new conquests in the area (Nicol, 1966; Angold, 2003; Phillips, 2004).

The realities of the time also present an interesting geographical dimension; in order to sufficiently grasp the notion of 'the West' regarding the Empire of Nicaea, one should always bear in mind that this very 'successor state' was gradually formed and established in northwest Asia Minor, having started from point zero; it was first able to secure lands exclusively in Asia Minor, and only from the third decade of the 13th century onwards, under John III Doukas Vatatzes (1222–1254), it started to gain lands also in Europe, thus further significantly expanding its territory (Langdon, 1978, passim; Angold, 1975a, 182–201).

In the background of our discussion lies the notion of 'the West' 'through the looking glass' of Nicaea. Not surprisingly, that did not exactly coincide with the

traditional Byzantine ideology, since the whole political scene had now dramatically changed. The Byzantine Empire had practically come to an end, its ecumenical character had been decidedly lost, and the effort made at Nicaea was originally aimed at the establishment of a state that would act as a shelter for people who would not reconcile themselves with the situation of the Latin occupation in its political or ecclesiastical aspects.

To the west of the empire of Nicaea stood another newly-founded state with Byzantine origins which fiercely competed with Nicaea for the ecumenical legacy of Byzantium: the state of Epiros (Stavridou-Zafraka, 1990; Giarenis, 2001; Stavridou-Zafraka, 2016). As is well known, the political controversy between Nicaea and Epiros was also to obtain an important ecclesiastical aspect; in that framework, the bishops who, interestingly, called themselves the bishops of the western part (*οἱ κατὰ μοῖραν ταύτην τὴν δυτικὴν ἐπίσκοποι*) (Vasilievskij, 'Epirotica saeculi', 285.14–5; see also Giarenis, 2001, 110) claimed a certain degree of independence from the Orthodox patriarchate of Constantinople, which now operated in exile at Nicaea (Karpozelos, 1973; Stavridou-Zafraka, 1990; Giarenis, 2001).

Through the Fourth Crusade, Western Europeans had come to settle very close to the state of Nicaea, but they mostly remained to its west in geographical terms; they had already been able to conquer Constantinople and many other Byzantine lands, and planned to gain control over the ones that remained in Byzantine hands, trying to implement the *Partitio Terrarum Imperii Romaniae* (on this document see Carile, 'Partitio Terrarum'). The 'exiled' Nicaean state gradually devised plans for the reconquest of the Latin-occupied lands and the *liberation*, as rhetoric effectively put it, of the Byzantine population who lived under Latin rule; such a prospect was propagated as a political resurrection of the New Israel and its capital (Choniates, *Orationes*, 128.18–28, 132.11–14, 133.1–2, 138.12–13, 172.22–28; see Giarenis, 2008, 313–316). But, in order to fulfil what was demonstrated as its main mission, the empire primarily had to struggle for its very existence, which was neither an obvious outcome nor an easy task.

Other parts of the 'West' for Nicaea at the time included, among others, the papacy, the Italian maritime cities –Venice, Genoa and Pisa – and the kingdom of Frederick II Hohenstaufen. Of course, by comparison to these powers, the Nicaean state had been established to the East – in fact, it occupied only the eastern part of the former empire. Its emperor steadily used the title *Basileus Rhomaion* and claimed the traditional imperial status; but there were some political and ecclesiastical officials of the time who seem to have preferred to call its first emperor especially, whose lands were exclusively Asian, emperor 'of the East' (Choniates, *Orationes*, 128.13–25. See also Stavridou-Zafraka, 1990, 100–101; Giarenis, 2008, 297–298). The emperors of Nicaea had to secure their political survival first in Asia Minor, and thus they often resorted to diplomatic connections or military confrontations with other states in the East, such as the Seljuk Sultanate of Rûm, the kingdom of Armenian Cilicia, and the empire of Trebizond (Langdon, 1978; Savvides, 1981; Langdon, 1992; Giarenis, 2008).

Nevertheless, Nicaea's gaze was directed to Constantinople in both geographical and ideological terms. *New Rome* and a large part of Byzantium had now

fallen to the Latins and had to be won back, as *lost fatherlands* and *the paradise out of which the Byzantines had been expelled because of their sins*, as Niketas Choniates wrote on behalf of Theodore I Laskaris (Choniates, *Orationes*, 128.13–25; see Giarenis, 2008, 296–299). That aspiration for a new *reconquista imperii*, from Nicaea to the West, was promoted from the beginning as the very *raison d'être* of the state. But in reality, the relations between Nicaea and the Latin Empire of Constantinople, apart from military encounters, also included diplomacy and agreements. Here we shall focus on some critical aspects of the respective choices made by the Nicaean regime.

The early years: Nicaea faced with the Latin Empire

The Latin Empire of Constantinople was one of the main players in the area, and Nicaea had to face the dangerous reality which the Latin administrative and military organization represented (Hendrickx, 1970; idem, 1974; Van Tricht, 2011; Burkhardt, 2014). During the first formative years for both empires, from 1204 to 1214, a direct and constant controversy between them is clearly attested. That controversy derived from the fact that the very existence and the territorial claims of the one clashed directly with the other's intentions and goals (Giarenis, 2008, 90–116).

As regards the events of the period, we possess reliable testimonies such as Villehardouin, as well as the historical and rhetorical works of Niketas Choniates and Georgios Akropolites. Additionally, two letters written by the Latin emperor Henry of Hainaut, dated to the beginning of 1212, are of great value. In these the emperor described the situation in which he found himself as a very difficult one; he noted that he had to deal simultaneously with four rivals. If we are to believe Henry, the most dangerous rival of the Latin Empire at the time was considered to be Theodore Laskaris (*Lascarus* in the letter), who strongly resisted the Latin plans and had also sent letters to all the provinces of the 'Graikoi' (*provinciae Grecorum*), asking for help in order to liberate the whole *Graikia* from the Latin dogs (*Greciam totam de latinis canibus liberaret*) (Prinzing, 'Der Brief', 414–415). Henry repeated in another letter that the Byzantines called the Latins, dogs (*quos etiam nunc canes appellant*) (Lauer, 'Une lettre inédite', 201). Therefore, Henry's letters give us a good testimony of an 'image d'autre', presenting a straightforward expression of the widespread anti-Latin sentiments among contemporary Byzantines.

The same perception is recorded in a letter of July 1205 by Pope Innocent III addressed to his legate in Constantinople, Peter Capuano. The pope notes that the Orthodox people had, since the events of 1204, rightly detested the Latins more than dogs (Hageneder et al., *Die Register Innozenz'*, VIII, 231; English translation, Andrea, 2008, 166). But had that quite popular, as it seems, image of the Latins as dogs actually become an integral part of imperial ideology and rhetoric coming from Nicaea, as Henry asserted?

Apart from the aforementioned reference found in Henry's letters, we can also find some similar hints in Byzantine sources. Michael Choniates, in one of his

letters to the emperor of Nicaea (entitled *To Emperor Laskaris of the East*), which was written most probably in 1208, makes a noteworthy wish, where the Latins of Constantinople are portrayed as rabid dogs which would hopefully be expelled from the Reigning City. Theodore Laskaris is promoted as a *New David* who would act in that capacity in *New Jerusalem* following, as the scholar notes, the example of David when he had expelled the Jebusites from Jerusalem (Choniates, *Epistulae*, 124.39–43; Stavridou-Zafraka, 1990, 101; Gallina, 2006; Giarenis, 2008, 315–316; Rickelt, 2015, 400–401. For a discussion on the date of the letter, see Choniates, *Epistulae*, 105*–106*, with further bibliography]. The imagery used is in accordance with the general anti-Latin tone of the scholar's correspondence, but also mirrors a wider intellectual reality of the era, with interesting roots and background from the 11th century onwards (Gallina, 2006; Jeffreys & Jeffreys, 2001; Papageorgiou, 2011).

Perhaps we are confronted here with a *Leitmotiv* shared by many Orthodox people not only in Asia Minor, but also in other Latin-occupied lands of the former Byzantine Empire. Its roots naturally lay in the anti-Latin sentiments which had been caused by the recent events of 1204 and had been further deepened by atrocities and acts of violence committed by the Latin crusaders; that image of Latin ferocity seems to have been useful for the political authorities of Nicaea, and was gradually incorporated in the imperial propaganda of the state's founder, Theodore I Komnenos Laskaris, especially during the first years of his reign. Such choices had been determined by Laskaris's struggle to survive in a very difficult political environment, where the Latins had made important alliances (particularly with Trebizond and with the Seljuk Turks) effectively isolating the Nicaean emperor (Giarenis, 2008, passim). During those years, the interaction between Nicaea and the Latins was mainly of a military nature; as a result, rhetoric, apart from continuing the traditional legacy of hostility towards the adversaries, soon either invented or discovered strong – and sometimes even extreme – ways to present this confrontation, in order to further deepen the gaps, underline the differences, and escalate the conflict between the two opponents.

Nevertheless, some interesting variations appear in the depiction of the barbarian and savage actions of the crusaders during the conquest of 1204. When the deacon Nikolaos Mesarites wrote about his brother John's fate in the context of an *Epitaphios* composed in Constantinople in early 1207, he noted that during the years 1203 and 1204 the violent Latin troops had attacked the city and terrified its inhabitants, resembling wild wolves or boars, which provoked chaos, disruption, and destruction (Mesarites, 'Epitaphios', 40.24–29; on the scholar, see Giarenis, forthcoming). In these lines, the scholar uses an effective metaphor to indicate the most important features of the Latins as 'other': ferocity, wildness, the Italian animal-like howl, rapacity, destruction, and devastation. The scholar's rhetorical imagery colourfully depicts critical aspects of identity and otherness in the first years after 1204 and constitutes a valuable testimony of anti-Latin sentiments which seem to have existed in Latin-occupied Constantinople itself. Furthermore, since the composition of that work appears to have coincided with the first steps of the scholar's relocation to Nicaea, a possibility remains that

the rhetoric he expressed in that work was to a certain degree influenced by the respective Nicaean political and ideological priorities. Nevertheless, such a connection could not be regarded as certain, since the anti-Latin sentiments and the attribution of the features of violence, barbarism, greed, etc. seem to have been widely spread throughout the Latin-occupied lands which used to be parts of the Byzantine Empire (Koder, 2002, 32–33; Gounaridis, 2006; idem, 2008b).

In such a polarized political environment, even when truces between the two sides occasionally occurred, as the one most probably concluded in 1205, these were presented in the framework of imperial ideology not as diplomatic events, but rather as clear testimonies for the humiliation of the enemy. Hence, in 1206, Niketas Choniates, in a speech addressed to Theodore I, notes about the truce that: 'the spear-bearing Latins were repulsed or, more precisely, were shamefully chased from our land; furthermore, they begged for a peace treaty and gave an oath of allegiance' (*τὸ μὲν κοντοφορικὸν Λατινικὸν ἀνεστάλη, εἰπεῖν δ' οἰκειότερον, τῆς ἡμετέρας αἰσχρῶς ἀπελήλαται· μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν καὶ περὶ σπονδῶν καθικέτευσαν καὶ τὴν πίστιν ἔνορκον ὡμολόγησαν*) (Choniates, *Orationes*, 135.29–31). The Latins are depicted here to have taken the initiative for the conclusion of the truce, and to have actually begged for it, thus recognizing the superiority of the emperor of Nicaea. A mutually accepted truce is thus rhetorically transformed into a triumph for Theodore I.

The rapprochement between Nicaea and the Latins

In the aftermath of a crucial Nicaean victory against the Seljuk army headed by the sultan Ghiyath-al-Din Kaykhusraw I at Antioch-on-the-Maeander in 1211, there was a gradual smoothening of the relations between Nicaea and the other powers of the region (Giarenis, 2008, 65–89, 102–104; Korobeinikov, 2014, 149–156). In 1214, a treaty between Nicaea and the Latin Empire of Constantinople was concluded, which certainly reaffirmed the balance of power, but also proved to be a starting point for even closer relations of peace and co-operation in the following years (Papayianni, 2000, 40–42; Giarenis, 2008, 106–116). Diplomacy emerges as a priority, and Nicaean policy becomes more realistic and conciliatory, not only towards the Latin empire, but also towards the papacy; interestingly, the rapprochement with the latter took the form of union negotiations already in 1214 (Lambriniadis, 1996, passim; Papayianni, 2000, 154–163; Giarenis, forthcoming, passim). The rhetoric of the era propagates these new imperial choices and priorities, gradually becomes less populist, and invests much of its persuasive power in promoting the idea of a considerate and trustworthy emperor ruling in Nicaea. Nevertheless, the union negotiations did not meet with a unanimous or enthusiastic reception from all the clergy of the patriarchate at Nicaea. The Patriarch Theodore Eirenikos's complaints towards Nikolaos Mesarites, who had taken part in these, as well as the emergence of Constantine Stilbes's work on charges (*aitiamata*) against the Latins are only some of the hints of an opposition, which nevertheless did not succeed in altering the imperial policy (Gounaridis, 2008a; idem, 2008b, 51–57; Giarenis, 2008, 252–253; idem, forthcoming).

In this context, a diplomatic marriage was arranged some years later, circa 1219, between Theodore I and Maria de Courtenay, daughter of the Latin regent empress Yolanda. That marriage is, of course, to be seen as part of a new treaty concluded between the two sides. The emperor of Nicaea looked for a closer connection with the Latins, and perhaps also entertained hopes of succeeding to the throne of the Latin Empire through that diplomatic act and the kinship consequently created. The mixed marriage did not meet with any resistance from either the pope of Rome or the patriarch of Constantinople, a fact probably to be associated with the inception of ecclesiastical negotiations between Nicaea and Rome (Giarenis, 2008, 111–112).

This marriage was, unsurprisingly, presented as perfectly normal and somehow of little importance in the sources coming from the empire of Nicaea (Giarenis, 2008, 112). However, it provoked a fierce reaction from prelates of Epiros, such as John Apokaukos; in the following year (1220), Apokaukos addressed a letter to the patriarch of Constantinople – resident in Nicaea – Manuel I Sarantenos, in which he spoke on behalf of the Epirote flock. If we are to believe Apokaukos, the news of the marriage had caused laughter among the Orthodox Christians of north-western Greece: ‘You should know, despot, that you provoked a great hilarity, through that marriage with the Latins, in the hearts of the Christians who live here’. *(Γίνωσκε, δέσποτα, ὡς μεγάλην πάσαις ψυχαῖς τῶν ἐνταῦθα χριστιανῶν τὴν θυμηδίαν ἐνεποιήσατε τοῖς Λατίνοις κηδεύσαντες)* (Vasiljevskij, ‘Epirotica saeculi’, 266).

Drawing a contrast between the attitudes and behaviours of the leaders of Nicaea and Epiros, the clergy of north-western Greece declared that it had absolutely every right to pray for the Epirote leader of the time, who was also a Theodore, and of course also held the glorious name of Komnenos; his rhetorically propagated superiority lay on the fact that he had, in Apokaukos’s words, managed to restrain the Latins’ impetuousness without a marriage (*οὐ κῆδος παρὰ Λατίνων ἐπισπευδόμενον*), and without granting any benefits to them (Vasilievskij, ‘Epirotica saeculi’, 266; also Giarenis, 2008, 113–114). The leader of Epiros was thus rhetorically presented as an active and patriotic ruler, whereas the emperor of Nicaea was accused of subservience and compliance towards the Latins.

The attempts at accommodation with the Latins continued to prevail in Theodore I Laskaris’s policy during the last years of his reign. He even devised a plan, most probably in 1221, so that his youngest daughter Eudokia would be married to the new emperor of Constantinople, Robert de Courtenay, although the latter had already been Theodore’s brother-in-law. But, at that point, the patriarch reacted and cancelled the plan, on the grounds of kinship impediment. The fierce patriarchal reaction to that ‘unjust marriage’ (*ἀθεσμογαμία*), as described by Akropolites (Akropolites, *Opera*, I, 31.7–9; see also Macrides, 2007, 157–158), most probably took into account the steady opposition of the high clergy at the patriarchate, as is noted in the *Synopsis Chronike*: “the hierarchs not only did not consent to that unfair marriage, but they also prevented it as far as they could” (*μήτε τῶν ἀρχιερέων συναινούντων τῇ ἀθεμιτογαμίᾳ*

ταύτῃ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ὅσῃ δύναμις κωλυόντων) (Sathas, *Bibliotheca Graeca*, 2:465.24–25; see also Giarenis, 2008, 115–116; on the issue of the authorship of the work in connection to Theodore Skoutariotes, see Tocci, 2006, and Zafeiris, 2011).

Politics and rhetoric under John III Vatatzes

From the beginning of his reign, Emperor John III Doukas Vatatzes followed a mostly anti-Latin policy, in full contrast to his predecessor's late choices. That anti-Latin policy met with the enthusiastic approval of Patriarch Germanos II. John's policy towards the Latins was mostly influenced by his eagerness to further expand the territory of his state; his victories against the Latins led to his great success at Poemanenum in 1224. The treaty which was concluded between the two sides soon afterwards, most probably in late 1224, reflected a new balance of power, which was really advantageous for Nicaea. According to it, the Latins were driven out from Asia Minor, with the exception of the corridor of Nicomedia; furthermore, at the same time, many islands on the northern Aegean recognized the suzerainty of Nicaea (on those issues, see especially Langdon, 1992).

Diplomatic arrangements with the Latin Empire continued in the following years. The emperor of Nicaea had to act in a different set of circumstances; political needs led to ecclesiastical negotiations which had started in the years 1232–1233, and to more systematic meetings at Nicaea and Nymphaion in 1234, over whose final stages John Vatatzes presided himself (Langdon, 1994; also Papayianni, 2000, 168–190). Nevertheless, these negotiations were eventually fruitless. In the aftermath of that outcome, Vatatzes's alliance with the Bulgarian ruler John II Asen posed a great challenge to the Latin Empire, and Pope Gregory IX tried to propagate and organize a crusade in defense of the Empire against the two allied rulers and their states. A joint assault and siege of Constantinople in the winter of 1235–1236 clearly showed the gravity of the danger (on the sources and the relevant studies, see Langdon, 1978, 199–237); the pope made repeated efforts to dispatch a significant crusade, which could act against the Empire of Nicaea, whose ruler and people were described as schismatic, heretics, and enemies of God (Chrissis, 2012, 102–104).

In 1237 the emperor of Nicaea received a rather arrogant and aggressive letter from Pope Gregory IX (text in Grumel, 1930, 455–456), which addressed him solely as 'noble man Vatatzes' (*nobili viro Vatacio*), and he referred to him and his subjects as *Greci*. Vatatzes prepared a quite offensive reply to the pope (text in Sakellion, 'Ανέκδοτος επιστολή', 372–378; see also Pieralli, *La corrispondenza*, 119–126; Papayianni, 2000, 127–136; Mitsiou, 2006, 180; Kaldellis, 2008, 371–372; Chrissis, 2012, 108–111), where the ruler of Nicaea expressed his disbelief on whether the letter he had received had indeed been sent by the pope. That ironic question placed particular emphasis on the importance of the *Intitulatio*. According to the rhetorical outlook adopted here, the ignorance which was supposedly shown in that letter regarding Vatatzes's *basileia* made it questionable

whether the letter could have really come from the pope (Sakellion, ‘Ανέκδοτος επιστολή’, 372–373).

Furthermore, in the imperial reply the choice is made to equate the papal appellation of *Greci* with that of the *Hellenes*, which was more broadly accepted as a self-definition label at Nicaea (Kaldellis, 2008, 334–388; Page, 2008, 72–107; Papadopoulou, 2014, passim; Kaplanis, 2014, 91–92): ‘That letter noted that the wisdom rules in our *genos*, the Hellenes’s (*Ἐσήμαινε δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον γράμμα, ὅτι τε ἐν τῷ γένει τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡμῶν ἡ σοφία βασιλεύει*) (Sakellion, ‘Ανέκδοτος επιστολή’, 373; see also Angelov, 2005, 301–302). In addition to that, the emperor declares that it was to that *genos* again that Constantine the Great had bequeathed the *basileia*: ‘How was it overlooked, or if not overlooked, how was there no mention that, apart from the wisdom which rules among us, also the earthly *basileia* has been allotted to our *genos* by Constantine the Great?’ (*Ἐκεῖνο δὲ πῶς ἠγνοήθη, ἢ καὶ μὴ ἀγνοηθέν, πῶς ἐσιγήθη, τὸ σὺν τῇ βασιλευούσῃ παρ’ ἡμῖν σοφίᾳ, καὶ τὴν κατὰ κόσμον ταύτην βασιλείαν τῷ ἡμῶν προσκεκληρῶσθαι γένει παρὰ τοῦ μεγάλου Κωνσταντίνου;*) (Sakellion, ‘Ανέκδοτος επιστολή’, 373; Pieralli, *La corrispondenza*, 123–124). The emperor appears adamant in his refusal to acknowledge any imperial power or territory to the Latin Emperor John of Brienne, and proclaims that resistance to the Latins of Constantinople will be incessant: ‘My basileia has not seen where on earth or on the sea there is a territory or power of such an Ioannes, […] and we will never cease to fight and combat those who bring down Constantinople’ (*οὔτε εἶδεν ἡ βασιλεία μου τὴν τοῦ τοιούτου Ἰωάννου ἐπικράτειαν καὶ ἐξουσίαν ποῦ γῆς ἢ θαλάττης ἐστίν,* […] *οὐδέποτε παυσόμεθα μαχόμενοι καὶ πολεμοῦντες τοῖς κατάγουσι τὴν Κωνσταντινούπολιν*) (Sakellion, ‘Ανέκδοτος επιστολή’, 373; see also Angelov, 2005, 296).

According to Vatatzes, they were waging war in defense of the *fatherland* and its freedom which is an integral feature of that fatherland (*ἡμᾶς ὑπερμαχοῦντας τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τῆς ἐγγενοῦς αὐτῆς ἐλευθερίας προκινδυνεύοντας*); therefore, the pope ought to praise the emperor of Nicaea, since he was an imitator of Christ, the successor of the head of the Apostles, and had knowledge of the Christian laws and the human institutions (*Καὶ σύ δέ, ὡς Χριστοῦ μιμητής, καὶ τοῦ τῶν ἀποστόλων κορυφαίου διάδοχος, καὶ γνῶσιν ἔχων θείων τε νομίμων καὶ τῶν κατ’ ἀνθρώπους θεσμῶν, ἐπαινέσεις ἡμᾶς*) (Sakellion, ‘Ανέκδοτος επιστολή’, 377). The notion of fatherland, closely related to Constantinople, which was elaborated upon in the court rhetoric of Nicaea was thus reaffirmed and propagated (Irmscher, 1970; Angold, 1975b). As underlined in the concluding part of the letter, it was the imperial disposition for peaceful relations with the pope that had led Vatatzes to finally receive that arrogant and ‘unknowledgeable’ letter, and treat leniently those who had presented it (*τοῦ εἰρηνεύειν ἕνεκα μετὰ τῆς σῆς ἁγιότητος, τὴν τοῦ γράμματος ἀπαιδευσίαν ἤνεγκεν ἀλύπως, καὶ τοῖς τοῦτο διακομίσασιν ἠπίως προσηνέχθη*) (Sakellion, ‘Ανέκδοτος επιστολή’, 378).

Vatatzes’s reply should be seen in a wider context since it clearly reflected an attitude of political and ecclesiastical independence, which also corresponded to a broader anti-papal coalition; Nicaea was an important player in the great struggle

of the era between the papacy and the Hohenstaufen. Confronted with an intense papal crusading policy in Romania, Vatatzes saw an alliance with Frederick II as a priority (Gill, 1979, 89–96; Tinnefeld, 1995). That alliance was later reaffirmed by the marriage, most probably celebrated in 1241, between the emperor of Nicaea and Frederick's illegitimate daughter Costanza Lancia, who received the name Anna (Kiesewetter, 1999, passim; Papayianni, 2000, 264–270). The papacy was the main common enemy of that alliance; Vatatzes thus chose to propagate his image as a steady and unwavering defender of Orthodoxy.

Despite his partnership, the results of Vatatzes's alliance with Frederick were actually poor; as a result, the Nicaean emperor had to turn again to the papacy and seek accommodation. The most ambitious phase of ecclesiastical negotiations came during the papacy of Innocent IV (1243–1254) (Franchi, 1981; see also Angold, 1995, 525–526; Papayianni, 2000, 190–213). But in 1254 both Vatatzes and Innocent IV died, which consequently meant the cancellation of the plans for Church Union.

Under Vatatzes's austere and protectionist economic policy the empire prospered, taking full advantage of the rich resources of Asia Minor. Aiming at a society whose economy was organized around the ideal of autarky, the emperor took special care for the development of agriculture and protection of the home market (Angold, 1975a, 97–143; Mitsiou, 2006). He also showed hostility to international trade, which was specifically directed toward the West. Vatatzes even passed sumptuary laws which prohibited the use of foreign luxury goods; he legislated that the people who bought imported goods from the 'Italians', as well as from the markets of the East, would be considered as unpatriotic (Gregoras, *Byzantina Historia*, I, 43.15–44.12). That policy certainly came in sharp contrast to the policy of his predecessor, Theodore I, who, in August 1219, offered Venice generous commercial privileges, which were to last for five years (Hendrickx, 2004; Giarenis, 2008, 131–139).

Byzantine self-identification in the period of exile

Vatatzes's reign also witnessed an ideological reinvention, which gave priority to the Hellenic identity of the people of the empire, and officially started using the relevant labels. Of course, the question of identity and the terminology used during this period is extremely complicated, if one wishes to avoid simplistic schemes. It constitutes an important issue of the period – naturally regarding also the relations between Nicaea and the West – and its elaboration is most effectively reflected in rhetoric. We can only raise a few pertinent points here. The identity label of *Hellene* was at the time reappropriated, reinterpreted, and propagated, especially through the writings of the scholar-emperor Theodore II Doukas Laskaris (Kaldellis, 2008, 372–379; Angelov, 2005, 95–98; Koder, 2016, 195–210). That label certainly did not erase the traditional one of *Rhomaios*, which continued to be used in order to denote another simultaneously existing identity, of a primarily 'political' nature (on the use of the term in that era, see also Papadopoulou, 2014, 163–167; Stouraitis, 2017, 86–87).

The Byzantine identities were undoubtedly reshaped in the empire of Nicaea under the influence of elements such as the notion of exile, the strong anti-Latin sentiment, and the commitment to a Byzantine recapture of Constantinople and the other Latin-occupied lands. Those elements were also followed by certain imperial choices, such as the one taken by Vatatzes for autarky, which meant more introversion than interaction with the Latins – and with the West in general.

Different approaches can also be seen in the use of terms of self-identification during the existence of the empire. Let us just consider the illustrative example of the fate of the term *Graikos* in the period after 1204. Nikolaos and John Mesarites had in 1206 quite independently operated as spokesmen of the *Graikoi*, that is the Byzantine Christians (Heisenberg, *Neue Quellen* II; Giarenis, forthcoming). But when in 1214 Nikolaos Mesarites took part in the union negotiations with the papal legate Pelagius in Constantinople as a representative of the empire of Nicaea, on his return there he had to face the accusations and the resentment of the Orthodox patriarch Theodore Eirenikos. The problem raised was that Pelagius had reportedly referred to the latter by the nonexistent ecclesiastical title 'archbishop of the *Graeci*' which was regarded as inappropriate by the Byzantine hierarchy, and he had also attempted to use the term 'archbishop of Nicaea'; the latter had not been accepted, as Mesarites reassures us (Heisenberg, *Neue Quellen* III, 19–33; Giarenis, forthcoming). In contrast, we know that the next patriarch of Constantinople (at Nicaea), Germanos II, in the following years did not have any problem in accepting, and even promoting, the term *Graikos* as an identity label for the Orthodox Christians of the empire towards the Latins (Sathas, *Bibliotheca Graeca*, 2:17, 43, 45; Arabatzis, 'Ανέκδοτη επιστολή', 375–377).

Such a re-shaping or re-labeling of Byzantine identities in the empire of Nicaea can be best traced in the writings of the scholar-emperor Theodore II Laskaris, where political ideology touches upon ancient philosophical roots, simultaneously attempting to exceed and radicalize them, providing a new thought-system, which was nonetheless to be largely forgotten after 1258, and especially after 1261. The new social and political framework necessitated differentiated political thought and ideological responses (Agoritsas, 2016; Angelov, 2007).

Those fluid and multiple identities, which were either reshaped or relabeled in the empire of Nicaea, operated in different levels, responded to challenges posed especially by the Latin Empire of Constantinople, but also seem to have taken into account attitudes from other parts of what was regarded as 'West' at the time, such as Epiros. Their elaboration also reflects intellectual attitudes towards the past, which were meant to serve contemporary needs. The emergence of *Hellene* and *Graikos* as terms of self-identification corresponded to the term used to describe the 'other', namely *Italos* for the Latins. Nevertheless, the ruler of that state steadily remained *basileus Rhomaion* and its people were politically *Rhomaioi.* Its last ruler, Michael VIII Palaiologos, succeeded in receiving a second coronation at Hagia Sophia of Constantinople in 1261. The Reigning City was Byzantine again, and some important ideological choices and their subsequent rhetorical manifestations which had been made in exile

were now considered as outdated and no longer corresponding to the needs of the time. Thus, the aforementioned terms of self-identification were temporarily forgotten during the first Palaeologean era, to surface again in Byzantine political and intellectual history only in the last decades of the empire.

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15 The image of the ‘Greek’ and the reality of Greco-Latin interaction in Romania, according to 13th and 14th-century Latin sources

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This chapter aims to examine the portrayal of Greeks in Latin sources, originating primarily from Romania, in the 13th and 14th centuries. It will also sketch the outline of Greco-Latin contact in the administration, economy, society, and culture of the Frankish states in Greece. Thus, we will deal with both the perception and the reality of the interaction between Latins and Greeks in this period.

The events of the Fourth Crusade and its eventual deviation towards Byzantium are well-known and have been extensively studied (see e.g. Godfrey, 1980; Queller & Madden, 1997; Phillips, 2004; Piatti, 2008; Chrissis, 2014). The atrocities committed by the crusaders when they captured Constantinople in 1204 were condemned in Byzantine sources (such as Nicetas Choniates) as well as by Pope Innocent III; however, the contemporary chroniclers Geoffrey of Villehardouin and Robert of Clari tried to justify them, searching for a moral excuse for the deviation of the crusade by saying that God favoured the Latins and punished the schismatic Greeks. The motive (*excitatorium)* for the holy war was the excuse (*excusatio*) for the military expedition. The chroniclers of the Fourth Crusade thought of the Byzantines as schismatics, liars, and not to be trusted. Geoffrey of Villehardouin (*La Conquête de Constantinople*, par. 184, 185) despised them, called them *Grifon* (griffins, γρύπες) not worthy of confidence, while Robert of Clari (*La Conquête de Constantinople*, par. 73, 99) described them as enemies and cowards. The anonymous author of *The Chronicle of Morea* (see in general Shawcross, 2009), especially the Copenhagen codex – written in Greek but Latin in mentality – uses offensive language against the Greeks, whom he calls faithless and disrespectful towards the Church of Rome, as he attempts to justify the attitude of the crusaders who proceeded to capture the City [*τὴν κακοσύνην τῶν Ρωμαίων, τὴν ἀπιστίαν ὅπου ἔχουν* (Schmitt, *The Chronicle of Morea*, v. 727; trans. Lurier, *Crusaders as Conquerors*, 88: ‘the evilness of the Romans, their faithlessness’)*, λοιπὸν ἀφότου οὐ σέβονται τὴν Ἐκκλησίαν τῆς Ρώμης, διατὶ νὰ ὑπᾶμε εἰς τὴν Συρίαν κι οὐ μὴ νὰ στραφοῦμε ὀπίσω, νὰ ἐπάρωμεν τῶν ἄπιστων τὴν ἀφεντίαν ὅπου ἔχουν* (Schmitt, *The Chronicle of Morea*, v. 816–818; trans. Lurier, *Crusaders as Conquerors*, 90–91: ‘Well, since they do not respect the Church of Rome,

why should we go to Syria and why should we not return to take from the faithless their dominions')].

The memory of the Fourth Crusade and the recapture of Constantinople by the Latins was kept alive during the 13th century and even the expulsion of the Christians from the Holy Land – the fall of Acre in 1291 – was far from being the end of the crusading movement. Crusades continued to play an important role in the politics and society of late medieval Europe. During the 13th and most of the 14th century, crusading ideology was maintained, although there was a notable change: since 1204, fighting the *scismatici Greci* had become another one of its aims alongside (and sometimes even instead of) the desire to recapture the Holy Land. Constantinople found its place alongside Jerusalem. Despite its initial objections to the diversion of the Fourth Crusade, the papacy had given its support and authorization for crusades in defence of Latin presence in Greece – and, therefore, against the Byzantines – from the early years of the conquest. This continued even after the Byzantines recovered Constantinople, when the most significant efforts for the restoration of the Latin empire were spearheaded by Charles of Anjou (Chrissis, 2012). So, the Byzantine emperor after 1261 was called *scismaticus sibi nomen usurpans hostis Romane ecclesie*, while the Latin one was the rightful *dei gratia fidelissimus in Christo imperator a deo coronatus Romaniae moderator et semper augustus* (Filangieri, *Registri*, I, 94, no. 3). Phrases like *pro itinere Achaye contra Grecos scismaticos in subsidium fidelium* or *negotium Romanie quod multum imminet cordi nostri* (Filangieri, *Registri*, I, 251, no. 230) are constantly repeated in Angevin documents showing that the ideology of the crusades was kept alive. The treaty of Viterbo in 1267 justified Angevin involvement in Romania. The dream of re-establishing the Latin empire of Constantinople continued even during the reign of Charles' heirs, showing that the Frankish settlement in the Eastern Mediterranean maintained its prestige (on Charles of Anjou's involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean, see: Léonard, 1954; Geanakoplos, 1959; Bon, 1969; Abulafia, 1997; Dourou-Eliopoulou, 1987; eadem, 2005). The term 'Grecus' is used for the byzantine emperor (*quod facere consueverunt temporibus imperatorum grecorum*), as well as for the locals (pirates, merchants, or land owners having *pheuda antiqua de tempore Grecorum*) (Filangieri, *Registri*, XIX, 151, no. 197, and 160, no. 238).

The Frankish principality of Achaea, which was formed in 1205, is a representative example of a Western state established on former Byzantine territory thanks to the political, economic, and cultural domination of the Franks after the Fourth Crusade. *The Chronicle of Morea*, the Assizes of Romania, and the documents of the Angevin chancery provide us with crucial information on every aspect of Latin policy and organization. The main tools used by the Latins to consolidate their power in the East and to influence the local population were religion, feudal law, administration, and the Western monetary system (*deniers tournois*, Venetian *grossi*, *fiorini*). The impact of Latin settlement was reflected in various areas of activity: political (diplomatic relations, foreign policy, treaties, marriage arrangements), economic (commercial relations, treaties, money circulation), and social (participation in everyday life, mixed societies, cultural interaction). Although

the crusaders replaced the hierarchy of the Greek Orthodox Church with a Latin one, they did not compel the local population to change their faith. According to *The Chronicle of Morea*, the Greek *archontes* of the Peloponnese requested 'that from now on, no Frank will force us to change our faith for the faith of the Franks, nor our customs and the law of the Romans', a condition accepted by Geoffrey of Villehardouin (trans. by Lurier, *Crusaders as Conquerors*, 132; Schmitt, *The Chronicle of Morea*, v. 2093–2095: *ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν καὶ ἔμπροστεν Φράγκος νὰ μὴ μας βιάση ν' ἀλλάξωμεν τὴν πίστιν μας διὰ τῶν Φραγκῶν τὴν πίστιν, μήτε ἀπὸ τὰ συνήθειά μας τὸν νόμον τῶν Ρωμαίων*). A constant process of acculturation and interaction between the Latins and the local population is also evident, though this is matched by both sides tenaciously retaining their individuality (Jacoby, 1973; idem, 1986; Ilieva, 1991; Arbel, 1996; Chrysostomides, 2003; Dourou-Eliopoulou, 2004).

The crusaders' intervention in local society is another interesting aspect of their policy. The Franks respected the old privileges accorded to the local population in an effort to avoid hostilities. The Byzantine *archontes* had kept their properties according to the Byzantine law (Assizes: Parmeggiani, *Libro delle Uxanze*, par. 138, 194; Topping, 1949; Jacoby, 1967), but belonged to a lower rank, being nobles of simple homage, which meant they did not have the right to participate in the prince's court. The rural population kept their land (*stasis*), and remained there (*οἱ χωριάτες τῶν χωριῶν νὰ στέκουν ὡσὰν τοὺς ηὗραν*: Schmitt, *The Chronicle of Morea*, v. 1648), paying the same contributions as in the Byzantine period (*sub annuo redditu pro stasia sua paterna*, *telo pro eius acrosticum, pro aliis juribus, episseme seu cabelle seu bona et jura*: Longnon & Topping, *Documents*, no. II, 45). On the other hand, diplomatic relations with Byzantines were maintained (*carissimus amicus duca Neopatre*) and the ancient Byzantine privileges were respected (*privilegia ab antiquis imperatoribus Romaniae*) (Filangieri, *Registri*, IX, 209, no. 62, X, 48, no. 166, XII, 187, no. 6; Nicol, 1972). In general, the chivalrous ideal was encouraged, while a brilliant and glamorous society is illustrated in the contemporary chronicles (Marino Sanudo Torsello, Ramon Muntaner), which give an idealistic and exaggerated picture of the feudal society, reflecting the harmony and the togetherness among the Latin settlers and the local Greek population that prevailed in the 13th century. In the Greek version of *The Chronicle of Morea* the Franks are referred to as the flower of the noblemen, each one worth as much as two hundred enemies [*τὸ ἄνθος τῶν εὐγενικῶν ἀνθρώπων τοῦ Μορέως* (Schmitt, *The Chronicle of Morea*, v. 3927), *ἐπεὶ ἄν ἔχωμεν ὁμοῦ ἀγάπην ὡς ἁρμόζει, ὁ κατὰ εἷς γὰρ ἀπὸ ἐμᾶς ν'ἀξιάζη διακοσίους ἀπὸ ὅσοι ἔρχονται ἐδῶ διὰ νὰ μᾶς πολεμήσουν* (ibid., v. 3994–3996)], while phrases like *χα μοτσοῦκιν ἔποικεν, κι' ἐφάγασιν καὶ ἐχάρησαν κ' ἐξυλοκονταρίσαν* (ibid., v. 2408), *ντζοῦστρες, κοντάρια ἐτσάκισαν*, *χαρὲς μεγάλες εἶχαν* (ibid., v. 3369) recall the Western habits, games, jousts, and festivities espoused in Romania. In the French version of *The Chronicle of Morea* we read that the knights added the name of their castle to their own name (Longnon, *Livre de la Conqueste*, par. 218), and the bourgeois of Glarentza lent money to the barons (ibid., par. 794), while in the Aragonese version the barons of Carytaina brought up the sons of Byzantine

archontes according to the feudal law (Morel-Fatio, *Libro de los Fechos*, par. 313), and Greeks could trade with the Franks (ibid., par. 474). Furthermore, in the French version of *The Chronicle of Morea* part ownership is mentioned (Longnon, *Livre de la Conqueste*, par. 663: *casaux de parçon*), indicating the peaceful symbiosis that existed between Greeks and Latins.

A considerable number of Latins, mostly Italians and Catalans, settled in Venetian dominions under the title of *habitatores* (protected guests) and participated in the regions' social and economic life living peaceably with the local population. Several examples of their economic activities are reported in Venetian notarial acts: they seem to have cooperated with Greeks or other Italians, Ragusans, or Catalans in commercial companies (*collegantia)* in order to trade *per terram et aquam* for a certain time, and tried to satisfy their everyday financial needs by borrowing (Rocca, *Benvenuto de Brixano*, 16, no. 35, and 38, no. 93; Carbone, *Pietro Pizolo*, 195, no. 1121, and 201, no. 1140). Several Latins turned to moneylenders, while others lent their own money for commercial and shipping purposes (*ad usum cursi, prestito marittimo*) with interest (Carbone, *Pietro Pizolo*, 52, no. 103). The sums mentioned varied from very small to sizeable, which is indicative of the population's financial wherewithal. In other cases, they borrowed or purchased agricultural products such as wine or grain in advance, traded in slaves, or engaged in other activities such as selling or freighting ships. Venetian notaries also inform us that several settlers in Candia apprenticed their children to artisans (Carbone, *Pietro Pizolo*, 132, no. 98, and 182, no. 394). Catalans also lived peacefully as *habitatores* in other Latin dominions, especially Venetian ones, and cooperated in *collegantie* or were active as merchants or pirates (Lluch, *Diplomatari*, 205, no. 157). Latins could possess land with the consent of the administration (Filangieri, *Registri*, XXVIII, 118, no. 80: *privilegium ... concessimus in feudum nobile de liberalitate mera et gratia speciali*).

The Latins grafted the Western system of organization into a different environment. Western feudal institutions were established which were retained in Byzantine and Venetian territories even after the decline and fall of the Western dominions. The phrase *fidelitatem et ligium homagium juxta consuetudines Imperii Romanie* (Filangieri, *Registri*, XXVIII, 101, no. 92) figures frequently as a reminder of the feudal oath of fidelity and homage demanded by the legislative code of the Assizes of Romania, which were in force in the Frankish states. The Latins' main goal was to maintain control over their dominions, and Charles of Anjou, a skilful leader, did the best with the opportunities given to him. He organized the finances of his kingdom in an admirable way, especially the grain trade, so that he made profit. The documents provide all the relevant details, such as the merchants who undertook the mission, the quantities which were exported, the export tax (*jus exiture*), and the markets where they were forwarded. Glarentza in Achaea, built by Geoffrey of Villehardouin in 1223, had developed into an important port and lucrative market. The enemy markets, on the other hand, were excluded (*preterquam ad terras Paleologi vel aliorum inimicorum nostrorum*) (Filangieri, *Registri*, XV, 35, no. 143). Furthermore, Charles of Anjou organized the salt monopoly in Corfou and Dyrrachion and the profit from this was given for

the payment of the mercenary troops (*pro solvenda mercede*). The Angevin king renewed the ancient privileges of the locals – the citizens of Dyrrachion (*privilegi et immunità di cittadini di Durazzo*) – while, on the other hand, he fully respected the old obligations of the inhabitants of the island of Corfou (*pro hominibus insule non cogantur ad indebita servicia, or homines angararii insule Curie prestare tenentur*) (Filangieri, *Registri*, XVI, 76, no. 283) and ordered his officials not to violate them. Examples of these are the golden bulls issued by the despot of Epiros in 1236 and 1246 which provided Corfu's Orthodox clergy and people (*castrenses et exocastrenses*) with immunity and were ratified first by the Angevins and then by the Venetians (Lemerle, 1953).

In the 13th century Greeks were excluded from the administration of Frankish states, which was restricted only to Latins. Nevertheless, we can observe a gradual promotion of Byzantine *archontes* to the feudal rank of liege nobles, as well as of Greek merchants or peasants to the rank of feudal lords. Only during the 14th century, when the Latin dominions were in decline and a progressive osmosis of Greek and Latin elements is attested, some offices, as that of the *protovestiarius*, were given to Greeks, as well as feudal goods (Longnon & Topping, *Documents*, nos. III, 62, II, 33, 43). In general, Latins maintained a policy of building consensus with the locals, in an effort to avoid hostilities. The legislative code of the Assizes of Romania is indicative of their policy, separating Latin feudal customs from the Byzantine system of transferring land which was preserved for Greek *archontes* (as noted above; see: Parmeggiani, *Libro delle Uxanze*; Topping, 1949; Jacoby, 1967).

The cultural life in the crusading territories concerned translations, exportation of objects of art, and involved the elite. There was a close interrelation between the Latins and the Greeks. Gradually, the Latins were influenced by the Greek language and culture and kept Greek books in their libraries. They spoke Greek as we read in *The Chronicle of Morea* regarding Prince William II Villehardouin (*ὁ πρίγκιπας ρωμαΐκα τοῦ ἀπεκρίθη*: Schmitt, *The Chronicle of Morea*, v. 4130). In the middle of the 14th century a *lingua franco-graeca* had spread in Romania with characteristic example *The Chronicle of Morea*. It seems that very few Byzantines knew Latin and were familiar with the classical works, such as Maximos Planoudes, Demetrios Kydones, or Manuel Kalekas who converted to Catholicism. They formed the nucleus of Latin culture in the East. Byzantine scholars played an important role in the Italian Renaissance. Florentine humanism was transferred from Latin to Greek philosophy and literature. Demetrios Chalkokondyles (born in Athens in 1423) taught in Florence and is responsible for the edition of classical Greek works. He attacked the bad translations of Aristotle (by Averroes or the Thomists) in Latin. The Florentine Leonardo Bruni produced more accurate translations. Moreover, the educated Latins read Greek. Demetrios Kydones and John Bessarion believed in the coexistence of the two cultures. By examining several examples concerning the classical culture of the Latins, we can conclude that the Latin Church and monasticism were the nucleus of classical education which transferred Latin culture not only to the clergy but also to the young aristocrats in the Frankish

states of Greece. The Dominican monastery of Pera in Constantinople, founded in 1228, was the nucleus for the study of Latin in the East. An interesting aspect was the revival of the Greek Orthodox Church and the Greek language under the Florentine rule of the Acciaiuoli in Athens (Geanakoplos, 1966; Setton, 1975; Haberstumpf, 2005; Giannakopoulos, 2006). Documents of Charles I of Anjou mention copyists of classical Greek and Latin works, as well as translators of books from Arabic to Latin on behalf of the Angevin king, along with orders for their payment; similar is the case of the Aragonese Grand Master of the Hospitallers in Rhodes, Juan Fernandez de Heredia, who commissioned the Aragonese version of *The Chronicle of Morea* (Filangieri, *Registri*, XXV, 86, no. 18, XXIV, 176, no. 188; Luttrell, 1960). Furthermore, classical works were found in the libraries of certain members of the Latin elite, showing the interest they had for classical culture. The example of the chancellor of Achaea, Leonardo, is characteristic of an educated Latin official of the 13th century, who appreciated the classical Greek literature and kept Greek books as well as translations in Latin in their libraries. There is a list of Leonardo's goods in his will, such as a *scrineum* with cloths and objects like candle holders, plates, books, weapons, and wine; according to the inventory, his library included legal and medical books, novels, as well as Greek books and chronicles (Filangieri, *Registri*, XXIV, 176, no. 188; Miller, 1908, 153–154).

In the 14th century, when the crusading activity had declined, Latins continued to travel to the Eastern Mediterranean in search of profit. Archival sources illustrate not only matters relating to everyday life, but also the official aspect of Latin intervention in the Eastern Mediterranean, i.e. diplomacy and foreign affairs. The 14th century was a turbulent one in which most of the Frankish dominions were severely weakened, and newcomers like the Catalan company of the Almogavares for a time threatened the status quo. After the Sicilian Vespers of 1282 and their acquisition of Sicily, the kings of Aragon turned their attention to the East. However, although they made several efforts to obtain titles and territories through treaties and marriages, none of them was a long-term success. In the early 14th century, their relations with the Angevins of Morea and the Lusignan dynasty on Cyprus reveal their considerable interest in Achaea and Cyprus, where they sought to obtain (mostly vacant) titles. At the end of the 14th century, the Aragonese king, suzerain of the duchy of Athens since 1312, exempted Greeks and Albanians who wanted to settle in the duchies of Athens and Neopatras from taxes. In addition, he advised his subjects, Franks and Greeks, to obey the vicar of Athens, and offered them his protection (Lluch, *Diplomatari*, p. 71, no. 56; p. 246, no. 189; p. 587, no. 536; p. 486, no. 395). Several Aragonese documents deal with Navarrese claims and various affairs of the subjects of the duchy of Athens, including the financing of a fleet in 1383. In Catalan duchies, Greeks were excluded from offices except for the role of notary, and only at the end of the 14th century was Catalan citizenship awarded to some subjects for their services and fidelity to the house of Aragon (Lluch, *Diplomatari*, 353, no. 269, and 540, no. 479).

In the same period, the Venetians and the Genoese were already dominant and highly antagonistic in the area, while the Greeks were struggling to

recover their old territories and the Turks were rapidly developing into a major threat. An interesting point is the change in Western mentality concerning the Greeks in the second half of the 14th and also the 15th century: at that time they were no longer regarded as schismatics, but they were invited to rally with the West in order to confront their mutual enemy, the Ottoman Turks (Lluch, *Diplomatari*, 232–234, no. 181, and 246, no. 189). Contemporary documents are full of exhortations of the pope to all Christian powers to participate in a crusading expedition against the *Turchi infideles* (Lluch, *Diplomatari*, 423, no. 336, and 425, no. 337). The Hospitaller Order, which was established in Rhodes from 1310, played an important part in papal policy against the Turks. The Frankish principality of Achaea in the 15th century was in terminal decline, but kept its glamour in the West, as evidenced by the persistence of the Latins in distinguishing the title of *magnificus dominus princeps Achaye* from the Byzantine *illustrem dominum despotum Misistre* (Chrysostomides, *Monumenta Peloponnesiaca*, 519, no. 271; Loenertz, 1970, esp. 227–265, 329–369; Zakythinos, 1932). The importance of the area to the crusading movement was also expressed on the eve of the Ottoman conquest in 1460, when the Peloponnese was seen as having more advantages than any other Eastern region to protect Latin interests and wear down the power of the Turks.

As is well known, Latins in Romania were a minority. Their insecurity compelled them to settle in fortified towns and fortresses, while there was also a tendency towards ethnic solidarity expressed through arranging weddings between Franks in order to reinforce Latin power in Romania. Marriage was a means of conveying property and status, but, as the feudal code of the Assises of Romania indicates, mixed marriages with the indigenous population were also taking place. The Eastern Mediterranean was a popular destination for Westerners seeking to improve their fortune in a more propitious environment. Latins, especially Italians, travelled in Romania on their own initiative (for idealistic, personal or financial reasons, to acquire land, etc.) or under the orders of their king. They did not bring about a major demographic change, but they deeply influenced the history of the area. Bits of scattered information illustrate the atmosphere in 13th-century Romania, with a Western feudal system over a Byzantine substructure. The picture that emerges from the written sources is of a mixed society consisting of Frankish and local Greek populations, living peacefully together, having social and economic contacts such as marriage, trade, cultural relations, but on the other hand keeping their own religious beliefs and customs. *The Chronicle of Morea*, written in the second half of the 14th century, provides us with valuable information concerning the nature of the Latins' settlement and their co-existence with the Greeks. Still, the Frankish states proved short-lived and declined in the 14th century, when newcomers such as the Florentines and the Catalans were established in Romania claiming land and profit. Eventually, however, Latins were also influenced by the Greek local population and the living conditions in Romania, and a new social, economic, and cultural reality was formed in the Eastern Mediterranean, while the memory of that symbiosis was passed down the centuries in popular tradition.

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16 Perceptions of the Greek clergy and rite in late medieval pilgrimage accounts to the Holy Land

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For the historian of the Latin states of medieval Greece, Western pilgrim literature of the late Middle Ages presents a fascinating corpus of material. These texts, rich in detail, personal and often autobiographical, have, in some cases, preserved the type of incidental information about Latin-held Greek lands which is often missing from sources emanating from these territories. The present study, however, rather than reviewing the information on the Greco-Latin East offered by these writings, aims to consider the attitudes exhibited by 14th and 15th-century pilgrims towards the Greeks and their rite. It will argue that, even though there was never such a thing as complete uniformity of opinion regarding the Greeks, even among coeval pilgrims, one can observe a very obvious shift in the attitudes of pilgrims from the mid-15th century onwards; whereas, in the late 14th and early 15th century, our travellers (even those belonging to the regular clergy) were prepared to acknowledge the devoutness of the Greek clergy, despite their religious difference, the mid-15th century marks a turning point, whereby the Greeks are envisioned primarily as religious deviants and enemies of the Latins. This hardening of attitudes is manifested in increased instances of tension, predominantly in the shared shrines of the Holy Land, which, in turn, seems to affect the Latin pilgrims' views of the holy places themselves. It will be further argued that the pronounced hostility of some of these authors towards the Greeks may reflect the views of the Franciscan friars of Mount Sion at times of increased competition with the Greeks over the guardianship of the holy places.

The attitudes of Western pilgrims towards the Greek clergy and rite are, of course, inextricably linked with their attitudes towards the Greeks in general. This is evidently a complex topic, further confounded by medieval conceptions of ethnicity, which often conflated aspects of ethnicity, race and religion (Jotischky, 2003, 1–19). With regard to the Greeks (and the Eastern Christians more generally), it has been shown that Western attitudes and attempts at taxonomy continued for centuries to be influenced by a number of polemical tracts written within a crusading context in the 12th and 13th centuries (Rouxpetel, 2015, 58–77 and 99–107; Kedar, 1998, 121–122), to which we shall return below. The most evident example of this is the fact that, when attempting to describe the various Christian nations of the East, most 15th-century authors rely, not so much on personal observation, but on a more or less standardised ethnographic list,

deriving from a number of 13th-century texts, including Jacques de Vitry's *Historia orientalis*.[1] Some variant of these texts is often (but not always) inserted in the part of the account that describes the Holy Sepulchre since at this point the pilgrims were confronted with all the different Christian sects celebrating in one place. Michele Campopiano has shown that these texts would have been available to pilgrims at the friary of Mount Sion, not least in the form of compilations produced by the Franciscans (Campopiano, 2011, 329–357; Campopiano, 2012, 75–89; Campopiano, 2014, 52–53). Versions of such ethnographic treatises were also available to the pilgrims via the pilgrimage guidebooks on sale at Venice, whose main function was to list the indulgences granted at each of the shrines in the Holy Land (Richard, 1993, 104–105).

Western pilgrims' first contact with the Greeks and their clergy occurred as they travelled through the Latin states of Greece and Cyprus on the way to the Holy Land. However, relatively few authors (e.g. Niccolò da Martoni, 'Relation', 584; Pietro Casola, *Pilgrimage*, 200–201) comment extensively on them at this stage of the journey and usually these descriptions are short and focus on their appearance. Only a very small number of pilgrims (and that number is particularly small in the earlier period) insert here any comments on the doctrinal issues that separated the two Churches. The Anonymous English Franciscan's account from 1344 (Anon., 'Itinerary', 60) is particularly interesting in this context, for he reports what he believes to be the Roman Church's official position on the Greeks, but at the same time betrays considerable doubt about the validity of this opinion and appears sympathetic towards the Greeks when he says:

> The Lord Pope calls them schismatics, because they make a schism in the Catholic Church, against the document of Solomon and leaning upon their own prudence (Prov. 3.5). They follow in dogmas, errors and opinions the Church of St Sophia in the city of Constantinople, the rival of the orthodox Church of St Peter of Rome […] Their punishment, when captured, is a life of servitude, nor does the Church of Rome lift a hand for their liberation, although it is a work of charity to ransom slaves.

Such diatribes, however, are uncommon in the early part of the pilgrimage, possibly because contact with the Greeks remained relatively limited during the voyage.

The crucial issue of otherness, however, cannot be avoided when the pilgrims reach the Holy Land. Here, not only did the Greeks (and other Eastern rites) share the pilgrims' holy sites, but, ever since Saladin's reconquest of Jerusalem, they often controlled them or occupied a privileged position in them as compared to the Latins. The cases of the Holy Sepulchre and of St Catherine of Sinai are, of course, the prime examples and will therefore form the main focus of this study. It is perhaps surprising to find that, in the earlier period (up to the mid-15th century), this situation does not appear particularly problematic to our pilgrims, even while recognising the Greeks as deviants. The Irish Franciscan Simon Fitzsimons in 1322–23, for instance, gives a very positive assessment of the Greek

Patriarch in Egypt, despite the fact that he designates the Greeks as schismatics right from the start of his account (Simon Fitzsimons, 'Itinerary', 9 and 34). At the Holy Sepulchre, he reports with wonder the miracle of the descent of Holy Fire at Easter (though he probably did not witness it), unperturbed by the fact that this miracle was at the time operated by the Greek clergy (Simon Fitzsimons, 'Itinerary', 44–45). A version of the miracle is also recounted a few years later in 1344/45 by the anonymous English Franciscan (Anon., 'Itinerary', 65–66). In fact, this traveller, who visited the Holy Land only a few years after the Franciscans established their presence there, seemingly attests to a spirit of cooperation between the Greeks and the friars, when he notes that the tour of the Sepulchre was conducted jointly by four Franciscans and four Greeks (Anon., 'Itinerary', 65–67). Lay pilgrims also appear unperturbed by the religious difference of the native Christians: Nompar de Caumont in the early 15th century, for instance, comments on the strangeness of the Eastern rites in the Holy Sepulchre, but there is no hint of disapproval in his account (Nompar II de Caumont, *Le voyatge*, 37).

Nowhere does the coexistence of the various rites get a more positive review than in the account of the Augustinian Jacopo da Verona, whose attitude can only be described as ecumenical. He reports that in August 1335 he joined a march of about 3,000 Christians of all nations and rites from Jerusalem to Bethlehem where, at the church of the Nativity, he led the Latin mass, while all the other nations celebrated simultaneously, each in their own rite: 'Oh God', he says, 'what joy it was to hear such noise, all praising God and the Glorious Virgin'. This, despite noting the precedence that the Greeks took over the Latins at Bethlehem and despite casually distinguishing between Greeks on the one hand and Christians on the other. Later, the various Christian nations all celebrated mass together at the sepulchre of the Virgin in the valley of Josaphat, at which point our friar exclaims: 'never have I had such joy as in those three days; blessed be God' (Jacopo da Verona, 'Le pèlerinage', 217–219).

Such expressions of universality are exceptional, but positive assessments of the Greek clergy and their role in the shared shrines are almost ubiquitous until the middle of the 15th century. St Catherine of Mount Sinai is an even better example than the Palestinian sites, for this was a purely Greek church (albeit one that had long-established links with the West); and yet, in this period, it is impossible to find even hints of ambivalence towards the Greek monks, even by those authors who explicitly refer to the Greeks as heretics in other parts of their accounts. Thus, for example, we see pilgrims, like Ludolph of Sudheim, Lionardo Frescobaldi, Giorgio Gucci, Gabriele Capodilista and Roberto da Sanseverino, giving unambiguously positive accounts of the monks of St Catherine's, emphasising in particular their ascetic and pious lifestyle and reporting on the miracles encountered there (Ludolph of Sudheim, *De itinere*, 65–67; Lionardo Frescobaldi, 'Pilgrimage', 59–60; Giorgio Gucci, 'Pilgrimage', 113–114; Roberto da Sanseverino, *Viaggio*, 131–136). This is not to say that these authors do not note the religious difference of the Greeks, but they clearly do not consider it an obstacle to living a holy life of perfection. The itinerary of Anselme Adorno, written by his son John in a period when, as we shall see, attitudes had changed noticeably,

is a good example of this; it describes the Greek monks as strict observers of the regular life and implies quite unmistakeably that they are more ascetic than the Latin religious, before stating that they are only able to continue living in the desert of Sinai because of the miraculous aid given to them by St Catherine. He concludes his description by urging the Latin pilgrims to be generous towards them, as 'even though they belong to the sect of the Greeks, it is pious and most righteous to help support them, on account of the honour of the holy places which are kept safe by them' (Adorno, *Itinéraire*, 230–233).

This easy-going tolerance towards the Greek rite is also apparent in the shared devotions of Latins and Greeks at the monastery of St Catherine's. It is well known, of course, that a separate chapel existed in the monastery to accommodate the Latin pilgrims, but, as Drandaki has shown, this chapel is never mentioned before the 1470s and cannot have existed before then (Drandaki, 2006, 494–495). In fact, it is clear from earlier pilgrimage narratives that the mass was celebrated jointly by Latins and Greeks in the main church during this period. Lionardo Frescobaldi, for instance, describes attending the Greek mass at St Catherine's and notes how long and devout it was, though he could not understand anything apart from the 'Kyrie Eleison'. At the end, his companions took communion from the Greek archbishop, along with the Greek monks. The Greek use of leavened bread in the Eucharist, which in later authors features as a major indictment of the Greek rite, is here reported but with no hint of condemnation (Lionardo Frescobaldi, 'Pilgrimage', 64). More strikingly still, Roberto da Sanseverino reports in 1458 that one of his pilgrim companions, Friar Francis from Brescia, celebrated mass at the Greek altar in the main church of the monastery (Roberto da Sanseverino, *Viaggio*, 131–132). This is, to my knowledge, the only explicit mention of a Latin mass celebrated at the main altar of St Catherine's, but it may not have been a unique occurrence.[2] Nor was the celebration of Latin masses at Greek altars confined only to the monastery of Mount Sinai. As late as 1514, the Franciscan Francesco Suriano (who later became guardian of Mount Sion) reports in his treatise on the Holy Land that the Franciscans of Mount Sion visited the Greek monastery of St Sabba, once a year, on the saint's feast day and celebrated mass there (Francesco Suriano, *Il trattato*, 124–125).[3]

The apparent tolerance and easy coexistence, however, did not survive the second half of the 15th century. From this period onwards, relations between the Latin pilgrims and the Greek clergy of the Holy Land become increasingly confrontational and, conversely, outright condemnation of the Greek clergy and rite becomes increasingly common. One example of this tension has already been encountered; the construction of a Latin chapel at St Catherine's in the 1460s or 1470s can only signify that a) the Latins were no longer allowed to celebrate mass at the main altar; and b) the pilgrims were no longer content with simply attending the Greek mass. It is ironic that the existence of a separate chapel is first reported in the pilgrimage of Anselme Adorno, who expressed such a positive opinion of the Greek monks (Adorno, *Itinéraire*, 226–227).

Evidence of tension is apparent even earlier at the Holy Sepulchre. The bishop of Saintes, Louis de Rochechouart, for instance, reports in 1461 that, when the

Latin pilgrims shut themselves in the Sepulchre to spend the night there, as was customary, one of the Greek priests poured water all over the place where the Latins usually slept to prevent them from lying down (Louis de Rochechouart, 'Journal de voyage', 255). Though not all pilgrim authors turn hostile towards the Greeks overnight, from this period onwards, complaints against the Greek clergy of the Holy Land become almost ubiquitous; especially so among a group of clerical (and particularly mendicant) authors of the 1480s.

Thus, Bernard of Breydenbach (1483–84), for example, concedes that the monks of St Catherine live ascetically, but points out disapprovingly that they are property owners and engage in commercial activity (Bernard von Breydenbach, *Peregrinatio*, f. 108v). The famous Dominican pilgrim Felix Fabri notes that upon arriving at the Sepulchre for their first vigil, the Franciscans of Mount Sion warned the pilgrims not to fraternise with the Oriental Christian merchants inside the temple, and instructed them to only pray at the Latin altars, which they should also favour if they wished to make a pious donation (Felix Fabri, *Evagatorium*, 1:284–285); a far cry from the experience of the anonymous Franciscan in 1344, who was shown around by four friars and four Greeks. Felix is also much more overtly hostile to the monks of St Catherine than Breydenbach. He, too, acknowledges their ascetic lifestyle and concedes that they had been graced by miracles before they removed themselves from apostolic obedience, but then proceeds to attack their religious errors before concluding that he would not recognise any holiness in them, even if he saw them raise the dead, because they are schismatics (Felix Fabri, *Evagatorium*, 2:504–505). He urges his Latin readers to stop supporting them financially and, to illustrate his point further, he relates an anecdote that occurred after he had returned to his diocese in Ulm, when a monk of St Catherine arrived at his church with permission from the Latin Patriarch of Alexandria to beg for money for the repair of the monastery. After allowing him to read out his letter during mass, Felix then addressed the faithful and said: 'This, I urge you in the Lord, to give nothing to this brother, because he is a schismatic, a heretic and an infidel and he should not be allowed in our churches, nor be present in our services, because he is anathematized' (Felix Fabri, *Evagatorium*, 2:506). We see here an attitude diametrically opposed to the one expressed by Adorno, when he urged the Latins to continue supporting the monks of St Catherine because they are worthy guardians of the holy places.[4]

Though similar denunciations are plentiful in the writings of Felix's contemporaries, a single further example should suffice here: the German Franciscan Paulus Walther of Güglingen reports that the friars of Mount Sion had an agreement with the monks of St Sabba, whereby on the saint's feast day the Franciscans would celebrate mass at the monastery. In this, he confirms the statement made by his contemporary, Francesco Suriano. In the year of Paulus's visit (1482), however, the Greek abbot refused to allow the custom to take place and threatened the visitors that if they insisted on celebrating mass, he would take his monks and leave the monastery and there would be no celebration at all. When the friars persisted, the Greeks and other Eastern Christians, who had flocked to the monastery, barred the church's doors and refused to allow the friars to leave, while arguing

among themselves over whether the service should proceed. A riot threatened to ensue, putting the friars in fear of their lives. Eventually, the friars were allowed to go, without saying mass, but having avoided the danger of martyrdom (Paulus Walther, *Itinerarium*, 132). The incident is instructive, for it shows that what was apparently a fairly routine operation up until that point was quickly becoming a very contentious matter.

This hardening of attitudes is also reflected in the way the authors in question perceive the sacredness of the places and events that they encounter. Thus we find, for example, Paulus Walther noting that the relics of St Catherine had ceased to produce their holy oil because of the demerits of the Greeks, who were in damnable and sinful heresy (Paulus Walther, *Itinerarium*, 202); or, Alessandro Ariosto (not strictly speaking a pilgrim, but rather a missionary who wrote an itinerary for the years 1475–1478) declaring that the Greeks had destroyed the saint's relic by selling it off piece by piece, a somewhat perplexing accusation, given the fact that Ariosto was himself a recipient of one of the saint's bones, which he took with him back to Italy (Alessandro Ariosto, *Itinerarium*, 133 and 402). Francesco Suriano goes a step further and opines that the Greeks no longer held the relic at all; just as the angels had first brought the body of St Catherine to the Greek monks, they had now returned to take it away because the Greeks were not worthy guardians (Francesco Suriano, *Il trattato*, 176–177). Other miracles associated with the monastery are also discredited or explained away.

A similar process can also be observed with regard to the Holy Sepulchre, where one of the most venerable traditions associated with the site—the descent of the Holy Fire at Easter—is now dismissed as a scam. The accusation of fraud first appears (to my knowledge) in the anonymous Franciscan of 1463, who asserts that the miracle did, in fact, use to happen, but has now stopped because of the demerits of the people; what is even worse though is that the Greeks and Armenians strive to fake the miracle, discrediting, in the process, the Christian faith in the eyes of the Muslims, who recognise it as a fraud (Anon., *Description*, 16). Similar accusations follow in Wilhelm Tzewers in 1477 and Felix Fabri, Paulus Walther, Francesco Suriano and others in the 1480s (Wilhelm Tzewers, *Itinerarius*, 192–194; Felix Fabri, *Evagatorium*, 1:341; Paulus Walther, *Itinerarium*, 143–144; Francesco Suriano, *Il trattato*, 30). Some pilgrims continue to report positively on the Holy Fire until the end of the 15th century (e.g. Anon. *Viaggio da Venezia al S. Sepolcro ed al Monte Sinai*, 36),[5] but by the 16th century, the Latin rejection of the miracle is reported even in Greek pilgrimage accounts (e.g. Anon., 'Προσκυνητάριον', 62). The rejection of this miracle is of particular importance, not only because its veracity was universally acknowledged by Christians until this time, but also because, as Andrew Jotischky has argued, it may well have originally been a Western importation into the Jerusalem ritual, though, by this time, its origins had been forgotten (Jotischky, 2011, 44–60). By contrast, a number of late 15th-century authors complain that the frivolity of this scam is one of the reasons why the Muslims are so resistant to conversion.

The increased instances of tension between the two rites are not apparent only in the Holy Land. The same authors frequently report run-ins with the Greeks in

their travels through Greece and Cyprus – incidents, that is, which either happened to them personally, or more frequently, which are alleged to have happened to others. Typically, these instances of tension are said to arise from the Greek intolerance of the Latins and their rite. Paulus Walther, for instance, tells the story of a Greek on the island of Rhodes who allegedly grabbed a Franciscan friar by the beard and started taunting him about the *filioque* (Paulus Walther, *Itinerarium*, 87). Similarly, Fabri reports that a Greek invaded the Augustinian friary of Candia and vandalised the sculptures of the saints on the choir's pews because it is the habit of the Greeks to sabotage Latin churches (Felix Fabri, *Evagatorium*, 3:282). Most frequently, however, the accusation is that the Greeks will not allow the Latins to celebrate mass at their churches.

It is evident from these few examples, selected among many, that there is considerable variation in the attitudes exhibited towards the Greeks and their rite in the writings of late medieval pilgrims. Perhaps unsurprisingly, clerical and especially mendicant authors are amongst the most implacably hostile ones, but this had not always been the case, as was shown by the example of Friar Simon Fitzsimons, who travelled in the early 14th century. By the end of the 15th century, however, clerical writers are almost uniformly hostile towards the Greeks and this hostility often leads them to question the sanctity of the Greek holy places and the miracles encountered there.

It is not easy to explain why such a dramatic change of attitudes should occur at this particular time—a time when the collapse of the Byzantine Empire might have eased the rivalry between the Latin and Greek Churches. It would appear, however, that the growing hostility of the pilgrim authors towards the Greek rite actually reflects the attitudes of the Franciscans of Mount Sion in the period in question. It is evident that, however lively and individual the accounts of the clerical and mendicant authors may be, their attitudes are severely conditioned by a dependence on a literary and theological polemic tradition that stressed the differences between Latins and Oriental Christians, especially Greeks. What is more, the pilgrims' own writings make it clear that some of them were acquainted (or reacquainted) with this polemic tradition while sojourning with the Franciscans of Mount Sion.[6] Thus, Paulus Walther, for example, notes that one of the three activities that he devoted his year-long stay in Jerusalem to was 'collecting materials for a tract on various matters, namely […] about all the nations that live in the Holy Land and about their errors and sects […] And this material I collected with great care from various books, and from experienced people worthy of trust and from my own daily experience' (Paulus Walther, *Itinerarium*, 181). Recent studies by Michele Campopiano have shown exactly what kinds of books would have been available to Paulus and his fellow pilgrims at the convent of Mount Sion. Campopiano has persuasively argued that the Franciscans not only maintained a library in their convent, but also engaged in compiling collections of texts relating to the history of the Holy Land, including various polemic tracts against the religious errors of the Greeks, one of which was probably originally composed by the Dominicans of Constantinople in 1252 (Campopiano, 2012, 83–84). The aim of such compilations was to present 'a particular conception of the relationships that Western Christianity should establish with these groups [the inhabitants of Palestine] and [with] the Holy Land'

(Campopiano, 2012, 79). Such compilations also included descriptions of the oriental Christians, ultimately deriving from Jacques de Vitry's *Historia orientalis*, which forms the basis of many of the most polemical pilgrims' descriptions of the Eastern denominations.[7] Another pilgrim, Gian-Matteo Botigella (1458), spent his time in Jerusalem making a copy of the *Historia orientalis* from an exemplar provided by the friars, which then served in turn as the basis for several other copies made in northern Italy (Donnadieu, 2006, 419). It may be fair to speculate, therefore, that the clerical authors' pronounced hostility towards the Greeks was not simply the result of their heightened sensitivity to religious issues, but may have also been fanned by their stay with the friars of Mount Sion.

There can be little doubt about what the friars' own views on their Greek neighbours were in the late 15th century. Francesco Suriano, the Venetian friar who was made Guardian of Mount Sion in 1493 and again in 1512, makes these views clear in his *trattato*; in a chapter snappily entitled 'The third nation that inhabits the Holy Sepulchre is the accursed Greeks', he explains that the Greeks are the worst of the enemies of the Catholics (Francesco Suriano, *Il trattato*, 71–72). Further on, while discussing the monastery of St Catherine, he expresses the exact same opinion as his contemporary Felix Fabri, namely, that the Latins should stop supporting the monks of Mount Sinai, who in any case hate the Latins so much that they would rather starve themselves than live off Latin charity (Francesco Suriano, *Il trattato*, 176–177). His invective is by no means directed solely against the clergy. His assessment of the Greek Cretans deserves to be repeated in his own words: 'an accursed (epicurean) people, more treacherous than the Albanians, vindictive, homicidal, keepers of concubines, enemies of churches, of the mass, of sermons, of confession and communion, enemies of preachers and of friars and of every spiritual good; an arrogant, pompous, vainglorious, sinful people (liars, contemptuous and infamous), and finally, apart from their baptism, worse than the Muslims' (Francesco Suriano, *Il trattato*, 248).

As Campopiano points out, the friars of Mount Sion had a difficult diplomatic and missionary task ever since their establishment in Jerusalem in the 1330s, which often brought them into conflict with the neighbouring religious groups (Campopiano, 2012, 76–77). If the above observations are correct, however, it would appear that the relations between the friars and the Greek clergy deteriorated in the second half of the 15th century and this increased hostility filtered through into the writings of the pilgrims, especially those who were hosted by the friars.

It remains for us to consider why relations between the friars and the Greek clergy should deteriorate at this particular point in time. This question is not easy to answer. The increased instances of tension reported at the holy sites of Palestine and Egypt are sometimes explained by historians with reference to the Council of Florence and Ferrara, which convened in 1438/39 with the aim of bringing about the union of the two Churches, but was soon afterwards rejected by the Greeks. Denys Pringle, for example, explains the exclusion of the Latin pilgrims from the main church of Mount Sinai as a reaction to the Council (Pringle, 1993, 54; Drandaki, 2006, 2:495; Ševčenko, 2006, 22–24). Seen in this way, the evidence of tension in the Holy Land can be interpreted as an attempt by the Greek clergy to assert its independence and further undermine the union. The union of Florence

did indeed provoke the reaction of the Greek Churches of the Holy Land and was formally renounced in 1443 by a synod called by the Greek patriarch of Jerusalem and attended by the patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch (Papadopoulos, 1910, repr. 2010, 383). It is, therefore, probable that these tensions played a part in the deteriorating relations between the Greeks and the friars, but this does not fully resolve the issue. After all, the first consistent evidence of conflict in the travel accounts (including the construction of the Latin chapel at Mount Sinai) appears from the 1460s and intensifies in the 1470s and 1480s, more than two decades after the formal renunciation of the union.

A further clue as to the origins of this tension may perhaps be found in the polemical historiography produced by the Greek Patriarchate of Jerusalem from the 17th century onwards. In his history of the patriarchs of Jerusalem (probably begun before 1680),[8] Patriarch Dositheos II notes that the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople turned the Mamluk rulers of Jerusalem against the Greek clergy of the Holy Land, who were forced to rely on their Georgian coreligionists for protection. Even thus, the Orthodox clergy was said to have been so adversely affected that even the patriarchs had to work for a living (Dositheos, *Ιστορία*, Bk 11, ch. 7, par. 2). This reversal of fortunes was explained in the early 20th century by Chrysostomos Papadopoulos: upon Mehmet II's capture of Constantinople, Patriarch Athanasios IV sent an embassy to the sultan, asking him to ratify the privileged position of the Greeks in the holy places (Papadopoulos, 1910, repr. 2010, 386–388). Athanasios's successor, Gregory II, continued the same policy and obtained a renewal of these privileges from Mehmet in 1465 (Komninos Ypsilantis, 1870, 13). According to Papadopoulos, this was the cause for the Greeks' fall from favour, as the Mamluk authorities perceived these petitions as a transfer of the patriarch's loyalty to their Ottoman rivals and retaliated by lending their support to the Franciscan friars' appeals for an increased presence at the holy sites (Papadopoulos, 1910, repr. 2010, 389–390). If Papadopoulos's reading of the situation is accurate, then the growing tension observable between Latins and Greeks in the pilgrim literature may be the indirect result of patriarchal policy, which, in the short term, backfired, causing renewed competition between the Greeks and the friars over the guardianship of the holy places.

It is still difficult to answer conclusively why the attitudes of Western pilgrims towards the Greeks and their rite appear to change after the mid-15th century; it is certainly possible to take our pilgrim authors at their word and conclude that tensions arose because the Greek clergy became more intolerant, by denying, for instance, privileges that had been happily granted to the pilgrims in the past (e.g. the celebration of Latin masses at Greek altars). Even if this was the case, however, it appears that it may have been the result of a more complex process, influenced by the rejection of the union of Florence and Ferrara on the one hand, and increased competition over the holy sites in the aftermath of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, on the other. The friars of Mount Sion, for their part, appear to have played an active part in this process, through the promotion of a particular polemic tradition among the pilgrims, which created a self-fulfilling prophecy, in effect precipitating this hardening of attitudes.

Notes

1 There are, of course, exceptions to this rule. Camille Rouxpetel, for instance, has noted that Niccolò da Poggibonsi is untypical in inserting his own observations into the ethnographic section of his book, rather than simply following Jacques de Vitry's taxonomy (Rouxpetel, 2016, 6–7).

2 It is possible that other such instances may have gone unreported. Gabriele Capodilista, for instance, who travelled with Roberto da Sanseverino, does not mention this particular incident, even though he probably witnessed it (Santo Brasca & Gabriele Capodilista, *Viaggio in Terrasanta*). Shared devotions of this kind certainly also happened in Frankish Greece and Cyprus, though these were mostly as a result of the scarcity of Latin clergy at the parish level. There is also evidence of the coexistence of both rites in a single church building in territories such as Crete and Cyprus (for example in twin-aisled or twin-apsed churches), but, as Michael Olympios (2013, 329) has argued, the very existence of separate spaces within these churches can be read as evidence of demarcation and separation of the two rites, rather than of convergence. Olga Gratziou (2011, 118) argues that all twin-apsed churches of Crete were meant to accommodate both rites; but even she is only able to find just a couple of documentary sources attesting this and one of those (concerning the church of Christ the Saviour in Ierapetra) was manifestly the result of tension between the two communities.

3 There exist three versions of Francesco Suriano's *trattato*, compiled in 1485, 1514 and 1524. The published version, referred to here, is the 1514 one.

4 Though Fabri is implacably hostile towards the Greeks throughout his long account, it is only fair to note that he remains unambiguously positive towards the monks of St Sabba and uses their example to illustrate how much more ascetic Greek monks are compared to Latin ones (Felix Fabri, *Evagatorium*, 2:149–53). He does, however, note that he was robbed at the monastery by an Eastern Christian, whom he identifies as one of the monastery's servants. He, in fact, attributes his dislike and mistrust for Eastern Christians to this incident (Felix Fabri, *Evagatorium*, 2:148–149).

5 This is a 1770 edition, based on an earlier version dating to 1500. The anonymous work was attributed by the publisher to Fr. Noe Bianco but was probably a compilation based on Niccolò da Poggibonsi (Blair Moore, 2013, 375–411).

6 Several authors, including Felix Fabri, state that, while the lay pilgrims were accommodated by the Franciscans at a hostel in Jerusalem, the clerics among them were invited to stay at the friary of Mount Sion (Felix Fabri, *Evagatorium*, 1:240).

7 As Benjamin Kedar has shown, Jacques's own taxonomy is itself influenced by an earlier tract composed between 1168 and 1187, known as the *Tractatus de Locis et Statu Sancte Terre Ierosolimitane* (Kedar, 1998, 121).

8 On the dates of composition and publication of this work, see Sarris, 2005, 25–73.

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Part IV

The Latins and Late Byzantium

Perceptions and Reality

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17 The *ἑσπέρια γένη* in Byzantine literature before and after the first capture of Constantinople (mid.-12th to mid.-13th c.)

Theodora Papadopoulou

Relations between East and West during the Byzantine period have been the subject of thorough research which has shown that these relations went through many phases, from tolerance and alliances to friction and ruptures. Phrases like 'Meeting of East and West' or 'Meeting of two worlds' characterize attempts of modern research to describe and interpret these relations.

During the middle Byzantine period, serious friction arose between the two sides because of the coronation of Charlemagne and Otto I (9th and 10th centuries). Relations between Byzantium and the West also saw attempts to reach a mutual understanding (Dölger, 1961, 76–87; Ohnsorge, 1966; Lilie, 1985). As for the tensions in particular, these remained at the diplomatic level until the 11th and 12th centuries, when they turned into armed conflict through the Norman invasions and the crusades, culminating in the conquest of Constantinople in 1204.

Byzantine scholars in their works make remarks and comments on the behavior and character of the peoples Byzantium came in contact with, and dedicate short or extensive descriptions of the *ἑσπέρια γένη* (e.g. Choniates, *Historia*, 1:585.24–25: *παρὰ γενῶν ἑσπερίων*; Choniates, *Annals*, 322: 'nations of the West'), i.e. the 'Latins' or 'Franks' – but also of non-Western peoples.[1] These 'foreigners' arrived in Byzantium sometimes individually (as potentates, officials, or scholars visiting the imperial court) and sometimes as an army. Byzantine scholars follow the example of classical authors who also presented the habits and culture of the various peoples that the Greeks came in contact with in their narratives. So, either through the narration of incidents and events or through direct characterizations, emerges the image of certain peoples, as perceived by Byzantine authors (Mavrommatis, 1996).

Terminology: *image* and the *other*

In the modern period, the term *image* (*εἰκόνα*) has a significant place in psychology and sociology, particularly in theories concerning *identity*, and it is connected with another theoretical concept, that of the *other*. History, in its attempt to approach peoples' self-awareness and interactions in a more complete way, has borrowed the terminology of sociology and psychology and, to some extent, their reasoning. Regarding identity, it should be noted that historians are interested in

its sociological and anthropological rather than its psychological side, because they focus on the mechanisms through which an individual integrates into a society and a culture. Furthermore, historians are interested in defining collective identities, since they examine a group (of people) or an entire people.

A very brief outline of social identity theory will help demonstrate how it is intertwined with history. The nature and function of collective identity are closely related with social identity, which is defined as the awareness of the individual that it belongs to a certain social group, from which it derives its values and self-esteem. At the same time, this sense of belonging has an emotional significance for the individual. In another formulation, social identity is the perception an individual has about itself as a member of a group. The content of this self-concept is the sum of images the individual has about itself (self-images); these vary in richness, depending on the time they were formed (Abrams & Hogg, 1990, 2, 9).

Thus, the theory of social identity attributes a central role to the process of categorization, since the latter sorts the world into comprehensible units. Stereotypes (which are certain generalizations referring to groups of people) emanate from this process and they function in two directions, towards the self and towards the other(s). According to the first, the *autostereotypes*, certain characteristics are attributed by a group to itself; whereas *heterostereotypes* refer to the properties attributed by a group to another. Through this process people label various groups, and themselves as well, thus putting in order a chaotic social environment. This is the basic function of stereotypes. Although stereotypes basically aim to differentiate groups, at the same time they help create connections between people, providing them with a nexus of common beliefs (Condor, 1990, 230, 233–234, 242, 247). We shall examine how these heterosterotypes emerge from Byzantine texts during the period under consideration here.

Εἰκών (image) in Byzantine sources

The term *εἰκών* (image) in Byzantine sources has a philosophical but primarily a theological meaning, as it refers to the depiction of the divine. A brief review in the dictionaries of the Middle Byzantine period, as that of pseudo-Zonaras, elucidates its meaning, interpreting the image as the same as the archetype to which it refers, but different from the archetype in essence. The word derives from the verb *εἴκω*, which means ‘to look alike’. Although the relation of the term with the holy icons is not stated, its indirect reference to them is obvious; the lexicographer implies the definition of John of Damascus for the icons, who, quoting St. Basil, came up with the following formulation in the Seventh Ecumenical Synod: ‘the honor given to the image passes over to the prototype’ (John of Damascus, *Schriften*, vol. 3: no 3, par. 15: *ἡ τῆς εἰκόνος τιμὴ ἐπὶ τὸ πρωτότυπον διαβαίνει*).

Nevertheless, the word is used in the sources in non-theological contexts as well, with a meaning closer to the modern one. In these cases, the image denotes the total of qualities that are ascribed to a person. An illustrative quote is from the *Tactica* of Leo VI, where the emperor presents the image of the general, which he paints with colors, as he himself writes in his text.[2] These colors are, first, the

virtuous character a general ought to have; then, he ought to be frugal, with sober and prudent attitude. Leo advises the general to talk to the soldiers in a simple but clear and effective way, to encourage them, even to console and comfort them during the predicaments of a campaign. He underlines the duty of the general to be the first to suffer the adversities, so as to become an 'image' for his soldiers. In this phrase, Leo gives an additional meaning to the word, that of an example to imitate, a role model.[3]

This is the meaning the word acquires in the sources when describing other peoples. Their portrayal, their image emerges through the texts painted with vibrant colors so that it may be clear, precisely as Leo noted in his *Tactica*. Descriptions of the Western nations and their qualities become more frequent and more detailed as the contacts of the two worlds become closer: Western scholars and merchants travel to Byzantium and Western potentates form alliances with the emperor or, on the contrary, get into conflict with him.

From the long story of these contacts with its variety and fluctuations, we shall focus on the period delineated by the reign of Manuel I (1143–1180), the first conquest of Constantinople (1204) and its reconquest by the Byzantines (1261). More specifically, we shall focus on three points that marked the relations between East and West during the Second Crusade, the Fourth Crusade and, finally, the year 1261 when the crusaders were forced to abandon Constantinople. Our examination will be based primarily on historiographical sources and more specifically the works of John Kinnamos, Niketas Choniates, and George Akropolites.

Manuel I

The reign of Manuel I was marked by the close contacts between Byzantium and the West. It is well-known that the emperor's plans were aimed at the reconstitution of an ecumenical state according to Justinian's model, or, as it has been observed, were aimed at directing the rise of the West in such a way that Western Christians might recognise the Byzantine emperor as the natural champion of their own values (Magdalino, 1993, 2). Based on this vision, Manuel mapped out his foreign policy, which included both political and military alliances and intermarriages. During his reign, he had to confront the Second Crusade crossing Byzantine territory (1147–1148), as well as a Norman invasion (1147–1149). At the same time, Manuel assigned some offices to Westerners. It seems, however, that he did not appoint Westerners to crucial administrative positions, but mainly to diplomatic and military ones (Magdalino, 1993, 221–224; Christophilopoulou, 2001, 154–155). Furthermore, he himself adopted Western habits in the court festivities (e.g. Choniates, *Historia*, 1:108.53–109.88).

Alliances and rivalries consist of a nexus of relations which, naturally, is depicted by scholars of that era through their individual perspectives. As it has already been mentioned, the description of the Western nations is incorporated in the historical narrative and their image is 'painted' with vibrant colors, an image that is also vivid in other literary works, primarily in orations addressed to the emperor.

John Kinnamos, imperial secretary, was a supporter of the emperor's ideology and of his plans to revive the ecumenical Roman state. This, in turn, affected his stance towards the crusaders and made it more intolerant (see the entry for *Kinnamos* in the ODB, and Asdracha, 1983). He was an eye-witness to many events, and he left an informative narration of Manuel's reign, as he possessed a good knowledge of the political situation of his time. Within three years (1146–1149) Manuel had developed close relations with the German king through two weddings and a crusade. He himself married Bertha of Sulzbach, sister-in-law of Conrad III, gave his niece Theodora in marriage to Henry Jasomirgott of Babenberg, Duke of Austria, and confronted the Second Crusade, which was led by his kinsman Conrad and the king of France Louis VII (Runciman, 1952, 2:247–288; Phillips, 2009, 76–103; Harris, 2014, 93–110).

The royal bride Bertha-Eirene is portrayed briefly by Kinnamos and Choniates, who underline her 'Christian modesty', her prudence, and her charitable spirit. Choniates, more graphic in his descriptions and comments, gives more details. The empress of German descent (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:53.58–59), he writes, is more concerned with the beauty of her soul than of her body. He praises her because she despises the usual cosmetics women make use of and embellishes her soul with virtues (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:53.59–60: *αὕτη μέντοι οὐ τοσοῦτον τοῦ σωματικοῦ κάλλους ἐφρόντιζεν, ὅσον τοῦ ἔνδον καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν ἐπεμέλετο*; Choniates, *Annals*, 32: 'She was not so much concerned with physical beauty as with her inner beauty and the condition of her soul'). He goes even further and reproaches Manuel, because, although he honored her in public as it was proper for an *Augusta*, in their private life he was far from being a faithful husband. According to Choniates, the virtuous empress has only one quality in common with her people, the Germans (and non-Byzantines in general), her obstinacy (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:54.64–65: *εἶχε δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐπικλινὲς ἐθνικὸν καὶ τὸ τῆς γνώμης ἐκέκτητο δυσμετάθετον*; Choniates, *Annals*, 32: 'She had the natural trait of being unbending and opinionated'). Nevertheless, Choniates not only emphasizes Bertha's modesty but he also contrasts it with the basic characteristic of the Western nations, that of arrogance and conceit. A brief note should be added at this point, concerning the meaning and the connotations of the word *ethnos* (nation) and its derivative *ethnikon* in Choniates' text. The term refers to groups of people, the members of which share common features; it does not necessarily have pejorative meaning nor refer to the non-Christian or non-Orthodox peoples (Papadopoulou, 2015, 221–258). The characteristic of obstinacy, however, is quite often attributed to the Western peoples by Byzantine scholars.[4]

Kinnamos charges Conrad with 'arrogance without limits', when the latter demanded that Manuel should come and meet him at the outskirts of Constantinople and escort him to the City.[5] Arrogance, because such an act would have meant that Manuel recognized Conrad as his equal, which was inconceivable from the point of view of Byzantine ideology, according to which there was only one emperor in the Christian world: the emperor of the Romans with his throne in Constantinople.

During the course of the Second Crusade, there were repeated frictions and tensions between the local population and the crusaders regarding the army's provisioning (Choniates, *Historia*, 1: 66.10–31; Harris, 2014, 93–110). We shall not try to discern which side was right and to what extent. We will rather examine this affair from the perspective of Kinnamos, who quotes in his work a letter from Conrad. In this letter, the German king explains that the assaults of his soldiers, while searching for food, against the inhabitants of Byzantium were not hostile actions, but the natural behavior of a multitudinous and therefore difficult to control army. Kinnamos notes that this explanation was considered ironical by Manuel; so, he answered in the same spirit. He wrote to Conrad that he understood the situation and added that it would be difficult for him, too, to control the local population, in case they attacked the German army. He ended his letter stating that he was grateful to Conrad, as the German king illuminated him on how to handle the matter correctly (Kinnamos, *Epitome*, Bk 2, par. 15).

Modern research has convincingly argued that the letters quoted in Kinnamos' text are not quotations of authentic diplomatic correspondence, but a rhetorical way for the writer to express his views, based more or less loosely on his archives (Dölger & Wirth, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden*, no. 1360; Kresten, 1996, 37–44). This perspective, however, that emerges through the exchange of letters between the two rulers, is what interests us and is summarized in the following points:

1 The German potentate broke his promise for a peaceful crossing of the crusaders through Byzantine territories, so he was unreliable and a perjurer,
2 He was conceited, since he refused to recognize the Byzantine emperor's supremacy in the Christian world,
3 Finally, and most importantly, Kinnamos was convinced that the real aim of the campaign was not Palestine but Constantinople.[6]

The historian never fails to stress Manuel's justice and the fair treatment of the crusaders. He points out that the emperor had instructed his officers never to attack the Western troops based only on information of hostile movements. They should wait until they observed actual attacks (Kinnamos, *Epitome*, Bk 2, par. 14). Niketas Choniates, on the other hand, refers to misdeeds of the locals against the Western soldiers, misdeeds such as selling supplies in extremely high prices and mixing lime with barley groats (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:66.18–31). Choniates, contrary to Kinnamos, does not hesitate to criticize either the Byzantine emperors and aristocrats or the common people. This critique, as an important component of his historiographical work, serves his purpose to trace the reasons of the decline of Byzantium in his times. The scholar attributes the misfortunes of the empire to the incompetence and moral defects of his compatriots (Tinnefeld, 1971; Magdalino, 1983; Papadopoulou, 2012).

Byzantine writers usually ascribed bravery to the Western nations and admired them for that. Kinnamos notes the effectiveness of the German infantry and the French cavalry, recognizing thus the Westerners' ability in battle – which,

however, he immediately belittles.[7] Their victories, he writes, make them arrogant and conceited (meaning: even more arrogant and conceited), whereas adversities dishearten them and fill them with despondency (Kinnamos, *Epitome*, Bk 2, par. 16). In addition, the historian considers them to have limited military experience and ability in campaigns, and he remarks that, first, the German king committed a lot of mistakes during his march to Palestine and, second, the French king learned nothing from Conrad's errors, meaning that he was not only incompetent but foolish as well (Kinnamos, *Epitome*, Bk 2, par. 17).

Despite this criticism, Kinnamos is more favorable to Louis VII because he sent emissaries to Manuel and swore an oath of friendship and non-aggression. The implication seems to be that he recognized the emperor's supremacy, which (for Kinnamos) is affirmed by the French army's behavior: no attacks are mentioned in his narration, nor the taint of arrogance. However, there is a striking omission in the text, in the narrative of the Second Crusade; the French king is not mentioned by his name, unlike the perjurer Conrad.

1204, the first conquest

Niketas Choniates, as is well known, was an eye-witness of the First Conquest of Constantinople. He could be expected, after the experience of the disastrous events of 1204,[8] to be bitter and resentful in characterizing the conquerors. Nevertheless, the Byzantine scholar remains loyal to his historiographical purpose, that is to find the causes of Byzantium's decay, even if they reflected badly on his own people, and therefore he lavishes praise on the Western nations when he believes they deserve it. Their first and foremost positive quality is their bravery, their boldness, their martial spirit. An indicative description is that of the knight Peter. Choniates is impressed by his formidable stature, his heroism, and his equally formidable helmet, representing a whole city with towers. Choniates ascertains, in a manner of speaking, that this giant was capable of defeating all the enemy battalions (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:569.15–570.21).

The Westerners' bravery is, however, blemished once again by lack of virtue, that is by cruelty and arrogance. An arrogance which leads them to consider themselves the only brave and heroic warriors among all nations (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:598.86–89). A cruelty evident in their barbarous attitude, their inability to appreciate beauty, their impetus to destroy, often without any reason, as if spurred by a spirit of death (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:560.5–6: *οἱ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀνέραστοι κηρεσιφόρητοι βάρβαροι*; Choniates, *Annals*, 306: 'these barbarians who were borne by the Fates and hated the beautiful').

Choniates is indignant primarily towards the Venetians, because, as he asserts, they owed their very existence to the Byzantines. They became civilized and wealthy, they emerged in history for the first time as a people with a name through their relations with Byzantium – the emphasis again on the concept of *name*. Venetians are *σύμφυλοι*, of the same descent as Byzantines, they are Romans who turned against their benefactors because of their avarice (Choniates, *Historia*,1:171.41–55).

Choniates, of course, also shares the Roman ecumenical ideology, but in his criticism against the Western nations, and especially the Venetians, there is a tone of complaint, resembling that of an ignored kinsman. This is better understood within the Byzantine concept known in modern research as the 'family of kings' (Dölger, 1953); the Byzantine emperor was the paterfamilias of all the other rulers; he endowed foreign leaders with a court office and, in this way, they were subordinated to his will. It is debatable, however, to which extent this notion corresponded to reality, to actual international – so to speak – relations (Moysidou, 1995).

The historian of the Conquest paints the portrait of the Westerners not with colors and shapes but with words. He describes the physical features of their faces: upright neck, high brow, empty look, well-shaved cheeks. The sound of their speech piercing and running. They first drivelled and then uttered the words. Each of these features corresponds to a character trait: the upright neck to arrogance; the high brow to haughtiness and contempt for the others; the empty look to the lack of compassion; the well-shaved cheeks indicate everlasting youth, thus immaturity and lack of prudence. The quick and piercing articulation of the speech also indicates arrogance, haughtiness and lack of culture and education (Choniates, *Historia*, 1:575.15–18).

1261, the Reconquest

A little more than half a century later, the Byzantines recovered Constantinople. The historian of the Reconquest, George Akropolites, contrary to the historian of the Conquest of 1204, refrains from characterizations and appraisals of the Westerners.[9] He only notes that they were terrified when they realized that the 'Romans' (Byzantines) returned to the city. He focuses on the event of the Reconquest and underlines that the city was returned to the hands of its natural owners, precisely as it should (Akropolites, *Opera*, 1:183.18–20, par. 85: *ἡ Κωνσταντίνου προνοίᾳ θεοῦ καὶ αὖθις ὑπὸ χεῖρα τοῦ βασιλέως τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐγένετο κατὰ λόγον δίκαιόν τε καὶ προσήκοντα*; Akropolites, *History*, 376: 'and by the providence of God the city of Constantine again became subject to the emperor of the Romans, in a just and fitting way').

In this way, first, he implies the supremacy of the Byzantines and Constantinople within the Christian world; and, second, he attributes the Reconquest to the Divine Providence and not to the mundane, i.e. to the political power of the Byzantines. Thus, in a way, he follows the reasoning of Choniates, who considered that the primary responsibility for the Conquest of Constantinople lay with the Byzantines – the emperor, the aristocracy, and the people, both the clerics and the laity – as mentioned above. Akropolites implies that the Byzantines were punished for their sins, that they repented, so they regained what was theirs by nature – 'the natural order of things' (cf. Anna Komnene, *Alexias*, 1:450.95–450.1: *φύσει γὰρ οὖσα δεσπότις τῶν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν ἡ βασιλεία τῶν Ῥωμαίων [...]*; 'being by nature mistress of the other nations, the Roman Empire […]').

Why is Akropolites so careful in his assessment of Westerners? A first reading could attribute his discretion to demoralization and to the political weakening of the Byzantines. But the foreign policy of Michael VIII shows that Byzantium had become once again a dynamic presence in European affairs, even though to a lesser degree by comparison with the period before 1204. However, it is precisely this foreign policy of the first Palaiologos which may help explain Akropolites' stance; as far as West Europe was concerned, Michael had to fight off Charles of Anjou in Sicily and at the same time hoped for military support against the increasing Turkish threat in the East. The means to achieve support from the West and primarily from the pope was the Second Council of Lyon (1274), where the emperor pledged to reunite the Eastern Church with Rome (Geanakoplos, 1959, 258–276; Roberg, 1964). Akropolites was actually the one who signed the reunion in the name of the emperor. The historian, himself a high official and supporter of Michael's policy, avoided sharp phrases and pejorative appraisals in his work, because these were not in accordance with the emperor's goal.

Conclusions

Within almost a hundred years the image of the *ἑσπέρια γένη* emerges more and more vividly through the sources; we have approached it through the historiographic literature narrating the Second Crusade, the Conquest and the Reconquest of Constantinople. The image and its alterations follow the course of the relations between Byzantium and the West. The basic issue which arose through the meeting of East and West was that of Roman ideology. Byzantines considered themselves to be the only true and legitimate heirs of the ancient Roman state and its ecumenical ideology. Any claim for equal political treatment expressed by the Western potentates was considered by the Byzantines as arrogance, or, even worse, as an attempt to usurp the Roman throne. Political realism, however, made Byzantines adapt their attitude and rhetoric to the new historical circumstances, which were marked by the decreasing power of the empire and the increasing influence of the West. In the era of Manuel I the image was formed through the perspective of Byzantium's power; the Westerners were seen as inferior to Byzantines and very few virtues, if any, were attributed to them. The experience of 1204 turned this image even darker and the Western nations were harshly criticized. Nevertheless, Byzantine self-criticism was also harsh, even harsher than the criticism of the *other*. In the Reconquest of 1261, the image of the *ἑσπέριοι* emerged almost neutral, colorless, something which reflected the political goals of the emperor at the time.

The heterostereotypes projected in the texts were used to structure the world of the *other*, a world that was nonetheless necessary for the Byzantines to designate their own boundaries, their own world, and to define the elements of their own identity. From the Byzantine perspective, the Roman element was particularly at stake during the period under examination. Byzantines, however, never retreated from their Roman ideology. The true Roman emperor was the sovereign

in Constantinople; the foreign leaders should respect his will and recognize his supremacy. In case, however, he failed to protect the prestige and integrity of the empire and his subjects, Byzantine scholars criticized him and did not hesitate to charge him with incompetence and moral deficiency.

Notes

1 See: Asdracha, 1983; Hörandner, 1994; Gounaridis, 1994; Kazhdan, 2001; Koder, 1987; Koder, 2002; on the crusaders in particular, see Kolia-Dermitzaki, 1991. For non-Westerners, see: Malamut, 1995; Malamut and Cacouros, 1996.

2 Leo VI, *Tactica*, par. 13: *οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τῆς τοῦ στρατηγοῦ προτυπωθείσης εἰκόνος, δεῖ καθάπερ διὰ χρωμάτων ἡμᾶς ἀναζωγραφῆσαι τὴν τούτου ποιότητα*. ('So then, having made this preliminary sketch of the general, we must now paint his qualities as though it were a portrait in color'.)

3 Leo VI, *Tactica*, par. 6: *Φερέπονον δὲ ἵνα μὴ πρῶτος τῶν στρατευομένων τὰς ἀναπαύσεις ἐπιζητῇ, ἀλλὰ γίνεται αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον εἰκὼν πρὸς τὸ γενναίως ὑποφέρειν τοὺς πόνους*. ('Let him endure toil and not be the first among the soldiers to seek rest. Rather, let him be a model to them in nobly bearing up under hard labor'.)

4 Cf. Anna Komnene, *Alexias*, 1:357.40–41, when referring to Bohemond: *πᾶν τὸ βάρβαρον γένος δύστροπόν τε καὶ δυσανάκλητον ἐφ' ὅπερ ἂν ἐφορμήσειε* ('the whole barbarian nation is hard to turn back from any undertaking upon which they have started'). On the use of the term ἔθνος by Anna, see for example ibid, 79.28–29: *τοὺς Νεμίτζους (ἔθνος δὲ καὶ τοῦτο βαρβαρικὸν καὶ τῇ βασιλείᾳ Ῥωμαίων δουλεῦον ἀνέκαθεν)*; 'the Nemitzoi (these too are a barbaric tribe who have been subjects of the Roman Empire from of old)'.

5 Kinnamos, *Epitome*, Bk 2, par. 14.14–18: *ὁ δὲ καὶ εἰσέτι μηδαμῇ καθυφεῖναι θέλων τοῦ γαύρου, ὑπαντᾶν αὐτῷ ἐς Βυζάντιον προάγοντι τὸν αὐτοκράτορα ἠξίου, τοιούτων τέ τινων ἄλλων ὁμιλίαν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σταθμώμενος ἦν. ἐφ' οἷς ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀλαζονείαν ὅρον οὐκ ἔχουσαν αὐτοῦ καταγνοὺς τοῦ λοιποῦ περιεῖδε*. Kinnamos, *Deeds*, 63: 'The other [Conrad], still unwilling to abandon his pride, demanded that the emperor meet him as he approached Byzantion, and esteemed his own conversation worthy of other such things. Since the emperor thereby perceived that his pretension was limitless, he overlooked the rest'.

6 Kinnamos, *Epitome*, Bk 2, par. 12.5–10: *καὶ ἅπαν ἁπλῶς τὸ ἑσπέριον ἐκεκίνητο κράτος, λόγῳ μὲν τῷ προχείρῳ ὡς ἐξ Εὐρώπης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν διαβήσονται Πέρσαις τε μαχησόμενοι τοῖς παρὰ πόδας καὶ τὸν ἐν Παλαιστίνῃ καταληψόμενοι νεὼν τόπους τε τοὺς ἱεροὺς ἱστορήσοντες, τῇ γε μὴν ἀληθείᾳ ὡς τήν τε χώραν Ῥωμαίων ἐξ ἐφόδου καθέξοντες καὶ τὰ ἐν ποσὶ καταστρέψοντες*. Kinnamos, *Deeds*, 58: 'and simply the whole western array had been set in motion, on the handy excuse that they were going to cross from Europe to Asia to fight the Turks en route and recover the Church in Palestine and seek the holy places, but truly to gain possession of the Romans' land by assault and trample down everything in front of them'.

7 As Gentile Messina, 2002, has argued, Byzantine scholars criticized their emperor in case he failed to fulfill his duties as a leader; on the other hand, they praised 'barbarians' when they showed 'civilized' virtues.

8 For an assessment of the crusades based on the perspective of the Byzantine literary sources, see Runciman, 1986; Angold (1999) provides an overview of the sources, and Chrysos (2008) traces the causes of 1204 to the shortcomings of both Byzantines and Westerners. On the account of Choniates in particular, see Harris, 2000.

9 For Akropolites and his work in general, see the introduction by Ruth Macrides, in Akropolites, *The History*, esp. 3–65; for the perception of the Latins in Akropolites, see also ibid., 89–90.

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18 Worlds apart? Reconsidering Late Byzantine identity through the image of the West

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A clarification is necessary from the beginning: the present chapter, as well as the conference from which this entire volume has sprung, constitute parts of the post-doctoral research project I carried out at the University of Athens from 2012 to 2015, entitled 'Worlds apart? Identity and otherness in Late Byzantine perceptions of the West: the evidence of oratory and correspondence'.[1] Thus, this chapter is meant primarily as a general presentation of the project: over the following pages I will briefly describe its rationale and main aims and I will put forward some preliminary findings and insights from this research.[2] As its title makes evident, the project aims to map Byzantine views of the West and the Latins in the period from 1204 to the 15th century, with the wider intention of decoding Byzantine perceptions of 'self' and 'other'. It is meant, therefore, as a contribution to the study of identity and otherness and the applicability of terms such as 'ethnicity' in the Middle Ages – a particularly active area of research in recent years.[3]

Rationale, main aims and research questions

Of course, many studies have appeared in the past regarding Byzantine identity, as the question 'what was Byzantium?' is as old as the discipline itself (see e.g. Charanis, 1978; Magdalino, 1991; Chrysos, 1996; Vryonis, 1999; Gounaridis, 1999; Maltezou, 1999; Kiousopoulou, 2000; Koder, 2003; Ciggaar, 2003; a good overview in Rapp, 2008). At the same time, there is also a rich literature on Byzantine attitudes towards the West (for example: Nicol, 1967; Hunger, 1987; Angold, 1989; Hermans, 1990; Kolia-Dermitzaki, 1994; Laiou, 1995; Ducellier, 1996; Kolbaba, 2000, 2001; Kazhdan, 2001; Koder, 2002; Gounaridis, 2006). So, why do we need more? I can offer a threefold 'defence' for adding to the constantly growing bibliography; the aforementioned project aims to complement and move beyond these studies in terms of *methodological approach*, *scope* and *sources*.

Earlier works on Byzantine identity tended, with few exceptions, not to take into consideration the insights from the social sciences on identity formation. They rather approached the subject from a positivist and essentializing perspective, seeking a set of objective criteria that made up the Byzantine identity and often trying to prove or refute whether certain traits were manifestations of the 'true' Byzantine character – particularly the vexed question of how 'Greek' the

Byzantines really were. It is only recently that two book-length studies appeared, by Athnony Kaldellis (2007) and Gill Page (2008), which have given greater weight to the mechanisms of constructing and representing identity. The need for a methodological reconsideration of Byzantine identity has been stressed even more in the last couple of years (Stouraitis, 2014; Smarnakis, 2015).

Anthropological and sociological studies highlight the fluidity of identity and its situational and dynamic character. Concepts like ethnicity, nation and race are social constructs and not objective, unchanging, 'biological' attributes of individuals. They are created and negotiated at the level of everyday interaction and communication, they are mutable, they depend on specific historical contingencies, and they derive their power from people's belief in them.[4] A basic tenet of research on identity is that it is formed by exclusion: the 'us' presupposes a 'them'. A community is conceptualised not only by reference to its members but also by what separates it from those who are excluded. As has been argued by Fredrik Barth, the focus should not be on the perceived cultural traits characterizing the 'in-group', but rather on the processes of creating and maintaining the *boundary* with those 'outside' (Barth, 1969, 9–38; Vermeulen & Govers, 1994). This is precisely why our examination focuses on the Byzantine representations of the West as a key mechanism of boundary maintenance.

Despite the considerable differences between scholars, there is still a basic consensus that Byzantine identity was constructed around three foci, namely Roman (imperial/political), Christian (religious) and Hellenic (cultural/linguistic) elements, even if the relative importance and the exact content of those terms differ significantly from interpretation to interpretation (see e.g. Rapp, 2008). The Byzantines' perceptions of the Latins as an 'out-group' are a crucial test, particularly because two of these three essential elements were, to an extent at least, shared by the Westerners: namely the Christian religion and the political and cultural heritage of the Roman Empire. As one scholar has put it, for Late Byzantium the Latin West was 'a peer culture, different enough to be set off but similar also in enough ways to make comparison inevitable' (Kaldellis, 2013, 169).

It is also widely agreed that the events of 1204 triggered a Byzantine identity crisis, alongside a radically different context of interaction with the Latins (Angelov, 2005; Kaldellis, 2007, 334ff; Page, 2008). The capture of Constantinople and the fall of the empire prompted a recalibration of 'Byzantine' collective identity as it sought to be defined outside the now collapsed state apparatus, while the accommodation or conflict with the new Latin masters became a central question. Hence the chronological scope of our examination: from 1204 and up to the time that the whole area was reunited under Ottoman control in the 15th century, the formerly imperial territory became a mosaic of small states, colonies, and lordships, contested between Byzantines, Latins, Slavs, and Turks. In this fragmented world, political affiliation frequently did not coincide with religious or 'ethnic' self-ascription, making questions of identity particularly complex and intriguing (see Ilieva, 1991; McKee, 2000; Shawcross, 2009).

The monographs of Kaldellis and Page acknowledge these points and have both greatly expanded our understanding of Byzantine identity. Nevertheless,

Kaldellis' work (2007) examined a particular aspect of it over a broad period, namely how Hellenic culture and the classical tradition was adopted, adapted, and transformed from the second to the 13th century, and what was its impact on a predominantly 'Roman' identity. The focus was mostly on Byzantine self-ascription, and the attitudes towards the Latin West were only marginally addressed. Page (2008), on the other hand, focused specifically on the post-1204 period and the changes in Byzantine identity in view of the new reality created by the Latin conquest. The contrast between 'us' and 'them' is a central consideration of her book. However, the source material upon which she based her examination is limited to a handful of major texts. Crucially, with two exceptions (Mazaris' *Journey to Hades* and Manuel Palaiologos' funeral oration for his brother Theodore), only historiographical works are analyzed: to be precise, five Byzantine historians (Choniates, Akropolites, Pachymeres, Kantakouzenos, and Gregoras) and the Chronicle of the Morea. This severely limits the general applicability of the conclusions drawn. It will become clear in this chapter why it is crucial to cast our net wider in terms of sources, in order to include different contexts of communication and expression of identity.

Our examination differs from earlier studies in certain other key ways. First, a central point of our analysis revolves around the contrast of the Latin-as-enemy in the context of Latin conquest and rule after 1204, with the image of the Latin-as-ally in the face of Turkish danger in the 14th and 15th centuries. Neither Kaldellis nor Page deals with the latter pole of the examination; but it is crucial because this readjustment entailed certain political and ideological compromises which prompted some Byzantines to renegotiate the boundaries between 'self' and 'other'. The importance of this development is highlighted in the contrasting statements made by two major Byzantine literary figures in the 13th and 14th century. Niketas Choniates commented, under the experience of the Latin attacks on Thessalonica and Constantinople, that

> between us and them [the Latins] is set the widest gulf, and we are different in our minds and we are diametrically opposed, even if we stand physically close to each other and often share the same dwelling
>
> (*Historia*, 1:301: *οὕτω μέσον ἡμῶν καὶ αὐτῶν χάσμα διαφορᾶς ἐστήρικται μέγιστον καὶ ταῖς γνώμαις ἀσυναφεῖς ἐσμεν καὶ κατὰ διάμετρον ἀφεστήκαμεν, εἰ καὶ σώμασι συναπτόμεθα καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν πολλάκις κληρούμεθα οἴκησιν*).

However, a century-and-a-half later, in the 1360s, Demetrios Kydones, tried to convince his compatriots to accept Western help against the Turks and alluded to the shared Roman provenance that ought to unite the two sides: 'Who are the most suitable allies for the Romans [i.e. the Byzantines] but the Romans [i.e. the Latins]? Or, who are more dependable than those who share the same homeland?' (*Pro Subsidio Latinorum*, in MPG, 154:977: *Τίνες Ῥωμαίοις Ῥωμαίων οἰκειότεροι σύμμαχοι; ἢ τίνες ἀξιοπιστότεροι τῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐχόντων πατρίδα;*). We will examine these statements in more detail below.

Furthermore, our research looks into the actual negotiation of identity, paying particular attention to the circumstances of the production and use of our texts. Based on the nature of our sources, we look at them not as self-standing statements of individual or collective beliefs but as the residue of the communication and negotiation that went on at the heart of the Byzantine establishment during this period. This brings us to the third point, namely the sources. The project focuses on Byzantine orations and correspondence, two types of sources which have not really been exploited on the question of Byzantine identity and perceptions of the West, particularly in the late period, as previous works have focused overwhelmingly on historiography or on anti-Latin treatises. This is not just a quantitative matter regarding the benefits of using more sources or more genres of sources.[5] These particular texts have certain key attributes which are central to the considerations of the present research.

Byzantine orations have often been dismissed in the past as pointless exercises in rhetoric and flattery, empty of historical substance. However, in more recent years, the importance of imperial orations has been reinstated by the work of scholars such as Paul Magdalino (1993, esp. 331–360), Elizabeth and Michael Jeffreys (2001), and Dimiter Angelov (2006, 2007). Orations were a central feature of Byzantine court life: they were an outlet for the imperial administration to communicate its policies and aims, while at the same time they provided a platform for members of the Byzantine elite to offer comment, advice, or criticism (Angelov, 2003). The authors of these orations communicated their message in terms that were intelligible to their peers – and therefore these works give us access to the audience's common symbolic language. For these reasons, it is particularly useful to exploit them in order to investigate how the representation of the West was manipulated in the context of different political circumstances.

The correspondence complements the orations. While the orations afford a view to the 'public' discourse within the court, the correspondence provides insights into more 'private' attitudes.[6] It is intriguing to examine whether there is any dissonance between the two and to explore to what extent the views expressed are affected by the identity of the correspondents, the relationship between them, and the context of the communication. As identity is also a representational process, court orations and letter-writing are key sources for the examination of self and other, since they effectively constitute acts of self-representation performed publicly and privately.

Of course, it has to be kept in mind that these sources heavily privilege the elite viewpoint. This is a predicament that can hardly be avoided given the surviving evidence. Nevertheless, our examination attempts to explore at least how inclusive these elite discourses of belonging purported to be; that is to say, whether the elite authors envisaged a 'Roman' community which cut across social divisions and was meant to include those in the lower orders of Byzantine society.[7] Whether or not the latter groups themselves would have agreed with this perception is a different question which needs to be examined separately and for which, unfortunately, we have very little direct evidence.

In light of the above considerations, the main research questions for the project were formulated as follows:

- Was there a binary perception of 'them' and 'us' in Byzantine views of the West and, if so, how consistent was it? Who was included and what were the criteria for inclusion or exclusion? (For example, where were Greek-speaking populations under Latin rule, or Latins in imperial service considered to belong?)
- What were the markers of identity and otherness: were perceptions about Westerners expressed in terms of religion, culture, ethnicity, social standing, or political affiliation?
- How were references to the Latins' Christian religion and Roman heritage handled? In what circumstances were these elements invoked and how?
- Memories and traditions are seen as an important determinant of identity. Which events of the past were selected by the Byzantines as representative of a common memory vis-à-vis the Latins?
- Finally and more widely: what were the changes that occurred over time and under the pressure of historical circumstances? Did perceptions dictate policies or did policies shape perceptions?

As a final point, it is necessary to stress an important distinction: that is, between the *existence* of an ('ethnic' or other) identity and its actual historical/political *effectiveness*. In relevant scholarly discussions, it is not uncommon to conflate the possibilities for self-identification (that is, whether a group of individuals understood themselves as a 'people' and the terms in which they might have done so) with the capacity of this self-identification to influence historical action and political decision-making. In simpler terms, it is a different question whether there was a 'Byzantine' (or Latin, or Bulgarian, or whatever) identity and a different one whether such an identity eventually dictated or influenced the political allegiance of individuals. For example, the fact that not all those we would describe as Byzantines automatically sided with one of the Byzantine successor states, such as Nicaea and Epiros, and some even chose to fight on the side of their Latin, Seljuk, or Bulgarian enemies does not *ipso facto* mean that they had no conception of a Byzantine/Roman identity or that it played no part in their worldview. It is important to establish first which thoughts were 'thinkable', specifically whether such an identity was part of the conceptual world and the cognitive process of the people of the time, before going on to assess their actions.

A few answers: public performance of *romanitas* and sharing the Roman legacy with the Latins

We can now turn to some observations and preliminary answers regarding these questions on the basis of our research. First, the evidence seems to confirm our initial working hypothesis: there does appear to be a certain divergence between the public and the more 'private' discourses, regarding both the attitude towards

the Latins and the 'Roman' self-identification for the Byzantines. Here, we will focus primarily on the 13th century, where both trends are more pronounced before subsiding in the 14th century.

The image of the Latins in the post-1204 orations is monolithic: they appear as an undifferentiated hostile block generally described as *Italoi* or *Latinoi* (the two terms are interchangeable[8]). This should not be attributed to Byzantine ignorance of the differences between Western peoples. Niketas Choniates, in his *History*, was perfectly capable of distinguishing between the Franks, the Venetians and the Lombards when discussing the composition of the army of the Fourth Crusade or the political arrangements after the conquest (Niketas Choniates, *Historia*, 588, 596–597). Yet, in the orations he composed at Nicaea, Niketas only speaks of 'Italians' or 'the Western nations/barbarians' (Niketas Choniates, *Orationes*, 127.9, 128.11, 145–147, 149.5–6, 178.2–3). The reason lies, of course, in the role of orations as propaganda and the requirements of the genre – namely to incite the audience to fight and to build up an image of the emperor as a victorious general against external enemies. Subtlety and fine distinctions, or a sober analysis of the characteristics of these enemies, are not very high on the agenda.

Crucially, the Latins were still presented as the enemies *par excellence* in the rhetorical works composed in the later period of Nicaea. As far as public pronouncements went, not much changed, despite the fact that the Latin military threat had faded, while the needs of diplomacy and well over a generation of co-existence in Romania imposed a different framework for contact between the two sides, including repeated treaties and marriage negotiations between Nicaea and Latin powers. John Vatatzes' fight and victories against the Latins are presented as essentially his greatest achievements in the encomiastic orations penned by Jacob of Bulgaria ('Vita e opere', 81–93) and by his son, Theodore (II) Laskaris (*Opuscula rhetorica*, 23–66), as well as in the funeral oration by George Akropolites (*Opera*, 2:12–29).

Letters and other types of sources, on the other hand, could be more nuanced at times. In the years immediately after the conquest, hostility against the Latins was, unsurprisingly, intense as evidenced for example in the correspondence of Michael Choniates (e.g. *Epistulae*, nos. 93, 100, 104, 110, 124, 132, 134, 139, 154, 165, 171). However, a few decades later, the Latins could be largely ignored in non-public sources, reflecting the changed circumstances. Theodore II Laskaris' epistolographic corpus is comparable with that of Michael Choniates in terms of size (218 versus 181 letters), but the contrast between them is striking: only a handful of Laskaris' letters refer to the Latins, whereas they were a constant preoccupation in Michael's correspondence. Furthermore, the Latins are not automatically described as enemies and the attitude expressed towards them is not always hostile. For example, Theodore wrote approvingly of the wisdom and learning of the German delegation headed by Berthold of Hohenbourg, notwithstanding the emperor's obvious delight at their 'defeat' by the Byzantine scholars in the intellectual contest between the two sides (Theodore II, *Epistulae*, no. 125). Similarly, Blemmydes, in his autobiography, gave a mostly objective account of his theological debates with the papal envoys in Nicaea, in 1234 and in 1249/50,

without demonstrating any rancour towards the Latin side; in Blemmydes' text, the envoys are treated with respect, are referred to as learned men, and are presented as theological and intellectual opponents but not as 'enemies'. If anything, the disputation with the Armenians, which follows in the narrative immediately after the second one with Latins, is presented in more hostile terms (*Autobiographia*, par. 1.72, 2.25–40, 2.50–60; Munitiz, 1990).

Another interesting comparison between public and 'private' pronouncements, as we will see, concerns the usage of the term 'Roman(s)' for Byzantine self-identification. But, in order to put this in context, it is essential first to make a few observations as to how our sources treat the two crucial characteristics which were shared between Byzantium and the West, namely the Christian religion and the Roman legacy.

It is noteworthy that even in the most combative pieces of public oratory, which called for the annihilation of the Latin invaders, the Latins are never characterised as heretics or schismatics and there are hardly any attacks on their faith; that is to say, they are not treated as 'religious' enemies.[9] The desecration of churches, the violence committed even against priests and nuns during the sack of Constantinople is, naturally, brought up – but the shock value of these descriptions lies precisely in the implicit acknowledgement of the Latins as Christians who commit crimes against coreligionists.[10] The Latins are heavily criticised, in particular, for shedding Christian blood and perpetrating other impieties while carrying the Cross on their shoulders (Niketas Choniates, *Historia*, 1:569–576; idem, *Orationes*, 126; Mesarites, *Neue Quellen*, no. I, 45–47; Michael Choniates, *Τα σωζόμενα*, 2:361–362, 368; Holobolos, 'Orationes', 61, 85–89; Stilbes, 'Le memoire', 77; Apokaukos, 'Epirotica', no. 15; John Vatatzes, 'Ανέκδοτος επιστολή', 375–376). In this context, therefore, the shared religion with the Latins is essentially deployed so as to further provoke the audience's outrage.

Here we come to the important issue of historical memory: whereas there was no explicit reference to the Schism of the Churches, on the other hand, the Fourth Crusade and the sack of Constantinople loomed large in the orations and correspondence of the 13th century, as was to be expected. However, the memory of crusading could also be exploited in a different manner. The rise of the Turkish threat in the 14th century allowed the issue of the shared Christian religion between Byzantines and Latins to come to the fore again, this time in a positive manner.

In this context, Demetrios Kydones' oration *Pro subsidio Latinorum* is a fascinating text (MPG, 154:961–1008). Kydones composed this oration in order to convince his fellow Byzantines to accept Western help against the Ottomans in 1366, and one of his arguments was to invoke the history of Latin crusading in the Eastern Mediterranean. There was certainly no revisiting of the Fourth Crusade in this text. Rather, Kydones made the point that the Latins could be trusted as allies because they had bravely fought for the faith, even protecting Byzantine territories, both in the distant and in the recent past! Among other events, Kydones presented the Latin victories in the First Crusade as carried out on the Byzantines' ('our') behalf, with the Latins restoring lost cities to the empire and bringing

freedom to the 'Hellenes' of Asia Minor. He also referred to the Latins' activities against Turkish piracy and their recent expeditions against Umur Pasha of Aydin (Crusade of Smyrna, 1343–1351) and against Mamluk Egypt (Crusade of Alexandria, 1365). As far as Kydones' argument went, the Latins' fight against the Turks was not only persistent and continuous but also waged on behalf of the faith (*eusebeia*), which was threatened by the 'barbarians'. Generally, alliance with the Latins was presented as the best guarantee for Byzantine 'freedom'. Kydones went as far as to say that, if servitude (*doulevein*) cannot be avoided, it would be better to submit to the Latins rather than to the Turks, as an answer to those who would object that an alliance with the former would also lead to a loss of Byzantine freedom (MPG, 154:980–984; Ryder, 2014).

While Kydones' oration is very striking in its outlook, it is not an isolated case: Nikephoros Gregoras had also included a very positive assessment of the First Crusade in his *History*, praising the Latins for their zeal to 'worship and avenge' the Holy Sepulchre and 'drive away the impious', a 'godly and praiseworthy desire'. He even claimed, inaccurately, that the crusaders and the Byzantine army, led by Emperor Alexios, recovered a part of Asia Minor and 'liberated' a number of towns, with the Latins acting impeccably and honouring all agreements (Gregoras, *Historia*, 1:103–106, Book IV.7). This idealized view of Western crusading activity evidently reflects concerns and hopes of the period from the 1330s onwards, regarding the attempted Byzantine-Latin cooperation against the growing Turkish threat. Indeed, Gregoras narrates these first efforts for joint Byzantine-Western action against the Turks, adopting the language of a 'common threat' found in the diplomatic language of the anti-Turkish leagues of the 1330s and 1340s, even if he blames the failure of the attempt on the Westerners' duplicity and insincerity (Gregoras, *Historia*, Book XI.1: *κοινήν τε ἐπῆγε φθορὰν Λατίνοις ὁμοῦ καὶ Ῥωμαίοις … οὐ γὰρ ἀνεκτὰ ἔφασκον εἶναι, ὅσα Ῥωμαίοις ἐπάγουσι καὶ Λατίνοις οἱ βάρβαροι καθ' ἡμέραν δεινὰ*, etc.; for the context see Ivanov, 2012; Chrissis, 2014b, 36–42). Thus, the change of political circumstances in the 14th century prompted a different 'remembering' of the history between the two sides and a different 'spin' on their shared faith.

It is noteworthy, furthermore, that Kydones included a section in his speech on the common elements of history and culture between Byzantines and Latins, referring not only to the Christian faith but also to the Roman legacy; the two sides, he argued, constitute a single *demos* drawing their common beginning from Constantine the Great, who was responsible for transferring the name of the 'fatherland' (*patris*) as well as all the institutions, such as the emperorship and the senate, from Old Rome to New Rome (MPG, 154:977–980). This brings us back to the issue of *romanitas*. 'Roman' undoubtedly remained the primary term of self-identification for the Byzantines throughout our period. In the past, Byzantium had reacted fiercely against any Western claims which challenged its sole ownership of the Roman imperial title (see e.g. Kolia-Dermitzaki, 2014, with references to earlier literature).

So, what are we to make of Kydones' statement which identified both Byzantines and Latins as 'Romans' (MPG 154:977D)? Certainly, this was to an extent a rhetorical pronouncement, trying to make his point in a way that would

capture the audience's attention. Yet, there was more than wordplay there and the ambiguity went back to a much earlier time. 'Roman' could also be used to denote the followers of the Church of Rome – in other words, the Latins. In the works of Mesarites, Chomatianos and Bardanes both meanings of the term make their appearance, sometimes used within the same text (Mesarites, *Neue Quellen*, no. II, p. 24.31–35, no. III, pp. 21.1–2, 22.1, 34.16, 35.5–6; cf. Kaldellis, 2007, 354–355; Chomatianos, *Ponemata Diafora*, no. 54; Hoeck & Loenertz, 1965, 189–190, no. 9).[11] Even more interestingly, Nikephoros Blemmydes employed the term 'Rome' and 'Roman' *only* to refer to the Latins (specifically those under the pope) in his autobiography (*Autobiographia*, par. 1.72, 2.25–28, II.50–51); in fact, he did not use any other collective name for his contemporary Byzantines other than 'us'/'our'.

Could this reflect a certain discomfort regarding the 'Roman' ethnonym after the events of 1204? On this matter, there is an interesting pattern observable in the correspondence of Michael Choniates. The term 'Roman' (both noun and adjective) appears infrequently in Michael's post-1204 letters. It is only used consistently when writing to the Byzantine authorities in Nicaea and Epiros (*Epistulae*, nos. 94, 136–138, 165, 179). But outside these letters, Michael almost never uses it,[12] even though he does speak a lot about the situation of his compatriots under Latin rule. The most common terms used to refer to the other Byzantines in such cases are *ὁμόφυλος*, *ὁμοεθνής*, or *ὁμογενής* – and conversely *ἀλλόφυλοι*, *ἑτερογενεῖς*, etc. for the Latins (see e.g. *Epistulae*, nos. 96, 100, 102, 123, 126, 134, 140, 152, 153, 164, 171, 179).

Noting the pattern is one thing; safely interpreting it is an entirely different matter. We are on hazardous ground, as it cannot even be demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that this is a conscious choice of terms on the part of the author, although the consistency with which the noun/adjective 'Roman' crops up in the correspondence with the new Byzantine authorities and its rarity otherwise are quite striking. Nevertheless, a hypothesis can be put forward: does the term 'Roman(s)' belong to a higher, more 'official' register? Is Michael reluctant to use it after 1204, except in the most formal of occasions? It seems that in the correspondence with those representing the 'official order of things', such as the emperor and the patriarch at Nicaea, Michael switches to a more traditional terminology; but he adopts a different approach in his private letters, as if he is somewhat unsure about the self-identification value of the 'Roman' appellation after the cataclysmic events of the conquest.

This fits well with the observable tendency in Late Byzantium of more frequently invoking Hellenism as an element of self-identification, in response to the ideological challenge posed by the Latin conquest – indeed, a similar pattern is also noticeable in the work of the most ardent promoter of Byzantine 'Hellenism', Emperor Theodore II Laskaris.[13] In this case too, the term Roman/Romans appears mostly in his works which are addressed to the public or in formal exchanges, such as Theodore's encomia to his father and to the city of Nicaea, his missive to Pope Alexander IV, and the bulletin sent to his subjects regarding his Bulgarian campaign (*Opuscula rhetorica*, 23–66, 67–84; *Epistulae*, no. 143 and Appendix I).

However, in his personal correspondence, for example with George Mouzalon or with Nikephoros Blemmydes, Theodore commonly turns to the terms ‘Hellene’ and ‘Hellenic’ when speaking about the Byzantines, while the term ‘Romans’ is never used (e.g. *Epistulae*, nos. 40.17–19, 44.79–84, 202.55–57, 204.56–59, 214.34–35).[14] It is not unreasonable to argue that such choices, whether conscious or unconscious, hint at a strong attachment of the ‘public’ (i.e. the intended audience of these texts) to the Roman name, while scholars and erudite commentators held more nuanced or ambiguous positions regarding self-identification following the collapse of the empire in 1204. This points to the opposite conclusion to Stouraitis’ argument (2014) that Romanness was an elite identification meant to exclude the wider population.

Finally, we can also compare the common Byzantine-Latin Romanness that Kydones alluded to with the points made a century earlier by George Akropolites in his two-part treatise on the procession of the Holy Spirit, entitled *Λόγος κατὰ Λατίνων* (*Opera*, 2:30–66). There, Akropolites also used the term ‘Romans’ to refer to the Latins, and explicitly invoked the common past that the two peoples shared. In the text, he addresses his imaginary Latin collocutors thus: ‘Roman men, you who originate from Elder Rome, I would like to call you brothers, as we are of the same mind and think similarly’ (*Ἄνδρες Ῥωμαῖοι, οἱ τῆς πρεσβυτέρας Ῥώμης ὁρμώμενοι, ἐβουλόμην μὲν καλεῖν ὑμᾶς ἀδελφοὺς ὡς ὁμογνώμονας καὶ ὁμόφρονας*) – by which he means primarily the shared Christian religion, as the rest of the opening section makes clear (*Opera*, 2:30; cf. ibid. 31, 32, 46). When he distinguishes between the two sides, Akropolites speaks of *Italoi* and *Graikoi* respectively (e.g. ibid., 64–65; cf. Page, 2008, 126). Towards the end of the treatise, in fact, Akropolites launches into a fascinating discussion of how they both shared not only the Roman name but also culture, faith, and institutions:

> It seems, O Italians, that you no longer remember our ancient harmony … But no other nations were ever as harmonious as the Greeks (*Graikoi*) and the Italians. And this was only to be expected, for science and learning came to the Italians from the Greeks. And after that point, so that they need not use their ethnic names, a New Rome was built to complement the Elder one, so that they all could be called Romans after the common name of such great cities, and have the same faith and the same name for it. And just as they received that most noble name from Christ, so too did they take upon themselves the ethnic name [i.e. Romans]. And everything else was common to them: magistracies, laws, literature, city councils, law courts, piety itself; so that there was nothing that was not common to those of Elder and New Rome.[15]

Then, Akropolites goes on to explain how the two sides were torn apart from each other and they have become the worst enemies – a development he attributes to the Latin addition to the Creed (i.e. the *filioque*), which they effected ‘rashly and in an authoritarian fashion’. He calls the Latins to excise the addition and, consequently, for both sides ‘to utter the symbol of faith commonly in one mind and speech, and to proclaim it in one heart and mouth’. Akropolites ends his double treatise exactly

as he had started it, by lamenting the break in the former unity between the two sides and praying for its restoration (*Opera*, 2:64–66; cf. ibid. 30–32).

The above discourse, striking enough in its own right, is even more surprising considering that the same author deployed the terminology of *romanitas* in a much more exclusive way in his famous *History*, where he reserved it solely for the 'legitimate' state of Nicaea and refused it even to the rulers and inhabitants of Epiros (see Macrides, 2007, 94–97; Page, 2008, 98–107).[16] This is demonstrably *not* a question of Akropolites' views changing over time. In texts written both before and after the composition of this intriguing treatise (i.e. in the funeral oration for Vatatzes and in the History respectively: see *Opera*, 2:12.2–4, 13.9, 14.9–17, 16.31–33, 23.3, 25.7), Akropolites employed the Roman appellation exclusively for Byzantine self-identification.[17] The usage of 'Romans' to signify the Latins, therefore, was solely due to context: it allowed Akropolites to make a very different argument in his treatise on the Holy Spirit. But the very malleability of the term, as well as Akropolites' reasoning, demonstrates its problematic nature for Byzantine self-ascription in this time of extreme political and ideological upheaval. The Roman name carried with it the potential for blurring the dividing line with the Latins – that is, the same enemy against whom Byzantine identity needed to be buttressed.

Drawing this brief overview to a conclusion, we may point to some useful insights afforded by our examination – even if, on this occasion, our aim was mostly to set out the questions rather than provide definitive answers.

Dissecting our source-materials by genre and by context of communication revealed evidence of what we could call the 'public performance' of *romanitas*: in public occasions and formal contexts, Romanness was confidently asserted. However, in more 'private' contexts (or in more idiosyncratic sources) there were indications of unease and reconsideration regarding what it meant to be a 'Roman', especially in the 13th century. This is a reminder that we should remain aware not only of the situational and dynamic character of identity but also of its performative nature.

It is also important to highlight the context-specific testimony of our sources as to what separated or united the Byzantines and the Latins. There are striking differences even between works composed by the same author, as we saw, for example, in the case of Akropolites. This should put us on our guard against easy or sweeping generalisations about a single 'Byzantine attitude towards the West'. There was manifestly a pool of widely divergent options available in perceiving and defining 'self' and 'other': the common religion, the shared 'Romanness' and even the historical memory of interaction between the two sides could be deployed in different ways to either highlight or attenuate Latin otherness. The eventual choice depended very much on contemporary concerns and on the particular point a source was trying to make in each case. What is certain, however, is that the Latins played an important role as the 'constitutive other' in Byzantine self-perception throughout the last centuries of the empire. For these reasons, I believe that the research project presented here constitutes a fruitful approach to better understand how Byzantine identity was shaped and represented in the later period.

Notes

1 The research project 'Worlds Apart? Identity and Otherness in Late Byzantine Perceptions of the West' (SH6–1345) was implemented within the framework of the Action 'Supporting Postdoctoral Researchers' of the Operational Program 'Education and Lifelong Learning' (Action's Beneficiary: General Secretariat for Research and Technology) and was co-financed by the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Greek State.

2 I am currently preparing the full text of my research and conclusions for publication as a monograph.

3 On identity and ethnicity in the Middle Ages, see e.g. Forde, Johnson & Murray (1995); Smyth (1998); Hahn (2001); Garipzanov, Geary & Urbanczyk (2008); McKee (1999); Pohl & Reimitz (1998); Pohl (1998); Pohl & Diesenberger (2002). For the question of nations and nationalism in the pre-modern world, see in particular Armstrong (1982), Smith (1986), Hastings (1997), Reynolds (2005), and Hirschi (2012). For 'otherness' in the Middle Ages, see also Classen (2002).

4 See in general Eriksen (2002); an excellent overview on the characteristics of ethnic identity according to modern research by Halsall (2007), 35–45. On the situational aspect of ethnicity, see Okamura (1981) and Geary (1983).

5 There is a considerable body of surviving materials: indicatively, more than 40 imperial encomia (without counting the funeral orations) and more than 3,500 letters survive from 1204 to 1453, with some authors being particularly prolific, such as Nikephoros Gregoras (252 surviving letters) and Demetrios Kydones (450), both of whom also composed major orations. See Toth (2003); Hunger (1991–2000), 1:292–296, 351–355.

6 It is important to note, nevertheless, that correspondence in Byzantium was often semi-public, as many letters were composed with a view to being read out to a group of people. Furthermore, some missives had the character of formal communication, e.g. letters to/from the authorities on official matters, diplomatic correspondence, or epistolary encomia. For the purposes of our research, such sources are examined as part of the 'public' rather than the 'private' discourses, as the key issue is the *function* and not strictly the *format* of our sources.

7 Recently, Ioannis Stouraitis (2014) argued that, for Byzantine authors, Romanness was 'an identity of higher status' that consciously excluded the vast majority of the population (the 'illiterate and semi-literate masses') and was meant to distinguish the ruling elite from the latter. This prompted a rebuttal by Anthony Kaldellis (2017), who argued that such an interpretation on the social scope of Roman identity goes against the testimony of the sources. Our findings tend to agree with the latter. I would like to thank Anthony Kaldellis for providing a copy of his paper prior to publication.

8 See e.g. Michael Choniates, *Epistulae*, nos. 115.72, 142.54, 146.22, 156.24, 159.12 [*ἰταλικῆς τυρρανίδος*] and 136.27 [*λατινικῆς τυραννίδος*]; Chomatianos, *Ponemata Diafora*, no. 22.53–63.

9 Similarly, in the extensive correspondence of Michael Choniates (a little over half of his 181 surviving letters are dated after 1204), and despite the nearly constant denouncement of Latin 'tyranny', there is hardly any reference to the faith of the Latins or any discussion of the religious differences between the two sides – except for a single reference to the *filioque* in a letter to John Apokaukos: 'the Italians, careless in their audacity, contrive to make the unitary source of the Supreme Divinity into a binary one; they do not celebrate only the Father but also the Son as the source of the procession of the Holy Spirit, thus defiling the unitary miracle of Divinity with an audacious novelty' (*Epistulae*, no. 173.66–70). Before we read too much into this, it would be good to make the context clear: this statement is made in a lengthy and otherwise light-hearted rhetorical exercise, where Michael is arguing the point that number one (the unit) is far superior to number two (pairs). Among his other arguments, in fact, is that the

unicorn is a far nobler animal than the bulls, which have two horns! (*Epistulae*, no. 173.154–163).

10 If anything, some Byzantine authors expressed concern at the realization that the Latins had started to view the Byzantines as non-Christians: 'pagans' as Niketas Choniates put it (see Bossina, 2009, 181–182), 'white Hagarenes' in the words of George Pachymeres (*Relations Historiques*, 2:471), or 'white Ethiopians' according to Manuel Holobolos ('Orationes', 88.26–29). All these authors were aware that this perception of religious otherness could prompt further military aggression through crusading which was increasingly deployed in all the frontiers of the Latin world (see Chrissis, 2014a).

11 In the synodical decision penned by Demetrios Chomatianos regarding relations between Byzantine-rite and Latin-rite monks on Mount Athos (Chomatianos, *Ponemata Diafora*, 198–201, no. 54), Chomatianos (perhaps realizing the ambiguity of terms) actually calls the Byzantine monks *Graikoi*. However, he refers to the time of 'the Italian attack against the Romans' (*τῆς τῶν Ἰταλῶν κατὰ {τῆς} τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐπιδρομῆς*, ibid., no. 54.14–15); and a little later in the text he calls those who follow the pope of Rome and the Latin rite as 'those who follow the customs of the Church of the Romans' (*τοῖς ἔθεσι τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἐκκλησίας ἀκολουθεῖν* – later in the text, this is phrased as *τοῖς Λατινικοῖς ἠκολούθησαν ἔθεσιν*, ibid., no. 54.24 and 54.31). This is generally an interesting text regarding ethnonyms: Chomatianos uses both the terms *Romaioi* and *Graikoi* to designate the Byzantines, while he uses *Italians*, *Latins*, but also 'the Church of the Romans' to designate the Westerners. This demonstrates the fluidity of these terms but, arguably, also an identity anxiety in search of more precise definitions of what separates 'us' from 'them'.

12 There are only two exceptions: the first one is in the letter-monody that Michael Choniates sent to his nephew George on the death of the latter's son at the hands of Leo Sgouros (c.1206-1208), where he made the point that Leo's brutality made even the Latins look good by comparison, so his compatriots, the 'Romans', preferred to escape to the territory of the 'foreigners' (*Epistulae*, no. 100). The second occurrence is in the letter to the *kathegoumenos* of the Kaisariane monastery, where Michael defends himself against the rumour that 'some of the Latins and the Romans' (*ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν Λατίνων καὶ Ῥωμαίων τινές*) believe, namely, that Michael took a great treasure with him when he fled Athens (*Epistulae*, no. 156).

13 For the 'Hellenic' identity in Byzantium, and for Theodore II's role in promoting it, see Kaldellis (2007), passim, esp. 360–388; Angelov (2005), 300–303; idem (2007), 95–98.

14 Once again, however, we must be careful, because the pattern is not entirely consistent. In the encomium Theodore composed for his father, he also used the term 'Hellenes' to refer to his contemporaries (Theodore II Laskaris, *Opuscula rhetorica*, no. 2, par. 14). In fact, the strongest and most elaborated statement of a Hellenic identification is found in Theodore's 'Second *Logos* against the Latins' (*Θεοδώρου Β΄ Λασκάρεως περί χριστιανικής θεολογίας λόγοι*, 137–148): ostensibly a theological treatise, but effectively a praise of the superiority of the 'Hellenes' over the 'Italians' in terms of culture and history. However, it is unlikely that this peculiar text was intended for public delivery.

15 Akropolites, *Opera*, 2:64: *ὡς ἔοικε γοῦν τῆς ἀρχαίας ἡμετέρας ἀγάπης οὐκέτι ἔχετε μνήμην, ὦ Ἰταλοὶ. [...] οὐκ ἄλλα ἄττα τῶν ἐθνῶν εἰς τοσαύτην προέβη τὴν ὁμόνοιαν καὶ τὴν σύμπνοιαν ὡς Γραικοί τε καὶ Ἰταλοί. καὶ εἰκότως· ἐκ Γραικῶν γὰρ τοῖς Ἰταλοῖς καὶ αἱ λογικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ τὰ μαθήματα. κἀντεῦθεν ἵνα μὴ τοῖς ἐθνικοῖς τούτοις ὀνόμασι περιγράφωνται, τῇ πρεσβυτέρᾳ Ῥώμῃ ἑτέρα νέα ἀντῳκοδόμηται, ἵνα ἐξ οὕτω μεγίστων πόλεων κοινὸν ἐχουσῶν τοὔνομα Ῥωμαῖοι πάντες κατονομάζοιντο καὶ ὡς τὸ τῆς πίστεως κοινὸν οὕτως ἔχοιεν καὶ τὸ τῆς κλήσεως. καὶ ὡς ἐκ Χριστοῦ ταὐτὸ τὸ τιμώτατον ἔλαχον ὄνομα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐθνικὸν αὐτοῖς ἐπηγάγοντο. καὶ πάντα δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ὑπῆρχε τούτοις κοινά, ἀρχαὶ νόμοι λόγοι βουλαὶ δικαστήρια, αὐτὴ ἡ εὐσέβεια, οὐδὲν ὅτι μὴ κοινὸν Ῥωμαίοις τοῖς παλαιοτέροις καὶ νεωτέροις*. Translation in Kaldellis (2007), 52 and 382.

16 Though Akropolites was not entirely consistent: in a few, rare occasions in his *History* he seems to unconsciously recognize the Epirote ruler and those under him as 'Romans' (see *Opera*, pars. 14, 25–26).

17 The eulogy for Vatatzes was evidently given at (or around) the time of the emperor's funeral in 1254 (see e.g. Akropolites, *Opera*, 2:23.3–4), the *Logos kata Latinon* was written during Akropolites' captivity in Epiros in 1257-1259, and the history was composed certainly after 1261 and possibly after 1267 (Macrides, 2007, 31–34, 76–77).

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19 In the face of a historical puzzle

Western adventurers, friars and nobility in the service of Michael VIII Palaiologos (1261–1282)

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Unfolding the essential features of Michael VIII Palaiologos' grandiose strategy, which was a masterful synthesis of military action and ingenious diplomatic practice, we notice a striking paradox: in his military policy, which was aimed at restoring Byzantium to the territory held prior to 1204, he avoided recruiting Western mercenaries because they were considered unsuitable for fighting a war against their fellow Latins in Greece (Pachymeres, *Relations historiques,* I, 273.4; Bartusis, 1992, 50). However, when it came to his diplomacy and confrontation at sea with rival Latin rulers, Westerners played pivotal roles as diplomats in the West and as corsairs under the Byzantine banner in the waters surrounding Greece in the later 13th century. His most extravagant innovation was, by far, the appointment of a Latin adventurer as commander of the imperial fleet.

This study presents the intriguing network of Westerners drawn to the service of Michael VIII and assesses the roles played by outstanding individuals in the success of his strategic ends. By bringing to light the fluidity of identities and allegiances of various Westerners in the politically fragmented world of Romania during the second half of the 13th century, we uncover the mentality and idiosyncrasy of a Byzantine emperor who knew how to meet Westerners' expectations in order to serve his own objectives. A study of Westerners in the service of Michael VIII, mainly diplomats and corsairs, serves at the same time as an introduction to those two essential but unexplored dimensions of his subtle strategy: diplomacy and *guerre de course*.

As a way of introducing the subject, it is worth noting that attracting Westerners to imperial service was not Michael Palaiologos' innovation, but the latest chapter in a practice which had started in the second half of the 11th century and became commonplace during the era of the Komnenoi and the Angeloi emperors (Janin, 1930, 61–72; Pryor, 1992, 154; Kazhdan, 2001, 91–100; Harris, 2014, 122; Vučetić, 2016, 94–95). Michael Palaiologos, however, not only revived the practice of his predecessors, but he proved to be a past master at drawing Western individuals into imperial service and an expert at exploiting the weaknesses of three particular social groups of Westerners for the success of his Western policy: adventurers, friars and nobility.

The *milieu,* in which one would expect to find Westerners in the service of Michael VIII, must be, first and foremost, the imperial chancery. As the last

Byzantine emperor to be a major player on the international stage, Michael VIII seems to have actually initiated drastic changes in the imperial chancery as a way of running successfully his manifold Western policy. With Latin becoming the main language of diplomatic correspondence from the beginning of his reign (Oikonomidès, 1985, 194), trained bilingual Westerners formed the nucleus of the emperor's imperial chancery and were highly prized as secretaries (*notarii imperii nostri*), interpreters and advisors. Westerners also emerged in a prominent role in the imperial chancery, that of *protonotarius*, defined by Pseudo-Kodinos as the emperor's personal secretary having responsibility over the secretariat and the head of the imperial chancery (Pseudo-Kodinos, *Traité des Offices*, 186.21–24; Saradi, 1991, 131). Quite often, the most trustworthy and qualified of them carried out delicate diplomatic assignments. The Latin orientation of the imperial chancery is attested also by the official documents directed to Western Europe (Oikonomides, 1985, 194, n.2), which from 1279 onwards were written mainly in Latin (Karayannopoulos, 1972, 194).

The most outstanding Latin in Michael's imperial chancery seems to have been the Genoese Ogerio Boccanegra (Pieralli, *La corrispondenza*, 81, 88–95; Saint-Guillain, 2012, 22–23), whose previous service as notary in the Community of Genoa (Pieralli, *La corrispondenza*, 147) had paved the way for his subsequent outstanding career in Byzantium. His first assignment was that of *notarius* in the imperial chancery during the period of 1272–1277, followed by that of the emperor's personal secretary (*protonotarius*) and the head of the Latin interpreters until 1294 (Loenertz, 1965, 393; Pieralli, *La corrispondenza*, 81, 91, 95). Along with his duties in the imperial chancery, he was entrusted with two diplomatic missions, one to Genoa in 1272 as *ambaxator illustrissimus imperatoris* (Dölger & Wirth, *Regesten*, no. 1990; Geanakoplos, 1959, 248; Nicol, 1962–1964, 1; Pieralli, *La corrispondenza*, 92) and the other to Venice in 1277 (Dölger & Wirth, *Regesten*, no. 2026). What we can discern from these details known of Ogerio's career in the imperial service is that his main assets were apparently his previous working experience and acquaintances in Genoa and his fluency in both Latin and Greek. He must also have been a man of confidence and great prestige since he accomplished demanding duties in the imperial court.

The names of Obertus Doceanus and Johannes Romino come to light in 1262 in a Latin letter by Michael Palaiologos to Genoa in which they were accredited as the emperor's *nuncios*, a designation applied customarily to envoys functioning as message-bearers (Belgrano, *Cinque documenti genovesi-orientali,* 227; Mergiali-Sahas, 2001, 592, n. 30). A Florentine was sent as the emperor's *nuncius* to Genoa in 1262 to announce the recapture of Constantinople by the Byzantines (Geanakoplos, 1959, 148, n. 48). The case of Marcus and Marcetus, the two papal legates of Pope Nicholas III to the Byzantine court, bear witness to the emperor's readiness to occasionally appoint as his imperial *nuncios* even simple papal envoys at hand in order to accomplish a confidential mission to the papal curia (Loenertz, 1965, 378). Goffridus and John Pagano are also mentioned in the sources, most probably serving as interpreters in overseas missions. Goffridus participated as an interpreter in an embassy to the papal curia in 1273, along with an imperial

court official and the papal envoys. His presence was deemed indispensable as no college of interpreters seems to have existed at the Papal See (Dölger & Wirth, *Regesten*, no. 2002; Guiraud, *Les registres de Grégoire X*, no 314, 122). Similar to Goffridus' case must have been that of John Pagano; it is not mentioned under what capacity he was sent to the papal curia as a member of a Byzantine embassy at the end of 1275, but we could assume that he served at least as an interpreter (Dölger & Wirth, *Regesten*, no. 2023a; Geanakoplos, 1959, 292, n. 66).

A foretaste of Michael's pro-Western policy is given by what appears to be his first priority the day immediately after his triumphant entry to the city: the establishment of good relations with the remaining Latin colonists in Constantinople. Such concern on the part of the emperor could possibly be accounted for by the predominant role of the colonists of the three maritime republics of Italy, particularly those of Venice, for the preparation of the conquest of 1204, still fresh in Byzantine collective memory (Halphen, 1930, 141). Anticipating a potential future Latin coalition, the emperor did his best to ensure through skillful negotiations and multiple favors the friendship and the submission to his authority of all the remaining Latin inhabitants in Constantinople. The emperor's intention was precisely to come to an agreement with each one of the three national groups of Latins residing in Constantinople (Genoese, Venetians and Pisans) and at the same time to loosen their bonds with their compatriots in Italy. At worst, preoccupied as he was by the imminent threat of a Western attack, he was vigilant that neither the colonists nor their country of origin should side with his enemies (Pachymeres, *Relations historiques,* I, 219.20–28).

The Genoese, as the most favored among the Latins, experienced a golden era in the Byzantine Empire during the reign of Michael Palaiologos. Through the famous treaty of Nymphaion (July 10, 1261), Michael VIII opened the way for them to prosper in the Byzantine Empire at the expense of their hated rivals, the Venetians, and to manifest their hegemony beyond challenge in the Archipelago, the Bosporus and the Black Sea. No wonder that after 1261 the Genoese hurried to the Byzantine Empire in large numbers on account of the unprecedented opportunities offered for trade and a career in imperial service (Geanakoplos, 1959, 134, 162; Balletto, 2005, 46–47). Michael VIII knew how to exploit Genoese individualism for his own ends and how to lure the most talented of them, who were eager for glory and wealth, to his service.

The most typical case might be that of the Genoese brothers, Benedetto and Manuele Zaccaria, who had greatly impressed the emperor with their enterprising and business-like qualities, especially Benedetto, when he first came to his court in 1264 as a Genoese ambassador. They were soon to become the major Western beneficiaries of Byzantine imperial policy as they were granted the alum-mining rights to the mountainous regions of Phocaea on the Asia Minor coast, northwest of the Gulf of Smyrna, in 1267 (Balard, 2016, 62). This was the origin of the monopoly of alum by the Genoese for over 150 years, from the date of the grant of the fief by Michael Palaeologos till 1455, the year of the Ottoman occupation. This imperial concession was of great importance as alum was one of the most desirable commodities during the Middle Ages and the mines of Phocaea were the richest ones (Heers, 1954, 31–32).

Thanks to the emperor's intervention, the Zaccaria brothers managed to ensure a monopoly on alum's export at the expense even of their own compatriots who were trading the alum extracted in the countries bordering the Black Sea. This unique granting of Phocaea to the Zaccaria can be explained as a reward for multiple services, including numerous diplomatic missions in which Benedetto participated. The grant of Phocaea to the Zaccaria was the origin of a more generalized policy on the part of Michael VIII to assign to Latins territories of the empire as fiefs for exceptional services (Pachymeres, *Relations historiques,* II, 471.7–8). Having devoted himself to the formation of a coalition between the Byzantine emperor and the Western powers available for joint action against Charles of Anjou, Benedetto fulfilled very demanding diplomatic missions to the West as the emperor's most trustworthy envoy and faithful friend. His most important contribution was as intermediary between Peter III of Aragon and Michael VIII in 1282, before the Sicilian Vespers, as he appears to have been instrumental in instigating the revolt and thus canceling the imminent attack of Charles of Anjou against Byzantium (Templar of Tyre, *Chronique*, V, 415; Geanakoplos, 1959, 357; Balard, 1978, 54). He was entrusted with yet another important mission in 1282 as the emperor's plenipotentiary at the court of Aragon and Castile with the express purpose of sealing the political alliance between Byzantium and the kingdom of Aragon through a matrimonial alliance between the son of the Byzantine emperor and the daughter of Peter of Aragon ('Letter of Peter of Aragon to Michael VIII Palaiologos' in Tsirpanlis, 1972, 324–325). No wonder that he was associated with the imperial family through his splendid marriage with the emperor's sister (Sanudo, *Istoria,* 151.17–22; Miller, 1964, 284).

The privileged status that the Genoese enjoyed in their relations with the Byzantine emperor did not remain unchallenged for long. A turning point was the discovery of the alleged plot on the part of the Genoese podestà, Guglielmo Guercio, to betray Constantinople to King Manfred of Sicily in 1264. Upon uncovering the plot, Michael VIII expelled the Genoese from Constantinople to Herakleia at the Sea of Marmara and decided to open negotiations with Venice. At that very moment, the noble Venetian Errico Trivigiano was released from prison and sent secretly on a mission to the Doge Raniero Zeno to open up negotiations with the *Serenissima* on the emperor's behalf (Martino da Canale, *La Cronaca Veneta*, 497, CLXXXVII). The Venetian historian Marino Sanudo Torsello informs us that Michael Palaiologos on this occasion tried unsuccessfully to win the Venetians to his cause or to lure some outstanding individuals among them with lavish gifts and brilliant marriages with Greek ladies from his court (Sanudo, *Istoria,* 173.3–10). Subsequently, he turned once more to the Genoese and concluded a new treaty with them in 1267 putting an end to their banishment from Herakleia and assigning Galata or Pera across the Golden Horn to them for their settlement. Nevertheless, as he feared that they might pass into the camp of Charles of Anjou, who after the battle of Benevento (1266) was beginning preparations for an attack on Constantinople, he asked them to become his own men or *lizioi* according to the Western feudal concept of liege-homage (Ferluga, 1961, 121–122; Bartusis, 1988, 346).

Michael Palaiologos' reliance on intelligence gathered by secret Latin agents seems to have been a *sine qua non* element for the success of his strategy. Being constantly faced with a Latin coalition against Constantinople, seeking the propitious time to gain a foothold in the zone of Venetian influence, and anticipating a sudden revolt of the numerous and arrogant Genoese within Constantinople, Michael Palaiologos had a network of official or unofficial agents, Latins or *gasmouloi* (i.e. offspring of a mixed marriage between a Byzantine and a Latin), residing either in Constantinople itself or in Western Europe to keep him always abreast of the latest developments (Geanakoplos, 1959, 139). Imprisoned Westerners could occasionally act under the double capacity of secret agents and diplomatic envoys (Dölger & Wirth, *Regesten*, no. 1928). In an embassy that the emperor sent to Genoa in 1262, he asked the Genoese to spy on the Venetians and to inform him constantly on their movements in the waters of Romania (Belgrano, *Cinque documenti genovesi-orientali*, 228–229). In all likelihood, leading personalities of the south Italian-Greek population, who were striving to maintain their Greek and Orthodox identity while being oppressed by the Angevin regime, served the emperor as a useful stock for intelligence-gathering on Charles of Anjou's movements. A fleeting allusion to their pro-Byzantine feelings can be found in Sanudo (Sanudo, *Istoria*, 169.3–10; Geanakoplos, 1959, 189–194).

The first illuminating insight into Michael's policies and strategic moves immediately after the treaty of Viterbo (1267), when Charles of Anjou emerged as a key-protagonist in Mediterranean politics, is given by George Pachymeres, the Byzantine historian *par excellence* about the years of Michael's reign. Pachymeres mentions that as the emperor was painfully aware of his weakness to face Charles of Anjou militarily, he placed all his hopes on a very careful and sophisticated diplomacy with the papacy. In a total of fifty-four diplomatic missions to the West during his reign,[1] twenty-five had as their destination the papacy. The great number of diplomatic missions to the Papal See reveals that the emperor pinned his hopes primarily on the pope and on the Union of the Churches. Nevertheless, the rapid succession of popes was posing an obstacle to the policy of Michael VIII, breaking the continuity and progress of negotiations (Pachymeres, *Relations historiques,* II, 471. 9–12).

In his quest for the ideal covert agents to the Holy See, Michael VIII sought the good offices of the Dominican and Franciscan friars whom he welcomed to his court for their unique credentials: they were bilingual, usually devoted to the cause of the Union of the Churches and, thanks to their monastic identity, had the advantage of passing unnoticed through Charles of Anjou's kingdom, who had blocked the way to any Byzantine embassy to the pope (Pachymeres, *Relations historiques*, p. 460. n. 5–461.19–27; Roncaglia, 1954, 142; Setton, 1976, 1:102–103).

The first Franciscan to be entrusted with a diplomatic mission to the newly elected Pope Gregory X in 1272 was John Parastron, the most outstanding of the Constantinopolitan Franciscans. He was a bilingual of Greek origin, born in Constantinople, distinguished for his learning and the invaluable experience he had acquired as clerk in the service of the Apostolic Camera (Dölger & Wirth, *Regesten*, no. 1986; Pachymeres, *Relations historiques*, II, 474, n.2–475.22–27; Gill, 1979, 124). Being closer to the Byzantine mentality than anyone else, he was

favorable to the Greek rites and inspired by a sincere desire for the healing of the schism between the two Churches (*PLP* 21910; Wolff, 1944, 230; Geanakoplos, 1959, 267–268; Setton, 1976, 1:110; Tsougarakis, 2012, 143). The ephemeral Union of the Churches at Lyon, which temporarily nullified Angevin aggression towards Constantinople, was no less than a diplomatic achievement of Michael VIII and his Franciscan ambassadors, particularly of John Parastron (Roncaglia, 1954, 144; Chrissis, 2012, 217–227).

As Michael made the policy of fostering the Union of the Churches central in his diplomacy, the case of learned Greek bishops from Southern Italy rose to prominence for their unique qualifications to carry out delicate diplomatic negotiations between the Byzantine court and the Holy See. Thus, Nicholas of Crotone, bishop in southern Italy, fluent in Latin and Greek, well-versed in the Orthodox dogma and devoted to the pope, was the first to whom the emperor turned for assistance as early as 1262. He invited him to Constantinople as his religious adviser on issues of dissension between the two Churches and relied on him for the negotiations with the pope, as well as with the king of France, Louis IX in 1270 (Dölger & Wirth, *Regesten*, no. 1905; Gill, 1979, 109, 121).

Another key criterion prevailing in the emperor's mind for the choice of the most appropriate Westerners to serve his Western policy was high social rank. This piece of information is again due to Pachymeres, who specifies that the emperor preferred to recruit Westerners, especially among those coming from the Italian nobility and those who were of a friendly disposition towards his authority. In this respect, one can notice that Michael VIII pursued matrimonial alliances with the Frankish barons of the principality of Achaea, as he was motivated by a need to obtain Western allies who would support his interests in the Peloponnese. One such case was the Frankish Moreote baron Matthieu de Vélicourt (*PLP* 2555), whose presence in the Byzantine court was attested on the occasion of his arranged marriage with the third daughter of Theodore II Laskaris (Pachymeres, *Relations historiques,* III, 243.15–17; Gregoras, *Byzantina Historia*, 1:92–93). In support of the same policy, according to Sanudo, the emperor and his advisors tried unsuccessfully to arrange a marriage between his heir to the throne, Andronikos, and the daughter of the prince of Achaea, William of Villehardouin, with the ulterior motive of bringing the Frankish principality of Achaea under Byzantine rule after Williams' death (Sanudo, *Istoria*, 129.5–10).

Beyond a shadow of a doubt, Michael's reliance on Westerners is evidenced primarily in his naval strategy favoring chiefly privateering warfare (*guerre de course*) against Venice, Charles of Anjou and the Latin petty lords in the battlegrounds of the eastern Mediterranean. The imperially sponsored piracy was probably the most important and persuasive weapon of Michael Palaiologos for the weakening of his Western enemies (Ahrweiler, 1966, 369). As a matter of fact, by favoring privateering warfare against his political rivals, he was reviving a practice already introduced by the Angeloi emperors (Pryor, 1992, 154, n. 82). In terms of percentage, adventurers were dominant in the socially heterogeneous group of Westerners in Michael's service. Michael Palaiologos' personal bonds with Westerners gained new significance in the case of the famous Italian adventurer Licario, who entered the Byzantine emperor's service and became his vassal.

Having previously served the Latin triumvir Giberto II da Verona as a knight, he attempted to no avail to ensure his admission into the Lombard nobility of Euboea through marriage to Giberto's sister. 'Since he could not live a life in the margins and without glory' among his fellow Latins, he switched his allegiance to the Byzantine emperor, who was seeking to recover Euboea, and became an imperial vassal (Sanudo, *Istoria*, 131.7–26). The Byzantine expedition against Euboea, which took place in the years 1276–1277 under Licario's command, was triumphant. After his unprecedented victory, Licario was appointed *megas konostaulos* and *megas doux* (commander of the Byzantine fleet). The following years, his victorious course was directed towards the restitution of Byzantine power over the Duchy of the Archipelago and over the autonomous Latin principalities in the Aegean islands. He managed to temporarily restore a number of islands to Byzantine control, enhance Michael VIII's prestige, cause great damage to the rulers of many Latin-held Aegean islands, and finally force Venice to renew its treaty with Byzantium in 1277 (Ahrweiler, 1966, 369). It is little wonder that he was generously rewarded by the emperor with Euboea as a fief and with a noble and rich Greek wife. Licario's longing for fame, glory and fortune was fulfilled by joining the cause of the Byzantine emperor. All in all, his individualism prevailed over any sense of 'patriotism' and his Latin identity. What he achieved was beyond any expectation, since he emerged as the first and the last ever Latin to be honored as commander of the imperial Byzantine fleet.

The clearest evidence of Western corsairs employed by Michael VIII is to be found in the Venetian document of 1278 known under the title *Judicum Venetorum in causis piraticis contra Graecos decisiones* (Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, 159–281; Morgan, 1976, 411–438). A total of one hundred names of corsairs, mainly of Italian origin, active in the waters of the Aegean in the second half of the 13th century, are listed in the aforementioned document as *cursarii domini imperatoris* or as *homines domini imperatoris*. Of particular interest in this document are the references to 170 piratical assaults inflicted on Venetian ships by the corsairs of Michael VIII during the period 1269–1277, which amounted to 35,000 hyperpyra in damages (Papadopoulou, 1994–95, 98–100; Maltezou, 1995, 210). Apparently, this document was no less than 'a procès-verbal of claims for damages suffered by Venetian merchants at the hands of corsairs - many in the service of Michael' (Geanakoplos, 1959, 303). Among them, the document enumerates the names of Giovanni de le Cavo, John Senzaraxon and Andrea Gaforus (Tafel & Thomas, *Urkunden*, 179, 216, 241, 265, 273; Heyd, 1885, 442–443). A particularly active individual seems to have been Giovanni de le Cavo, a Genoese privateer serving the Byzantine emperor since 1269 under the title of *comes*, a subaltern officer of the Byzantine fleet (Pseudo-Kodinos, *Traité des offices,* 302.6, 308.18). His name was linked to more than twenty piratical attacks against Venetian ships (Sanudo, *Istoria*, 282–283). In c.1278, he was munificently rewarded by the emperor with the *signoria* of the islands of Nanfio (Anafi) and Rhodes (Geanakoplos, 1959, 211). In 1281, at the news of the alliance at Orvietto, whose leading protagonists were the pope, Charles of Anjou and Venice (Nicol, 1988, 209), Michael VIII equipped six galleys under the command of Giovanni de le Cavo with the express purpose of 'harming his [the emperor's] enemies' (Sanudo, *Istoria*, 151.7–10 and 151.17–22).

No wonder that Venice, one of the three partners of the anti-Byzantine alliance at Orvietto, was the first target of piratical violence and reprisals as two of her ships were looted by Giovanni de le Cavo (Sanudo, *Istoria*, 151.1–14). By turning the pirates into corsairs and *homines* of his kingdom, consenting to their piratical activities and allowing their ships to be equipped with arms in the ports of his empire, especially in Thessalonica, Anaia (near Ephesus) and Monemvasia, Michael VIII aimed to harm the financial interests of his two main rivals, Venice and Charles of Anjou (Maltezou, 1995, 216). The corsairs who acted, having Thessalonica as their base during the aforementioned period, were fifteen in number and of Italian origin, mostly Genoese and Pisans. Two of them, Lanfranco and Rolando, are referred to as *ser, milites* or *cavallarii de Salonichi*, titles denoting relation of vassalage towards the Byzantine emperor. It is worth noting that the usual titles conferred to Latin corsairs by the Byzantine emperors as a reward for their services were related to the administrative hierarchy (*megas doux, megas konostaulos, vestiarios*) and not to a status related to land ownership as the titles *ser* and *cavallarius* meant to imply (Maltezou, 1995, 211, n. 14).

Apart from the Venetian document of 1278, references related to corsair activity under the license of Michael VIII are to be found in the Angevin Registers (Angevin archival documents), one of the most valuable official Western sources for the 13th century on this topic (Filangieri, *Registri*). Piracy was purposely used by Michael Palaeologos as a means to weaken his main political rival Charles of Anjou, especially after the treaty of Viterbo (1267), when the principality of Achaea, the 'Regno di Albania' and Corfu became Angevin provinces and the Angevin involvement in Romania became more manifest. In a total of approximately 100 documents referring to the subject of piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean, some point to *homines Paliologi more piratico* or *pirate greci* sent by the Byzantine emperor to plunder the coast of Angevin territories (Dourou-Eliopoulou, 2013, 59–60, n. 28). In this case, the evidence of the Angevin Registers reveals that the corsairs in the service of the Byzantine emperor were also Greek.

The continuous and active involvement of Westerners in imperial affairs was undoubtedly the most dominant and lasting characteristic in Michael Palaiologos' strategic planning. It seems that by placing diplomacy and the *guerre de course* at the core of his subtle strategy and by constantly orchestrating a heterogeneous network of talented, highly esteemed or adventurous Westerners, Michael VIII managed to preserve, in spite of his limited military power, the recently recaptured Constantinople from Western aggression and to triumph in the duel for supremacy against the most influential Western figure of his time, the Angevin King of Naples and Sicily, Charles of Anjou.

Note

1 See Dölger & Wirth, *Regesten*, nos. 1905, 1906, 1911, 1920, 1921, 1923, 1927, 1928, 1934, 1936, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1947, 1960, 1961, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1971, 1974, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1991, 1998, 2002, 2002a, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2019, 2020, 2022, 2028, 2029, 2038, 2039, 2041, 2044, 2045, 2049, 2053, 2054, 2056, 2060, 2072.

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20 *Μιξοβάρβαροι* and *λίζιοι*

Theory and practice regarding the integration of Westerners in Late Byzantine social and economic reality

Triantafyllitsa Maniati-Kokkini

The contact between the Westerners and the Byzantine East evolved at different levels, from hostile confrontation to tolerance and interaction. Especially since the 11th century, the time of the 'Schism' and the crusades, the problem faced by the Byzantine state of either dealing with the Westerners or incorporating them into Byzantine society can be explored through focusing on the terminology found in the sources. Particularly noteworthy as well as revealing is the meaning of the specific terms *μιξοβάρβαρος* and *λίζιος*, and more importantly, the interpretation of their usage by Byzantine scholars and in official documents.

The words *βάρβαρος* (barbarian) and *λίζιος* (liege) represented something originally foreign to the Byzantines. The meaning of the former in Greek was simply a rendering of theoretically incomprehensible (foreign) speech; the latter was foreign both as a term and as a concept since it was the Hellenized form of a legal status unknown in Byzantium.

The appellation *βάρβαροι* (cf. *ODB*, 1:252–253) was attached throughout the ages to various enemies of the ancient Greeks and, later on, the Byzantines: it was given to marauders who spoke a different language or followed a different religion. The term was inherited by Byzantium via the Romans' perception of a civilized and an uncivilized world, but also through the study of ancient Greek writers and the imitation of their writing style by Byzantine historians, who used it repeatedly to describe nomadic peoples or even Christians living outside the Byzantine borders of the time.

The *μιξοβάρβαροι*, in a primary and general sense, are people of semi-barbarian, or semi-Greek, origin, while officially, as A. Kazhdan also briefly notes, the word refers to the inhabitants of the Danube region who speak different languages.[1] The term is used, for example, by Michael Attaleiates (Michael Attaleiates, *Historia*, 158.4: *μιξοβάρβαρον τὸ παρὰ τὸν Ἴστρον*) and Anna Komnene, who employs it when referring to the Turks or Scythians and in connection to language (Anna Komnene, *Alexias*, passim and, for instance, 464.27–28: *μὴ τὸν μιξοβάρβαρον νοείτω, ἀργυρώνητος γὰρ … δοῦλος γεγονὼς*); we will focus (see in detail below) on the references to it in the work of Niketas Choniates.

The term *λίζιος* in 12th and 13th-century Byzantine sources defines the loyalty of Westerners to the Byzantine emperor, a state of affairs that would have been taken more or less as implicit in his relations with his subjects.[2] The well-known

study by Jadran Ferluga remains fundamental in understanding the issue of the connection between the term and the question of feudalism in Byzantium (Ferluga, 1961, 97–123), as well as the one by Nicolas Svoronos on the oath of fealty (Svoronos, 1951; cf. the reexamination of the question, in Auzepy & Saint-Guillain, 2008). Apparently the Byzantines were familiar with the untranslated term, which is successfully rendered in Greek by the historian John Kinnamos as *δοῦλος ἐθελόδουλος* (Kinnamos, *Epitome*, 223.5–6) and by Anna Komnene, citing a state document in her own words, as *οἰκέτης καὶ ὑποχείριον* and 'emperor's slave' (Anna Komnene*, Alexias,* 414.10–11, 414.24, 416.84 and 420.32; see in more detail below and notes 3 and 5).

A historical examination of the presence and use of the terms *βάρβαρος* and *λίζιος* in the sources reveals that, although they follow independent courses, in the Late Byzantine period they occasionally cross paths, either when the specific terms are used or when their meaning is implicit, even though the actual words are absent.

Their explicit or implicit dual presence in Byzantine sources is also connected with the term *Λατῖνος* (Latin; see e.g. *ODB* 2:1187–1188), which, from the 11th and 12th century onwards, is commonly used to describe various people: Westerners who serve in the Byzantine army; the empire's Western allies who provide naval contingents in exchange for significant financial privileges; the Westerners who unexpectedly conquered the Queen of Cities and other Byzantine lands; Western opponents in the 13th century; as well as Western allies (whether actual or nominal), lenders and interlocutors on a religious and political plane from the end of the 13th century to the fall of Constantinople in 1453.

Thus, it appears that the *Λατῖνος*, or occasionally *Ἰταλός* (Italian), *Φράγγος* (Frank) or *Νορμανδός* (Norman), has already been incorporated, either directly or indirectly, into Byzantine reality – sometimes as a *λίζιος* and loyal to the Byzantine emperor, worthy of rewards and privileges, other times as a *βάρβαρος* who is not to be trusted or given donatives. The corresponding references in the sources reasonably lead one to wonder whether the positive or negative attitude is tailored to the occasion or, perhaps, to the author's point of view. Yet as soon as we proceed to examine the description of actual events and specific instances, we begin to see things more clearly. More specific questions on the subject will be posed (and some tentative answers will be given) after first examining the gradual appearance of terminology in the sources. The examination will follow a mostly chronological order to reveal and emphasize the development of the terms' usage over time.

According to the historian **Michael Attaleiates**, one such *βάρβαρος* whose arrogance Emperor Michael VII had to 'massage' was the *Λατῖνος Ῥουσέλιος* (Latin Roussel), when he rebelled and proclaimed a new emperor (1073–1076, Attaleiates, *Historia*, 143.24–25 and 146.2–3), whereas before that the same Norman, Roussel de Bailleul, served as a useful imperial mercenary (Attaleiates, *Historia*, 141.27–28).

Composing her historical work, *Alexias*, after 1137, **Anna Komnene**, Alexios I Komnenos' daughter, proudly narrates her father's successful move and renders

(we hope faithfully) the terminology and content of the document granting Bohemond, son of Robert Guiscard, the possession of Antioch under the suzerainty of Alexios and his heir apparent, John Komnenos. In this indirect manner, we are informed in detail on the content of the *ἀμοιβαῖος χρυσόβουλλος λόγος* ('mutual chrysobull') which was probably signed in 1108, after the defeat of the Normans.[3]

Of course, the characterization of Bohemond the Norman as *λίζιος ἄνθρωπος* of Alexios and the signing by the emperor in question of a 'mutual chrysobull' did not signify any actual integration of the recipient into Byzantine society or hierarchy (Anna Komnene, *Alexias*, 413–423, describes in full the agreement between Alexios and Bohemond; for the terminology see below, note 5). It was, however, a first indication of the acceptance of the oath of loyalty and homage after the Latin fashion in exchange for an imperial grant,[4] at a time when the rule in Byzantium was – and, of course, continued to be until the end of the Empire – the unilateral decision on the part of the emperor to donate grants or privileges to subjects whose fealty was taken for granted.

From the Byzantine perspective, the handling of this issue was appropriate, both politically and diplomatically. The authority of the Byzantine emperor remained intact, since he maintained his influence over the region and the administrative fortunes of Antioch**,** which remained under the control of central authority (Anna Komnene, *Alexias*, 419.7–9ff, 23ff); at the same time, the Western conqueror of Byzantine territory, during the First Crusade, was now tied through fealty to the Byzantine emperor – as well as through a hierarchical administration, much like a Byzantine commander (Anna Komnene, *Alexias*, 421.94–96ff). It is also worth noting the concessions on the part of Bohemond, perhaps in an effort to find common ground between the two legal traditions: first, the exclusivity of the homage offered – i.e., the promise not to become the vassal of another person as well, as he would have been able to do under Western law –, an exclusivity that was to be both individual and collective, meaning it applied also for the Normans who followed him (Anna Komnene, *Alexias*, 418.69–78); and, second, the additional acceptance of vassalage towards the co-ruler (and, in all probability, future emperor), John Komnenos. The developments that followed the untimely death of Bohemond in 1111 (Anna Komnene, *Alexias*, 427.18ff) do not negate Alexios' success and the coupling of Byzantine and Western customs.

Anna Komnene, in this long description of the agreement between the Byzantine emperor and the Norman leader, repeatedly uses the term *λίζιος*, often in conjunction with the word *ἄνθρωπος* (man), also referencing, as has already been noted, the Greek terms *οἰκέτης* (household servant), *δοῦλος* (slave) and *ὑποχείριον* (subordinate).[5] Prior to that, when referring to the above-mentioned relation between Alexios Komnenos and the first crusaders, on a single occasion she characterizes the latter by using the corresponding Greek word *ὁμότης* (under oath) in conjunction with the term *δοῦλος* (Anna Komnene, *Alexias*, 316. 82).

The *Alexiad* also includes among the oft-mentioned *βάρβαροι* Franks, Normans or Latins in general,[6] while the same appellation is reserved for individual Westerners as well, such as Baldwin, Robert Guiscard or Roussel de Bailleul,

the latter being named Ourselios (the selfsame Rouselios already mentioned by Attaleiates). Let us also note the use of the term by Bohemond – always according to Anna Komnene – as a generic adjective attributed to other enemies or would-be liege-men (Anna Komnene, *Alexias*, 416.4–5, 421.71–72).

The same Bohemond, who would go on to become Alexios' 'liege-man', appears 27 years earlier in connection again with the term *βάρβαροι*. In his oration addressed to Emperor Alexios I Komnenos, **Theophylaktos of Ohrid** uses the phrase *βαρβάρων θράσος* ('barbarian audacity') referring specifically to the invading Normans under Robert Guiscard and Bohemond (Theophylaktos, *Discours*, no. 5, 219.22–25; cf. p. 218, notes 7 and 8 by the editor, P. Gautier).

Half a century later, another erudite churchman, **Eustathios of Thessalonica**, also uses the characterization of 'barbarians' to describe the Normans who besieged and sacked his city in 1185 – while at the same time accusing the city's commander, David, of imitating them in appearance (Eustathios of Thessalonica, *Espugnazione,* passim and 82.8–9, 94.18–20, 114.13–15, 114.35–116.1, 136.6, 138.5–6, 156.2–3).

While no link emerges between the Schism of 1054 and the way Byzantine historians or even churchmen characterize Westerners until the end of the 12th century, after the watershed events of 1204, awareness of the differences with the Latins became all the more intense,[7] as we shall see. References to the Latins in the historical work of **Niketas Choniates**, who was, of course, a civil administrator and not an ecclesiastical dignitary, form a bridge between the 12th-century views and those dating from after the conquest of 1204. With regard to our topic, the most interesting reference is particularly caustic despite its brevity. It forms part of Choniates' criticism of Manuel I Komnenos' decision to replace soldiers' salaries with tax revenues, evidently from *pronoia*-type grants.[8] On the basis of this decision, at some point, 'Roman' smallholders and *paroikoi* would have been forced to pay their taxes to soldiers who were not of pure Byzantine descent – to 'half-breed barbarians', as the historian puts it (Choniates, *Historia*, 209.43ff).

I do not believe that here the term *μιξοβάρβαρος* carries the narrow meaning mentioned at the beginning of this chapter; rather, it is probably used in the wider archaizing sense of barbarians as non-Greeks – in this case, non-Byzantines.[9] It is highly likely, therefore, that it (also) refers to Westerners,[10] whether they were of pure blood or mixed race, like the *γασμοῦλοι* of a later age, while it carries an intensely derogatory meaning. The verbal disparagement is intensified by the choice of using not the masculine form *μιξοβάρβαρος/-οι*, as would have been expected in the case of soldiers, but the neutral *μιξοβάρβαρον*, which accompanies the highly pejorative noun *ἀνδράριον* (homunculus). The two meanings are mutually complementary and I find it difficult to decide which term is more offensive to these, many or few, 'half-barbarians'. It seems, however, that the term *ἀνδράριον* is rather more negatively charged,[11] while Choniates clearly juxtaposes both words with the terms *Ῥωμαῖος* (Roman) and *ἀνήρ* (man), respectively – used in that same passage to describe the Byzantine tax-paying farmers (see the juxtapositions *Ῥωμαῖον-μιξοβαρβάρῳ* and *ἄνδρα-ἀνδραρίῳ* in Choniates, *Historia*, 209.45–46).

Of course, in the same passage Choniates also expressed a negative opinion of most soldiers and recipients of imperial financial donations at that time; however, with regard to beneficiaries of foreign (or even semi-foreign) descent in particular, Choniates proves even more censorious, since this is an added element on top of those used to characterize the majority of the military of the period as poor-quality soldiers and unworthy recipients of *pronoia* grants.

Bearing in mind the numerous negative comments on the character of the Latins that Niketas Choniates makes when describing the events that preceded the Fourth Crusade and the Fall of Constantinople in 1204 (money-grabbing, untrustworthy etc.),[12] perhaps his aforementioned opinion should not come as a surprise. However, in other parts of his *History* positive references can be found to capable Latin soldiers fighting alongside the Byzantines – for instance during the reign of John Komnenos in 1139 (Choniates, *Historia*, 35.21–23).[13] Consequently, it does not appear that Niketas Choniates was negatively predisposed towards Latins; rather, he qualifies his critical comments on Manuel's decision by invoking a specific reason.

Also, to the extent that the characterization of *μιξοβάρβαρον ἀνδράριον* referred to Western soldiers, perhaps it is important to look at the timing of this careful (as was Choniates' habit) selection of the dual term with the truly loaded pejorative meaning. In other words, did he do it during the first draft of the *History*, when most chapters on Manuel Komnenos were written, as is the conclusion of specialists on Choniates (see Simpson, 2004, 25–27ff, with a discussion of the relative views), or after he had been influenced by the events of the early 13th century? Even if the latter were the case, he was definitely not influenced in a more general way, as is proven by the abovementioned positive characterization of Westerners, including also the praises heaped on Conrad, son of the marquis of Montferrat, and the valor he had displayed in 1179 (Choniates, *Historia*, 201.93–95).

Choniates also associates the term 'barbarian' with Westerners when he refers to the ruthless behavior of the multitude of conquerors during their storming of Constantinople in April 1204: 'Above all, it was a difficult and arduous task to mollify the barbarians with entreaties and to dispose them kindly towards us, as they were highly irascible and bilious and unwilling to listen to anything' (Choniates, *Historia*, 574.37–40: *ἐργῶδες ἦν καὶ δυσμήχανον τὸ ... εὔνουν θέσθαι τὸ βάρβαρον ... καὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀκοὴν ἀθέλητον*, trans. by Magoulias, *O City*, 315). Furthermore, he describes the imperial territory as 'barbarized' in the aftermath of the Latin conquest, concluding with a reference to the 'barbarous' acts against the Greeks (Choniates, *Historia*, 580.87–95).

It is also worth noting that the term *βάρβαρος* is more often used by Choniates not as a generic characterization of the different (in regard to the Byzantines) 'ethnicity', but aimed at individuals and their behavior, language etc. Besides, numerous Byzantine texts – and not just works of historiography – use *βάρβαρος* as an adjective to define language or actions, in contradistinction to *ἕλλην* - *ἑλληνὶς* or *ῥωμαϊκόν*.[14]

As for the second term, which denotes (even in Byzantine texts) submission and fealty to a Byzantine emperor, Niketas Choniates uses both the Latin-sounding term *λίζιος* and the Greek *ὁμότης* (one who is under oath).[15]

Thus, while narrating events that took place in the reign of John Komnenos, he uses the term *λίζιος* to characterize the submission of 'prince Raymond' (Raymond of Poitiers, prince of Antioch and son-in-law of Bohemond II) and the 'count of Tripoli' (Raymond II, count of Tripoli) to the emperor during the latter's triumphal entrance into Antioch in August 1137 (Choniates, *Historia*, 27.2–7). Furthermore, when referring to the Italian and other cities during the reign of Manuel Komnenos, he portrays those citizens who were 'loyal' and 'friendly' to the Byzantine emperor (in 1173 and 1179) as *ὁμότης* and *λίζιοι* (Choniates, *Historia*, 201.5–6 and 12–13).

Likewise, towards the end of the 12th century, Emperor Isaac II Angelos refers, in a **document** dated 1192, to 'his majesty's liege horseman, Pipinus of Pisa' (*λίζιον καβαλλάριον τῆς βασιλείας ... Πιπῖνον τὸν Πισσαῖον*), as one of his three *apokrisiarioi* (envoys) (MM, 3:37–40 at 38, no. VI, November 1192; on the date, see Dölger & Wirth*, Regesten*, 1612). In a document dating from the following year, Isaac uses the same term, combined with its Greek version, to refer to his majesty's 'most faithful liege Baldwin Gertzus' (*πιστότατος λίζιος Βαλδουῖνος Γέρτζος*), who is among a number of delegates dispatched to him by the Genoese (MM, 3:40–46, at 42, no. VII, October 1193: *Χρυσόβουλλον σιγίλλιον*; on the date see Dölger & Wirth*, Regesten*, 1616). On the contrary, the same document exclusively uses the corresponding Greek words when mentioning 'the city of Genoa, which shows great loyalty and favor towards his majesty and Romania [i.e., the Byzantine Empire]' (*κάστρον* [*τὴν Γένουαν*]*, πολλήν εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ Ῥωμανίαν πίστιν καὶ εὔνοιαν τρέφον*) (MM, 3:42; cf. pp. 44 and 45, respectively: *πίστιν ἐπωμόσαντο ... τὸ όρκωμοτικὸν αὐτῶν ἔγγραφον*).

Niketas' brother, **Michael Choniates**, metropolitan of Athens, shares the historian's negative outlook towards the Latins after 1204, during his final years, after the Queen of Cities had been subjected to 'Latin tyranny' (Michael Choniates*, Epistulae*, no. 136.2, 8, 27, 30, 137.20–22). In fact, in three of his letters, written between 1208 and 1214, he describes in glowing terms a most loyal 'Byzantine', the *sebastos* Chalkoutzes, an important personage of the city of Chalkis and the island of Euboea in general.[16] This *θεματικὸς* or *κτηματικὸς ἄρχων*,[17] being particularly 'Latin-hating' (*μισολατῖνος*), abandoned as 'a voluntary exile' (*ἐθελοντὴς φυγόπατρις*) his Latin/Italian-held homeland – not to mention his own family and estate – and sought refuge in the empire of Nicaea (Michael Choniates, *Epistulae*, no. 136.24–28, 31ff; cf. no. 137.17–19ff, 40–41ff Also no. 138.12–14ff, 18ff). According to Michael Choniates (ibid., no. 136.24–25 and 31–33), everyone wished fervently to settle there and enjoy the protection of the newly-formed state's ruler – at least during the reign of Theodore I Laskaris.

In fact, in one of the three letters (the one addressed to the bishop of Crete, also a refugee at Nicaea), and while still on the subject of Chalkoutzes' relations with the Latins, he expounded on the subject of 'Latin avarice' with regard to the accumulation of money (ibid., no. 138.15ff.). Moreover, in another letter, he does not hesitate to use the term *βάρβαρος* in reference to the Westerners hailing from Italy (ibid., no. 146.22).

A negative attitude towards the Latins is also displayed by **Demetrios Chomatenos**, metropolitan of Ohrid (1216–1236) (see for instance Chomatenos, *Ponemata diaphora*, no. 150.44–46). The term *μιξέλλην* (mixed-Greek), which he uses interchangeably with *ἡμίγραικος* (half-Greek) (ibid., no. 151.386–387), could also correspond to 'semi-Latin', while the term *βάρβαρος* found in his works usually carries the original generic meaning of the word or refers to Bulgarians (Ibid., no. 26.15, no. 59.71–72, 82, no. 81.272–274, no. 127.47) and thus lies outside our present scope.

Furthermore, definitely after 1204 – and more specifically between the years 1224 and 1226(?) – a learned clergyman expressed views similar to those of Niketas Choniates, perhaps not in an equally derogatory tone, but in a more absolute manner. It is 'not proper' for a 'Latin' to possess 'Romans' under the terms of a *pronoia* grant – that is what **John Apokaukos**, metropolitan of Naupaktos, asserts in one of his letters,[18] even if, as he himself admits, the Westerner in question is a mercenary soldier and, what is more, one loyal to the Byzantine ruler of Epiros, Theodore Doukas Komnenos, Apokaukos' own sovereign (Apokaukos, 'Unedierte Schriftstücke', 132, no. 71.64–72).

Of course, John Apokaukos generally appears violently opposed to the Latins, whom he blames as being 'anti-Roman by nature' (Apokaukos, 'Unedierte Schriftstücke', ibid.: *Τὸ γὰρ φύσει κατὰ Ῥωμαίων· πῶς τὸ φύσει μεταβαλόν, τὴν ἕξιν ταύτην μεταπλασθῇ καὶ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἀντιλάβῃ διάθεσιν*). In that context, he also stresses that the lion or the leopard, even when domesticated, preserve their ferocity. After all, Apokaukos seems to have been in favor of a common effort by Epiros and Nicaea to resist them (Lambropoulos, 1988, 65 and 80–81). It is apparently in this spirit that they too are included among the 'barbarians'[19] as the 'insolent Italians' (*ὑβρισταὶ Ἰταλοί*), whose attacks lay waste to the coastal regions of the state of Epiros (see two letters of Apokaukos dated 1218: Lambropoulos, 1988, 186–187).

His position is clearly stated in his work and often displayed in his letters. We are not interested here in his purely religious views (see Lambropoulos, 1988, 133: 'the faith and worship of the Latins is erroneous'), but in the way these reverberate in connection to the acceptance of the Latins in the real world of the state of Epiros. He fears them as raiders (Lambropoulos, 1988, 133 and n. 78, as well as a third letter dated 1218, ibid., 189–190), he is suspicious of them as underminers of Orthodoxy and the independence of the Orthodox Church, he agonizes over their expansion and the occupation of its monasteries (see in a letter from 1225: Lambropoulos, 1988, 233–234), he considers the union of a Byzantine man to a Latin woman as a 'lawless marriage alliance' (see below). Therefore, how could it have been possible for him to approve any financial grants to them?

Consequently, he is opposed to the use of Latins in military and administrative positions (Lambropoulos, 1988, 140–141 and n. 189) and, what is more, to granting them privileges and possessions, which Theodore Doukas is prone to do before and after his coronation in Thessalonica, acting as the legitimate Byzantine emperor (see for example Karpozilos, 1973, 40–41) – apparently in the form of

exkousseia or *pronoia*, those two well-known Late Byzantine institutions which conferred financial privileges and social status to the recipients.

It is within this general context that we ought also to view Apokaukos' aphoristic view mentioned above, about it being improper for a Latin to 'possess' Romans via a land grant. We cannot state with any degree of certainty whether Apokaukos was simply expressing a general opposition to any type of 'subjugation' of an Orthodox to a Western Catholic, or even if he was repeating the complaints of local smallholders who had to pay rent and taxes to foreign soldiers. Likewise, we do not know, but perhaps we can guess, how Theodore Doukas would have reacted to Apokaukos' suggestions.[20]

Be that as it may, Apokaukos sings Theodore's praises as an implacable enemy of the Latins[21] and wishes for a common struggle of the Orthodox Byzantines (of Epiros and Nicaea) against them (Lambropoulos, 1988, 65, 80–81, 98 and 242–243: *Ἕλληνές τε καὶ Γραικοί ... ἄνδρες Ρωμαῖοι* must resist the raids and negative influence of hostile nations).

On the contrary, John Apokaukos castigates Theodore Laskaris, ruler of the empire of Nicaea, for his inappropriate wedding to the daughter of the empress of (Latin) Constantinople, because of which, as he notes, even the people of Epiros are indignant (see the letter of 1220: Lambropoulos, 1988, 145–146, 198–200, 207–209). To the reprehensible attempts on the part of Nicaea towards a rapprochement with the Latins, he includes not only the 'lawless marriage alliance', but also Laskaris' territorial and economic concessions to various Westerners, part of his master-plan of becoming emperor at Constantinople (Lambropoulos, 1988, 145–146 and n. 209).

Indeed, as Nicolas Oikonomides notes (Oikonomides, 2006, 3:241), Theodore Laskaris found himself with available lands in western Asia Minor, since, apart from imperial estates, there were also the ecclesiastical lands belonging to the foundations of Constantinople which were now under enemy occupation; he proceeded to make grants in the form of '*pronoia* donations' to high-ranking officials and financial privileges. His successors on the throne of Nicaea signed similar documents providing grants.

The valuable **archive of the monastery of Lembos** (or Lemboi) in Asia Minor, even in its present state of publication (MM, 4:1–289), also provides information on Western grant-holders and beneficiaries, particularly in the region around Smyrna. The testimonies, at times clear and rather detailed, at others very brief or indirect, refer to specific individuals with names that have been distorted in the process of rendering them in Greek form, often with *σῦρ* (sir) added to them.

Particularly renowned among them is the *πανευγενέστατος λίζιος καβαλλάριος τοῦ βασιλέως ὁ Συργαρῆς* (Syrgares, the most noble liege horseman of the emperor), whose name and the imperial grant of *pronoia* to him are mentioned in seven documents of the period 1234–1239 (MM, 4:32–43 and 7, respectively nos. 7 and 2), in an earlier one dating from 1231(MM, 4:80–83, 60–61, respectively nos. 28 and 17), as well as in a ninth document of 1251, when he is no longer alive.

The ethnic origin of this favorite of the emperor is made evident both by the name Syrgares – perhaps Sire Garin[22] or Sir Harry (according to Bartusis: *ODB*, 2:1243) – and by the use of the term *λίζιος*, as well as the term *καβαλλάριος*, i.e., cavalryman. Indeed, according to the earlier views of Marc Bartusis, this term ended up being a title which did not always denote the bearer's actual status; a similar view has also been proposed with regard to the Greek term *στρατιώτης*, i.e., soldier (Bartusis, 1982, 57; however, cf. on the term *στρατιώτης* Maniati-Kokkini, 1988, 51 and 60). I will refrain from developing my objections here.

Other *καβαλλάριοι* – and possibly beneficiaries of financial grants –, in the same region of Asia Minor and probably during the same period, are mentioned in later documents preserved in the Lembiotissa archive (MM, 4:79 and 94, nos. 26 and 38, probably dated 1280–81): the *καβαλλάριος ὁ σύρ Ἀδὰμ* and the *ἀνδρικώτατος καβαλλάριος ὁ Συραλιάτης* (certainly Adam and perhaps Gallehalt - Galléhaut - Galiotto[23]).

I would add that, in the end, both Theodore Laskaris and Theodore Doukas handled financial grants to Latins in the same spirit, while at the same time they confronted the latter in an effort to reach the same goal: domination and the reconstitution of the empire. More specifically, of course, in serving their partly different aims and for specific reasons on a case-by-case basis, perhaps they ended up granting privileges of differing scope and nature.

During the **Palaiologan** era, similar perceptions and concepts can still be detected, regardless of the presence or absence of the terms *βάρβαρος* and *λίζιος* in the texts and the use of other terms referring to Westerners.

By this time, the term *βάρβαροι*, often accompanied by the adjective *ἀσεβεῖς* (impious), had come to denote the Turks, as we see for instance in a document of **Andronikos II** dated 1322, and others issued by the **Protaton of Mt Athos** in 1347 and 1362,[24] but also in the well-known funeral oration by **Manuel II Palaiologos** (Manuel Palaiologos, *Funeral Oration*, 129.30 and 131.4). More specifically, that is the term used to characterize the Turkish pirates (*πειραταὶ Τοῦρκοι*) who raided the monasteries of Mt Athos during the first half of the 14th century (see *Actes de Vatopédi,* II, no. 94.4,16, year 1347), as well as earlier, in the 13th century, as is mentioned in a chrysobull issued by **Michael VIII** in 1259 (*Actes d'Iviron,* III, no. 58.14, 22).

During the same period, according to a reference in the historical work of **George Pachymeres** that was written after 1261 (Pachymeres, *Relations Historiques*, 2:470, n. 1), the Genoese of Galata are *λίζιοι* men of the aforementioned first Palaiologan emperor. Pachymeres essentially uses the Western term to render the synonymous Greek word *ἴδιοι* ('his own [men]'), noting that the Genoese would have characterized their relation with the Byzantine *basileus* with the term *λίζιος*.[25]

Besides, generally speaking, **Michael VIII** has a special relation with the Latins and depends on them. Two members of the Venetian family Morino are a highly indicative case regarding the terminology under study and the full incorporation of a particular Westerner in Byzantine society, social hierarchy and the 'order' of the entitled (see also *PLP*, no. 19512 and 19513); both, and especially the first, appear

in several documents, although not always with an explicit reference to the Western origins of the family and sometimes without the addition of *σύρ*.

Thus, the *πανσέβαστος σεβαστὸς οἰκεῖος* of the emperor, the *πρωτοβεστιαρίτης κῦρ Δημήτριος ὁ Μουρῖνος*, is, as is confirmed by Michael VIII in 1280 or 1281, a man who, apart from displaying zeal (*ζῆλος*) in the political offices to which he was appointed, was constantly distinguished by his favorable disposition and sincere devotion, so much so that the sole purpose of his thoughts and actions was to serve his lord, offering his life for the emperor's affairs and thinking nothing of himself. Now he is praised by the emperor for his gratitude (*εὐγνωμοσύνη*) and straightforward manners (*εὐθύτητα τῶν τρόπων*), and his absolute loyalty is being rewarded (*ἀνταμείβεται*) accordingly. His reward as described in the rather long-winded chrysobull[26] is, quantitatively as well as qualitatively, particularly exceptional and privileged – glaringly so, I might add, if we did not bear in mind the earlier Council of Lyon (1274) that brought about the Union of the Churches and caused numerous problems for Michael and the obvious support of Mourinos in this particular matter. On the other hand, perhaps we should not be surprised that Michael VIII granted a member of the upper class the greatest amount of privileges possible; the emperor was often maligned for his generosity towards the Latins of Constantinople. Indeed, in this case, the person in question certainly fitted the bill and also possessed a quality for which every ruler has a 'soft spot': unconditional loyalty.

Of course, had Demetrios Mourinos lived at an earlier period, he would clearly have been called Michael's *λίζιος* and, in all probability, Apokaukos would have viewed him as 'improperly' privileged.

It appears that Demetrios Syrmourinos[27] continued as a true and loyal subject of the next emperor, **Andronikos II Palaiologos**, until his death, and so did his grandson and heir, *Δοῦκας Γλαβᾶς Μάρκος ὁ σῦρ Μουρῖνος* (*Actes de Docheiariou*, no. 40.1). Let us note that the fact that the younger Mourinos was of distant Western heritage did not prevent him from rising through the ranks of the military hierarchy, ultimately holding the office of *ἐπί τοῦ στρατοῦ* (*Actes de Docheiariou*, no. 31.8 and 39.9).

In Byzantine **documents** from the reign of Michael VIII and other members of the Palaiologean dynasty the term *καβαλλάριος* also appears, referring to recipients of grants and benefits of obviously Western descent. Apart from the abovementioned Syraliates, who may have been favored during the reign of Michael VIII, a *pronoia* must also have been granted to the *καβαλλάριος σῦρ Πέρος Μαρτίνος* (*Actes de Xénophon*, no. 4.24 and 5.17), apparently the scion of a Western Venetian family.[28] Other recipients of privilege grants also mentioned in documents include the *καβαλλάριος Σέρπης*, before 1321 (*Actes de Xénophon*, no. 15.14–15), and the *καβαλλάριος ὁ Μουζάκης* (or *Μουζάκιος*), before the years 1346–1356 and 1352 (*Actes de Vatopédi, II,* no. 93.17 and 23, 97.10–11, 108.15 and *Actes de Xénophon*, no. 29.15). In all probability, *σύρις Ἀλέξιος*, before 1333 (Bees, 'Σερβικὰ καὶ βυζαντινὰ γράμματα Μετεώρου', 64.20, no. 18), and the *καβαλλάριος κῦρ Δημήτριος ὁ Τρικανᾶς*, who appears between the years 1361–1366 (*Actes de Docheiariou*, no. 34.4, 35.8, 36.28 and 38.6), were also graced with financial grants.

During the civil war between John V Palaiologos and John VI Kantakouzenos, individuals of Western descent, such as the *ἀνδρικώτατος καί πιστότατος* to John V *καβαλλάριος* Syrmanuel Mesopotamites in 1343,[29] appear among the followers who manage to secure additional privileges or grants.

Of much greater importance than the aforementioned *καβαλλάριοι* are two more individuals of Western descent who were related by marriage to the Palaiologan family: a man incorporated into Byzantine state hierarchy, as well as a woman, both favored with significant financial grants after the middle of the 14th century. I will limit myself to the basics, refraining from presenting here the entire gamut of changes in the possession of the object of the grant and the arguments that have been presented with regard to this case.

The object in question is a property much discussed by researchers, including myself: a 'courtyard' (*αὐλή*), i.e., a 'collection of real estate properties' (as is rightly pointed out in *Actes de Docheiariou*, 347), situated in Thessalonica, which from about the middle of the 14th century to 1415 had been granted successively to two monasteries (that of the Hagioi Anargyroi and the Nea Moni, both in Thessalonica), to various holders of *pronoia* and to the two individuals we are studying here, whose identity has been the focus of scholarly interest. According to the best-documented view, they are members of the same family, that of the Lusignan. More specifically – and the identification is taken with a grain of salt – the woman mentioned in the document as *κυρά Καντακουζηνή, θεῖα* of the emperor and *εὐτυχεστάτη βασίλισσα* is Isabella-Maria de Lusignan, wife of Manuel Kantakouzenos, while *Συργής, θεῖος* of the emperor as well, is Sire Guy de Lusignan, governor of Serres (1341–1342)[30] and king of Armenia (as Constantine II, 1342–1344) (See mainly Lemerle, 1957, 271–286 and Lemerle, 'Un praktikon inédit', 279–280).

As for the status of the grant, probably a significant and privileged one for the time that these two important personages held it (prior to approximately 1360[31] by *Συργὴς* and in 1370–1371 by Kantakouzene), I will only note that it was not a case of perpetual grant (*γονικόν*), i.e., a hereditary property, as is proven by the succession of holders. Nevertheless, it continued to be known, perhaps for more than 60 years since what is thought to be its first donation, as *ἡ αὐλὴ τοῦ Συργῆ* (see *Actes de Lavra*, no. 163). This holder is of particular interest to us, more than the other person of Western descent who later held the property, although his name is not followed by the reference to the term *λίζιος* or any other similar adjective in Greek (i.e., *πιστότατος*).

Meanwhile, this being the state of affairs between the Westerners of the empire and the Byzantine state, many Byzantine scholars and ecclesiastics remained cautious or openly expressed their opposition to the 'Latin' presence, as they had done in earlier times, and not just with regard to religion.

I will only mention an example from the early 14th century: **Patriarch Athanasios I**. His concerns regarding the religious teachings of the Latins (see Athanasius I, *Correspondence*, no. 23.2–6, probably from 1305) are to be expected and were probably justified. However, the antipathy he expressed, in a letter addressed to Andronikos II during the famine of 1306–1307, towards the

Italian merchants who controlled the flow of grain has also been interpreted by modern researchers as xenophobic (see Athanasius I, *Correspondence*, no. 93, and the commentary by the editor, Alice-Mary Maffry Talbot). His fears and the description in this letter of the Westerners' 'arrogance' and 'cupidity' are reminiscent of the picture Niketas Choniates painted of the Latin conquerors of 1204 (cf. the relevant passages in his *History* with commentary in Maniati-Kokkini, 2008, 203–238) – or even of the characterizations penned by Michael Choniates (see above).

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On the basis of this brief overview[32] of evidence coming from the non-Latin-held regions of the Byzantine world,[33] I would like to focus on certain questions and conclusions. I consider the following to be the key issues, which of course remain open to further investigation: First, to what degree had the Byzantines espoused the **Western mentality of feudal loyalty** – and not simply the usage of the relative terminology, mainly represented by the word *λίζιος*? Second, to what degree did the Byzantines **actually look down upon** the Westerners as ***barbarians***? And to what extent was the treatment of individual Westerners by the Byzantine state and emperor **determined or affected by attitudes towards their religion or origin**?

With regard to the first question, in the sources we have come across the term *λίζιος* in conjunction with the word *ἄνθρωπος*, or the term *καβαλλάριος* also combined with *λίζιος*. All four versions of this terminology show a clear correspondence to Western feudal terminology. However, it would be risky to consider them as an equally clear indication or proof of a gradual prevalence of a feudal mentality and feudal institutions in Byzantium. As far as the majority of Byzantinists are concerned, the issue should probably be considered as resolved. Indeed, with regard to the earliest mention of a *λίζιος* by Anna Komnene, we have noted the concessions of the Norman leader Bohemond, perhaps so that the two legal traditions, Byzantine and Western, might converge.

Mention of these designations, instead of the corresponding Greek ones or of the complete absence of any designation of loyalty, that being superfluous for a Byzantine subject, undoubtedly show the well-known and apparently acceptable 'peculiarity' of the person being described and, in a way, link him to the feudal West where he was born, or whence he came or at least to which he traced his origins.

At any rate, using Western terminology to highlight a person's, especially a military man's, loyalties does not appear to carry any particular significance in Byzantine documents, nor does it state his actual differentiation from other contemporaries who had also been favored by the Byzantine emperor or had been integrated into state hierarchy. Western influence on Byzantium, even after the crusades and the Fall of Constantinople in 1204 (when we are not referring to Latin-held lands), usually did not go beyond the borrowing of some terms that corresponded to similar Byzantine customs, although of course they were not identical in content.

With regard to that, I stress the use of the term *λίζιος* mainly (cf. Ferluga, 1961, 97) or solely (cf. Bartusis in *ODB*, 2:1243) in the 12th and the 13th century, and even then not very frequently. I believe that the term is not found in later years because it was rather superfluous, since the individual Westerners who had taken up permanent residence in Byzantium were accustomed to the Byzantine form of loyalty on the part of soldiers or officials towards the Byzantine *basileus*, which was taken for granted.[34]

We have seen that *Βαλδουῖνος Γέρτζος* as early as 1193 and *Συραλιάτης* in (probably) 1280–81 are described in a mixed Byzantine-Western manner as *πιστότατος λίζιος* and *ἀνδρικώτατος καβαλλάριος*, which probably proves the typical use of the Western term *λίζιος* in other instances as well, such as that of the *καβαλλάριος* Syrgares several years earlier. Of course, apart from the Byzantine state, the word *λίζιος* is to be even more expected as a term denoting the declaration of loyalty to the Byzantine emperor, as in the case of the Italian cities.

Of course, the limitations of space do not permit a detailed exposition of the subject of 'Byzantine feudalism'. As for the relation between this issue and the terms mentioned here, I will limit myself to reminding the evolution of terminology in the sources, which probably shows the gradual actual incorporation of Westerners in Byzantine society and to their equal treatment when it came to the application of financial institutions. In chronological order, from the 12th to the 15th century: *λίζιοι ἄνθρωποι*, *λίζιοι καβαλλάριοι*, *πιστότατοι λίζιοι* (*καβαλλάριοι*), *ἀνδρικώτατοι καί πιστότατοι καβαλλάριοι*, *πιστότατοι στρατιῶται*, *οἰκεῖοι* (see in numerous sources and cf. the well-known study by Verpeaux, 1965) and *εὐθεῖς* officials of the Byzantine emperor and dignitaries according to Byzantine hierarchy.

As for the second question and the term *βάρβαρος*, it is difficult to reach a conclusion as to what scholars, historians, churchmen or emperors really thought of the Latins. Circumstances and past experiences stemming from the actions of the Latins or the imminent threat of the latter achieving domination, as well as each person's overall views, certainly played a part. We should also not overlook factors like authorial zeal, the penchant for using hyperbole to criticize contemporary ills, or even the level of education, which allowed Byzantine authors to imitate the ancient Greeks when it came to their comparative superiority over other peoples – or the promotion of the Eastern Christian doctrine's perceived rectitude vis-à-vis that of the West.

Consequently, I would attribute these characterizations to the usual practice of attaching the appellation *βάρβαροι* to whatever enemies threatened Byzantium at any given time, whether on the field of battle[35] or as a menacing presence and source of hostile diplomatic pressure on a social, economic and religious level. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that in the case of the Westerners we are not dealing with 'godless' enemies, as in the past (see for instance the characterization of the Avars as *ἄθεσμοι* or *σκοτεινοὶ βάρβαροι* in George Pisides, *Poemi*, no. IV [= *Bellum Avaricum*], lines 37 and 526, respectively), or with 'infidels' like the Turks (see above), but with Christians – who, however, behaved in a rather unchristian manner, particularly when they sacked Constantinople at the beginning of the 13th century.

Therefore, it was mostly attitudes, such as those of the crusaders or the invading Normans, that were cast in a negative light, rather than a more general overview of their customs and differences with regard to the 'Eastern Romans'. Westerners being given preference as potential spouses of emperors or princesses, over other peoples with religious beliefs and ways of life more akin to those of the Byzantines, most probably attests to that. Of course, the Western-mannered and Western-loving Byzantine emperors were not always able to impose their will, nor were their views regarding the West or in favor of it always acceptable to their subjects in the Eastern Roman Empire.

Similarly, it is not possible to give a simple answer to the question whether it was the different religion or the different ethnic origin that weighed more in the negative juxtaposition between Romans and 'barbarians'. Of course, religious differences were already known (and were listed when necessary), just as the different ethnic origin linked to them was never forgotten – and all that became much more significant when cast in the harsh light of the long-lasting shock and awe caused by the Fall of 1204.

However, a fundamental and rather common element of all Byzantines who refer to the 'barbarians' from the West in a negative fashion or accept them as different people, albeit remarkable ones, is the stated or emerging justification of their opposition to the presence of Latins in Byzantine society or to their preferential financial treatment by the emperor.

At any rate, it appears that the head of state, whoever he may be at the time, is not particularly influenced by the views of scholars and clergymen when making decisions regarding diplomacy or finances[36] – or, in this case, the treatment of Westerners. I would not, therefore, conclude that the treatment of Westerners by the Byzantine state was proportionate to the higher or lower degree of sympathy or antipathy towards the West and the Latins, as a group of conquerors who followed a different Christian doctrine.

I believe that interpersonal relation and the loyalty or usefulness of each individual Westerner were of much greater importance. Otherwise, we would have been forced to consider it a major contradiction that Western beneficiaries and grant holders existed even after 1204, or the fact that Westerners were granted privileges by such rulers as Theodore Laskaris and Theodore Doukas Komnenos, who were fighting against the Latins on either side of the Aegean and were at times considered stout defenders of 'Latin-hating' individuals such as Chalkoutzes.

Even if Byzantine emperors granting more and more privileges to Westerners – I refer mainly to the Italian maritime republics – did not always come out as winners on the field of diplomacy and defense, we may say with conviction that their trust in specific Westerners, who were regaled with grants and privileges similar to those of the rest of their Byzantine subjects, was not betrayed, nor were their hopes for a display of personal loyalty in vain. The variance in making mention or not of their loyalty and their services to the Byzantine state and emperor was more an issue of different terminology and, of course, flexibility. The partial adaptation to terminology (which reflected also a corresponding mentality), to which the Byzantine emperor's newly minted subject, be it a civilian, military official or a

mere mercenary, was accustomed, facilitated his integration into society, if that was the *desideratum*, or incorporated him more efficiently in the state's hierarchy and service for as long as he remained on Byzantine soil. At the end of the day, several *λίζιοι* 'barbarians' proved to be highly loyal subjects to the Byzantine emperor, even if that came in parallel with, and as a result of, receiving significant privileges.

Notes

1 Or perhaps the Wallachian ancestors of modern-day Romanians, according to the theory of E. Stanescu, erroneous though it is considered to be: see *ODB*, 2:1386. On the term *μιξοβάρβαρος*, Vryonis, 1969/1970, 270; idem 1975, 133–134 and 146.

2 Cf. *ODB*, 2:1243, where M. Bartusis correctly notes that it denotes a personal bond between Westerners and the Byzantine emperor, but not between him and his subjects (citing Ferluga, 1961).

3 This was the Treaty of Deavolis, which was favorable to the Byzantines and was concluded after their victory over the Westerners before Dyrrachion (1107). See Anna Komnene, *Alexias*, 414.29–35ff: *ἐπειδὴ λαμβάνω τὰ νῦν τὴν ῥητῶς ἐνταυθοῖ δηλωθησομένην χώραν ... διὰ χρυσοβούλλου λόγου τῆς βασιλείας σου, ... ὃς δὴ χρυσόβουλλος λόγος καὶ ἀμοιβαῖος γεγονὼς ἐπεδόθη μοι, δέχομαι μὲν τὰς δοθείσας χώρας ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς βασιλείας ὑμῶν δεδω ρημένας, καὶ τὸ ἐνδύναμον ἔχων τῆς δωρεᾶς ἐκ τῆς χρυσοβούλλου γραφῆς ἀντίδοσιν ... δίδωμι τὴν πίστιν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ πρὸς τὴν ὑμῶν βασιλείαν*.

4 There was an exchange of the corresponding documents in the presence of witnesses. See Anna Komnene, *Alexias,* 422.31–423.52: *ταῦτα ἐγράφη τὲ καὶ οἱ ὅρκοι συνετελέσθησαν παρουσίᾳ τῶν ὑπογεγραμμένων μαρτύρων ... τὸν μὲν οὖν ἔγγραφον ὅρκον τοῦτον ὁ αὐτοκράτωρ παρὰ τοῦ Βαϊμούνδου ἔλαβεν, ἀντιδέδωκε δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν εἰρημένον ἄνωθεν χρυσόβουλλον λόγον ἐνσεσημασμένον διὰ κινναβάρεως, ὡς ἔθος, διὰ βασιλικῆς δεξιᾶς*.

5 See more specifically the mention of the term in the following passages of Anna Komnene*, Alexias*: 414.10–13: *ὥστε λίζιον γενέσθαι τοῦ σκήπτρου σου ἄνθρωπον καί, ἵνα σαφέστερον εἴποιμι καὶ φανερώτερον, οἰκέτην καὶ ὑποχείριον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ὑπὸ τὴν σὴν δεξιὰν ἕλκειν ἐμὲ βεβούλησαι καὶ ἄνθρωπόν σου ἐθέλεις ποιήσασθαι λίζιον*; 414.23–24: *ἀπρὶξ ἔχομαι τὸ δοῦλον τῆς βασιλείας καὶ ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι καὶ λίζιον ἄνθρωπον*; 415.44–45: *καὶ τὸ λίζιον ἄνθρωπον ἀνόθευτόν τε καὶ ἀπαραποίητον, ἕως ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ μετά ζώντων συναριθμῶμαι*; 416.83–85: *καὶ εἰ ἐμέ βούλεσθε ἐπιτροπεύειν τῆς κυριευθείσης χώρας ὡς ἄνθρωπον ὑμέτερον λίζιον καὶ δοῦλον πιστὸν, ἔσται τοῦτο*; 418.55–57, 67–71: *καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν φυλάξουσι πίστιν καὶ δουλείαν καὶ εὔνοιαν πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἣν κἀγὼ συμπεφώνηκα, ... καὶ ἕξει καὶ τούτους τὸ κράτος ὑμῶν ἀνθρώπους ὑποχειρίους καὶ χρήσει τούτοις ὅσα καὶ ὑπηρέταις πιστοῖς. καὶ ὅσοι μὲν ἐνταυθοῖ τυγχάνουσι συνεπιδημοῦντες ἐμοί, αὐτίκα καὶ τὰς ἐνόρκους πίστεις καὶ τὰς συμφωνίας δώσουσι πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοὺς σεβαστοὺς*; 419.98: *ὀμοῦνται καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ συμφωνήσουσι τῇ δουλείᾳ τῆς βασιλείας σου*; 420.32: *τῆς βασιλικῆς ῥάβδου δοῦλον εἶναι καὶ λίζιον ὑποχείριον*; 421.91–92: *καθαπερεὶ ἀνθρώπου λιζίου τυγχάνοντος τοῦ αὐτοῦ κράτους καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς βασιλείας*.

6 See for an instance of Western 'barbarians' breaking an oath: Anna Komnene, *Alexias*, 428.21–22. On the attitude of Anna Komnene towards the Latins as it emerges in the *Alexiad*, see e.g. the observation of Magdalino, 1996, 7: 'The author makes no secret of her bias in favour of her father and against the Latins'.

7 See Angold, 1997, 317, who refers to 'religious prejudices [on the part of the Byzantines] against the Latins, which had always existed, but only burst forth in the massacres of 1182'.

8 I have already examined this passage repeatedly and in depth, in connection to the institution of *pronoia*; for an extensive analysis, see: Maniati-Kokkini, 1990 (accessible at http://www.didaktorika.gr/eadd/handle/10442/1457).

9 Although in *ODB*, 2:1386 (see above, n. 1) Niketas Choniates is mentioned as one of three 11th and 12th-century authors who use the term to describe the populations of the Danube region that speak various languages.

10 We should keep in mind the fact that Latins were prominent in both the army and the state administration during the reign of Manuel Komnenos, a situation that irked many Byzantines. It should be noted that the emperor in question is considered an admirer of Latin culture, while Western sources describe Manuel as an excellent ruler, in contrast to the Byzantines, who were negatively portrayed as underhand and effeminate, lacking in military virtues; on this cf. Angold, 1997, 236–237, and Kazhdan & Epstein, 1985, 174.

11 Cf. also the use of the term in the well-known passage mocking the skin color of Manuel Komnenos (Choniates, *Historia*, 86.80: *ἀνδράριον ἐπίτριπτον*).

12 See the analytical presentation of the passage in question (Choniates, *Historia*, 574.51–576.95) in Maniati-Kokkini, 2008, 211–212.

13 Cf. also the expression *τοῖς χριστιανικωτάτοις Λατίνοις* ('most Christian Latins'), which John Komnenos used in a letter he addressed to Pope Callixtus II: Lampros, 'Αὐτοκρατόρων τοῦ Βυζαντίου χρυσόβουλλα', 107.32–33).

14 For an instance of such usage in Choniates' *History*, where sometimes the distinction of language likely harks back to the ancient Greek sense of the term, see Choniates, *Historia*, 130.70–72.

15 Cf. above, on a similar usage by Anna Komnene.

16 The letters are addressed to the most eminent persons in the empire of Nicaea: [Theodore I] Laskaris, *basileus* of the East; Patriarch Michael IV [Autoreianos]; and [Nicholas], the bishop of Crete: Michael Choniates, *Epistulae*, no. 136, 137 and 138, respectively; commentary on pp. 129*–130*.

17 Michael Choniates, *Epistulae,* no. 136.24 and 137.19, respectively. This was probably a Byzantine-era official of Euboea and, apparently, a great landowner. Cf. on the subject of his office and status the views of Jacoby, 1976, on p. 5, who distinguishes between propertied lords and thematic or tagmatic officers, i.e., provincial civil or military officials; and the editor of the letters, Fotini Kolovou (Michael Choniates, 129* και 130*), who calls him a landowner. More specifically, Gounarides, 1983, 151–152, proposes several arguments regarding these two terms and does not conclude that the term *θεματικὸς* denoted a military officer. The literature on this Chalkoutzes and the family in general can be found in Michael Choniates, *Epistulae,* 129* and n. 379.

18 Apokaukos, 'Unedierte Schriftstücke', no. 71, pp. 130–132. Researchers are not in agreement as to the date of the letter; it depends on the date each scholar accepts as the most likely for Theodore's coronation. See for instance Stavridou-Zafrakas, 1988, 57, and eadem, 1993–1994, 150; see also Lambropoulos, 1988, 228–229.

19 See Lambropoulos, 1988, 98, where it is noted that 'Vlachs, Bulgarians, even "Latins," are all referred to as "barbarians"'. In all probability, it would have been language, attitude or even religious differences, that served as the main criteria.

20 We do not know furthermore, whether he took any measures regarding the imperial estate, the *ἐπίσκεψις Βαρεσόβης*. The learned metropolitan of Naupaktos, at any rate, in his letter expresses his view on the cause of the 'downfall' and 'destruction' of the estate, although he concludes with the expected compliant stance before the emperor: 'as your majesty wishes' (*ὡς δόξει πάντως τῇ βασιλείᾳ σου*).

21 For example, in a letter of 1220: see Lambropoulos, 1988, 198–200. Theodore Doukas liberated many territories from the Bulgarian and Latin yoke: Lambropoulos, 1988, 138 n. 177 and 186–187.

22 According to the suggestion by Henri Grégoire, one of the two Byzantinists (the other being Paul Lemerle) who prepared the French translation (from the 1951 Serbo-Croatian edition) of the well-known earlier work on the institution of *pronoia*: Ostrogorskij, 1954, 79 n. 2.

23 The suggestion regarding the Western form of the name Syraliates, as well as the observation that this Hellenized version is reminiscent of the king of Lydia known through Herodotus, are due once again to Henri Grégoire; see the previous note.

24 *Actes de Vatopédi,* no. 56.4–5, where Andronikos II refers to a raid by 'infidel barbarians', and *Actes de Vatopédi,* II, no. 94.3–4 and 116.1–2, where the 'continuous raiding of the barbarians' (*ἡ κατὰ καιροὺς συνεχὴς ἐπιδρομή τῶν βαρβάρων*) and the destruction caused to Mt Athos are stressed.

25 George Pachymeres, *Relations Historiques*, 2:471.4–8. The editor A. Failler comments (470 n. 2) on the use of the term in Byzantium from the beginning of the 12th century, citing the *Reallexikon der Byzantinistik*, I, cols. 539, 553, 590 (H. & R. Kahane, 'Abendland und Byzanz: Sprache').

26 *Actes de Docheiariou*, no. 9. Other documents issued on behalf of Demetrios Mourinos include a *prostagma*, an *orismos* and perhaps other similar documents that have not been preserved.

27 The family name is found in this form elsewhere.

28 Individuals bearing the family name *Μαρτίνος* appear in later Byzantine sources, either without any Western-sounding appellations or with explicit indications of their origins. See *PLP*, no. 17190–17192 and 17195–17203.

29 *Actes de Chilandar*, Appendix 1, no. 132. Perhaps he is to be identified with a man bearing the title of *σεβαστὸς* in a document of 1342 in Lemerle, 'Un praktikon inédit', 278–298, ll. 10 and 17.

30 About the family relation between Syrges and the emperor and other information concerning these two persons, see Lemerle, 'Un praktikon inédit', 294, mainly. Cf. the reference in the beginning of a document of January 1342, signed by Michael Papylas as «παραδότης» *οἰκονομιῶν*: *Ἐπεί ὡρίσθην παρὰ τοῦ περιποθήτου θείου τοῦ κραταιοῦ καὶ ἁγίου ἡμῶν αὐθέντου καὶ βασιλέως κυρίου μου τοῦ Συργγείν* (Lemerle, 'Un praktikon inédit', 281.1).

31 When the *αὐλή* had been donated to the monastery of Hagioi Anargyroi by Anna of Savoy.

32 Cf. the earlier study of this issue within a wider overview of privilege grants to foreign residents of Byzantium: Maniati-Kokkini, 2003.

33 It goes without saying that mentions of the 'liege-men' of the 'emperor of the City [Constantinople]' in the *Chronicle of the Morea* (for instance ll. 2078, 2578: *λίζιος ἄνθρωπος τοῦ βασιλέως τῆς Πόλης*) refer to the Latin emperor of Constantinople (1204–1261) rather than to the Byzantine emperor. On the term ἀ*νθρωπέα* in the *Chronicle of the Morea*, cf. among others Gounarides, 1983, 150.

34 Earlier I had reached the same conclusion with regard to *pronoia*-holders (Maniati-Kokkini, 1990, 401 and n. 480), despite the oath of loyalty to Alexios I Komnenos that key Western crusaders had taken, as was mentioned above. Cf. the well-known specialist studies cited at the beginning of this chapter: Svoronos, 1951, and Ferluga, 1961.

35 I draw attention to the general reference of Niketas Choniates to 'barbarous acts against Greeks' (see above).

36 Diplomacy and finances were not even the purview of scholars or ecclesiastics. Of course, emperors also took the lead in Church matters, such as the efforts towards a union with the Western Church.

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21 'Our engines are better than yours'

Perception and reality of Late Byzantine military technology*

Christos G. Makrypoulias

Historians of military technology are captivated by the idea of a revolution. Not the kind that involves armed rebellion to overthrow a regime, of course—such events usually come within the purview of political history. What fascinates students of military history and historians of technology is the notion that radical changes in warfighting methods and engineering—ushered in, for instance, by the appearance of a new weapon system or even by the invention of a seemingly insignificant piece of equipment—might cause social transformations that will ultimately lead to the emergence of new political systems.[1] Whatever the merits of this particular theory, the interplay between military technology, society and war should not be underestimated (McNeill, 1982). When viewed from that particular point of view, the study of medieval military technology becomes crucial to our understanding of the Middle Ages, especially the period after the 11th century, when both Byzantium and Islam found themselves at the business end of the so-called 'technological thrust of the West'.

Up until a few decades ago, most authorities on Western military history believed that, by the time of the crusades, Byzantine military technology was no match for that of the 'Franks'; it was thought that this perceived technological superiority was one of the main reasons behind victory in the East (France, 1994). However, just as the modern perception of superior military technology as a factor that will guarantee victory in war did not survive the reality of the jungles of Vietnam—or, in more recent years, the forbidding mountains of Afghanistan—so, too, the idea that the mechanical skills of Byzantium and Islam lagged far behind those of Western Europe has been shown by recent research to be inaccurate. This chapter will re-examine a few key aspects of this debate in order to demonstrate the need for a more nuanced comparison between Western European and Byzantine military technology.

It was Lynn White, Jr., professor of medieval history at Princeton, Stanford and UCLA, that ultimately codified the aforementioned ideas regarding Latin military

* This is a slightly revised version of the paper I delivered at the conference 'Byzantium and the West: Perception and Reality (12th–15th c.)' in September 2014. I would like to thank the organizing committee for inviting me to speak at the conference, as well as for their extreme patience in dealing with my rather cavalier attitude towards deadlines.

technology in one concise essay (White, 1975). According to the American medievalist, Western European superiority in the technology of warfare manifested itself mainly in three fields: mounted shock combat, the use of the crossbow, and siege warfare. It was in these areas, claimed the historian of technology, that Westerners enjoyed a marked advantage over their Byzantine and Arab opponents. To quote White, 'the soldiers of the cross marched and sailed eastward with the best military equipment in the world at the time' (White, 1975, 98).

White had already elaborated on his 'mounted shock combat' theory in the first chapter of his best-known book. He argued that the introduction of the stirrup in Western Europe at the beginning of the 8th century allowed Frankish cavalry to deliver charges at high speed, with lances couched under the right arm, leaving the left free to carry a shield. This tactic called for highly-trained men with expensive armour and large warhorses. To support these men, who came to be known as knights, a whole new social structure had to be created and thus was feudalism born (White, 1962, 1–38). As was to be expected, the so-called 'stirrup thesis' caused quite a controversy and was attacked by a wide array of scholars, Marxists and non-Marxists alike (Hilton & Sawyer, 1963; Bachrach, 1970). From a Byzantine historian's perspective, White's disregard for evidence in Greek-language military manuals of the early 7th century indicating that the cavalry of the Eastern Roman Empire had already adopted the stirrup from the Avars (Maurice, *Strategikon*, Bk 1, ch. 2; Curta, 2008, 302–303; Scholl, 2016, 30) does not inspire confidence in his theory. However, leaving stirrups and feudalism aside for the moment, the perception that heavy cavalry played a significant role on European and Near Eastern battlefields from the 11th to the 15th century should not be discarded lightly. What is more, it was precisely as armoured cavalrymen that most Byzantine men—and at least one Byzantine woman—came to know the Westerners.

Ever since the late 1030s, bands of Frankish mercenaries had been employed by Byzantium as heavy cavalry, first in Italy and later in Asia Minor (Shepard, 1992). They continued to serve in Byzantine armies until well into the 14th century, which speaks volumes about the effectiveness of Latin troops in that particular role (Bartusis, 1992, 27–29, 50–51, 104). The most explicit testimony, however, is that of the historian Anna Komnene, daughter of Emperor Alexios I: in describing the charge of the heavily-armoured 'Celt', Anna claims that it can 'punch a hole through the walls of Babylon' (Komnene, *Alexias*, Bk 13, ch. 8, par. 3). Her sentiments are echoed 200 years later by another historian, Nikephoros Gregoras, who writes: 'When the Italians [i.e. the Westerners] fight in an orderly way, they are like a fortified and impregnable wall' (Gregoras, *Historia*, 1:147). Not that the Byzantines had been unfamiliar with the use of armoured cavalry. The old misconception—apparent in both medieval Westerners and modern military historians—that no such troops existed in Byzantium before the middle of the 10th century has now been dispelled (Kolias, 1993). The main differences between Byzantine heavy cavalry and Frankish knights were in the weapons used—the Byzantines preferred an iron mace to the lance—and the method of attack employed; whereas the Normans and other Latins charged at full speed,

the Byzantines used a trotting pace in order to preserve their wedge formation's cohesion (McGeer, 1995, 301–318).

Nevertheless, the fact that Latin mercenary knights often fought side by side with Byzantine heavy cavalry in the 11th and 12th centuries has been taken as evidence to suggest that the differences between the two types of troops were not that pronounced (Haldon, 1999, 223). As for the effectiveness of Western European knights, there is no doubt that the Byzantines had a healthy respect for them, and Byzantine *kataphraktoi* often found themselves at a disadvantage when pitted against Latin mounted warriors (Birkenmeier, 2002, 61, 82); however, armoured cavalry was not, as earlier historians had once assumed, the king of the battlefield that had 'ridden roughshod over the populations of Europe' (Oman, 1885, 62). Using hit-and-run tactics, drawing the enemy onto broken and rough terrain and flanking him with horse archers were some of the methods employed (Maurice, *Strategikon*, Bk 11, ch. 3); the use of regular infantry to ward off enemy cavalry charges was also of paramount importance in the 10th and 11th centuries (McGeer, 1988) and even portable anti-cavalry devices were not unheard of (Leo VI, *Taktika*, 204). All in all, the Byzantines knew how to defeat heavy cavalry long before militiamen in the Low Countries and English/Welsh longbowmen took the field in battle against knights.

With this mention of projectile weapons, we come to another facet of White's theory: that the use of the crossbow gave Westerners a significant advantage over Byzantines and Arabs. Military historians of Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages seem to be obsessed both with the weapon itself and with its pedigree, the more so since the latter is so elusive. We still lack conclusive evidence as to whether the crossbow evolved from the *gastraphetes*, the original catapult of the early 4th century BC (Marsden, 1969, 48–56). Some scholars claim that such hand-held arrow-shooters were in continuous use from Hellenistic times onwards (Baatz, 1978, 14–16; Campbell, 1986; Baatz, 1999), including Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (Bachrach, 2001, 111–112); others believe that it reached Europe from China sometime (or perhaps twice) in the first millennium AD (Needham & Yates, 1994, 178). The fact that there are pictorial representations of it dating from the 2nd or 3rd century AD (Baatz, 1991) and then the weapon disappears, only to surface anew at the end of the 10th century, certainly adds to its mystique.

Somewhat less mysterious is the way the crossbow reached Byzantium, although one or two theories have been proposed, based mainly on the etymology of the terms used by the Byzantines to describe it: *τζάγγρα* and *τζάρχ*(*α*). The former is said to derive from the French *chancre* (= 'crab'), referring to its shape; this would imply that the crossbow came to Byzantium from the West (Dennis, 1981). However, a Medieval Latin source that refers to the crossbow as *chancre* (or *cancer*) has yet to surface (Pétrin, 1992, 288). This has prompted other scholars to argue that the weapon arrived in the Byzantine Empire from the lands of Islam, as is evidenced from the Persian etymology of the term *τζάρχ* (Kolias, 1988, 244–249). Tempting as the latter theory may be, we should note that both Anna Komnene, who is the first Greek author to describe the crossbow, and

John Kantakouzenos, the 14th-century emperor-historian, refer to this particular weapon as the 'Latin bow' (Bartusis, 1992, 331–332).

Of mysterious origin or not, the fact remains that, by the end of the 11th century, the crossbow had migrated to Byzantium, where it took root. Just like in Western Europe, special units of *tzaggratores* served as bodyguards and palace troops during the Late Byzantine period (Pseudo-Kodinos, *Traité*, 187; Bartusis, 1992, 299). The weapon's brutal effectiveness is attested to by the fact that the Second Lateran Council in 1139 forbade its use against Christian people—although the faithful were not supposed to have any qualms about using it against infidels or heretics (DeVries & Smith, 2012, 44). It would seem, therefore, that, at least in this case, White had his military revolution after all. Indeed, another American medievalist, Frederic Lane of Johns Hopkins University, has argued that the crossbow might also have played a part in the nautical revolution of the later Middle Ages, i.e. the transition from the galley to the cog (Lane, 1969). One is left to wonder, however, whether the way these revolutions are perceived actually corresponds to reality. Perhaps a look at things from a Byzantine perspective might be beneficial.

As far as arrow-shooting engines are concerned, up until the 10th or 11th century, Byzantium led the way. Having inherited the technological know-how of Greece and Rome, the Byzantine Empire was fortunate to have in its arsenal the arrow-shooting *ballista*, the world's most technologically advanced weapon system of its kind. Based on a design that appeared sometime in the late 1st century AD (Wilkins, 1995), the *βαλλίστρα* or *χειροβαλλίστρα* (as it was known to Greek-speakers) dominated siege warfare throughout the Early Byzantine period (Makrypoulias, 2018, 370–372). Some scholars would have us believe that, by the 5th century AD, its metal-framed torsion springs had been replaced by a metal or composite bow (Oliver, 1955; Chevedden, 1995); others argue that a hand-held type was common (Harpham & Stevenson, 1997; Baatz, 1999). Both schools of thought hang on to the perception that the post-Roman period was characterized by a technological decline, even in Byzantium; they also wish to convince us that the mysterious crossbow was, in fact, an evolution of the *χειροβαλλίστρα*. Both notions are erroneous. A careful study of all relevant sources shows that torsion arrow-shooters survived well into the Middle Byzantine period, perhaps even as late as the 10th or 11th century (Makrypoulias, 2018, 372–373). Furthermore, earlier views regarding the existence of crossbows in the Early and Middle Byzantine period (Haldon, 1970) have now been refuted (Nishimura, 1988). Actually, there is no real evidence to suggest that hand-held mechanical bows were known to the Byzantines before they became familiar with the crossbow; on this issue, Anna Komnene is adamant: 'the *tzaggra* is a barbarian weapon, wholly unknown to the Greeks' (Komnene, *Alexias*, Bk 10, ch. 8, par. 6).

Base-mounted *ballistrai* were ubiquitous in Byzantine fortifications and also (to a lesser degree) in offensive siege warfare; there is even the possibility that field pieces mounted on carriages, similar to Roman *carroballistae*, continued in service until the 11th century (Makrypoulias, 2018, 381–382). As for the use of the crossbow aboard warships and the radical changes in ship construction that it was supposed to have sparked, it is interesting to note that the Byzantines

continued to employ war galleys almost to the bitter end, even though—much like their predecessors in Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman times (Marsden, 1969, 169–173)—they habitually equipped their ships with large numbers of arrow-shooting engines (Leo VI, *Taktika*, 526; Porphyrogenitus, *De cerimoniis*, 669–670; Pryor & Jeffreys, 2006, 379–381) long before the nautical revolution of the later Middle Ages was even a glint in the Venetians' eye.

After the 11th century, all evidence points to the conclusion that the old arrow-shooting engines were gradually supplanted by the crossbow. Even a base-mounted version of the latter, termed *manganotzangra* in a 14th-century source written in vernacular Greek (Davis, *Μετάφραση*, 118.17), makes its appearance. Therefore, if Byzantium was as technologically advanced before the crusades as is indicated, the adoption of the crossbow was nothing less than a technological regression. The only logical explanation is to assume that the new weapon was far cheaper and easier to produce than the complicated engines that had defended Byzantium since the 4th century AD.

We have now reached the last, but certainly not least, field of military technology in which, according to Lynn White, the West excelled from the 11th century onwards: siege warfare. Judging by what has already been stated regarding Byzantine technical skills in this area, it is obvious that White's perception of Frankish superiority in poliorcetics must be taken with a grain of salt. A case in point is his assertion that the use of siege towers had been forgotten in the Near East and it was only thanks to the crusaders that the war machines in question were reintroduced in the region (White, 1975, 101). It is not clear whether he includes the Byzantine Empire in the generic term 'Near East' or if he is referring solely to the Arabs. If it is the former, then he is wrong, because the Byzantines never forgot how to build and use wall-dominating siege towers; actually, it was the citizens of the Byzantine city of Trani in southern Italy that taught local rebels, possibly including Normans, how to construct a siege tower in the 1040s (Rogers, 1992, 96–97). The fact that the Byzantines were adept in the construction of siege towers is also evident from a document containing a list of siege equipment to be taken aboard the armada sailing against the emirate of Crete in 949; the list includes a siege tower, or rather the pre-fabricated parts of one, to be transported by ship to the island and assembled on the spot (Porphyrogenitus, *De cerimoniis*, 670). Needless to say, the level of technical skills needed to accomplish such a task was neither easy to come by nor likely to be allowed to be forgotten.

Finally, the case of the stone-throwing engines. Following the historians of medieval military technology that came before him in the late 19th and early 12th century, White seemed to believe that the 12th century was a turning point in the evolution of medieval non-chemical artillery, marked by the appearance of beam-sling machines that replaced the ancient stone-throwers. He was only half right, but that was not entirely his fault, because the timeline was still muddled at the time he wrote. We now know that the first traction trebuchets were invented in China sometime in the 3rd century BC (Needham, 1976) and reached the Eastern Mediterranean by the end of the 6th century AD, when the Avars used them against the walls of Thessalonica (Scholl, 2016, 37–38; Makrypoulias,

2018, 374–375). The Byzantines were quick to adopt the new type of stone-thrower, even though (or perhaps because) it was simpler to construct and only slightly inferior in performance to the old *onager* they had inherited from their Graeco-Roman forefathers. Judging by the terminology used to describe the new stone-thrower in Latin and Arabic, it was introduced both to the Arabs and to the peoples of Western Europe via Byzantium (Huuri, 1941, 127–130; Gillmor, 1981; Hill, 1991).

The consensus among modern historians of military technology is that the 12th century is marked by the invention of an improved type of beam-sling engine, the counterweight trebuchet (Chevedden, 2000). Instead of using the momentum created by a group of people—soldiers, sailors, civilians of either gender—pulling on the ropes at one end of the beam, the new type came with a counterweight fixed at the end of the beam; when released, the sling on the other end flew open and launched the missile, usually a heavy rounded stone (although barrels of flammable substances, severed heads and even horses might also be used as projectiles). It was to this machine that White should have been referring, mentioning at the same time that, until then, Byzantium had been at the forefront of technological progress, since it was thanks to the Byzantines that most of their neighbours had learned about the traction trebuchet.

One of the questions that historians of medieval military technology have been called upon to answer is when and where the counterweight trebuchet was invented. It is first mentioned in an Arabic treatise on military technology dating from the year 1187 (Cahen, 1947–1948), while its first appearance in a Western source has been dated to the year 1199 (Huuri, 1941, 171). It is believed that the counterweight trebuchet was developed in Italy and from there made its way eastward (White, 1975, 102). However, it has recently been proposed that the new type was invented in Byzantium during the last years of the 11th or the first years of the 12th century (Dennis, 1998, 112–114; Chevedden, 2000, 110–111). This theory is based on the assumption that the effectiveness of Byzantine stone-throwers in the Komnenian era was far superior to that of earlier engines, in conjunction with certain indications in the Greek sources that point to the invention of new types of war machines during the reign of Alexios I Komnenos and their introduction to Western Europe and the lands of Islam. Other researchers have tentatively placed the invention at an even earlier date, perhaps the middle of the 10th century (Haldon, 2000, 274). Of course, historians of Byzantine military technology would love such a theory—if it had been firmly grounded on hard evidence. As it is, we have to assume that the main proponent of this theory, Paul Chevedden, an expert in medieval siege technology fully acquainted with Arabic and Latin sources but unfamiliar with the nuances of Byzantine texts, mistakenly took the latter at face value, while at the same time he paid too much attention to the exaggerations of Byzantine historians regarding the effectiveness of Komnenian artillery.

The truth of the matter is that we have no detailed description of 12th-century Byzantine stone-throwers that might shed some light on the issue. All we have are snippets of information from 11th and 12th-century texts referring to

pulling crews (Psellos, *Chronographie*, 2:118.4–5; Prodromos, *Gedichte*, 239). From these, we may deduce that the Byzantine army continued to rely on traction trebuchets well into the Komnenian era. A passage in a 14th-century vernacular version of Niketas Choniates' work could solve the question of the origins of the counterweight trebuchet in Byzantium. The text mentions a type of stone-throwing engine in Byzantine service called a *πρέκουλα* (Davis, *Μετάφραση*, 90.16–18). Now we know that by the middle of the 13th century there were many types of gravity-powered stone-throwers in the West (Rogers, 1992, 267–268); the one with a fixed counterweight is called a *trabucium,* a *biffa* is an engine with a hinged counterweight and the stone-throwing machine utilizing both a fixed and a hinged counterweight is termed *tripantium*. Apart from those, there was also a beam-sling stone-thrower with two hinged counterweights called a *bricola*; *πρέκουλα* is clearly the Greek version of this (Chevedden, 2000, 79). The fact that the Byzantines used an Italian name for their stone-throwers during the later period, although not absolute proof, certainly reinforces the belief that the first counterweight trebuchets to reach Byzantium originated in the West. It seems, therefore, that White was right for once.

So, whose engines were better? I hope that by now it has become clear that there is no such thing as a straightforward answer to this question. Both Byzantium and the West possessed elements of military technology that might be considered cutting-edge, as well as elements that need to be re-evaluated. It is true that eventually the Byzantine Empire lost and Western Europe won. Technology, however, played but a part in this outcome. Even the fall of Constantinople in 1453 cannot be attributed solely to the Ottomans' tremendous superiority in gunpowder artillery. Nevertheless, their new weapons did add a dramatic flair to the final hours of what used to be the Eastern Roman Empire—once the most technologically advanced state in medieval Europe. By the time the dust had settled on the ruins of the Theodosian Walls, that technological advantage was ancient history.

Note

1 The concept of Military Revolution was first described by historian Michael Roberts, who dated its appearance to the Early Modern era, more specifically the period 1560–1660, and linked it to the evolution of military tactics after the introduction of portable firearms (Roberts, 1956). The idea was later amplified by Geoffrey Parker, who argued for change over a more extended period, from 1450 to 1800, marked by the development of new fortification systems and siege methods in the 15th century (Parker, 1996). A 14th-century 'infantry revolution' has also been posited (DeVries, 1996), thus bringing the notion of 'military revolution' in contact with medieval studies. For a collection of recent scholarship on the subject, see Rogers, 1995.

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